






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MEMOIRS OF
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THE MEMOIRS
OF
FRANCESCO CRISPI

Translated by
MARY PRICHARD-AGNETTI
from the Documents
Collected and Edited by
THOMAS PALAMENGHI-CRISPI

VOLUME I
EXILE
THE THOUSAND

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A BOOK from nearly every one of whose pages Francesco Crispi speaks has no need of a preface by another.

The *Diary of The Thousand*, which will always remain the most reliable historical source for the story of the great epic, is preceded by documents that tell of the part taken by Crispi in the events that transpired during the eleven years of preparation, and the revolution of 1860.

For the most part these documents have never before been made public. The few already published are here cited for the sake of clearness, and wherever necessary such documents have been carefully distinguished by an asterisk. It is not impossible, however, that omissions may have occurred.

T. PALAMENGHI-CRISPI.

ROME, November 1910.

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ON the seventh of May 1849, when all hope of preserving Sicilian liberty was lost, Francesco Crispi forsook the little country that had given him birth, setting out for Marseilles on board a wretched French sailing-vessel. He bore with him indelible memories of that magnificent outburst of patriotism that had produced the revolution of the preceding year, and of the virtues displayed by the entire population, but his heart was heavy, nevertheless, with the pain of hope defeated, at thought of the fruitlessness of many sacrifices, and of the weakness and cowardice that had smoothed the way for the return of Bourbon domination.

The journey occupied a fortnight, and Crispi, who found himself a bad sailor, suffered so much that, writing to his father later on, he said: 'Sometimes I was so tired of life that I would willingly have jumped overboard.'

At Marseilles, his first place of exile, he remained only long enough to convince himself that he would not be able to earn his living there. But whither should he turn? His passport reveals how great was his indecision, for it bears a 'Vu par nous Commissaire Central de Police pour aller à Malte,' dated July 9, 1849; a further, 'Vu au Consulat Général de Sardaigne par Gênes à Malte,' dated July 16, and a third indorsement dated August 21, for 'Genoa by land, and thence to Malta.'

On reaching Nice he evidently decided to proceed to Turin, as his passport shows another visé, dated Nice, September 5: 'Indorsed for Turin by way of Genoa,' and finally the words: 'Porta Nuova, Seen, Turin, November 8, 1849, No. 78, the guard, Chiala.'

Crispi reached the Piedmontese capital almost if not entirely destitute of pecuniary means, his journey from Palermo having exhausted the supply of money his father—who was not wealthy, and who had four other children besides Francesco—had been able to give him. He must find work, and that without delay.

As good fortune would have it, he had not been long in Turin when Lorenzo Valerio took him on to the editorial staff of *La Concordia*. But the journal was already in financial difficulties, and on January 2, 1850, Valerio wrote to him as follows:—

DEAR FRIEND,—It is with pain that I obey inexorable necessity and tell you that *La Concordia* can no longer continue to pay you the poor wage which you drew monthly from her. I write you this because I cannot bring myself to say it to you, and I can only hope you will still be a friend both to the paper and to me.

Some time passed in fruitless efforts to obtain work, and amidst many privations. Bad news also reached Crispi from his own country.

On the evening of January 27,—[he wrote, to illustrate to the Piedmontese the spirit in which the Bourbons were exercising that clemency they had promised Sicily],—a demonstration was organised in the Fieravecchia, in which the best elements in the city were to take part. . . . It was intended to give the lie to the government, which had spread the report that Palermo was satisfied with its condition. . . . The police were furious, but being too cowardly to attempt any arrests in the face of the people, they waited until the crowd had dispersed, and then

seized six individuals who happened to be passing, and flung them into the fortress of Castellamare. These men were Niccolò Garzilli, a lawyer, Domenico Caldara, Giuseppe Garofalo, Vincenzo Mondini, Ajello and Deluca. . . . Signor Denaro drew up the committal, which was passed on to the Council of War accompanied by this observation, 'I herewith forward you the committal of the persons whose names appear on the margin, and who are guilty of rebellion and conspiracy. You are informed that the execution must be a public one, as an example to the people.' The lawyers were allowed but one hour's preparation. Ciminna spoke as well as these sorry times permit, but like a man of honour. Garzilli spoke in his own defence, and although he is barely twenty, his language was that of a hero. The victims were put to the torture, but no admission passed their lips save that they were strangers to one another. . . . The Council rose at ten P.M. on the twenty-eighth, and the execution was to take place before midnight. The condemned men went to Confession, and asked for Holy Communion, but this was denied them because . . . the sacred wafer would not be digested in one hour's time. . . . !

Through Cesare Correnti, organiser of the famous *Cinque Giornate di Milano* (Five Days of Milan), Crispi was brought into contact in February with Daelli, director of the Swiss Printing Office at Capolago (Canton Ticino), and obtained a position as collaborator in the publication, entitled *Italian Affairs*, that had been started by Daelli's office, to which Crispi also handed over his collection of documents concerning the Sicilian revolution. The same house undertook the publication of a pamphlet by Crispi, entitled *Latest Events in Sicily*, which had a fairly good sale.

By his work for the *Italian Archives of Contemporary*

History (Archivio Storico Contemporaneo Italiano) Crispi contributed towards the raising of a monument to the deeds of heroism that had testified to the many virtues of the Italian people during the last three years. This undertaking, assumed by one whose sincerity, genius, and energy were appreciated by all, met with the hearty approval of the Sicilian refugees, and all those who were in a position to furnish information and documents did so willingly.

Among others, Giacinto Carini wrote from Paris (6 rue d'Amsterdam) on August 21, 1850.

Let me tell you first of all, that not only I myself but all your friends here, are much gratified by the commission you have received from the *Italian Archives of Contemporary History*. In everything that can bring honour to you, well-being to our country and advancement to the cause of which, at the present moment, we are both the champions and the victims, we shall, one and all, be ever more than ready to assist you, dear friend. The immediate answer here to the first word of mine on the subject was: 'Let us do all in our power to place Crispi in a position to achieve his task worthily. . . .' Now to all this might be added an extremely interesting portion of the documents that La Farina failed to procure, but which I hope to get hold of for you. The papers of the Foreign Office were saved from Palermo, and reached Malta recently in a sealed case. Keep this to yourself for the present. In the course of a few days Stabile will be receiving a quantity of printed matter, newspapers and the like, which he has succeeded in getting from Palermo, and which have already reached Marseilles. From what he tells me, I judge them to be a collection of the various publications that appeared in the course of the revolution. From amongst these, therefore, from La Farina's collection of

newspapers, from Baron Friddani's correspondence, from documents held by Granatelli and Scalà, to the first of whom I have already written, and especially from the Foreign Office papers (amongst which, for all I know, there may be some from the Presidency of the government), your other friends and I will be able to collect such matter for you as you may need, to complete that part of the Archives which deals with Sicilian affairs.

We here insert one of Daelli's letters as a specimen.

DEAR CRISPI,—Here is a list of the Sicilian newspapers in our archives, which belong some of them to me, some to others.

Catania = *L'Unione Italiana*.

Messina = *L'Aquila Siciliana*.

„ = *Il Primo Settembre*.

Palermo = *Giornale Ufficiale di Sicilia*, 48-49.

„ = *La Costanza*.

„ = *Il Cittadino*.

„ = *Giornale del Circolo Popolare*.

„ = *Il 12 Gennaio*.

„ = *L'Apostolato*.

„ = *La Democrazia*.

„ = *Il Popolo*.

„ = *Lo Statuto*.

„ = *Vincere o Morire*.

„ = *L'Educazione Popolare*.

„ = *La Forbice*.

Syracuse = *Il Bione*.

Many of these are imperfect, some are represented by a few copies only—simply proving their existence. You yourself must decide whether any of these would be of use to you, but you must

guarantee their safe return, for, as I said before, many of them do not belong to me.

The news you give me is good. My most hearty thanks to your brothers for the generous aid they are giving you in your undertaking. I rejoice in your aim to bring our own honour and the honour of our country before the public. I have not yet got the *Tempo* but shall have it to-morrow. I will look and see if it contains what you want, and send it on to you at once. I have La Farina's complete manuscript by me. It is really admirable, and I shall begin upon it presently, pushing the work forward as quickly as possible. Beg, beg, and beg again from every one! Seek to convert all to your views and to this just undertaking, which must prove our common salvation. Thanks to your own, and to La Farina's labours, Sicily will be worthily represented in these publications of ours.

I shall *probably* be able to take copies from the Sicilian archives that were brought from the island, but on this point also, keep silent.

September 3.

The Sicilian conspiracy against the Bourbon government continued without interruption from 1849 to 1860. It was more or less active, timid or bold, noisy or silent in turn, but the sacred fire never died. The uprising that cost Niccolò Garzilli and his companions their lives took place in January 1850, and under date of Sicily, November 5 of the same year, an executive committee distributed a manifesto that had been printed clandestinely, and that ran as follows:—

The Executive Committee knows that to the single spirit that united all ranks of society and to that unity alone was due the liberty won from the three great revolutions between March 1282 and January 1848 of which Sicily is so justly proud.

On the other hand, when the spirit of concord was lost in the struggle for private ends, when the individual *I* had usurped the place of the collective *I*, and when internal weakness had led the people to turn for help to the foreigner, then Liberty died and all manner of tyranny flourished. And now, after bitter experience, the Sicilians have been obliged to look back, to recognise the true cause of their misfortunes, and to study the best means of saving their country. Under oppression, all classes are as one. Bourgeoisie and people, rich and poor—there is but one banner for them all. Our attitude to all foreign nations must be the same; so long as the treaties of 1815 remain the basis of international law in Europe, and there be governments and armies to maintain them, so long will English, Austrians, Frenchmen, and Russians be our enemies; all peoples who dwell beyond the Alps, beyond the sea, and who do not speak our language, have no kinship with our ideals.

Swayed by such convictions the Executive Committee, while encouraging those Sicilians who, at home, are offering brave resistance despite ever-increasing suffering to stand firm in the faith of our fathers for the cause of liberty, exhorts the lukewarm to cast aside all ill-will, all self-interest, for the sake of the supreme interest of Fatherland, and reminds those who are in exile that future triumph must depend largely upon their union.

Away with all political strife! No party has the right to force upon our country any one particular set of social guarantees. This right belongs to the nation alone, and when the nation has conquered it may be trusted to establish just that constitution which will secure to it the fruits of victory for ever.

Our common duty to-day is to concentrate upon the one aim, and summoning all our strength, to join hands with the other peoples of the peninsula, and share with them the fate that may come. So shall we be strong to face the tyrant at home as well as the foreign oppressor, and on the morrow of the revolution, instead of bowing down to diplomacy, it is we who shall dictate to her. The Executive Committee would be unfaithful to its mission if it proffered any other advice than this concerning the proper attitude to be adopted in the present state of the country's affairs. Animated by such principles as these, and with hearts overflowing with hatred of the foreigner, each day sees fresh martyrs arise to face the tortures of Satriano and of the 30,000 butchers who do his bidding. Shall the exiles dare to depart from this our common faith, and neglect to hold themselves united and ready for the day that may be close at hand of Italian redemption?

The Fatherland will forget the past of those of her penitent sons who, instead of striving to maintain old or new tyrannies, shall devote their strength to furthering the rights of the people. But woe to those indifferent ones who, at the hour of supreme justice, shall be found with unclean hands and unable to render an account of their actions. They shall be made to pay to the uttermost farthing for their misdeeds and omissions!

On December 22 the Sicilian refugees met in Turin, under the presidency of Crispi, to appoint a Central Committee of five members, with headquarters in Paris, 'for the purpose of putting into execution such measures as shall most effectually promote the liberation of our country.' The members elected were Tommaso Landi, Giuseppe La Masa, Marchese Milo Gugino, Saverio Friscia, and Michele Amari, the historian.

During the year 1851 Crispi continued to labour arduously, his heart yearning ever towards the land of his birth. He frequently contributed to the journal *Il Progresso*, founded by Correnti, and continued his work for the Historical Archives, printing at Capolago. Taking an active part in the controversy in which the European press engaged when Gladstone made his startling revelations concerning the infamies of the Neapolitan government, Crispi produced a host of irrefutable documents, which enabled Victor Hugo to show in the columns of the *Événement*, by means of a full list of the Bourbon's victims between the years 1844 and 1850, the true nature of that 'gentleness' of King Bomba's rule which had been extolled by *L'Univers*, *L'Assemblée Nationale*, *La Patrie*, the organs of the *Elysée*.

The Sicilian Committees were in correspondence not only with the Emigration Committee at Malta, of which Nicola Fabrizi was director, but also with Rosalino Pilo in Genoa, and, through him, with Mazzini and Crispi, who was living in Turin. Two bulletins issued by the Messina Committee may be quoted to illustrate the spirit that prevailed in these hot-beds of revolution during the latter months of the year 1851, while events in France were holding all European liberals in suspense.

BULLETIN No. I.

The reign of tyranny, realising that oppression must one day reach its limit, and foreseeing the dawn of redemption, is preparing to meet it, with formidable ostentation, and is here applying more thoroughly than elsewhere the means it thinks most efficacious to render a revolution impossible. Eight hundred of its Croats are expected to arrive in the course of a few days, part of whom will be stationed between the light-house and the city, and part along the line from here to San Placidio, a place half-way between Messina and Scaletta. Thus two wings will be added to the body formed by the troops within the city. In order to intimidate the cowardly

and spread a general sense of alarm, such arrangements have been made for lodging these troops as might suffice for an army of at least 30,000 men.

They have begun restoring, and will presently arm, those small forts which the English built along the southern and western coasts during their occupation of Sicily, and it would appear that they fear invasion rather than revolution.

These preparations had already greatly excited public opinion, which could no longer be held in check after the publication of two proclamations from Malta. With the intention of inspiring terror and quelling popular enthusiasm, the blood-hounds of the police are proclaiming that arrests are imminent. This, however, we know to be idle talk, but it is indeed true that many of the boldest partisans of our cause have been placed under strict surveillance. The dread of what may come from Malta is enormous . . . every ship that arrives here from that island is subjected to closest police inspection, and every letter the post brings is opened. The enclosed circular, issued by our dastardly superintendent himself, will give an idea of the suspicions and fears entertained here.

Two English steamers arrived here recently, one from Malta the other from Naples, with the news that it will not be long before Sicily has her own king, and that an English fleet is on its way to Naples, two ships having already entered the harbour. The constitutionalists are rejoicing, but men of sense cry out against them. We ourselves have added to the general confusion by spreading false information, and the populace repeats all these conflicting reports.

BULLETIN No. II.

The French Consul in this city asserts that a certain Ledru Rollin has been placed at the head of affairs in France since the fall of the Baroche ministry. None of our investigations have revealed the presence in any newspaper of this piece of news, of which you will appreciate the importance, but the Consul declares that it was published in the official journal of the Republic, and copied in the *Times*.

Six hundred strong belonging to the 'Philistine of Naples' have arrived at Milazzo. The local police who, in consequence of the true or false reports circulating at the present moment, had somewhat relaxed their severity, have in consequence adopted vigorous measures once more. In order to reassure popular feeling we have sent to Milazzo a few manifestos issued by the Sicilian Committee at Malta.

The commissary of the troops expected here has already arrived, and is to deliver the provisions, for which he is under contract, by the beginning of next month. Many objects for use in hospitals have also been brought hither, and it is amusing to watch all these preparations and listen to the ridicule which the people heap upon them. Every one is saying: 'Let them prepare. They will shut themselves up in the Citadel again fast enough, when we take up our rifles.'

Our people's contempt for everything that savours of the Bourbon, their steadfastness in hating this infamous government, and the confidence that all cherish in a new revolution, are our greatest consolation.

The Princess of di San Giuseppe, who came here on her way to Malta, commissioned some one to receive her correspondence and forward it to her, and asked to be kept always informed of political happenings. Is it to one of your friends that she has given this charge? Please keep me posted.

M. *October 18, 1851.*

CIRCULAR.

MESSINA, *September 26, 1851.*

SIR,—It is a well-known fact that another Sicilian Committee has been founded, and is issuing proclamations and manifestos from Malta in the name of an 'Italian Republic,' whether unitary or federal has not yet transpired.

Six or seven vagabond out-laws, meeting in demagogical orgy, elect themselves a Committee, spout in the name of an entire country, believing themselves to represent public opinion, and to be empowered to decide the fate of others.

The proclamations directed by this new Sicilian Committee to their brothers in Sicily are already in the hands of His Majesty's government. They are marked by the usual phraseology: liberty, inprescriptible rights, the brotherhood of peoples, the dawn of redemption, the republic is the form of government best suited to all nations, and further rubbish of the same sort, that has become the invariable text of all such proclamations, and of which the public is heartily sick.

The whole body of Maltese refugees is at work secretly introducing this fresh offspring of enraged demagogism into this island, in the hope of arousing the spirit of some, of intimidating others, and of

imposing upon all by proclaiming it, on its own authority, the mouthpiece of the entire country.

The great mass of the population and all men of sense will treat these absurd writings with the contempt they deserve; but the innovators, the ambitious and those desirous of gain, who see in revolution a means of enriching themselves and rising to power, will welcome them eagerly, use them to disturb the quiet of this peaceful population, and spread anxiety and unrest. In drawing your attention to this my object is to exhort you most earnestly to redouble your vigilance, to take all needful precautions, and to pay special attention to the sources from whence these writings come, in order to prevent the clandestine introduction of all such criminal publications.

—The Superintendent, M. C.

The year 1852 was one of many hardships for Crispi. What he earned by his writings was insufficient for his support. The sums paid by newspapers were ridiculously small. Suffice it to say that Correnti, as editor of *Il Progresso*, received only ninety liras a month, while Crispi's salary was but sixty. It was no easy matter for an exile, who had little influence in the city, to find work in such a place as Turin, which, at that time, was crowded with refugees from all parts of Italy. Certainly he did not lack the will to work, for he was ready to undertake any work however hard, and had accepted exile with a full knowledge of all the hardships it implied. Had his determination been less steadfast he might have followed the example of many others, and by an act of submission made himself free to return to Sicily and his father's house. But times were hard. Federico De Lorenzo's *Italian Publishing Library* proposed the following contract to Crispi on September 30, 1852:—

You will undertake to furnish the manuscript for a work on Despotism in Italy since 1847, which we will publish as a political 'gift-book' for the

year 1853; you will furthermore correct all proofs most carefully, and without sparing either time or labour. For my part, I will undertake to print 1500 copies of the work, allowing you one sixth of the published price on each copy sold.

On October 6 another publisher, M. Guigoni, requested him to supply a 'History of Industry, Commerce, and Navigation in Italy, from earliest times down to the year 1852,' offering him in remuneration fifty liras for every sixteen printed pages in large 8° with double columns . . .!

It will be readily understood how Crispi, worn out by privations and the fruitless search for reasonably lucrative employment, was brought, at last, to apply for the post of Secretary to the Commune of Verolengo, in the province of Turin. On December 8, 1852, Carlo Barberis, chemist and vice-mayor of the town of Verolengo, acknowledged Crispi's application and the documents that had accompanied it. On December 19 this same Barberis returned the papers and certificates, 'the Communal Council of this town having yesterday proceeded to nominate a secretary for this community. . . . We beg to inform you that the choice did not fall upon you.'

The rejected application was, in itself, a noble composition, and is worthy of a place here.

MOST HONOURED MAYOR,—Circumstances of an imperative nature, which it is unnecessary to specify here, prevent my coming to your town to present myself in person before you and the other honourable members of the Communal Council of Verolengo. Nevertheless you and that respected Assembly will find in the memorandum and documents I enclose what is sufficient to acquaint you with my qualifications. I think it improbable that any of my competitors will be able to offer better qualifications than those I possess. It is strange, and the reason for the strangeness must be sought in the exceptional position into which we were thrown by

the events of the year 1848, that a man who has filled high offices and been a barrister at the Court of Appeal of the most populous city of Italy, should present himself as candidate for a communal secretaryship. This circumstance in itself is surely an argument in my favour. As my application shows, I would gladly occupy the leisure which political events have forced upon me, and earn an honest livelihood, by devoting my knowledge and energy to the welfare of the commune you so worthily represent.

I refrain from presenting letters of recommendation. This would be as much an offence to my own self-respect as to the distinguished citizens who may see fit to honour me with their vote. My qualifications, unaided by the authority of high names, will be taken at their just value, and the good sense of the Communal Council has no need of an incentive to the performance of its duty.

I beg that this be read before the assembled Council, and I am, your obedient servant,

F. CRISPI-GENOVA, *Barrister*.

TURIN, 16 Dec., 1852.

On the sixth of February 1853 Mazzini's party made an attempt to rouse the city of Milan against the Austrians. The uprising, which was but insufficiently prepared and badly directed, was unsuccessful, and served only to provoke terrible retaliation, of which even the partisans of Austrian domination disapproved, pronouncing it excessive in its severity. No less than sixteen patriots perished on the scaffold. On February 10 the *Gazzetta di Milano*, the government organ, published the following notification from Field-Marshal Radetzky, dated Verona, February 9:—

Towards evening on the sixth day of the present month a band of insurgents armed with daggers,

made a treacherous attack upon certain officers and soldiers in the streets of Milan, killing ten and wounding fifty-four, more or less severely.

Inspired with the deepest horror for this most dastardly of all crimes, hired assassination, I find myself constrained to adopt severe measures against the city of Milan, and have therefore issued the following orders, based upon the comminatory notification contained in my proclamation of July 19, 1851.

I. The city of Milan is placed under strictest martial law which, with all it may entail, shall be maintained with the utmost severity.

II. All suspicious strangers (not Milanese) shall be expelled from the city.

III. The city of Milan shall maintain all the wounded as long as they live, and provide for the families of those who were killed.

IV. Until such a time as all promoters and instigators of this act of sedition shall have been given up and punished, the city of Milan will be held responsible for extra pay to the entire garrison, as a compensation for the extra fatigue to which it has been subjected in consequence of these events.

All such, however, as are known to be loyal supporters of the government, no matter to what class of the population they may belong, shall be exempted from this taxation.

V. I moreover reserve the right to inflict further well-deserved punishment or taxation upon the city of Milan, according to the result of investigations now in progress.

For the peace of mind of all, I herewith declare that public tranquillity has not been disturbed in any other part of the kingdom.

On hearing of the events in Milan the Piedmontese government—of which the Cavour-San Martino Ministry was then the head—immediately ordered the arrest and expulsion of such refugees as were marked upon the police registers as entertaining republican views, and this without provocation on the part of the Austrian government, or any just motive for so doing. It was not a question of having participated in the Milanese uprising; not one of those arrested was convicted of this, or even found in possession of correspondence that might pass for proof of any degree of complicity whatsoever. The sudden and manifestly illegal nature of this proceeding shocked all those who had believed in the liberalism of Cavour, and Mauro Macchi made the following declaration in print:—

Driven out of Piedmont in consequence of the Milanese uprising, after a residence in that country of five years' duration, . . . I wish to declare publicly what the government already knows well enough, that no one was a greater stranger than I to the attempt made on February 6, and that, moreover, no one deplores its bloody consequences more deeply than I do myself.

The Turin journal, *Gazetta del Popolo*, printed the following comment upon this declaration on March 10:—

Mauro Macchi is now expelled from the country as was Signor Maestri. Several others, whose names we omit, were treated in the same way, and yesterday a certain Crespi or Crispi, or whatever his name may be, was arrested and searched. What do you suppose his occupation was found to be? He was composing a legal treatise on a future code of procedure! Does that seem a work indicative of violent conspiracy? . . . But the *Gazzetta Ufficiale* would have us believe that severe measures are adopted only against those who have *declared themselves enemies of this government, and who*

concert and execute attempts against Austria. Why then, we ask, does not this all-wise government of ours, that is forever going to school with other powers, take a lesson from England? What was it that was proclaimed in the House of Lords? That the rights of the refugee are sacred. . . . Leave summary measures to Austria. Until you, the Government, shall have laid before us, through your magistrates, the proofs of these unhappy victims' guilt, we are justified in accounting them innocent. We are justified in being more ready to believe the moderate and simple declaration of one who is now setting forth as an exile, than what you by your arbitrary and insidious proceedings would have us believe. Insidious, yes insidious! . . . The proofs, the legal proofs, or you are no better than slanderers. . . . Certainly no one can accuse us of having behaved otherwise than with the greatest moderation during these recent events, but, after all, our banner is the Italian banner, it is the standard of independence, and if it pleases you to play into Austria's hands, you will do so without our support.

The *Eco delle Provincie* (Turin) and other journals wrote in the same strain. The Genoese *Corriere Mercantile* justly remarked that:—

. . . . The refugee who should take advantage of the safety guaranteed by our institutions, to wage daily war upon those institutions, would be acting both stupidly and dishonestly. On the other hand, the refugee who, while abstaining from harmful action, claims the freedom of his own political opinions, and who does not consider he has forfeited the right to those opinions by his acceptance of the protection afforded him, may rely upon the support

of the most elementary rules of equity and humanity.

On March 12 the *Gazzetta del Popolo* published an article entitled 'Switzerland, Austria and Piedmont,' which emphasised Switzerland's dignified attitude towards Austrian hostility, when she not only refused to expel the refugees but also defended them when unjustly accused, and instituted a legal procedure against the guilty. Then turning to what was taking place in Piedmont, it urged that war should not be entered upon, hastily.

But there is a difference between rushing into war and displaying an inordinate fear of war, a fear which probably does not really exist.

Just as a difference exists between dignity and baseness, between the soldier and the jailer.

The Piedmontese Ministry, after witnessing the confiscation by Austria of the goods of many of its own subjects, first issued a diplomatic message that is still a mystery, and then turned its attention to banishing the refugees, with or without reason, scattering them hither and thither, chasing them from province to province, even sending some to America; making arrests by day and by night, in the streets, in private houses, beneath the arcades; and then, at last—and this is indeed horrible—having handcuffed the 'politicals,' both the innocent and the guilty, flung them pell-mell into the same prison with thieves and pick-pockets.

For its own sake as well as for the general good, let the Ministry have a care lest it bring upon itself a battle of Novara!

The chief of the Turin police, De Ferrari, adopted measures on February 1, that placed the refugees in the same class as those individuals who were under police surveillance. They must apply for and obtain a permit to reside in Piedmont,

which permit might be revoked 'in any case of abuse,' and which they were bound to produce at the mere request of any officer or agent of the police or of the royal *carabinieri*. No refugee might absent himself from the commune in which his residence had been fixed without a written permit from the police authorities, etc., etc.

The refugee Fortunati, a native of Parma, and director of *La Gazzetta Popolare* of Cagliari, had been banished from the kingdom by virtue of a decree dated February 18, issued by the General-Superintendent Magenta, and upon the following grounds:—

In accordance with the notification issued from the Ministry of the Interior on the fourteenth of last month, and satisfied that during the recent uprising many refugees abused our hospitality, the government has resolved to expel from the country all such as shall be proved to have been implicated in the said uprising. . . . The name of the refugee Napoleone Fortunati figures upon the list of such persons. It is therefore decreed, etc., etc. . . .

In Turin the refugees to be expelled were arrested without ceremony.

We quote from one of Crispi's diaries:—

I was arrested on March 7, at 4 P.M. They asked for my keys. I gave up the only one I possessed. I desired to be present at the searching of my house, but this was refused me. I was examined at 5.30, or thereabouts. They questioned me concerning my parents and my birth-place, asked whence and when I came to Turin, and why I had come. They inquired which frontier I wished to cross, and I told them I would go to France or Malta, or if possible, to England. I asked for a few days' time, that I might write home for money. Once more I requested to be allowed

to be present at the perquisition, but was told I must apply to the Chief of Police.

I wrote to the Chief of Police as follows:—

HONOURED SIR,—I was arrested yesterday at about four P.M. My house was searched, but I was denied the simple right to be present. I am still in ignorance of the reason for so much severity. I fail utterly to understand it, for, in the three years and six months of my residence in Piedmont, I have never once found myself at variance with the laws of the land.

If my arrest be but a preliminary to my expulsion from the Kingdom of Sardinia, I take the liberty to point out that it is entirely unnecessary. I sought refuge on Italian soil, and in a state that is ruled by constitutional government, because I believed I should be allowed to dwell there in peace. But as His Sardinian Majesty's government has seen fit to adopt measures that must of necessity rob me of this fond illusion, I shall certainly not offer any resistance to any orders I may receive in consequence. I ask only to be allowed sufficient time to put my affairs in order, to send to my father for money for the journey, and then I will take my departure. I have a home in Turin, some furniture, books, and other possessions. There is some money owing me, I have a few debts, and I cannot leave suddenly and without settling my affairs carefully and honestly. I have too much self-respect to ask for further favours.—Respectfully yours,

Avvocato FRANCESCO CRISPI-GENOVA,
Deputy to the Sicilian Parliament.

TURIN, *March 3*, 1853.

Failing to receive an answer I wrote the next day as follows :—

In my letter of yesterday I put my request so plainly that it seems to me there should be little difficulty in arriving at a decision.

I repeat that if the government intends to banish me I shall certainly not ask that this purpose be altered, nor will I in any way seek to hinder the execution of official orders. I beg you to reflect that I have now been two days in prison, and that I am unaware to what law or to what political interest I owe this harsh treatment.

March 9.—Cordova, Tanari, Veneti, and Scelsi have been to see me. We are refused the newspapers. In the night, from March ninth to tenth, a certain Achille Valli of Milan, a pianist, was arrested at the *Café Lombardo*, locked up in the dark room on the right of the large saloon, and kept there all night. At ten o'clock the next morning he was examined, then locked up in the dark again until nearly eleven P.M., when he was set at liberty at the entreaty of the other prisoners. Valli, with nine others, disarmed an Austrian patrol four or five months ago. Arrested and conducted to the fortress, he succeeded in escaping from the guards and reaching the Piedmontese frontier.

On the evening of the ninth, at my earnest request, we were given *L'Opinione*, *Il Parlamento*, *Il Fischietto*, and the *Gazetta del Popolo*.

March 10.—Visit from Castelli. Questions as to treatment we receive. My answers. My arrest, the search at my house. Comparisons between Naples and Piedmont. 1847. My opinions and intentions. Will make no appeal to be allowed

to remain. Inspection of our rooms. Castelli's indignation.

We are summoned and consulted about frontiers and date of departure. Our answers. Report to the Ministry.

March 11.—The ministerial decree is read to me. I am to leave without delay, and my papers will be consigned to whomsoever I may appoint to receive them. Cordova and Valerio called.

March 12.—Loe, Ferdinandi, Valli, and Bednowsky ordered to leave. Major Giorgio Utassy sends his wife to the Minister, Count Appony, Hungarian magnate, to beg that he should be claimed and sent back to Austria. The Austrian Minister answers that his conscience forbids him to claim Utassy and send him home, where he would most certainly be hanged.

March 13.—Passports. Monsieur and Madame Bazin come to see us, and procure passports for us from American Minister. We write assuring them that their names will ever remain engraved on our memories. Any one who wishes allowed to visit the prisoners.

Giuseppe Grioli of Mantua, after fifteen days of imprisonment at Ivrea, arrives at the police-station to be deported with the rest.

At nine P.M. Robecchi and Correnti come to see us. Generosity of the deputies.

March 14.—*Avvocato* Moris (police officer). Refuse to remain in Turin until steamer leaves for Malta. Demand fair treatment at Genoa.

Another call from Correnti and Robecchi.

We leave Turin at four o'clock. Valerio, Robecchi, and Correnti come at three-thirty, just as we are leaving the police-station. Bonato, Fortunati.

Pelatis, Grioli, Trenti, Gattai, and Crispi set out with four *carabinieri* in plain clothes. Moris and Bellone meet us at the station.

We reach Busalla at nine.

March 15.—At one in the morning we enter the prisons of San Lorenzo in Genoa, and are placed in three cells. The jailer gives the *carabinieri* a receipt for seven political prisoners, after having entered our names in his register. We get to bed at two o'clock.

The Brigadier of the guards comes on his round of inspection at six, and takes our names. The jailer who registers them affects liberalism. The Brigadier informs us that, in this prison, the government provides bread alone. I refuse it.

We get up. We ask that our friends be permitted to visit us without special permit.

The prison of Sant' Andrea was once a convent of nuns. Our cells are in the old church, now converted into a penitentiary. There are two debtors in the same department with us. The prison holds five hundred prisoners in all, who are convicted of various crimes. The hall is called *Malapaga*.

At half-past twelve the Inspector Ruffa arrives. List of those who wish to see us. They do not intend to imitate Naples. Discussion.

Rosalino calls.

March 16.—Doors are opened at three-thirty. Errante, Bertolami, Luigi Orlando, Calvino, Cottone, Mistretta, Enrico Fardella, and Pisani.

Sant' Onofrio, and Count Manzone.

March 17.—Giovanni Interdonato, Rosalino, Pisani, Sant' Onofrio and his son, Cottone, Maggio, Mustica, Salvatore Orlando.

March 18.—At half-past five P.M. the secretary of the director of the prison arrives. Dinner.

Visitors. Not more than five persons may visit the same prisoner. Entrance to dormitory forbidden. Visitors received in examination-hall.

March 19.—We go to Mass. Only one visitor to be admitted. Count Amari and Paolo Orlando.

March 20.—No one. We leave the prison at five P.M., walking two by two, each couple accompanied by a *carabiniere*. We are taken to the harbour-master's office. He keeps us waiting a good half-hour, and then conducts us on board the *Oronte* and hands us over to the commander.

March 21.—At four A.M. we are off Livorno, and at five-thirty we enter the harbour. Two sanitary officials come to guard us. First two, and then four gendarmes are set to watch us that we do not communicate with outsiders.

March 22.—Arrive Civitavecchia at seven A.M. Leave again at three P.M.

March 23.—Reach Naples at seven P.M. Roll-call of sailors. Commissioner of Police remains on board until we leave. Roll-call of passengers. Leave at a quarter-past eleven P.M.

March 24.—After a most trying journey we reach Messina at half-past five in the afternoon.

March 25.—New covered batteries surround the citadel. Landwards this formidable bulwark will be divided by a canal, and strengthened by a covered battery at the extremity towards Santa Chiara.

We leave at ten minutes to eleven. Coast along the island. With a beating heart I once more look upon the fair cities of my native land, which were the scenes of the last unfortunate battles of the revolution, and have now sunk again into cruel bondage.

March 26.—Arrive at Malta at four A.M.

April 1.—Call upon Ruggero Settimo.

April 3.—Settimo returns my call.

Here the diary ends.

On the tenth Crispi had written to Rosalino Pilo at Genoa, and received the following answer:—

MY DEAR CRISPI,—I have this day (tenth) received your letter dated March 8. The news of your arrest has greatly distressed me. I feel sure, however, that this letter will find you free, for I presume the measures adopted against you will have been suspended as soon as the Ministry was satisfied that you have been leading the life of a hermit for a long time past. The government was surely misled by some personal enemy of yours. Meanwhile, I beg you to let me have news of you, and if you think Marchese Boyl could be of service to you, send me the draft of a letter, which I will rewrite myself and send to him at once, that he may help you, if possible. This morning I sent off the letter for Girgenti addressed to your father. I begged my cousin to forward it at once and get the answer, which he is to send to me, and which I will forward to you with all possible speed. Our friends Errante, Bertolami, Torrearsa, the Orlandi brothers, Cottone, and Villafiorita ask me to express their sorrow at what has happened, and their hope that the inconvenience to which you have been put may soon be removed. Good-bye. I close in the hope of receiving good news of you, and that soon. Good-bye again. Love me, make use of me, and believe me to be ever—Your friend and brother,

ROSALINO.

Before leaving Turin Crispi also wrote a protest to ‘the Chamber and People of Piedmont,’ which his companions in

misfortune signed with him. We copy it from notes in his own hand :—

The undersigned who were arrested at their own homes, whose possessions and papers were, without their knowledge and in their absence, subjected to search, detained in the damp and unwholesome cellars of Palazzo Madama, some for five days, others for six, seven, and even thirteen, subjected to the most cruel and barbarous treatment, and all this despite the fact that no indictment had been brought against them, have now been arbitrarily commanded to quit the Sardinian States, and, escorted by agents of the police, are to be conducted to some seaport still unknown to them, forcibly expelled from this Italy they have so loved to distant countries, perhaps even beyond the Atlantic.

They, therefore, herewith protest against this iniquitous act of *lèse-humanity*, which violates the most sacred laws of nature, which inflicts punishment upon innocent men, without a trial and without defence. They appeal to the Chamber, to the People, to all in whose veins flows Italian blood, to all whose hearts are Italian, that justice be done against those in power under a dynasty which has proclaimed itself as ‘national,’ and which political impostors have declared would redeem our country from foreign domination.

On their arrival in Genoa, Rosalino Pilo took Crispi’s position to heart more than any one else, as will be seen from the following note, scrawled in pencil :—

DEAR CICCIO (Francesco),—I went to see the American Consul at nine o’clock. He has viséd your passport and Gattai’s by way of France and London. Then I went to the French Consul

to get an indorsement for Marseilles, for immediate transit, but the under-secretary, who is an acquaintance of mine, told me that this will be difficult to get, as the minister in Turin should be communicated with, and it would be three days before the answer could arrive. At eleven, I am to return to see the French delegate who represents the Consul at the present moment. If I get the indorsement I will let you know at once, and in that case you can leave on Monday or Tuesday by the *Marie Antoinette*. If, however, the delegate refuses to endorse the passports, it will be better for you to start for Malta this very day. Let me know what you decide to do under the circumstances.

If they do not visé Gattai's passport for France, I will take it to Emanuele, so that Ferrari may secure his passage. Good-bye. ROSALINO.

The French Consul's endorsement could not be obtained, and as the ship *Oronte* was leaving for Malta, Pilo took passage on her for his friend. When they got on board, Crispi gave him the protest entitled 'To the People of Liguria, Piedmont, and Sardinia, and all the Provinces, subject to the House of Savoy,' which we copy from the notes in Crispi's own hand:—

The Ministers of His Majesty of Sardinia are driving us out of your country. This iniquitous measure was preceded by an arbitrary arrest which held us for a fortnight in the prisons of Turin and Genoa, and also by domiciliary visits and perquisitions at which we were not allowed to be present.

It is well that the policy inaugurated on the battlefield of Novara, and ratified by the proclamation of Moncalieri, should take its course and thus hasten the triumph of democracy. Italy will learn from these measures adopted against innocent men, that the Albertine constitution of March 4,

guarantees neither the inviolability of domicile nor even individual liberty. She will learn that, in our case, not even such laws as are recognised under despotism were respected, laws which decreed that every individual placed under arrest be brought before his judge within twenty-four hours, and that all perquisitions take place in the presence of the accused.

The consciousness of never having violated any of the laws of the Sardinian States enabled us to bear all violence with resignation.

Confident that the benefit Italy will derive from it will be great, we welcome this enforced exile in exile, as a fresh sacrifice for our country, to whose service we long ago dedicated our lives.

On board the steam-packet *Oronte*,
20 March 1853.

Avv. Francesco Crispi-Genova, Deputy to the Sicilian Parliament.

Napoleone Fortunati of Parma, formerly editor of the *Gazzetta Popolare* of Cagliari.

Avv. Alfonso Trenti of Modena, formerly Captain of the Modenese Volunteer Corps.

Nobile Tomasso Pelatis of Treviso, formerly Officer in Venetian service.

Bartolomeo Bonato of Vicenza, formerly Officer in the service of the Roman Republic.

Giuseppe Grioli of Mantua, formerly Officer in the service of the Roman Republic.

Simeone Gattai of Pisa, formerly Officer in the service of the Venetian Republic.

Here is a relevant thought of Crispi's found among his papers of this period:—

The exile is no deserter who flies from the camp

for fear of death, but rather a soldier who retires behind the entrenchments only to rally his strength on safer ground, in order either to renew the fight or prepare for a fresh struggle with the enemy.

Crispi's expulsion from the Kingdom of Sardinia was communicated to the Sicilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the following report, the original of which still exists in the State Archives at Palermo :—

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—The man Crispi-Genova, who is the subject of Your Excellency's confidential letter of the twenty-sixth of the present month, was one of the most enthusiastic and ardent revolutionaries during the unfortunate period of the Sicilian uprisings. In May 1849, after the people of Palermo had yielded to wise counsels of submission and peace, this individual strained every nerve to rouse them to action once more, inciting them to horrible deeds of rapine and bloodshed, by means, also, of seditious placards which he affixed to the walls of the city with his own hands. The right party conquered however, and this Crispi fled the country.

It is, therefore, no matter for surprise that the Sardinian government should have expelled a man of this stamp, nor that he should have decided to betake himself to Malta, whence, like a wild beast in the depths of his lair, he may sniff the air of Sicily in search of prey. I will have him watched in order to frustrate the evil designs that are ripening in his brain.

The meetings of demagogues are always characterised by fear, and there prevails in the dealings of that abominable sect, the Mazzinians, and in others as well, a cowardly tendency to push on to the slaughter certain deluded and mistaken victims,

they, the demagogues, keeping in the background while events are shaping themselves, that they may eventually profit by disaster, and claim their share in the victory.

What Your Excellency was pleased to communicate to me concerning the refugees' conclusions that Sicily is not the proper place for sudden action, is far from improbable, for they cannot fail to remember the tragic end of Lopez and of those other adventurers who attempted a mad enterprise on the Island of Cuba in 1851.

Acting in accordance with Your Excellency's conclusions I have ordered the Agent at Malta to keep a careful watch upon the actions of those outlaws who, being banished from Piedmont, are now swarming to that island.

Meanwhile I beg Your Excellency to receive the assurance of my deepest respect, and I have the honour to sign myself, Your Excellency's most devoted servant,

DUCA DI TAORMINA.

Here are two other documents that are also still preserved in the State Archives at Palermo, and that throw a most unfavourable light upon the liberty that was enjoyed in Piedmont during Cavour's first ministry :—

His Majesty the King's Ministry and Secretariate of State for Sicilian Affairs.—Department of Police, No. 550-551 (Private).

Concerning Crispi-Genova and other subjects of the Kingdom, who contribute articles to the *Pantheon of Martyrs to Italian Liberty*, in Piedmont.

NAPLES, 15 April 1853.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—The following official com-

munication, bearing date of yesterday, has reached me from the Minister of Foreign Affairs :—

‘The Piedmontese government, after having long tolerated the society founded for the publication of a work entitled *Pantheon of Martyrs to Italian Liberty*, has at last determined to dissolve it, attacking it on financial grounds by accusations of inexactitude in its business transactions and of fraudulent dealings. A portion of the profits derived from this enterprise was set apart for the refugees residing in Turin, another portion for establishing a Ligurian-Nationalist Office, working for the same ends. Among the principal contributors of biographical articles the following were prominent: Mariano D’Ayala, Scura, La Cecilia, Enrico Poerio, Sassi, del Re, and Crispi-Genova; and among the subaltern employees were: Federico Castaldi, Gabriele D’Amato, Uliva and Gioacchino de Filippis.

‘The government has made use of its right to expel from Sardinian territory all such members as were unable to prove themselves in possession of the necessary means of support.

‘I have the honour to inform you of this fact, and will forward the names of those who have suffered expulsion as soon as they are communicated to me by the Royal Agent in Turin.

‘Meanwhile, I beg Your Excellency to inform me whether means are now to be provided for those to whom passports or indorsements “for the Kingdom” have not been denied.

‘I consider it my duty to communicate the above-named events to Your Excellency, that you may,

if necessary, make use of this knowledge, and be pleased to despatch me an answer.'

The Minister CASSISI.

To the Lieutenant-General of the Royal Domains beyond the Lighthouse,—Department of Police, Palermo.

Ministry and Royal Secretariate of State for Foreign Affairs, Second Division, No. 3474 (Private).

NAPLES, 19 May, 1853.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—In continuation of my folio, No. 2556, of the fourteenth of last month, I hasten to forward you a copy of a report from His Majesty's Agent in Turin concerning the compilers of biographical articles for the *Pantheon*. Kindly take note of its contents, and make such use of the information as you may judge advisable.

The bearer of the Portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

CARAFÀ.

To His Excellency the Minister, Secretary for Sicilian Affairs of State, Naples.

(Enclosed)

Copy No. 366—Private.

TURIN, 3 May, 1853.

SIGNOR CAVALIERE,—In my report, No. 331 of April 4, I sent you the names of those of His Majesty's subjects who were compilers of biographical articles for the *Pantheon*, namely: Ayala, Scura, Laccècia, Poerio, Scalzi, Del Re, Crispi and Giovini. These men, however, had little or nothing to do with the administration and general workings

of the Society, and were paid separately for each published article.

The management of the Society, the enrolling of members, and the distribution of the literature produced—the business branch, in fact—belonged to Signor Gabriele D'Amato, who assumed the title of Director, to Diego Sorìa who is already known to you, and also to Carlo Depretis, Vincenzo Cliva, the brothers Silverio and Calisto Cappelli, Gioacchino Defilippis, Federico Castaldi, and Giuseppe Dassi.

This Diego Sorìa, the subject of a previous correspondence between us, had already been expelled. The other eight have been expelled recently, and at different times, according to the steps taken by each to obtain the cancelling of the sentence, or a delay, in order to settle their private affairs. Vincenzo Oliva was the last to leave.

The Publishing Society is completely dissolved. Its tools, type, and all else belonging to it, are now on sale to pay its debts.

The government continues to declare that politics had nothing to do with these measures, and that in this case, expulsion was simply the penalty of swindling. No one, however, credits this assertion.

Among those banished were the two Cappelli brothers who held passports issued by His Majesty's Consul at Malta, while Depretis and Defilippis had passports issued by the Royal Consulate at Venice.

They requested that these should be indorsed for London, crossing France, and to this I consented, as a refusal would have given rise to long and troublesome discussion with the local police authorities, and might even have paralysed our project of expulsion which had already found many opponents.

But should His Majesty's government deem it inadvisable to allow the above-named individuals to continue to travel with royal passports, it will be necessary only to notify the Embassies at Paris and London, where indorsements are not granted on sight, and where the consular documents can be cancelled.

The other men did not possess any documents from royal agents. I therefore refused to furnish them with any, alleging that I had no proofs of their nationality. They have therefore left for the same destination, London, crossing France with Sardinian passports.

The present folio completes the details with which it was my duty to provide you concerning this affair, and at the same time will serve as an answer, in part at least, to your private despatch of April 23, second division, No. 131.

Receive the assurance, etc., etc.

CANOFARI.

Crispi had in fact collaborated in the patriotic publication, to which he had contributed a 'Life of Francesco Paolo De Blasi,' and on February 3, only a few days before his expulsion from the states of His Majesty Victor Emmanuel, he had received a letter from the manager requesting him to prepare a biography of Prince Cottone, 'which,' the letter declared, 'was eagerly desired by all.'

CHAPTER II

At Malta—Difficulty of finding employment—Help from his father—The absence of a passport prevents Crispi from emigrating to Constantinople—The liberation of Ignazio Ribotti and letters from Lorenzo Valerio—Conspiracies—Correspondence between Crispi and Rosalino Pilo, Louis Kossuth and Crispi, concerning a Sicilian uprising—Crispi to the Sicilian Committees: instructions and interrogations—Crispi founds the journal *La Staffetta*—Expulsion from Malta—Private report of the Neapolitan Consul—From Malta to London on board the English battleship *Sampson*—Diary of the journey.

AT Malta the difficulty of finding employment was even greater than it had been in Turin. Crispi faced it, however, with dauntless courage, receiving pecuniary aid from his father at first. He found many Sicilian refugees in the little island, and formed a friendship that was destined to last through life with the exile, Nicola Fabrizi of Modena, who, with his three brothers, had taken refuge in Malta as early as 1837, and become the soul of Italian conspiracy in the Ionian Isles. Crispi was soon convinced that he would never be able to support himself here, and thus expressed himself, in writing to his father on May 21.

You must know that the conditions surrounding the life of an exile in any part of Europe save England are precarious. To outlaws no state offers a safe refuge; we are exposed to the caprice of governments who may expel us from their territory whenever they choose. Moreover for me, as for all others in the same position, life itself is threatened by even greater dangers. I am unable to follow my calling, and I lack the capital to go

into business. I must live by my pen, but—the honest writer is placed in a cruel position, for, if he deny his principles—a thing which I could never do—he exposes himself to abuse and shame, while if he maintain them, and continue to write with energy, which is the duty of every man who is steadfast and well grounded in his faith, he exposes himself to the wrath and vengeance of the mighty.

In order to reduce his expenses as much as possible, after two months spent at La Valletta, he went to live in the country, in a locality known as Tarxien, whence he could go down to the city every morning. Nevertheless, his earnings still remained less than his expenses, and he made up his mind to go to Constantinople, where he would be able, at least, to obtain employment in some business house. His friends disapproved of this plan, and Correnti wrote him from Turin, on May 6:—

. . . The *Pantheon* has been suspended, and is nearly bankrupt. Your friends here remember you with undying affection, and Correnti will never forget you. . . .

Let me add that I believe it is madness to think of going to the East. But at any rate keep me posted, whatever you may decide to do.

Crispi would probably have left Malta had he been able to do so, but he could not move, for he was a prisoner. 'I am without a passport,' he wrote to his father on November 26, 'and no government will give me one. This is the reason I have decided to spend the winter here.'

He worked untiringly for several months, but with small profit. Several hours each day he spent at the library, where he had discovered material for some historical essays, amongst which that on 'The Authority of the English Crown over the Maltese Church' is most noteworthy. The labours of conspiracy, his correspondence with Rosalino Pilo, with

Mazzini and with the Sicilian Committees, furnished constant occupation.

As may be gathered from the following letters from Lorenzo Valerio, Crispi at that time was taking a lively interest in the unhappy plight of Ignazio Ribotti, who was detained in the prison of Castel Sant' Elmo at Naples, in consequence of an attempt made in 1849 to rouse Calabria to rebellion :—

DEAREST CRISPI,—I also have written to you several times, but my letters have miscarried. I wrote you from Genoa to the address of a certain Orlandi, which Correnti gave me. I have also written twice to Malta, but thinking it unnecessary to stamp my letters, I did not do so, and I learnt later that twenty-three letters addressed to you were lying at the post-office, Correnti not having seen fit to withdraw them. Among these were two of mine. The least Correnti could have done was to write to you as I asked, informing him that letters of mine were lying at the office. He did not do so, however, and as this is but another instance of his usual courtesy, I am not astonished by it.

And this brings me to your last letter and to that of Signor Tamaio. As soon as I received these I went to see General Dabormida, to find out what stage had been reached in the proceedings concerning that brave and unfortunate fellow, Ribotti. I discovered that, in consequence of my three questions at the Chamber of Deputies, some feeble overtures had been made to the Bourbon's government, which had led to no result.

The only concession the Sicilian Ambassador has been able to obtain is permission to help the prisoner with small sums of money, but this only occasionally and in scant measure, ' that he may not

attempt to corrupt his jailers,' are the words used by the Bourbon authorities. Minister Dabormida promised to renew his efforts, but he entertains little hope of success, as the two governments are at loggerheads. He was somewhat encouraged, however, by my suggestion that he might find support in his undertaking from the Cabinets of London and Paris, by applying to Mr. Hudson and the Duc de Guiche, who represent those two Powers here. He promised me to make an earnest appeal to these gentlemen, and communicate the result to me privately, but he stipulated that I should refrain from further public questions, which would surely have the effect of setting the French representative against us. Finding the Minister so sincerely interested, and knowing his opinion concerning the French government to be perfectly correct, that government now being the only one from which we can hope for useful support, because, since Gladstone's letters, the Bourbon looks upon the British government as little better than an avowed enemy, I thought it wise and to Ribotti's advantage to comply with Signor Dabormida's request, at the same time reserving the right to speak in the strongest and most pressing language when the new session opens, should he himself fail to obtain satisfaction before that date. . . .

Good-bye. I will not speak of what is going on here, that I may not add to your trouble. Tell me all your news, all about your studies, your hopes, and Sicily, and believe me to be,—Your most affectionate

LORENZO.

TURIN, 16 *June*, 1853.

TURIN, 28 October, 1853.

. . . The efforts we are making on poor Ribotti's behalf are progressing favourably. The Minister of Foreign Affairs recently showed me some papers concerning the case. They consist of eleven despatches, more or less, from which it is evident that the matter is being warmly pressed. From the Piedmontese Ambassador's despatches it appears that the Neapolitan authorities refuse to give up the prisoner, which act must be sanctioned by the King himself.

Ribotti occupies two rooms in the prison of Castello Sant' Elmo, and is not in need of money, the Portuguese government having recently paid him the remains of a pension owing to him. The Piedmontese Minister has given orders that when that sum is exhausted he shall be supplied with more money, and meanwhile, to relieve the tedium of his confinement, the Minister sends him the *Revue des Deux Mondes* regularly.

On receiving the refusal from the Neapolitan government, the Piedmontese Ambassador appealed to the French and English legations, who promised to look into the matter, but no confirmation has as yet been forthcoming of what the memorandum asserts, that these powers have protested in favour of the prisoners from the *Strongoli*. The Piedmontese government then applied to London, and through the Ambassador there, Lord Clarendon, Lord Temple and Lord Palmerston were appealed to. These statesmen declared that the capture of the *Strongoli* by means of the English flag, was a *ruse de guerre*, and one the English themselves had practised at times; that investigation had proved the ship on which Ribotti was taken to have been

seized, not in the waters of Corfù, but at a distance of three leagues from the shore, and that the English government had confined itself to recommending the prisoners to the indulgence of the Bourbon. However, Lord Clarendon promised the support of the Cabinet of St. James in obtaining the liberty of the unfortunate Italian.

Orders have been sent to France to examine the archives of the imperial navy for any trace of Baudin's promises, of which no mention is made in the archives of the French legation at Naples. When the result of this examination is known an appeal for support will be made to France, which the Minister trusts will be complied with.

As you see, the matter is progressing in a fairly satisfactory manner, but please keep all this to yourself for the present. . . .

Here is an example of the Pilo-Crispi correspondence :—

I can give you no information concerning recent sales and purchases made by our firm, for the heads of the house at Messina and Palermo have not written to us since last February, I regret this the more as I am now in a position to place them in direct correspondence with K.[ossuth] who has opened a place of business in London and has sent me a letter, dated July 1, for the heads of our Sicilian house. Unfortunately, however, I am constrained to return K.'s letter with its proposals for the opening of business relations, especially as the Palermo people informed me not long since that they do not intend to enter into correspondence with foreign houses, Sicilian commerce deriving no benefit from such dealings, and the efforts of a large number of commercial travellers, who have laboured

in foreign lands, having also failed to produce any profit whatsoever. In reporting to the great and glorious K., who, judging from the contents of his letter, appears ready and willing to work with alacrity, to lend all his influence and contribute in all ways towards the success of the transaction, I shall make another effort, if I can think of anyone whose name, energy and intelligence inspires me with sufficient confidence; but I believe it will be difficult to find the type of person I am looking for in the Island, for he must be a man who is not deceived by appearances (who does not mistake fire-flies for lanterns).

GENOA, 10 *July*, 1853.

I have also written to find out if Pippo (Mazzini) shares Kossuth's opinions entirely, and whether he is aware that the latter has sent me a letter for the Sicilian patriots, intended to open a correspondence between himself and them. I expect an answer in the course of a few days. . . . I have no intention of delivering Kossuth's letter without mature consideration, because I will not assume the responsibility of bringing him into contact with men with whom I am not well acquainted, especially as the blame would fall upon me should I place the great Hungarian in communication with individuals who are neither true patriots, energetic in action nor endowed with good sense, and perhaps one day, both he himself as well as my own country, might come to regard such a mistake in the light of a crime. . . .

10 *August*, 1853.

(At the top of the letter are the words: 'Kossuth is of the same mind as Pippo.')

. . . Pippo's conduct in wishing to place weighty

matters in the hands of unscrupulous men has greatly distressed me. Good God ! After so many failures, due precisely to the meddling action of persons of no standing, it is inexcusable foolishness to make use of men of ill-repute. Pippo's great weakness is his belief that everyone is honest. . . . I fear some event like that which took place in Milan will also come to pass in our own country, because if any uprising be attempted under the leadership of men who are not known by all to be perfectly straightforward, the majority will not follow them, and failure will result. This thought worries me, for an unsuccessful attempt at the present moment would entail terrible consequences.

16 October, 1853.

As soon as your letter reached me I called a meeting of our true friends, and together we wrote to Kossuth in London, requesting him to inform us what manner of help he is prepared to offer Sicily should she take the initiative in an Italian revolution. I likewise informed him that the Sicilian patriots will send me a letter for him presently.

31 October, 1853.

The interest that the great Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth took in a Sicilian uprising referred to by Pilo, is clearly shown in the following letter from Crispi, addressed to the Sicilian Committees, on October 8 :—

Louis Kossuth, being firmly persuaded that for the success of that general uprising that cannot be far off, against the despotism which in various forms reigns over the whole of Europe, there must be harmony among the nations and mutual desire to help one another, wishes to place himself in direct communication with you, and to give you such assistance and advice as may be necessary. He does

not wish to take part in the discussions of internal politics which every people must decide for itself, nor does he desire to force you into ill-timed action, the proper moment for which can be determined only by men who are on the spot. What he is interested to know is how you are, or desire to be organised, and what are the means at your disposal, so that he may have an exact idea of your proposed operations from the tactical and strategical point of view, may see how and by what means to help you, and may judge whether the means he possesses be adapted to your needs.

The first question to ask yourselves is this : What is the strength of the enemy we shall have to face ?

On this point Kossuth premises that the Sicilian insurrection will not have to fear foreign intervention. Russia is far away ; Austria will not dare to interfere on account of her own internal political conditions, and of the large force she is obliged to maintain both in Central Italy and Germany. Should France, England or Spain attempt interference, Kossuth would be able to prevent their action by his powerful influence and by the help of the United States of America which would side with the people in revolt. The forces to be reckoned with would therefore be :—

- I. The reactionary element at home, if it exists.
- II. The troops maintained there by government.
- III. Those the government might send across from the mainland during and after the insurrection.

It must be the task of your organisation to neutralise and combat the reactionary element. Kossuth will supply arms and ammunition if these be necessary, and to the following amount : several

thousand rifles free of cost ; some pieces of ordnance and some battle-rockets, which must be paid for. The cannon would cost 4000 *colonnati*, the rockets half that amount. The pieces of ordnance form a complete mounted battery ; the rockets are of the latest model, and would be of great use in mountainous regions.

As the internal organisation must depend largely on skilfully planned tactics, it would be necessary to study the enemy's position, strength, and line of battle, and then prepare the movements and fix the halting-places of the insurrectionary forces, communicating the arrangements to Louis Kossuth, and concerting military operations with him.

The great point is to prevent the landing of more hostile troops in Sicily.

Louis Kossuth would also be able to supply a fleet, but half of its value would have to be paid for in advance, the other half on the happy conclusion of hostilities. This fleet would consist of ten steamships, four of which are superior to the enemy's in swiftness, size, and armament. Suffice it to say that while no European power possesses ships armed with cannon of more than 135 pounds, the above-mentioned steamers bear cannon of 270 pounds. These vessels, moreover, thanks to the combination of sail and steam, make three miles an hour more than the fastest European steamer.

Kossuth assures us that with two such ships he would be able, not only to check the action of the Neapolitan fleet, but to banish it entirely from the Mediterranean. Two ships of this type, ready equipped for action, would cost about one million *colonnati*.

Should the insurrection be sustained for some weeks and a temporary government established,

Kossuth would get the American Union to recognise Sicilian independence. It is superfluous to insist upon the importance of such a recognition which Kossuth would make himself formally responsible for obtaining.

A precise answer to these offers is necessary. The Patriots must fully realise that liberty will be acquired only by dint of great sacrifice. Times have changed in the last six years, and the preaching of ideas alone will not suffice to destroy tyranny.

Besides the support offered by Kossuth, other friends from the outside are ready to help with men and arms, which will further strengthen our forces.

You are requested to establish a cipher for correspondence purposes.

In November a letter was received from Naples announcing a proposed uprising among the troops to take place on December 8, on which date there would be a grand parade. The letter asked for advice and a leader. Already forty-nine men, non-commissioned officers and troopers, had been arrested on suspicion. Crispi wrote a long letter in reply, containing the desired advice, and earnest exhortations that on the present occasion, unlike the uprising of July 1820, and the conspiracy of Rossaroll, Angelotti and Romano, the action of the military might be conducted in such a manner as to 'prove decisive, and insure the future welfare of the country.'

As a practical man, he was convinced that nothing could be done without first gaining the necessary information for a true estimate of the strength of the conspiracy as well as of that of the government to be overthrown, and he drew up a list of questions to be laid before the Sicilian Committees, which we copy from autograph notes.

- I. What political views prevail in the country ?
Is a constitutional monarchy desired, or a republic ?
- II. Does any form of organisation exist among

the Patriots? What is its nature? Does it cover the entire island? What intercourse is there between the different branches?

- III. Who are the most popular men, to whom you would turn in case of action, placing them at the head of affairs?
- IV. How many armed men could each Patriot produce in case of action?
- V. Have you any arms? Of what sort and in what quantity?
- VI. Have you any ammunition?
- VII. In the absence of either, have you any certainty or hope of procuring them?
- VIII. Being able to procure them from foreign parts, could you be sure of receiving them safely?
- IX. What is the strength of the Royal troops, both in the capital and throughout the province?
- X. How many agents and gendarmes would the police be able to bring into action?
- XI. Would it be possible to undermine the loyalty of any of the military and police force?
- XII. Could the armed bands be won over to support the popular uprising?
- XIII. How many fortresses are there? How strongly are they garrisoned? By what means do you propose to reduce them to submission? Are new fortifications in course of construction? Where?
- XIV. How are the troops distributed in the city? Where are their barracks and guard-corps?
- XV. What is the condition of the commissariat

department and the strength of the stations of police, gendarmes and armed bands ?

- xvi. Have you decided upon the best method of barricading the city in order to overcome the royal troops ?
- xvii. Could one or more bodies of firemen be organised without delay, to fight any conflagration that might occur during the struggle ?
- xviii. In case European events should suddenly develop and active measures become imperative, would you be in a position to send us a confidential agent with whom we could concert plans of action ?
- xix. Arrange a safe channel to insure free communication with us, and establish a cipher to protect correspondence against police surveillance.
- xx. Answer questions xiii.-xiv.-xv. by means of a map of the city with necessary remarks upon it.

At the beginning of the year 1854 Crispi founded a newspaper called *La Staffetta*. His purpose in so doing was, indeed, twofold—to earn a livelihood and to have an organ for the dissemination of his ideas.

Malta, at that time, was a most important point of observation not only for the Bourbon police, but for that of the various other Italian states as well. Political emigrants were closely watched and not infrequently trapped ; spies were everywhere, and it was no easy matter to avoid them in a country whither refugees came from all parts of Europe, on their way, for the most part, to Egypt or the far East.

Crispi's activity was watched with special attention at the Neapolitan Consulate. His paper often contained powerful articles against the Bourbons, of a republican and unionist character, and by reason of its small size it was easily smuggled

into Sicily ; it also contained frequent attacks upon the local government of Malta, upbraiding its abject submission to Jesuit influence. Here is a sample of the articles that filled the columns of *La Staffetta*.

We speak to the Italians in the name of their rights and in the name of their duties, rights and duties to rise and become a free and united nation. These are :

The right to wage war upon every enemy of the nation either at home or abroad.

The right and duty to watch carefully that the true purpose of the national struggle be not altered and betrayed.

The right and duty to consult the emancipated and freely constituted nation concerning the form of government under which it shall elect to live.

The right of every subject to express his opinions and to cast his vote in the council of the nation.

The duty of every subject to render obedience, and to safeguard national freedom of thought and speech.

And, in direct consequence,

Supreme power of direction in war, to be vested in a national authority, which shall itself be acclaimed by the will of the people.

The arming of the people.

The establishment of a national militia by the side of the body of regular troops belonging to each Italian province in the field.

To have a rebel of this sort at Malta and so near the Kingdom was disquieting both to the Governor of the island and to the Consul at Naples, and on December 18, although no accusation of law-breaking could be brought against him, a decree of expulsion was issued against Crispi.

He wrote to his father on December 21, asking for help.

On the eighteenth of this month the local police authorities ordered me to quit Malta within a fortnight. The reason alleged is that I, a foreigner, have started publishing a newspaper, this being forbidden to strangers. You can fancy how difficult my position is. . . . It is true that I have always considered my residence in Malta as uncertain, but at last, after living here for one and twenty months, I had begun to follow a regular occupation. Now, however, I must be off. . . . I propose going to England, the only country where I shall be allowed free entrance. . . . Besides, neither there nor in the colonies shall I be in danger of molestation. In England they make no difference between the native and the foreigner, as far as political opinions are concerned. Everyone is free to hold any opinions he chooses as long as he respects the laws. Unfortunately, as I may not set foot on the Continent, I shall be forced to take a long sea-voyage.

But Crispi did not yield without a protest, and without setting forth the regularity of his own position and the arbitrary nature of the decree. The following is the appeal presented to 'His Excellency, Sir William Reid, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Island of Malta':—

On the eighteenth of the present month, the undersigned, *Avvocato* Francesco Crispi-Genova, was ordered by the local police authorities to leave Malta within a fortnight.

Although no reason was given in the order itself, the Superintendent of Police made a verbal statement to the effect that the measure had become imperative because the undersigned had dared to write for a newspaper called *La Staffetta*, it being against the law for anyone not a British subject to take part in any publication whatsoever.

The undersigned was ignorant of any such law, which, indeed, does not appear in the most recent police regulations sanctioned by Her Majesty, and published in these islands. Moreover, a chain of circumstances which he has decided to expose to Your Excellency combined to maintain him in this ignorance, and in the belief that his action was not at variance with any law of this land.

In February last the undersigned enquired of Mr. Lushington if a foreigner might establish and write for a journal in this country. The answer was that no law existed forbidding a foreigner to write for a newspaper provided the journal were the property of a British subject, as only such may own printing-offices here. Regarding this suggestion in the light of a permit, as it were, Crispi accepted an offer recently made him by the Notary, Mr. George D. Page, who had decided to establish the journal *La Staffetta* for his own benefit.

It must be set forth, furthermore, that from the first the police were aware of Crispi's share in the above-named paper, and that Signor Giglio, an employee in the Superintendent's office, accepted a copy of the paper from Signor Crispi as a gift.

The Inspector Caruana was one of the subscribers, Signor Crispi himself signing the receipt for the full amount of the subscription. The silence of these persons convinced Crispi that he was committing no breach of any law, and that the only obligation resting upon him was to respect, in his compositions, those regulations that abolished censorship in the island in the year 1839.

Your Excellency will see that Crispi was acting in all good faith, and that such being the case, instead of inflicting upon him a penalty in the form

of banishment, which will cause him severe loss and pain, it would have been sufficient to warn him of his involuntary crime, inflicting punishment upon him only in case of his rebellion against the decrees of the authorities. Your Excellency must be aware that Crispi resigned the editorship of *La Staffetta* on the very day on which he was informed that by writing for it he was breaking a law. This fact must convince Your Excellency that it was his firm intention to respect the laws of the land.

In any case the undersigned desires to point out that, after seven years of exile in the cause of his country's liberty, he, who at home maintained himself by exercising his profession of barrister, now finds himself in a most critical position, and quite unable to meet the expense of a long journey. He is also destitute of the means necessary to support him in any other place until he shall have found work, whereas here in Malta, his literary labours now enable him to support himself.

The undersigned furthermore desires to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that, being a native of a Southern land, Sicily, he would find it difficult to accustom himself to the severe climate of that northern country to which alone he is free to go, his circumstances forbidding him to reside either in France or in Italy.

For all these reasons the undersigned begs Your Excellency to consent that the order of expulsion against him be revoked, or at least suspended until the spring.

Avvocato FRANCESCO CRISPI-GENOVA.

VALLETTA, December 21, 1854.

But the decree was not to be revoked.

On December 20 the measures adopted against the 'outlawed subject' had been communicated to Palermo.

Ministry and Royal Secretariate of State, Office of the Lieutenant-General of the Royal Domains beyond the Lighthouse.—Department of Police—No. 3546.

Concerning the expulsion from Malta of His Majesty's outlawed subject, Francesco Crispi.

PALERMO, *December 26, 1854.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—His Majesty's Consul General, by his folio, in date of the twentieth of last month, has made the following communication :—

His Majesty's outlawed subject, Francesco Crispi-Genova, Barrister, of Ribera, came to this island after having been expelled from Piedmont, and soon began publishing a newspaper entitled *La Staffetta*, and, a few days after the publication of the ninety-second number which I enclose (December 18), Crispi-Genova was expelled from here also, the governor's order, which was communicated to him by the local police, decreeing that he shall leave these parts within a fortnight.

I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency with this information.—For the Lieutenant-General (Absent),

The Director, SALVATORE MANISCALCO.

To His Excellency Cavaliere Cassisi, His Royal Majesty's Minister and Secretary of State for the Affairs of Sicily, Naples.

And thus he was flung into the unknown again to suffer fresh privations, and just when he had begun to make a place for himself. In the heart of winter this Southerner, who was extremely sensitive to the cold, and to whom a sea-voyage was intolerable, had to set sail for a distant country, whose climate was of the severest.

A few entries scrawled day by day in a small note-book, enable us to follow Crispi on his voyage.

Being unable to cross the Continent on his way to England, he was obliged to seek passage on board an English man-of-war that was on its homeward journey from the Crimea.

29 Dec. 1854.—At three-thirty p.m. I am to be at the Superintendent's Office, as his adjutant is to escort me on board the *Sampson*. Miloro, Valenza, Oddo, Page and Duroni accompany me, but do not come aboard. Pizzuto goes ahead to make his recommendations. I am informed that we shall not be starting until to-morrow at six a.m., and that I may spend the night at home. I go ashore with Pizzuto. We meet Giorgio Tamaji and Nicola Fabrizi in another boat. We dine together at the *Commercio*.

30 Dec.—At five-thirty a.m. Giorgio comes for me, and we go aboard the ship. The commander of a French vessel, the *Suffren*, comes to request us to tug him out of harbour. Is it liberty tugging out despotism, or the one become the humble servant of the other?

Once outside the harbour the *Suffren's* crew assemble on deck and give us three cheers, to which the *Sampson* responds. The two ships then go their different ways. We are one mile out from Malta. I am attacked by sea-sickness, and Lieutenant Rogers of the *Arethusa*, on his way home on board the *Sampson*, conducts me to the captain's cabin, and places me on a bed which has been prepared for me there. The day wears away in misery.

31 Dec.—My sea-sickness continues unabated. An orange is all it is possible for me to eat during the day.

1 Jan. 1855.—The suffering continues. In the

morning I am made to swallow a hot punch, and a little hot wine in the evening. I take nothing else all day.

2 *Jan.*—A kind-hearted officer, touched by my sufferings, has me carried, bed and all, to the midshipmen's saloon which is in the centre of the ship, where I shall feel the motion less. The change has done me good. I have been able to take some broth.

Beyond the Straits of Majorca the sea begins to be more calm.

3-4 *Jan.*—I am on my feet again, and feeling fairly well. We arrive at Gibraltar.

6 *Jan.*—We left Gibraltar at three-thirty p.m. The sea was calm. At five we are called to dinner. We discuss Menchikoff who has fallen into disgrace, and Osten-Sacken who has gone to take his place as first in command in Crimea. We also discuss the incapacity of the Prince-Admiral, who, if not its author, is at least the second in this fierce duel that is subjecting Russia and Turkey to the vandalism of battles. There is further unimportant conversation.

Nothing of note occurs during our passage through the Strait. My thoughts go back to the cordial reception I received in Gibraltar from Giovanni Danilovich and his dear mother. She has brought more vividly before me the memory of my own mother, whom I have not seen for five years, and may never see again.

7 *Jan.*—Since eight o'clock last night we have been in the Atlantic. The sea is calm. It being Sunday, all attend Divine Service.

8 *Jan.*—Beautiful weather, although the sea is slightly rough. The east wind is in our favour, and the *Sampson* is steaming with sails set.

I am once more attacked by sea-sickness, and obliged to lie down. But in the afternoon I am able to rise and dine with the rest.

Lieutenant Rogers asks me if I am a Republican. Can any one doubt it? The question came out of a discussion of the changes in government that have taken place in France in the last fifty years: republic, empire, legitimate monarchy, bourgeois monarchy, and again republic and empire! What we wish to do is to create Italy!

Palmerston's great crime was in permitting the several interventions against the Italian Republic in 1849, and from fear of a war that England had, after all, to engage in five years later at much greater sacrifice and with far more danger, having allowed reaction, led by the Czar, to triumph on the Continent. To-day Italy might have already been what we wish her to be, and you would have had a nation of twenty-six millions as your natural ally, nor would you have been obliged to seek Austrian aid to overcome Russia and to restore international peace.

Lieutenant Rogers, who seems to object to the word 'republic,' believes that under it America does not enjoy the same liberty as England enjoys under a monarchy, and fears, moreover, that we are not 'ripe.' The usual objection that is not worth discussing. Man does not become worthy of liberty under despotism or under bastard governments. Liberty herself educates him and makes him worthy of her. There is no *via media* in politics. If you wish to create good citizens, you must govern them by broad measures that will develop their faculties and not restrain them.

9 Jan.—We are in the Bay of Biscay. Again

to-day the weather has favoured us. I am told that on Thursday night or, at the latest, on Friday morning, we shall be in Portsmouth. This is good news to me, for I can hardly wait patiently to get ashore. I spend most of my time reading the third volume of Miège's *History of Malta*.

10 *Jan.*—We are off the coast of the French department of Finistère. The day passes without incident. I have been fighting the first symptoms of sea-sickness, and such violent dizziness that I was forced to keep quiet in the Officers' Saloon until a late hour.

11 *Jan.*—The sun rose out of the depths of the sea like a globe of fire, leaving a bloody trail behind it. Uneventful day. Dr. Beveridge talks to me about the use of the coroner's court in England, that investigates deaths from unknown causes such as may have to be dealt with by justice, and of the superiority which the French claim over the English in the matters of military medical service and administration.

12 *Jan.*—The *Sampson* reaches Spithead at four-thirty a.m. The atmosphere is foggy and very cold. It is still dark at seven. The waters are calm and gloomy like the sky. It seems ill-omened that my arrival in England should be marked by such gloomy weather. To-day is the seventh anniversary of the great insurrection! How many painful memories! A throne that seemed shaken to its very foundations, and that we already saw tottering, was rescued on the very brink of the precipice by the hand of a fiend! And for this, thousands of orphans, widows and mothers of exiles, of prisoners in jails and secret dungeons, mourn to-day! Fatal twelfth of January that many failed to understand, that many failed to

honour, I salute you amidst the gloom and sadness that this day has brought me, this day so poor in light that it seems more like night itself.

We are waiting for Lieutenant Piers who has gone ashore for orders from the Admiralty. We may perhaps be ordered to Woolwich.

13 *Jan.*.—I start by rail from Portsmouth for London. I leave the *Sampson* at about ten o'clock, after heartily thanking her kind-hearted officers. At five p.m. I enter the great capital.

CHAPTER III

IN London—Letters to his father—A letter to the *Morning Advertiser*—The year 1855 passes in fruitless efforts to obtain employment—In Paris with an American passport—Clerk in the *Office Franco-Italien* at two francs a day—Giacinto Carini—Francesco Dall' Ongaro—Valerio requests him to write for *Il Diritto*—Political parties in Italy—Crispi returns to London and plans the founding of an international commission office—Letter to Correnti—Giuditta Sidoli and Antonio Panizzi—The journalistic debate between Crispi and Manin—A letter to the editor of the *Daily News*—Cavour's opinion of Manin and of Italian unity.

ON January 17 Crispi wrote a long letter to his father telling of his recent adventures, and adding:—

And now here I am, in a city twenty times the size of Palermo. It is terribly cold, and there is always fog. We know that the sun rises and sets, but we do not see it. . . . I am making every effort to obtain work, but am not sure I shall succeed. I am willing to do anything, and have already applied to schools, libraries, printing-offices, shopkeepers, and lawyers. . . .

On February 2 he wrote again:—

For some days now this Signor Lella has made me dine at his table. But my self-respect tells me this cannot, must not continue. . . .

Signor Lella was a Sicilian, who sought to help his compatriot by giving him a situation in his banking office. But the salary was too small to support him.

In answer to a proposal of his own, Crispi received the following letter from his friend Pietro Maestri, who was a refugee in Paris.

. . . I like your work on the Constitution and Organisation of the Papal States, but I dare not encourage you to finish it, knowing that you are, perhaps, actually in want of sufficient money to support you from day to day. . . . Have you any prospects in England? You must certainly be handicapped by the difficulty of language. I should like to advise you to come to France, but this seems a premature step, considering the publicity that was given to your expulsion from Malta.

Nor was Giuseppe La Farina more encouraging.

. . . I would gladly accept a weekly report of scientific, literary, industrial and commercial doings in England, but I doubt whether it would profit you much. The new *Società dell' Unione Tipografica* (Pomba) pays but twenty-five francs every folio of sixteen pages for articles for the *Encyclopedical Review*, and the English report must not exceed eight pages. It would therefore mean only about twelve francs a month to you.

As to your essays on the municipalities of Malta and Gozo, I think it would be most difficult to find a publisher here, in these hard times. In fact I have already spoken to several about the essays, but without success. . . .

In February the *Morning Advertiser* printed the following letter:—

To the Editor of the Morning Advertiser.

14 Feb. 1855.

SIR,—Having only lately arrived in London I was unaware until yesterday that in your issues of the 16th and 17th January you discussed my expulsion from Malta, and the severe treatment that I underwent at the hands of the local authority on

account of my connection with *La Staffetta*. Worthy confrère, I thank you from my heart not only for the honour you have shown me, but also because in defending me you have defended the liberty of thought and the liberty of the Press. And may I put myself under a still greater obligation to you by asking you to find room in one of your next issues for the enclosed letter from me to the Governor of Malta, Sir W. Reid—a letter which I found impossible to publish in Malta. From it you will see clearly that in my case not only were the laws abused, but my good name was injured and grave harm done to my interests by the enemies of your institutions as well as mine, who are monopolising authority in Malta, and in whose hands the representative of S. M. B. may be used unconsciously as a tool, thereby continuing the tyrannical work of Mr. More O’Ferrall.

These—let me proclaim them—have so compassed round about the government of your Queen that one is justified in asking whether it is She or the Pope who rules, or may declare almost with certainty that it is the Pope, for he now enjoys a greater power than he had before the expulsion of the Knights of Malta. Your soldiers are the outward and visible symbols of authority, but the Jesuits to whom Sir W. Reid has given shelter and protection, and who are the natural gendarmes of the Papal Court—govern the island.

If you will remember that Pius ix. reigns at Rome thanks to foreign bayonets, and that the Vatican is the home of the intrigues of these despots who support him, you will easily understand the dangerous influences that are at work in

Malta, your control of this island being coveted, and likely to be wrested from you by certain forces at the first possible occasion.—I am Sir, etc.,

Av. F. CRISPI.

Giacinto Carini, who, at one time, had been a colonel of cavalry in the Sicilian army, was now, as has already been mentioned, an exile in Paris, and, as a means of livelihood, had founded the *Courrier Franco-Italien*, a paper concerned not with political principles, but with matters generally. On May 3, he wrote to Crispi:—

. . . As to the correspondence you propose, it is just what I should have asked you to send me. Send it at once, and don't be particular about the style. Write at length on theatrical news especially, for that is the only thing that really pays with us here.

After four months of fruitless search for work and impossible offers, Crispi seemed disheartened.

. . . My position here is no better than it was four months ago,—[he wrote to his father on May 18].—I have been unable to find any means of earning my living, and am beginning to fear that it is going to be the same in the future. As soon as I have money enough, I shall move on again. If I cannot go to France, which at present is my one desire, I will take the decisive step and go to the United States.

Once more, on the twenty-third of the same month, he wrote to his father:—

Giacinto Carini has opened a printing-office in Paris and has written to me to come and share his fortunes. If I can get a *visé* for the passport I obtained at the same time that I obtained American naturalisation, I shall go to him. In any case, I

am beginning to think about crossing the ocean and going to New York.

In October he received a proposal to go to Portugal.

I am working in Signor Lella's office without the certainty of any salary, but at least it is a good opportunity to acquire a knowledge of business.

A young Tuscan (Gattai) whom I made friends with when we were in prison together in Turin, has started a company for running a line of steamers between Portugal and Africa, and wants me to go to Lisbon with him. That city has much the same climate as Palermo.

The year 1856 opened sadly and discouragingly. All his attempts to obtain work failed, despite his indomitable will, his determination to face any number of hardships and the support of such friends as Mazzini and Saffi. On January 8, he started for Paris, Mazzini having obtained American naturalisation for him and a passport for France.

To-night at six o'clock I shall start for Paris,—[he wrote to his father on that day].—I have nothing to hope for here. I have worked for several months, but the time I have spent has not brought me in anything. Now I am going to see what I can do in Paris . . . and if everything else fails, I shall simply be reduced to setting out for Alexandria, where everyone tells me I shall be able to practise my calling of a barrister.

I will not dwell upon all that has befallen me, how completely my hopes have been deceived despite my close attention to business, my honesty and intelligence. . . .

Things were but little different in Paris. We read in the letters to his father dated March 20 and April 26 :—

By this time you should have received two letters from me, one of January 8, from London, the other of February 15, from Paris. . . . I am in Carini's office here, *Office Franco-Italien*, 4 *Boul. des Italiens*, where I work four hours a day. My pay is very small . . . only about one-third of what I need to live upon. Living costs more here than in London, and everything is dearer, beginning with bread and coals.

Carini pays me two francs a day, and to live here needs three times as much. I am trying to find some other work, and hope to succeed.

Carini's office undertook work of a most varied nature and employed men who had been educated to callings far removed from the commercial. Here is a letter from that man of letters, Francesco Dall' Ongaro, written in Brussels on March 28.

DEAR CRISPI,—At the present moment I really do not know whom to recommend as agent for the Franco-Italian Office in Brussels. However, I myself will gladly transact any pressing business for you here, of which I am capable. My address is *Rue Josaphat* 68. Send on the certificates and documents for the patent you refer to. . . . As to conditions, you will pay me what you would pay anyone else. Meanwhile we shall see if the amount and nature of the work suits me. My regards to Carini. Tell him we are still waiting for the article on Calamatta. . . . I will forward the last part of my essay on Dante. Persuade Ristori to play *Fedra*. That would be an attraction strong enough to draw me as far as Paris, when we might have a long talk on all-important matters.

Keep well, and love—Your friend

FRANCESCO DALL' ONGARO.

Some time between the end of April and the middle of May Crispi returned to London, disheartened at not having found what he had hoped for in Paris. He was not satisfied with his position in Carini's office, but would certainly have resumed it on his return to Paris, until such a time as something better should present itself. His return to the office, however, was rendered impossible. Maestri wrote to him on May 17 as follows:—

Carini nevers mentions you. It is as if you had never existed. I greatly fear that, should you come back, you would not get your poor little place as secretary in the *Office Franco-Italien* back again. It is already filled by another. . . .

Another slight disappointment awaited him. On June 20, Lorenzo Valerio wrote to him at Paris, asking him to contribute three letters a week to the journal *Il Diritto*, requesting him to state his terms, and reminding him at the same time that the paper's financial condition was extremely 'democratic.' The letter was forwarded to London, but did not reach Crispi until some time had elapsed. When at last he wrote, accepting the offer, Valerio answered that he was very sorry, but that he had already made other arrangements. Politics always occupying a more or less important place in this correspondence, Valerio concluded by remarking:—

. . . No news here. Only much apathy, hypocrisy and dirty work doing, in which *Muratteria* (Muratism) is prominent.

Here is Crispi's answer.

RUE DE BOULOGNE, HOTEL DE BOULOGNE,
PARIS, 7 September, 1856.

DEAREST LORENZO,—Through the inland post I have just received a note from you written on the sixteenth of last month. I quite understand about your paper and the subject of our previous correspondence. We must postpone the matter until a more fitting time.

It grieves me to hear of the political conditions where you are, and which you describe to me in a few words full of meaning. With so many and such continuous party divisions we do indeed present a deplorable spectacle to the world. We are become like the Greeks of the late empire, disputing and rending each other, and thus making the redemption of our country ever more problematic. In this the Southerners especially distinguish themselves. They would appear to be striving to keep alive those disastrous municipal feuds, and to strengthen the foundations of the Bourbons' throne. Muratism, that greatest of all madnesses, has so completely turned their heads that they now rant against Sicily so violently as to wound her self-respect. And without Sicily no political movement will be successful in the southern provinces. The Neapolitans, who meet the headsman's axe with so much heroism, even should they take the initiative in a general insurrection (which it is extremely improbable they would do) could not possibly succeed without the islanders. Now, to hold the Sicilians, it is necessary, for the present at least, to respect their traditions, good or bad as the case may be, using them to the best possible advantage in the cause of the national *Risorgimento* to which we are all working.

I assure you, my dear Lorenzo, this endless baffling of our own efforts is enough to make one despair of success. As I said before, your letter paints the situation most vividly, and your words were especially painful to me because on that very day I happened to have been reading Leopardi's historical sketches, in which he repeatedly abuses Sicily, which country he has the stupidity to call the 'perpetual stumbling-block' of Neapolitan monarchy.

We stand in desperate need of a mighty voice that shall be raised to silence the dissenters, and that, having reconciled all warring interests, shall establish the true national party, whose authority all must accept and obey. Will this voice be raised in our day?

To Leopardi, who has distorted history and enraged the Sicilians in this attempt at autobiography, I intend to reply in four or five letters at which I am already working, in a calm spirit, and by means of which I shall seek to reconcile the spirits of the two municipal parties, the *independents* and the *fusionists*, just as we laboured to do throughout the year 1847. Will you publish these letters in *Il Diritto*? Should you consent, please let me know.

For the sake of the whole of Italy find a way, I beseech you, out of this ambiguous position to the straight path again. I cannot understand how you could have allowed yourselves to be deceived by Cavour's vague language—Cavour, who cares as much for Italian Unity as you and I do for Austrian rule in the peninsula! Do not let us forget the teachings of history, or we shall fall into the old errors again.

Good-bye, my dear Lorenzo. My regards to your brothers, and an affectionate embrace from your

F. CRISPI.

P.S.—I have seen a few pages of G. La Farina's work, Murat and Italian Unity. Could you send me a copy?

Such slight experience as he had had of business men gave Crispi the idea of founding an International Commission Office in London, and on April 14 he wrote thus to Cesare Correnti concerning his plan:—

On my return to London I intend to establish

an International Commission Office. I propose to engage in the same sort of business that the *Office Franco-Italien* undertook in Paris, at first, but on broader lines, and with better management. London is the centre of all business transactions between Europe and the United Kingdom, as well as that between Europe and America. My project would, therefore, have every chance of success. I will go into this more fully in a future letter. To-day I write to inquire if it would be possible to procure some books on deposit from Lombard and Piedmontese publishers. Eight or ten copies of Italian works of recent publication might easily be disposed of in England. Should this arrangement prove feasible, the publishers must state what profit they would allow me, and what responsibilities I should be assuming.

The enormous development of Great Britain's mercantile marine, the extraordinary activity of her inhabitants, the widespread circulation of her capital, multiplied to an unlimited extent by a system of credit of which we on the Continent have no conception, while making this country the very soul of the world's commerce, have also made her its arbiter. Not all countries, however, are in direct communication with England, and can thereby profit. This applies particularly to those countries lying beyond France, separated from England by a long sea-voyage, and difficult of access, in spite of railways, owing to defective organisation of transit. The International Commission Office might, therefore, undertake the following:—

- I. Express Agency work. For example, supposing an object has to be forwarded quickly, from some Italian town to Great Britain

or America, instead of its being sent by the long route via Gibraltar, or having to wait for the uncertain departure of some steamer, an Office in the same town would receive the object and forward it to London in the space of five or six days, by means of the French railways and the Channel steamers. From London it would be immediately despatched to any part of the United Kingdom or of the New World to which it might be addressed.

- II. Purchase and sale of public and private property or business in the different States, and of various commodities in the markets of Great Britain, America and Europe.
- III. Representative Agency in matters of litigation and administration; for the handling of industrial enterprises; for the procuring of patents and the sale of patented inventions.

In London he had once more been exerting every effort to find a means of livelihood. Giuditta Sidoli, probably at Mazzini's request, presented him to Panizzi, an Italian who was Librarian of the British Museum, and who wrote to Crispi as follows on May 7:—

DEAR SIR,—I have just received your note and the letter you were kind enough to enclose from Signora Sidoli. I am writing to thank you, and to offer you my poor services in any way in which they may be of use to you.

I am very busy always, and especially at the present moment, and I trust, therefore, you will pardon me for not coming in person and at once, to pay you my respects. Do not hesitate to write to me if I can serve you in any way; or, should you prefer a personal interview, let me know when it

would best suit you to come here, and I will make a point of placing myself at your disposal. I am extremely sorry not to be able to call upon you, but I cannot absent myself from the Museum.

I have the honour to be, yours faithfully and respectfully,

A. PANIZZI.

This was courtesy and nothing more, for Panizzi was of no more help to him than the rest.

But notwithstanding all these material anxieties Crispi's thoughts were ever with his native land. He kept up his correspondence with Fabrizi, Tamaio, and Rosalino Pilo concerning Sicilian affairs, assisted Mazzini in his wonderful mission of propaganda, and employed what leisure remained in the study of British civilisation.

On September 19, 1855, Daniele Manin, the illustrious ex-president of the Venetian Republic, published a declaration in Valerio's paper, *Il Diritto*, which had already appeared in the *Times*, in which he raised the flag of Italian Unity, saying to the House of Savoy in the name of the republican party: 'Make Italy, and I am with you, but not otherwise!'

In another letter, dated December 10, 1855, Manin declared that he and his friends desired that all patriots should form one great national party, for the *independence* and *unification* of Italy, adding in a note: 'I say *unification* and not *union* or *unity*, because the word *union* seems to me to exclude the unitary form. Unification may be either unitary or federal.'

In a third letter, of February 11, 1856, Manin explained his position more fully, censuring both the 'exclusively Piedmontese party' and the 'exclusively Mazzinian party'—the first seeming to say: 'The dynasty of Savoy is dearer to me than Italy'; the second: 'A republican form of government is dearer to me than Italy.' Manin, furthermore, pointed out to the dynasty the road it must follow to fulfil its mission: 'Boldly to risk losing the throne of Piedmont for the sake of gaining the throne of Italy.'

Manin's initiative displeased both the parties it was intended to conciliate. Mazzini answered him in three letters, contained in vol. ix. of his *Scritti editi e inediti*; the journal

L'Opinione held him up to ridicule (issue of February 11, 1856); the *Risorgimento* (issue of August 10) called his letters 'ill-omened,' and Count Cavour, who was attending the Congress in Paris at the time, wrote as follows to Urbano Rattazzi, his colleague in the Ministry:—

I have had a long conference with Manin. He is still somewhat utopian, has not dismissed the idea of a strictly popular war, is now a believer in the efficacy of the press in times of unrest, *urges the unity of Italy and further rubbish of this sort. . . .*¹

During the controversy that ensued in the English, French, and Italian press, Manin, being invited to explain how independence and unification might be achieved, wrote on June 26, à propos of the 'truly abominable excesses of the Neapolitan government,' that the 'people of the two Sicilies, instead of demanding reforms and new laws, should demand that those already in existence be respected, beginning with the constitution of 1848; and as, by virtue of this constitution, the government may not levy taxes that have not been approved by the two Chambers, the rate-payers would be justified in withholding payment. No violence! Simply quiet and lawful resistance. Should the government drive the people to revolution, it is plain that this would not stop at the abolition of the constitution, but would fling aside the dynasty itself, and proceed to organise the country in accordance with the ideals of Italian nationalism.' In another letter, of July 4, he emphasises his proposition by adding that the acceptance of the constitution of 1848 by all the inhabitants of the two Sicilies would signify the abandonment of all idea of separation, and would serve as a guarantee of friendship and fraternity between Sicilians and Neapolitans, whom the Bourbon now maintains in a state of discord, that he may the more easily dominate them. In a word, Manin had the greatest faith in passive resistance to the levying of taxes as a means of coercion.

¹ The words printed in italics are omitted, with doubtful historical accuracy, by Chiala in his transcription of this document contained in the *Lettere di Cavour*, but they appear in page 596, vol. iv., of E. Ollivier's *Empire Libéral*, the author having had them from Rattazzi himself.

‘ Could all be brought to act together, I am sure the government would be obliged to yield without the firing of a single gun. Within six months you would either have Poerio at the head of the Ministry, or the revolution, and Victor Emmanuel proclaimed King of Italy.’

Crispi answered these very temperate propositions of Manin’s by the following letter to the editor of the *Daily News*, which deserves to be given in full, and calls for no comment:—

To the Editor of the Daily News.

LONDON, 10 July, 1856.

DEAR SIR,—M. Manin, whose patriotism entitles him to the respect of politicians, still continues in his letters to the English and French journals, to lay down the rules for action for the next Italian Movement. This time he addresses himself to Southern Italy, as appears in his letter published in the *Daily News* on the 7th of July.

M. Manin completely ignores the history of the latter times and the laws in force in the Two Sicilies. Had he been acquainted with that history and those laws he would not have believed in those castles in the air, nor would he have planted his batteries in them.

The constitution of 1812 never had force on the continental portion of the kingdom—being framed for Sicily alone, at a time when Naples was under King Murat. That constitution proclaimed the political independence of the island and pronounced the forfeiture of the throne by the King, who had abandoned the Island and extinguished its independence.

The constitution of 1848 has been promulgated at Naples alone. Moreover the 87th article of that

constitution declares that the King, then a constitutional power, had sanctioned other laws for Sicily. Those laws were sanctioned on the 6th of March 1848, but the ill will of the court sufficed to prevent their being accepted by the Sicilians. Soon after the Sicilian Parliament met at Palermo, and after having decreed the fall of the Bourbons, it made a new constitution, which was received with enthusiasm by all the towns in the island and which thenceforth became the fundamental law of the state.

In Sicily the monarchist party is separatist: at Naples it is despotic and has always treated the island as a conquered country. Since 1839 we have made every exertion to unite the intelligent portions of these two parties, and to make them accept a common plan of action. The principle was settled that if the revolution succeeded the Sicilian monarchy should be assimilated to that of Sweden and Norway, with two parliaments, two administrations and two armies. Unfortunately the Neapolitan, M. J. Bozzelli, who had been one of the conspirators, as soon as he had attained to power, was iniquitous enough to be the first to deny the agreement which he had made, and plunged both parties in the kingdom into all the disorders of civil war.

In the Two Sicilies, according to the laws now in force, those citizens who might petition for the re-establishment of a constitution would be punished in the same way as if they took up arms and went to the barricades. Of a truth, if the people of this country were agreed upon a plan of action, it would not be worth while risking life for the first of these means, which has no chance of success.

The refusal to pay the taxes and the publication

of the declaration proposed by M. Manin would have the same effect. It has never been possible to organise any plan of refusing to pay taxes at a time when power was about to tread under foot public liberty—and when among the people the remembrance of the constitution was still fresh. In 1815, one man alone in Sicily had the courage to refuse to pay the taxes because they had not been voted by parliament. That man was the Prince of Castelnuovo, formerly minister, of whose popularity the government stood in awe, and who therefore escaped punishment, but nobody dared to follow his example.

You see, therefore, that in the Two Sicilies a general constitution has never existed, and that, besides, there are no lawful means for compelling King Ferdinand to yield. Unhappily there are but two ways of arriving at this consummation in that unhappy land: either the cannon of the Western Powers, or a revolution. For the cannon of the Western Powers we need not hope. The revolution will come, and it will be coloured by the same feelings which showed in 1848 that there is no municipal hatred between the inhabitants of the Two Sicilies. Then these inhabitants, as well as those of the other provinces of the Peninsular, will, I trust, have done with kings.—Believe me, Sir, your humble servant,

A DEPUTY IN THE LAST SICILIAN PARLIAMENT.

CHAPTER IV

Crispi and Mazzini—Their correspondence from 1850—They are of one opinion concerning Sicilian affairs in 1851—An attempted uprising in Sicily in 1853 encouraged by Mazzini and disapproved of by Crispi—At the beginning of 1855 Crispi makes Mazzini's acquaintance in London—Presented by Nicola Fabrizi—Mazzini shows a brotherly anxiety to find work for Crispi—Recommends him to a photographer among others, and at last to a Paris banker of doubtful standing—In consequence of the Orsini attempt, and the Tibaldi plot, Crispi is expelled from France—Letter to La Farina concerning this expulsion—In Portugal—Crispi engaged in a road-building agency—Founds a branch of the 'Party of Action' at Lisbon—Once more in London in February 1859—Crispi helps Mazzini in editing the journal *Pensiero ed Azione*.

CRISPI became personally acquainted with Mazzini in London in January 1855, but they had corresponded since 1850, when, their golden dream of liberty and independence banished by the return of all the tyranny of the past, the bravest of the patriots had once more begun to conspire.

While pondering the idea of founding a National Committee in which the various regions of Italy should be represented, Mazzini also determined to form a fund for the carrying out of great enterprises. And 'as it is impossible to obtain large sums secretly and from a few people,' he wrote, he worked out a plan for a National Loan, to be raised by the issue of bonds to be redeemed by a liberated Italy.

The first act of the National Committee was to authorise the issue of such bonds to the amount of ten million liras.

We must exert ourselves unremittingly, and day by day, that this end may be achieved,—[Mazzini wrote to Crispi on October 14, 1850].—It is vital to the success of all our undertakings wherever they

may be launched, and it is a condition that will determine our moral supremacy as much over active elements at home as over the national democracies of Europe. If we succeed in this, we are safe. I entreat you, therefore, to redouble your activity.

And on October 13 he wrote:—

You know that there is a large sum of money which was brought from Sicily and deposited here in London, to be kept in reserve, it is said, until it can be handed back to a Sicilian parliament. If nothing happens in the meantime in Sicily, I propose that we procure the signatures of as many Sicilian emigrants as possible in all parts of the world, and that a circular be then addressed from the different centres to the depositors, to obtain their permission for the cession of the money to the National Committee, the depositors receiving bonds of our loan in exchange.

Crispi answered on December 2.

BROTHER,—I have delayed answering your two letters of October 13 and 31, because before doing so I wanted to consult my companions in exile on the main point in your proposal. We are all working to carry out your idea. If not the entire sum, certainly the greater part of the money that was left over after the revolution will be collected and exchanged for bonds of the National Loan. We believe this can easily be accomplished as soon as our Provincial Committee is constituted, which will be soon, especially as the power and authority of this institution will be very great, it having been called into being by the vote of men of our own party, and of many belonging to the constitutional party, who are already converted to our way of

thinking. The said Committee once constituted, one of us will certainly be deputed to the National Committee. This will probably be Interdonato. Meanwhile we will seek to dispose of some bonds among ourselves, but the result can only be small, because people like us, who have barely enough to live upon, however willing to sacrifice themselves, personally, are to their sorrow and in spite of themselves debarred from any considerable financial sacrifice.

You do not tell us whether this proposed conversion of the Sicilian moneys deposited in London, into bonds of the National Loan, has been submitted to La Farina and Amari in Paris, and if so, what their opinion was.

The present conditions in Sicily are most deplorable. Of our own party, most are in exile or in prison, and thus the people, deprived of the leadership of their legitimate directors, though ever ready to rebel against the unendurable Bourbon yoke, are in a mood to support any party which will promise to deliver them from the tyranny of King Ferdinand.

That there was a popular uprising in Palermo at the false report, purposely circulated by the police, that the Duke of Genoa was on his way with a fleet to take possession of the throne which Parliament had given him, is quite true. Also that a revolution did break out at Castelvetro, at sight of a few ships belonging to the English Mediterranean fleet, a revolution which was suffocated in blood when the ships stood out to sea again.

Meanwhile a Committee of ours has been founded in Palermo, and has already extended its influence to several provinces. It works incessantly, and each day gains in importance. Nevertheless, I will not

try to hide from you my conviction that, after twenty months of enduring butchery and exile, Sicily will cast in her lot with the first party that comes forward to drive out the royal army, and to offer her any guarantee of liberty. The country is weary !

Good health and brotherly greetings.

Mazzini replied on December 27.

BROTHER,—Only a few words, as I am much pressed for time. I have received yours of December 2. Before its arrival I had spoken to Amari about the plan for converting the money into bonds. He approved. I did not consult La F. Push on the final organisation of your Committee and send Interdonato to London as soon as possible. Although conflicting reports reach me from Malta and elsewhere, I am convinced that you are correct in your estimate of Sicilian conditions. The people of that country must by this time be sufficiently exhausted to fling themselves into the arms of whomsoever will lead them on to action. For this very reason we must make every endeavour that the initiative may come from us, and if we but succeed in raising the loan, it *shall* come from us.

Can you, without difficulty, send me the name of a member of the Palermo Committee ? The central authority of the National Committee once recognised, it follows that we, or rather one or two of us, ought to be acquainted with the name of at least one member of each important branch at home. Circumstances might otherwise arise which would check or even wreck an undertaking, and moreover, occasions might present themselves when the National Committee would desire to send a word

of encouragement direct.—Believe me to be always,
your, GIUSEPPE.

On January 4, 1851, Crispi wrote to express his satisfaction that Mazzini shared his views on the conditions in Sicily, and he added :—

. . . I therefore exhort all those who support the cause to rapid action that we may not be forestalled by England or by any other power in the approaching European crisis. Should such a misfortune befall us, we should find ourselves confronted by an obstacle it would be next to impossible to overcome; when the time arrived to recognise the nation from the shores of Greece to Corsica we should be surrounded by islands occupied by foreigners who would paralyse any attempt on our part to extend our naval power or our maritime commerce.

By this time you will have heard the result of the elections to our Provincial Committee. The members will not be long in effecting organisation. This election has convinced me of one important fact, of which even a month ago I was doubtful, that the great majority of Sicilian exiles are eager for the triumph of democracy, and for a United Italy.

We have written to Palermo concerning your desire to be put into communication with a member of that local committee. As soon as we receive the answer we will inform you of the secret sign, and of the individual, so that you can communicate with him directly. We decided upon this course as we did not wish to assume any responsibility, or place ourselves in a position to be accused of indiscretion.


Good health to you, and brotherly greetings.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received the news of the revolution in Paris. I have nothing further to add to what I have already written, nor would I alter it in any way. It is a time for action rather than for theorising. Let the National Committee speak the word that shall usher in great events!

The correspondence was discontinued until October 1853, when, while in Malta, hearing that a handful of obscure emigrants were working with Mazzini to prepare an uprising in Sicily, Crispi wrote to him with the double purpose of putting him on his guard and of voicing certain complaints.

BROTHER,—The die is cast! At the present moment an uprising in Sicily is imminent, if, indeed, it has not already taken place. God grant it may not prove a second sixth of February!

Knowing that I was here you should have forewarned me. Those to whom you have seen fit to entrust the initiative will not be able to exert any influence whatsoever in the provinces of Palermo and Messina; their names, indeed, may even be greeted there with hostility, and bring about a reaction. Now without Palermo and Messina every attempt in Sicily will prove vain. But what is done is done, and our plain duty now is, to work together in helping on the undertaking, and, as far as is possible, in warding off evil consequences. Let me know the plan of action and what orders you have issued to the leaders. Although I have little regard for them, I intend to do my duty, and this for the good of our country and party, upon whose already tarnished reputation another failure would bring utter ruin. You will remember that ever since 1850 I have been ready to hasten to Sicily. At that time we were working to form the National Committee



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and raise the loan that should provide funds for any great emergency. Then the Sicilian Committee was formed and speedily dissolved, while two years passed away, during which time you worked to prepare an uprising in northern and central Italy, forgetting Sicily entirely. But not so my friends and I, who were convinced that the greatest possibility of success lay in this island. Nor was this all. After your misfortunes in Lombardy you forgot your old friends, and flung yourself into the arms of men who, up to that very moment, had held you and your theories up to ridicule, but who had been clever enough to deceive you through Signor Lemmi, to whom they had declared their intention to act.

I am no more their enemy than are any of the friends who belong to the party opposed to Calvi.

Being but recently arrived in Malta I would not identify myself with any one of those wretched factions which divide Sicilian emigrants in that island, because I was confronted on all sides by men of dubious pasts, and there seemed but few honest souls in either camp, but surely I did not deserve to be ignored by you who knew me, and to be kept in ignorance of an event whose consequences you were unfitted to judge, you who are and always have been ignorant of Sicilian conditions. But *factum infectum fieri nequit*. Write to me at once about all these matters, that I may be in a position to do all that is in my power. Have you provided for military and administrative organisation, which it will be necessary to have as soon as the insurrection breaks out? And how about the funds for maintaining the military forces? Rules should have been laid down for all these things, and their execution entrusted to

capable men. Heaven forbid that necessity should convert the bands of liberals into marauders.

But enough. Write to me soon, and at the same time answer my previous letters. Remember the enormous responsibility that rests upon you !!

Greetings and brotherly regards.—Yours,

CRISPI.

TARXIEN, 13 November 1853.

Mazzini answered this sharp letter on December 23, after the attempted uprising had miscarried :—

Brother, I have received your letter. I have no time to explain and discuss the events of the past as I should like to do. I think you are mistaken as far as I am concerned, but that matters little. If my writings have reached you, you are aware of what my position has been since February. Convinced of the absolute impossibility of carrying out vast plans, and long and vague conspiracies ; convinced that the country is ready, and that a call to insurrection that could be upheld for one week would be answered from all sides ; convinced that the European situation now offers us a more favourable opportunity for action than ever before, I gave the call to action ; I promised to aid in every way whomsoever should act in the name of our principles. Since then, as regards initiatory steps, I have remained absolutely passive. I accept a proposal to act, no matter whence it may come ; I accept it in the sense of preparing others to second it should it take place, and of imparting to it, as far as is in my power, our own principles and an absolutely national character. This I did, and am still doing, for the Sicilian attempt. I believe it is well timed. I wish that many would join in it, in order to render it more determined. I believe it is the duty of all,

even of such as do not sympathise with its more active promoters, to enter into this movement, to strengthen it, to render it universal should it take place. Insurrections left to themselves quickly die out or become sectarian. This I have said to others, and this I repeat to you.

What the sounder part of the body of emigrants is looking for, I do not know. But I do know that probably even as I write, the Powers are reluctantly being forced to take serious steps, whose consequences will be felt throughout Europe. I know that if we remain passive under such circumstances, foreign influences, diplomatic and dynastical influences of a treacherous nature, will be set in motion. I know that we should not hesitate to seize this opportunity of winning a right to be heard in the Capitol. I know that Sicily is ready, but that any vast conspiracy will be frustrated. Conspiracy must take the action. The flag of insurrection must be upheld in one place until the news has had time to spread from one end of Italy to the other and the whole country will rise and follow. In Naples work is already going on among the people and the militia. A beginning has been made, and they will follow us if the first cry raised be Italian, and its keynote: 'for our liberty and yours!'

Help us, Brother, and encourage all to action. That is all I want to say. Put aside all dissension. The country, roused to life at last, will judge. For more than a year the strong Party has been allowed to suffer disruption and fruitless dishonour. Cry out to the Party to come forth into the field. The National Flag: Proclamations in the name of God and of the People: The popular note in everything: Insurrectional committees of bold and honest

men : Appeal to all save to those who are notoriously bad. Adopt strong measures and wage war against all such as shall show themselves our enemies, but let there be no organised system of terror. The rest will come of itself from mutual contact when once the movement is started.

Good-bye, and believe me to be your brother,

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI.

We do not know whether there was further correspondence between Crispi and Mazzini during the year 1854, but we know that on his arrival in London, the following year, Mazzini was the first person Crispi sought out. As they were still personally unacquainted, Nicola Fabrizi, an old friend of the Ligurian exile, provided Crispi with a letter of introduction to him, perhaps not without value, as the unanimity with which the police of different countries had persecuted him might easily have aroused a doubt whether Crispi were not an imprudent person.

‘ A few words for Crispi to take to you, the truth of which is vouched for by the affection and esteem between us.

Crispi is the victim of malicious enemies, jealous not only of his straightforward nature, but even of the honour his misfortunes have brought him, and stirred by a hatred of our principles. He is one of those Sicilians who are truly Italian, heart and soul.

Any other verdict upon him is untrue, and whatever you have heard to the contrary you may be sure that it is either false or superficial.’

Mazzini was absent from London just then, but on learning that Crispi was anxious to see him, he wrote him the following note:—

BROTHER,—As you have probably been informed, I am here in the country for various reasons, and shall not be able to return to London before Sunday.

We might then meet at four o'clock. If this suits you, take an omnibus at Piccadilly at half-past three—the one with Putney on it, in large letters. Say you want to go to Park Lodge, Parson's Green, and the omnibus will bring you straight to the door. It is rather a long journey, but in London all distances are great, and I cannot meet you elsewhere as I have business with some English people who live at that address. Believe me, yours,

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI.

Thursday evening.

No brother could have been kinder than Mazzini was in helping Crispi in his attempt to accustom himself to life in London, and to find work. Many letters written in 1855 and 1856 prove this. In one of these, dated January 20, 1855, he writes:—

My American friends, Saunders and Sickles, are in America at present, but I will try, all the same, and let you know the result. I think I shall succeed.

As to the book, alas! If it were in English it might make its way, but when it comes to getting people to read Italian—there are so few who know that language. As to a translation, that would mean expense and risking money. I think the best plan would be to communicate with the secretary of the *Evangelical Alliance*, Sir Culling E. Smith. He speaks Italian as well as we do. Would you like to meet him, talk to him about your work, and tell him frankly that you are an exile, and must support yourself by your own efforts? I could give you a line for him. Meanwhile keep on working, and let me know when you want the note.

Since we last met some disastrous arrests have been made in Milan.

Some of the dissenters have come over to us since the Alliance.

Good-bye. As soon as I receive any news, I will write to you, or arrange to meet you.

In a note of March 30, Mazzini sent Crispi a passport. Thanks to his influential connections Mazzini was frequently able to procure passports. 'Here is a blank passport for an American citizen. Fill it in with your name. This is as good as naturalisation. I have your old one, which I will send you.'

We quote from other letters:—

June 26.—Were you ever employed in any business house? A firm here, Pattison Brothers, is looking for a clerk for Italian correspondence. It is a good house, and I believe would pay about 120 francs, and perhaps more, according to merit. I think I might safely recommend you. But you must know something about business. . . . Shameful inaction still in Italy. Nevertheless they may wake up presently. In Naples efforts are reviving. I do not mean the Muratist movement that Saliceti is taking such an active part in. He does not belong to us.

June 27.—Here are a few lines for Pattison. There are two brothers, both of them most kind.

June 29.—Here you have the note for Valeri. You will find his place easily enough if you walk down Oxford Street. I am not sure of the number.

The note ran:—

DEAR VALERI,—Signor Crispi, who is bringing this letter, is an Italian from Sicily, one of our best men, and a great friend of mine and of friends of mine.

He will probably be leaving England soon, and

being an exile will be obliged to look for some work as a means of support. Will you give him an insight into your branch of business? I will answer for it that he will not abuse any kindness you may show him. He will not make use in London of any experience gained with you. I feel that with this assurance you will not hesitate to comply with my request, and I am grateful to you in anticipation.

The letter was addressed to

SIGNOR GAETANO VALERI,
Photographic Establishment, 8 Oxford Street.

13 *June* 1856.—You are to be given a post in the banking office of our French friends, but you should be in Paris by Sunday, and see him at once.

Crispi, in fact, left for Paris immediately, and stopped at the 'Cité du Midi' outside the Barrière de Clichy. He hastened to present himself to the Banker Léonce Pignière, who took him into his office as he had hoped. But he soon perceived that Mazzini's confidence in Pignière¹ was misplaced. The banker was an unscrupulous business man, and on the pretext of having found other work, which, unfortunately, was not so, Crispi left him.

In the same year came this letter from Aurelio Saffi :—

OXFORD, *October* 19, 1856.

DEAR SIGNOR CRISPI,—Your letter of the second of this month reached me later than it should have done, for I was away from Oxford when it arrived. I must apologise for having kept the books you so kindly procured for me, until now. But owing partly to the fact that the books did not reach me

¹ Pignière did indeed come to a bad end. In 1862 Crispi, who was then Deputy to the Italian Parliament, was surprised by a summons to visit some one in the Turin prison. It was Pignière, who was accused of fraud.

until some time after you had sent them to our common friend, and partly because as I have had many other things to attend to during the last few months, I was obliged to postpone the work in connection with which I needed them, and have only now begun it. I should therefore like to keep the books you lent me for another fortnight, for they are admirably suited to my needs. I must seem very slow and careless, but I must appeal to your kindness and patience! I am preparing some letters on Italian affairs to give English people a grasp of the situation, in which I want to set forth as well and as clearly as possible, the true conditions of the national problem, the features and tendencies of the Italian movement, and the responsibilities devolving upon the British nation, from the point of view of that international solidarity to which all civilised nations should aspire. In spite of a growing intercourse and sympathy with Italy, public opinion here is marked by a great deal of indecision and confusion concerning our capability to redeem and create a country of our own, and everywhere many wide-minded individuals who really wish to help the Italian cause, are asking for accurate information upon the true state of affairs, for the better direction and regulation of their efforts. It is to such demands that I now propose to reply, and in this way I shall be carrying out both my duty to English friends and my duty as an Italian. I am therefore most grateful to you for the assistance the documents you procured have given me, and I shall be greatly obliged if you will allow me to keep them a little longer.

Before closing this note I must ask you, if you should see Maestri and Sirtori, to greet them for

me with all the affection which my heart has ever cherished for their dear and revered names.

I have the honour to sign myself, with true esteem and gratitude, Your devoted

AURELIO SAFFI.

On the ninth of November Crispi wrote to Cesare Correnti, giving news of himself and with reference to a matter that had been entrusted to him :—

Three months ago I was in England a second time, and I set about getting the information which you need for your *Annuario* (Year-Book). I did not discover anything that bears especially upon our country. Murray's *Handbook of Italy*, and *Italy* by Whiteside, are useful for English people, but contain nothing new to Italians, who already possess more useful works of the same sort. There is the same dearth as regards maps of our peninsula.

In the case of the British Isles and the Colonies, however, things are very different. There are three or four works on the topography of this vast empire, which it would be no disadvantage to study. Among these the *Topographical Dictionary* by Lewis, and the *British Topography* by Gough, are valuable. As to maps, the best are those by Black and Johnston of Edinburgh. Besides these the *Ordnance Map Office* has issued by government order certain local maps which are of the greatest interest, among which I found the geological one, finished in 1841, most excellent.

There are more than a thousand journals and periodicals. Should you wish it, I could send you their exact number, and let you know what subject each deals with. I could also give you the history of English journalism and of the various parties that use it, telling you something of their strength,

and how and to what extent their influence is exerted. There are more weekly papers here than in any other country.

For statistical work, I should especially recommend the Journal of the *Statistical Society*, from which you might glean much material. The *Statistical Society* which, like all institutions of its sort in England, is a private association, has magnificent headquarters in St. James Square, in one of the richest and finest parts of London. Thanks to the contributions of its members its financial means are large. It can therefore pursue important researches, and need spare no expense in carrying out its undertakings.

Banfield's *Statistical Companion* would be useful to you. It is a small but valuable volume. The *British Almanack*, with the *Companion to the Almanack*, a sort of English *Gotha*, that is published annually in London towards the end of December, would also help you.

If you think that any of the above-mentioned works would help you in compiling your *Annuario*, let me know, and I will see that you get them.

His second day in Paris was less unfortunate than the first. By dint of great perseverance Crispi succeeded in supporting himself. He found sincere and cordial friends, especially among members of the legal profession, such as Desmarest, who later became president of the Order of Parisian Advocates. He had frequent intercourse with Jules Favre, Garnier-Pagès, Jules Grévy and Floquet, and spent the year 1857 quietly enough, surrounded by the *bourgeoisie* whom he greatly liked. He still kept up all his political interests, especially those that bound him to Mazzini. Unfortunately no political documents relating to this period have been preserved. The jealous vigilance of the Imperial Police led to frequent perquisitions at Crispi's residence, but he was clever enough to prevent the discovery of even so much as a square inch of compromising paper. Every letter he received was immediately destroyed.

This habit elicited the remark from the Prefect of Police, on the occasion of one fruitless search, that Crispi was cleverer than Mazzini, who, in Pietri's opinion, wrote far too much.

But Orsini's attempt, followed by the Tibaldi plot, both attempts on the life of Napoleon, so thoroughly exasperated the police that many foreigners who were known to hold republican views, were expelled from the country, and Crispi was one of these. The following decree was issued against him :—

Vu le rapport de M. le Préfet de Police en date du 1 août 1856, concernant le nommé Crispi François, né à Ribera (Sicile) ancien avocat à la Cour Royale de Naples, en ce moment commissionnaire en marchandises, demeurant à Paris, 48 rue du Faubourg Poissonnière.

Considérant que la présence de l'étranger sus-désigné sur le territoire français est de nature à compromettre la sécurité publique.

Sur le rapport du Chef de division de la Sûreté publique.

ARRÊTÉ.

Article premier.—Il est enjoint au Sieur Crispi François, commissionnaire en marchandises, demeurant à Paris, de sortir immédiatement du territoire français.

Article deuxième.—Le Préfet de Police est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

PARIS, le 3 août 1858.

Where should he go? He returned to London, but driven by necessity, he presently decided to go to Portugal, where Gattai, with whom he had formed a friendship when both were expelled from Piedmont in 1853, had started a small business in connection with road building by contract.

From Lisbon, where he remained from November 1858 until the end of January 1859, Crispi sent the following letter to Giuseppe La Farina :—

LISBON, 28 October 1858.

DEAR LA FARINA,—I have seen by chance

number 42 of the *Piccolo Corriere d'Italia*, in which my expulsion from France is announced. The reason for this measure is but vaguely set forth, and my name is associated with those of two persons with whom, politically, I have never had any dealings, and who are still living peacefully on French soil. Although you belong to a party that is opposed to mine, I must nevertheless assume that this piece of information got into your paper by accident, and that you will therefore be glad to receive the correct version from me.

I was expelled from France—such at least is the reason set forth in the decree of the third of August last, of which, should you desire it, I can send you a copy—because my presence in that country was a menace to public safety.

In justification of this iniquitous measure, M. Delangle, His Imperial Majesty's Minister, informed my advocate, the Hon. Demarest, that there existed in the police archives an appalling volume (*un dossier épouvantable*) against me. He stated, moreover, that I was suspected of belonging to all the most dangerous secret societies, and that all those who had come into France with the intention of murdering the Emperor, had come with recommendations to me. The same minister informed *Cavaliere* Ragani, a man who is the soul of honour, who was an officer of the First Empire, and who kindly came forward to stand surety for me, that the police had been unable to convict me, but that they possessed evidence sufficient to convince them that I was implicated in the Tibaldi plot.

There is no need for me to assure you that there was not a word of truth in all this, and that M. Delangle, as is usual with people of that sort, lied

shamelessly. During the two years and a half of my residence in France, I was never acquainted even with the names of the secret societies. I did not conspire with Tibaldi, nor did I have any dealings with the men who made attempts upon the life of Louis Bonaparte, nor even with any who desired to do so. Your journal having seen fit to deal with my case, I will tell you what my crime was, my true crime in the eyes of the Napoleonic administration.

On my arrival in France in 1856, I was pointed out to the police of that country as being hostile to an imperial form of government. This caused me to be placed under strict surveillance, which led to two most thorough perquisitions, one on November 11, 1856, the other in the night from the 14th to the 15th of January 1858, which were followed by verbal examinations and short imprisonment. The Prefecture of Paris, which was continually receiving unfavourable reports and denunciations against me, disappointed in its investigations, and never succeeding in convicting me of any illegal action, decided to set one of its watch-dogs upon me, in the shape of a man who came originally from Carrara, who fought under Garibaldi in 1849, and who now performs the basest duties human corruption has seen fit to enroll amongst the functions of state. This Carrarese set traps for me on all sides, as he has done and probably is still doing for many another honest patriot living in France. As a brother-in-arms of the unhappy Tibaldi, he gained admission to his house, where he imposed upon the landlady's weakness, and acquainted himself with facts, innocent enough in themselves, but sufficient to form the basis of report to the police. He was told—and this was true—that I interested myself in the

defence of the unfortunate youth, and that until last April, when he left Brest for Cayenne, I had been in the habit of sending him money to alleviate the hardships of his imprisonment. With these slight threads the spy wove his black web.

A few days previous to my expulsion a fresh circumstance arose that strengthened the position of the Carrarese.

Either as a result of their search or owing, perhaps, to the malice of a fellow-countryman, a piece of paper fell into the hands of the police on the 26th or 27th of July, containing some notes in my handwriting, which I had taken down after seeing M. Gastienne-Renette, a Parisian gun-maker, concerning a commission I had received from a Sicilian officer to buy a brace of pistols for him, of the newest kind. A criminal meaning was attached to these notes, and the deed was done.

I believe that these details will suffice to convince you of your mistake. Meanwhile, as this is not intended as a protest, and as I have no intention of forcing you to make it public, I will leave it to your own conscience to decide in what way best to rectify the false report spread by your journal.

Hoping to receive an answer without delay.—I remain always, Yours,

F. CRISPI.

A copy of the above letter with the following note was sent by Crispi to Lorenzo Valeno, editor of the *Diritto* :—

LISBON, 28 November 1858.

DEAREST LORENZO,—La Farina having announced my expulsion from France in terms that were inaccurate, I have to-day written a letter to him of which I enclose you a copy. Kindly print it in the *Diritto*, and send me the number in which it appears,

addressed to London, *poste restante*. I shall be in that city towards the middle of December.

It is painful that amidst the many sacrifices and sufferings of an exile of which I see little prospect of a speedy end, we should be ill-treated by those who, at least, should pity us. But what can one do? Italians have always been prone to rend each other, and it is indeed a miracle that true friendship still exists amongst us. Dear Lorenzo, forgive me any trouble I am causing you, and command me in everything in which I can serve you.—Yours warmly,
CRISPI.

While in Lisbon he did not give all his attention to business, as the following letters show clearly:—

LONDON, 16 November 1858.

BROTHER,—You ought not to leave Portugal without founding an Italian Branch of the Party of Action.

Try, through Gattai, to find out where the Italians meet, and to get into as close touch as possible with Italian residents in Lisbon. There are artists, working men, merchants, especially Genoese merchants in Lisbon. Make an effort to get in touch with them.

Tell these people how the Party is organised at all points in other countries, from Buenos Ayres to Constantinople, from Malta to New York, and impress upon them that Lisbon should be represented in this great brotherhood.

If you succeed in this, arrange for the appointment of a committee of three, one of whom must be a working man.

You know the general rules. Each member shall pay a monthly subscription to remain in the

treasury of the Branch, to cover current expenses, postage, etc.

The members shall be divided into groups or squadrons, with a Chief at the head of each group.

The Committee shall endeavour to collect subscriptions from the wealthier members and from Portuguese sympathisers, to form a working fund, which shall be paid over to the Central Committee.

There must be propaganda by means of the press, propaganda among Italian sailors, an understanding with captains of steamers, and the foundation of a Branch at Oporto.

The Party of Action and our newspaper must be advertised through the local press.

These matters must be the first business of the new section, the rest of its work will evolve out of the correspondence with London, which should be kept up regularly.—Yours,

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI.

LISBON, 18 November 1858.

Gattai is back again and I am living in his house, whence I write you this letter. Our business promises well, and we may expect a good result.

The local newspapers have made favourable mention of the *Pensiero ed Azione*. The ten subscribers have not yet paid their subscriptions, but Gattai promises to collect what is due for the three months, and you will receive the money soon, or when I myself come to London, which will be towards the beginning of January. I have advised him to ask for six-monthly subscriptions, and it would be advisable for you to send out corresponding receipts by the next post, those we have here being only for quarterly payments.

Please forward a copy of each issue of the paper since No. 6, to Gattai, whose address is 7 rua do Monte de Santa Catharina, and also to Signor Felice Vecchi, whom I think you know, and who lives at number 37 rua de S. Roque. I have let them have the first five numbers, out of the six copies that Rosalino gave me the day before I left.

We are going to form a Committee for Lisbon on the lines you suggest. A meeting is to be held to-night for that purpose. As your delegate I shall myself establish the Committee in office, and give your instructions to the members. Let me know if I am to give them your address, that they may communicate directly with you. They want a copy of your book, *La Guerra Regia*, which they intend to bring out as a *feuilleton* in a local paper, to confute the favourable opinion of Carlo-Alberto's attitude in 1848, which is held by many in this country.—Nothing more for to-day, save a warm embrace from yours ever, F. CRISPI.

When Crispi returned to London great events were preparing. Since September 1 Mazzini had been publishing his bi-weekly, *Pensiero ed Azione*, for which Crispi was invited to write. Here are a few lines by Mazzini in reference to the editing of the paper.

10 *March*: DEAR CRISPI,—From to-day's *Times* you ought to translate an article taken from the *Manchester Journal*, on Napoleon's letter to Francis Head. You will find it in small print, in one of the less important columns. Send your work straight to the printing-office, to save time.

11 *March*.—I am sending you the *Morning Advertiser*. It contains an article on Farini that deserves to be translated, at least in part.

29 *March*: DEAR CRISPI,—I have, as yet, heard nothing from you. I am just finishing the paper. Have you not prepared anything for it? Here is an article by M. A. which it would be well to translate, but I have not a copy of Machiavelli, and the quotations should be taken from the original. Have you a permit for the Museum, or some friend who has Machiavelli's works? Please let me know. . . .

30 *March*: BROTHER,—You must be very accurate in translating the letter I enclose, for the author knows Italian and will read the translation. I also beg you to write clearly. With this letter there will be more than enough matter for our next issue. I am also busy writing, and shall send in the editorial to-morrow morning. . . . Your articles are perfectly satisfactory. I want you to go on writing about Naples and Sicily, as you propose.

25 *April*.—Please translate the enclosed. The beginning of it has already gone to the printer. No matter what turn things may take, we must get out one more number of our paper, even if it be the last.

Early in March news was received in London of the terms of the Franco-Sardinian Alliance against Austria, which had been established between Cavour and Napoleon III. at Plombières. In the issue of *Pensiero ed Azione* of April 1 Mazzini confirmed this report, commenting upon the fact that France would accept Nice and Savoy in compensation for Italy's freedom 'as far as the Adriatic.' Many of the Italian refugees in London did not believe that favourable results would accrue to the cause of independence and the unity of their country from a war conducted by Napoleon, and these men signed a declaration drawn up by Mazzini setting forth their reasons for abstaining. Crispi was one of those who signed the document, but it was painful for a man of action like him to refrain from participation when there was fighting going on in Italy.

The war was of brief duration, however. Two months only elapsed between the Austrian ultimatum (April 23) and the battle of Solferino (June 24). On the eleventh of July the French and Austrian Emperors signed the preliminaries of peace at Villafranca without taking the trouble even to inform the King of Sardinia of their intentions. By signing this unexpected treaty of peace, which indeed seemed unjustifiable after a succession of victories, Napoleon failed in the fulfilment of the terms of the understanding established at Plombières, and Cavour immediately tendered his resignation to the ministry. Mazzini had been a true prophet. He had foretold this unexpected peace in a brilliant article in his own *Pensiero ed Azione* on December 15, 1856, as follows:—

. . . No sooner shall Louis Napoleon have achieved his purpose than he (fearful of the effect of a protracted war upon the people) will accept the first peace proposal Austria may make, alleging, moreover, the desire for peace on the part of the other powers. He will thus constrain the Sardinian monarch to desist also, granting him some tract of land in the most available position, and perfidiously abandoning the Venetian provinces to their fate.

CHAPTER V

Civil war foreseen after peace of Villafranca—Crispi goes to Sicily disguised, and with an Argentine passport, for the purpose of preparing the revolution there—Returns to London to change disguise and passport—His second journey to Sicily—Goes to Modena to confer with Farini, Dictator of the Emilia—Farini promises to help if the Turin ministry will consent—Crispi hastens to Turin—Crispi-Fabrizi correspondence—Crispi and Rattazzi, President of Ministry—Mazzini—Rosalino Pilo arrives at Genoa—His correspondence with Crispi—Does not believe in good faith of the Italianissimi of the Sardinian government—Announces his intention to start for Sicily without delay—Crispi advises him to see Garibaldi first.

ON May 22 Ferdinand II., King of the Two Sicilies, died at Caserta. He had been taken ill at Lecce four months before, on the fourteenth of January, when on his way to Bari, whither he was going to receive Maria Sophia of Bavaria, the bride of the heir-apparent, Francesco, Duke of Calabria.

The new King was advised to perform some 'acts of clemency,' and a royal decree, dated June 16, gave permission to many who had emigrated, in consequence of the events of 1848-9, to return to the kingdom. Needless to say, Francesco Crispi's name did not figure in the list.

The war with Austria, which at the outset had caused the departure of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the establishment of a provisional government, had gradually kindled national feeling throughout central Italy. On June 11 the Duke of Modena, 'wishing to spare his subjects the sufferings of an unnecessary war,' declared his abdication; on the twelfth the Bolognese rose up and proclaimed Victor Emmanuel King, and the Cardinal Legate abandoned his protests. Ferrara and Ravenna followed Bologna's example the next day; on the fourteenth Perugia once more acquired her freedom, only to lose it again on the twentieth, and on July 7 the faithful

Swiss mercenaries themselves rebelled against the King of Naples.

The whole of Italy was quivering and on the verge of civil war, and those patriots who had emigrated to foreign lands could no longer restrain themselves from action.

On June 28 Mazzini wrote:—

DEAR CRISPI,—Please go to Mr. Taylor, Carey Land, Foster Lane, Cheapside, and give him the promissory notes that have been endorsed. Present the enclosed letter and he will give you your money without claiming commission.

Thank him heartily for what he is doing for you. He is one of our best friends.

On the door of the Carey Lane establishment you will see the name: Cortauld's & Co. That is his partner.

I shall have secured your passport in two days. Meanwhile get ready.

Or do you perhaps prefer to ask to be sent home? I fear this course would lead to much delay. But it is for you to decide. Good-bye.—Your

GIUSEPPE.

Tuesday.

Crispi had decided to go to Sicily. He was risking his life, for should the Bourbon police get hold of him they would not hesitate to make him a 'public example.' But the time for action had come, and he could not hesitate. His mission was to go from place to place ascertaining if the Sicilians were ready to rise, and encouraging them to delay no longer that they might not find themselves incapacitated from action when, the war once over, diplomacy should sanction and guarantee the *status quo*.

Crispi left London on June 16 with the passport Mazzini had obtained for him. He had taken the name of Manuel Pareda, a citizen of the Argentine Republic, had shaved his moustache and whiskers, which he had been wearing after the English fashion, and he now wore thick blue glasses.

Crispi recorded the adventures of his daring journey in a diary which has been published ; and here it is enough to say that he remained in Sicily from the twenty-sixth of July until the thirtieth of August under the very eyes of the ever-vigilant Bourbon police. He visited Messina, Catania, Syracuse, and Palermo, conferring with friends in each of these places, imparting instructions to them, making arrangements for supplying them with arms, assuring them that they would receive immediate support on the outbreak of insurrection, and that he himself would return at once with many other exiles. When he left it had been decided that Palermo should give the signal for insurrection on October 4, and that the other cities should immediately respond.

From Messina Crispi travelled by way of Malta and Marseilles to Florence, where he met Mazzini, to whom he reported the result of his journey and his hope of a speedy uprising. He then returned to London, intending to change his disguise and passport, and be back in Sicily once more for the day of the great struggle. He had no time to lose. He reached London on September 22, where he received the information that the Sicilian uprising had been postponed until October 12. Crispi left London again on the seventh, his passport describing him as Tobias Glivaie, a British subject born at Malta. His hair, moustache, and beard were now as black as ebony. Punctually on October 11 he arrived in Messina, resolute to meet the supreme trial. He landed ; but the first friends whom he met advised him to return to the ship without delay, and without communicating with any one, as the police were on the alert, and the insurrection had been postponed *sine die*. An active member of the revolutionary committee of Messina came to him on board the *Carmel*, and repeated the request that he should not come ashore, in order not to compromise his friends. Thus forced to continue his journey, and being unable with the passport of a native of Malta to go ashore at that port, whence recently he had been expelled, he was obliged to go on to Greece, whither the *Carmel* was bound. On the way back the vessel put in at Malta, and Crispi, having obtained at Athens a passport bearing his own name, ventured to go ashore, but the police immediately ordered him back to the ship. He

wrote to Mazzini from Malta on October 29, informing him of all that had happened. He also wrote to the Messina and Palermo Committees, complaining bitterly of the delay, emphasising the advisability of seizing the favourable opportunity offered by the general political situation of Europe, and renewing his offers and promises of help as soon as the movement should begin.

By way of Gibraltar, and thence through Spain, for the Spanish government had subsidised all merchant steamers for the war in Morocco, and he was therefore unable to continue his journey by sea, Crispi reached Genoa at last on December 4, and was in Modena on the ninth. He had come thither to confer with the Dictator of the Emilia, L. C. Farini, to whom Nicola Fabrizi had already spoken concerning Crispi, communicating a report of the latter's first journey to the leader. Farini listened to his fresh report with sympathetic interest; but when Crispi explained his plan of collecting all those volunteers whom Garibaldi had recently commanded in Romagna on the island of Elba, and sending them thence into Sicily, Farini pointed out that this could not be done without the consent of both the Turin and Florentine ministry. Thereupon Crispi set out for Turin.

The diary to which reference has already been made brings us up to this moment. We transcribe several unpublished documents relating to this period.

Upon Nicola Fabrizi's request Crispi wrote out for him the following account of his first Sicilian visit:—

You question me concerning our affairs in southern Italy. I will explain in a few words, and it is hardly necessary to ask you to be careful about repeating them. It would be unfortunate should the newspapers get word of any part of this report. Whenever the press deals with events in the provinces and talks of impending insurrection, the police invariably takes the opportunity of perpetrating horrors. You must therefore be as silent as the grave.

I spent only half a day in Naples, but from what

I saw and heard I learned that sympathy for France is still strong there, on account of the recent war, despite its untimely close. I will not go so far as to affirm that Muratism has really taken root in the place, or will ever be able to do so; nevertheless any party championed by Louis Napoleon would be warmly welcomed. I visited Sicily from end to end, and remained some time in each of the principal towns. Public sentiment there is eminently satisfactory, notwithstanding much ignorance and popular prejudice. The government is profoundly detested, and travelling through the country to-day, one might well believe oneself back in 1847. The police, who are foolishly violent, have made themselves odious even to those who were most moderate in their views in 1848, and who, after the fall of Catania, became parties to a compromise with the Bourbon. Even among government employees one hears language that reveals their weariness of the present methods of government, and a desire for a political change. The revolution will be welcomed by all when it comes.

Maniscalco, the true arbiter of Sicily, as Satriano is of Naples, is always on his guard, as if ever on the eve of a struggle. There are 40,000 men in Sicily, 20,000 of whom are distributed between Palermo and the neighbouring points. The soldiers, with the exception of five or six battalions, are armed with *minié*-carbines; the cavalry is composed of *chasseurs*. Every barrack has two or three guard-corps, about three hundred paces apart. The companies that patrol the city at night are each composed of six soldiers and a police officer. Opposite the royal palace, where the bastion of Porta Nuova once stood, there are sixteen field-pieces.

The strength of numbers and of military equipment are, therefore, not inconsiderable. There are three times as many soldiers as in 1848.

Nevertheless the country will act, and, I hope, successfully, if we outsiders lend our support, and north and central Italy do not remain insensible to our efforts. I need not say what banner will be raised, if only one of us is there at the decisive moment. You know my principles, which can never change, but I repeat what I have told you before, that under existing circumstances there is but one object which must and can be kept in view, and that is national unity. If we but succeed in this, we shall be satisfied. Our children will do the rest, if indeed matters do not mend in our own day. I have worked exclusively with this end in view.

The Party of Action in Sicily is ours, and therefore unitary. In order to encourage it to act we have provided it with means which, though small, are enough to begin upon. But besides this group and behind it there is the *separatist* party, which is maintained by half a dozen exiles in Genoa and Turin, who hold out hopes of foreign aid, of which however, up to the present, there has been no tangible evidence. In Palermo I saw a letter from a separatist exile, an honest, cultured and intelligent man, who seeks to dazzle the people with the prospect of Bonaparte's patronage, if they will but choose his cousin for their king. I heard of a deputation of exiles who have started for Paris and London with this end in view.

There are two separatists on the secret committee of the Island, but they were ashamed to reveal themselves to me as such. They will be set aside

on the day our action begins, and that day is not far distant.

I told you the means with which we had supplied our friends to begin with were small. They do not include the 700 rifles bought at Malta, and 1500 more we shall be able to purchase there, and which are already at our disposal. I did not include these, because in order to buy them we shall need more money than we possess at present. Besides this, we must raise a sufficient sum to cover the expenses of the small steamer that you know of, to transport them to a given point on the coast of Sicily.

There is another manœuvre which should be attempted, and on this our friends insisted especially. The Neapolitan provinces must be stirred, or the Bourbon government at least so thoroughly alarmed, that they shall not feel at liberty to send further troops into Sicily. Should Sicily rise and Naples remain quiet, we should be crushed. An insurrection in the Abruzzi and in Calabria, a raid by Garibaldi—whose name is greatly feared throughout this region—leading them to believe in an invasion of the kingdom, would ensure our success. In the achievement even of one of these undertakings we shall be satisfied, and it would be to the interest of all Italians to further this. It is my firm belief that there will be war with Austria again in the spring. If during the next six months we succeed in freeing the Two Sicilies, so that the forces of the whole kingdom may be concentrated upon the national struggle, we shall conquer. If on the other hand the South remains enslaved, we shall surely be defeated.

Before closing I wish to beg you to bring pressure

on our truest friends to return to the kingdom. There can never be too many intelligent supporters of our cause in that country. You cannot imagine, and I myself would never have believed, the amount of good achieved by my journey. One of us on the spot is worth four at a distance. Every time I spoke my words were listened to with respect and affection, by men who were perfect strangers to me. I quite understand that this form of propaganda is a question of money, for such journeys are expensive, especially when one travels incognito and must avoid the danger of detection. I have learned this by experience.—Yours,

FRANCESCO.

16 Sept. 1859.

This letter, which Fabrizi laid before the Dictator Farini, impressed him deeply, so much so that Fabrizi concluded it would be well for Crispi to speak to Farini himself, and solicit his aid in support of the longed-for Sicilian insurrection.

Writing to Crispi on November 9, Nicola Fabrizi directed him thus:—

The person to whom you must now devote the most attention (that is Farini) will henceforth be alluded to between us as M. Alawison, and I beg you to go to him as soon as possible.

He added that Crispi must inform Farini minutely of the state of affairs, and pointed out several matters which he considered especially important.

The principal causes that combined to prevent the proposed uprising of October 4; the disintegrating policy of correspondents in foreign lands brought to bear upon an organisation comprising many who joined at a time when the direct action of diplomacy and of government forces could alone have been successful. In fact a certain individual has openly declared to me that he discouraged the

movement 'in order to temporise until the King of Piedmont's decision should be verified,' and this person constituted the channel of communication with another in the place to which this advice was sent, from whom, and from the same place, there issued further advice of the same temporising nature, 'because the Sicilian insurrection would injure the cause of the Central Committee.' And finally, to confirm my interpretation of what this particular individual said, read what Cesare's friend writes from Florence. '——'s letter was directed to Tanari, and forwarded by him to Tassi. He says that Naples cannot carry out a revolution: *that 2000 men would suffice to overcome 40,000 Neapolitans*; but that, even were it possible, it would *perhaps be neither useful nor desirable*. Tassi read this letter before a meeting held on October 28, at which Dragonetti, De Blasiis, Gemelli, Spaventa, Besandi, Tupputi, Bellelli, Ulloa, Mancini, and Nisco were present, with the result that De Blasiis, who is charged with the extension of the National Society, demanded an explanation of his father-in-law, Mazziotti, who, with Leopardi, etc. . . .

Even were the Society about to engage in decisive action, there are two drawbacks: first, the habit that prevails in Naples of giving way to that precedent, prevailing as much in the region of action as in the region of thought, of passivity rather than active support of the movement; and second, the continual harping upon the necessity for elaborate organisation, whose first result would be to destroy all possibility of immediate action.

Two sorts of Parthenopean Academies have been founded. One at Turin that calls itself *unitary*, to which the founder of the National Society (La

Farina) belongs, concerning which it must be added that a few months ago, notwithstanding its aversion to active measures, and in the belief that a favourable occasion had at last presented itself, it sent a message to the people of Sicily to the effect that if they thought it would be any easier to act for the ideal of Sicilian independence alone, they were free to do so. There are good men among these, and some who might be useful in more practical ways. Such a one is Antonio Plutino. But in general these men are dazzled, even to the point of losing all sense of just proportion, by the idea that they will obtain great things from the government, and I also believe them to be hampered by the heterogeneity of their association. They expect to get two millions, and two steamers—probably for the transport of the two millions. The other society is the reunion in Florence of those individuals whose names you will find at the beginning of this communication, and who have prepared a programme of action ‘for *Italianity and liberty!*’ Does not that sound like the theme for a high-school examination paper? Latinity, Italianity, humanity and . . . verbosity! One of its members came to the Central Committee to announce this programme. We, here, are in touch with both societies. We do not conceal our opinion of the line and methods they have adopted, and we never go into particulars concerning *what it is best to do*, because they are too numerous, too much given to journalism, too pretentious, etc., etc. And therefore in all our dealings I wish to impress upon you that what passes between us must remain a secret. They know that I can count upon some support, but they are unaware to what extent, from what source or on what terms.

I was obliged to give them an inkling in order to keep on an equal footing with them.

The very desire to procure two steamers plainly indicates the intention of an expedition, which *it would be impossible to carry out in the way they propose*, and whose chances of success have been further *weakened by overmuch discussion*. They forget the telegraph, the personal pretensions that must spring up in an undertaking in which many men of equal standing are associated. They forget that it is impossible nowadays to execute a movement *stretching across the breadth of the peninsula* without its being anticipated at Naples, or Paris, or perhaps even signalled from Paris to Naples. Taking into consideration the existence of the telegraph and local political conditions, the only logical plan—indeed the only plan—would be for the Tuscan government itself after using the press to strengthen the rumour that is already afloat, to the effect that the Grand Duke is about to purchase two steamers from Lloyd's,¹ suddenly and unexpectedly to purchase two ships, to throw a body of picked men from the League into Elba, and at a given moment, to be known only to the few indispensable men, to allow the chosen leader to appear upon the scene and carry out the undertaking. Any other plan would mean disaster. Not more than two members even of the Central government should have cognisance of this.

As regards myself, you must understand that as far as indirect activity goes, correspondence, the sending out of agents, various propositions of help,

¹ In a letter of the seventeenth of the same month Fabrizi wrote as follows on this subject:—‘If possible, I will send the news of the steamers the Grand Duke is going to purchase to the *Morning Post* this very day.’

all that is over for me, but I may still be of some use in this place (Malta) if I can have the handling of some funds, for here they would not be exposed to any abnormal dangers, my presence in itself being a guarantee, and as our friends would be acquainted with the existence of this fund, my influence with them would not only be increased, but the rights of compensation to those working the cause would also be ensured. Otherwise it will be better for me to leave here, out of consideration not only for our Sicilian friends, but also following the dictates of my own principles, for great events are now transpiring in other regions, and particularly around my own home, Modena. In this case I could say to these same friends: '*I am going about my own business, as I find yours so complicated.*' The one important thing at this moment is *that it should be thoroughly understood that action must be identified with political movement, so that the men in whose hands lies the ordering of the situation may accept the principle of action as an indisputable one, together with all the different elements that action may bring with it.*

Crispi's movements at this period are set forth in the following documents:—

GENOA, December 6, 1859.

MY DEAR NICOLA,—I had no better luck at Malaga than at Gibraltar. The Spanish government having subsidised all steamers that ply round the coast of the peninsula, it was impossible for me to get away by sea. In order not to lose more time than was necessary, I decided to travel overland, and after ten days I reached this city, where I found your welcome letters, which I am now answering.

I cannot understand why you did not enclose a

word of introduction to Signor Alawison (Farini) or a note to some one who could have presented me. It is an omission which I regret. Nevertheless, I am starting to-day, and shall call upon him. If I have time I will write to you again by Friday's post, and tell you the result of my interview. I will follow your directions carefully.

I do not refuse to buy the barley (to return to Sicily), but after all that has happened, and the report that has been circulated both here and in Turin that I was repulsed on the occasion of my last visit, and that they would have nothing to do with me, the request to buy must now come from them. It will of course be necessary to go there when there is no further doubt that the contract will be fulfilled (that the insurrection will take place). I need hardly inform you that friends and foes alike are already aware of my last purchase (journey) which was made in August, and that I must now take every precaution not to lose my capital (life). I will go more deeply into this with you after my interview with Signor Alawison.

If you wish to write to our partners, you will need no other address than the one Giorgio used when forwarding my letters. State at the very beginning that you write to them in Serafino's (Crispi's) name. The Palermo address is: Signor Mazzeo.

Stanislao (Mazzini) complains of your silence. He asked me for your address in his last letter from Lugano.¹

¹ The following appreciation of Mazzini and Garibaldi, which cannot fail to interest, was contained in Fabrizi's answer to this letter, dated December 17:—'As to our friend who complains of my silence, you must know that I wrote to him but a short time since; but as I had already written once before, and had received no answer on a very important

I have seen Fanelli. He has received the sum you sent him. From what he said I do not believe he will make up his mind to buy the corn (go to Naples) as he promised you. It seems to be too difficult a matter for him. You cannot imagine what a list of objections he put before me.

The enclosed is for Giorgio. Please have your letters copied, for I have much difficulty in reading your handwriting.

MODENA, 9 December, 1859.

DEAR SIR,—You have probably been informed that I was coming to these parts, and will therefore not be surprised at the news of my arrival in Modena and my request that you will give me a few minutes' conversation with you on matters of importance for the welfare of our country.—Looking forward to receiving your orders, I am, yours respectfully and devotedly,

F. CRISPI.

ALBERGO S. MARCO.

point, I would not risk writing again until I should have heard from him. Moreover, I had requested you to explain my position of temporising expectancy to him. The first part of Mazzini's last communication is lofty in tone, but by stooping to deal minutely with unimportant daily happenings, he ceases to be the high-minded political philosopher, who holds himself aloof and passes judgment, and becomes the politician, who struggles, fails, and loses his temper. His running after Garibaldi, only to be repulsed over and over again, his interference in a quarrel simply to accuse, where he could not possibly see clearly, his attributing the responsibility of disbanding the volunteers to Fanti, whereas it really rested with the manifesto that was the true instrument of their dissolution, and his seeking to detach his friends from Garibaldi, all these acts have not only displeased me, but greatly distressed me. It seems to me that such matters are of too delicate a nature to be thus openly handled. I am sure that Fanti is all that he declares himself to be, while Garibaldi (who is swayed by admirable impulses that are, however, not always opportune, and who is at times inopportunately impetuous) has exhibited such vacillation in the field of politics, whereas in military matters his conduct has been, and always will be, irregular. I believe him to be a very important factor, but to accept his opinions always and *a priori*, even when, as is frequently the case, those opinions are mistaken, was, is, and always will be fatal.'

TURIN, 15 December, 1859.

MY DEAR NICOLA,—By this time you are in receipt of my letter of Dec. 6th.

I went to see Signor Alawison, who sent for me as soon as he had received my note announcing my arrival. He reaffirmed his promises, and you have only to draw on *Avvocato* Nardi for the sums you need, and your draft will be honoured at once.¹ It cannot be arranged in any other way, for he has no other means of forwarding you the capital necessary for the undertaking.

Signor Alawison has supplied the person you recommended² with the necessary funds for the purchase of the corn. I found out, in the course of conversation, that it is a matter of some 2000 francs, which I greatly fear have been thrown away, for I do not believe the purchase will be made. Signor Alawison thought it was already completed.

Signor Alawison offered me money. I thanked him, and told him that I was not in need of any. I seized this opportunity to ask him to transact all business with you personally, and make all payments directly to you. He did not touch upon the private matter between you, so I, following your instructions, refrained from mentioning it. However, I asked *Avvocato* Nardi to take the matter up, pointing out the necessity under the present circumstances of defining your position and of getting it recognised officially by the firm at Modena.

¹ Farini promised Fabrizi and sent him at different times, about 40,000 francs, which were carefully expended by him to promote his own work in Sicily. He also helped to defray the travelling expenses both of Crispi and Rosalino Pilo, who were helped by Mazzini as well.

² Fanelli is here alluded to, who had undertaken to go into the Neapolitan provinces and prepare the revolution. 'To purchase corn' meant to go to the Neapolitan provinces. 'To purchase barley' meant to go to Sicily.

The plan¹ you proposed to me, under article 8 in your instructions, met with entire approval. Signor Alawison has sent me here to prepare everything that may be needed, and as it may be necessary to obtain the sanction of the principal house, of which Signor Alawison's is but a branch (the Ministry), I have had an interview with the present head of the firm (Rattazzi). We are on the point of coming to an understanding. He received me very kindly. He approves of what I have done, and I hope he will be of service to us. I have another letter of introduction from Signor Alawison, for an interview with the firm mentioned on the list Giorgio sent me from London, as having its headquarters at number 24 (Tuscan Ministry).

The Academies (Committees) mentioned in your instructions under number 7 are of no account whatsoever. The individuals of whom they are composed belong to an entirely different school from ours. . . . He denied belonging to it, or having even been present at its meetings. He expresses himself entirely of our way of thinking, and furthermore denies having written the letter cited by friend number 12 (Giorgio's list) and is ready to sign a declaration to that effect. He has promised, moreover, to place all the means he possesses—and they are not inconsiderable—at my disposal. It is my opinion that having now come to an understanding in the matter of the programme, it is advisable to set aside all personal differences, and avail ourselves of all material aid, no matter from what source it may come.

¹ The plan of assembling those volunteers formerly under the command of Garibaldi, in the island of Elba, and transporting them thence by means of two steamers to Sicily.

Concerning the measures adopted by Crispi to induce the Piedmontese government to favour an expedition, of which mention has been made above, there exists a diary, which we transcribe.

11 *Dec.*—I arrive in Turin at 8 P.M. and go to the ‘Albergo della Dogana Vecchia.’

12 *Dec.*—I meet Depretis under the *Portici di Po* (the Arcades), and ask for an interview. He consents, and we arrange to meet at 8 P.M. We meet punctually at appointed time. Our conversation naturally turns upon the conditions created in the South by the political changes that have taken place in the North. I tell him of my journeys to Sicily, of the probability of an insurrection in the island, of the necessity of support should the people rise in arms. I beg him to obtain an audience with Rattazzi for me.

13 *Dec.*—Depretis comes to tell me that Rattazzi will receive me at the Home Office on Thursday, Dec. 15, at 3 P.M. I ask him if, after my expulsion of March 1853, I may now be sure of not being molested by the police. He replies that the conditions that then prevailed in Italy no longer exist, and that I may safely remain in Piedmont. I ask him for an introduction to the Minister, which he promises to send me.

15 *Dec.*—Minister Rattazzi received me as soon as announced. I immediately introduced the all-important subject, related my experiences to him, and told him that Farini, Dictator of the Emilia, had urged me to consult him. I disclosed the plan for an expedition into Sicily, spoke of how it is to be carried out, and of the forces which are at our disposal.

‘Since the episode at Cattolica,’ I said, ‘you

have many volunteers whom it would be well to employ. The youth of Italy longs for action and is feverish with the desire for glory. Garibaldi, who was not destined to fight the Pope, will find a field for action in the south of the peninsula. It has already been arranged with Farini how and when to assemble the volunteers. To-day the Emilia and Tuscany are free, and will soon form part of the Kingdom of Victor Emmanuel. If we free Naples and Sicily, national unity will be within our grasp, and to you will be due much of the merit of this achievement. We are ready to give our lives, but the Sardinian government must help us with money and arms, and also make it possible for us to act. I can guarantee that everything will be done with the utmost prudence, and that the Piedmontese government will not be compromised.'

Rattazzi approves of my proposal on the whole, but fears his adversaries, who are jealous of him, and are doing their best to undermine his power.

'Have you seen La Farina?' he asked. 'You must get into touch with him, and then work together.'

I told him I had had no correspondence with Giuseppe La Farina for four years, but that until the year 1855 he and I had been intimate friends. I fear he will do nothing to promote this enterprise, but rather seek to frustrate it. La Farina belongs to a party opposed to mine, and his methods and manner of procedure differ widely from mine. He works with the help and under the direction of Count Cavour. No plan of ours could be carried out unless we both regarded it favourably.

'Very well, go and see La Farina,' he replied,

‘Talk to him, ascertain his views, and then, if you think best, I myself will see him and talk to him.’

We agreed that he should see Signor La Farina, and we can then decide how to act.

17 *Dec.*—I learn from Depretis that Rattazzi has had a long interview with Signor La Farina. Impossible to find out what passed between them.

24 *Dec.*—I go to Rattazzi again. The Minister sends me word to come some other time, as he is unable to receive me.

25 *Dec.*—Minister Rattazzi being invisible for the present, I have decided to look up my fellow-countryman, La Farina.

La Farina and Crispi had not met for ten years. Their discussion was long, and at times heated. When Crispi touched on the Sicilian expedition La Farina raised a number of objections, ranging from those of a diplomatic nature to technical difficulties. They separated without having arrived at an understanding.

On December 27 Crispi succeeded in seeing Rattazzi again.

I found him,—[so Crispi wrote],—in a different frame of mind and full of hesitancy. He repeated all La Farina’s objections and persisted in non-committal, even when I declared that the Ministry need not participate openly in our undertaking, but might keep its eyes closed. When I asked him for money for purposes of propaganda and to buy guns for Sicily he flatly declared that he had none.¹

¹ A letter from La Farina to Cavour, printed in vol. iii. (page 160) of the *Lettere di Cavour*, and which evidently bears a wrong date, would lead us to suppose that Crispi went to see La Farina once more after his interview with Rattazzi. ‘The Sicilian you know of has just been here. He tells me he saw Rattazzi this morning, who assured him that the plan to incorporate the ex-volunteers—*Cacciatori delle Alpi*—once more, is now impossible, because Count Cavour is opposed to it. He added: “You and La Farina are intimate friends (?). Consult him. He alone may be able to persuade Count Cavour to yield.” It is evident that this is a trick to render us unpopular with the more ardent spirits and with the Garibaldians. . . .’

Rattazzi was on the eve of resigning his ministry, and naturally, under the circumstances, he shrank from assuming any grave responsibility. However, the attitude he maintained towards the plan that was laid before him was not entirely hostile, for on the same day (December 27) Crispi felt justified in writing to Farini as follows :—

At first, the person in question and I were agreed as to what was to be done, and he promised not only financial help, but also to assist in the execution of the plan which I had the honour to lay before him, and for which we shall also need the support of our Tuscan friends. We differed in opinion, however, as to the proper time. The person above mentioned thinks that we should wait, especially as the Congress is about to assemble, in order not to render its decisions hostile to us. He is, nevertheless, of opinion that we should be making all necessary preparations, and holding ourselves in readiness to act at once, should the news from Paris be unfavourable to our country.

It would be a waste of time for me to explain to you why I am opposed to a delay which can only injure our cause. Should our friends ask to be allowed to act, we must not refuse, but rather lend them our support. And that they do desire to act at once is clearly seen by a letter Nicola showed me, which further states that my presence in the country is necessary. At any rate, as I do not wish to act on my own responsibility, but rather in concert with you and with our other friends, I beg you to let me know your opinion on this point. Should you desire my presence at Modena, in order that we may come to a better understanding, send me word, and I will come at once.

Soon after this Crispi must have learned that further

opposition to the Elba plan had been raised, for in his letter to Fabrizi of January 5, 1860, he wrote as follows:—

Serafino's (his own) journey to Turin on the fifteenth was undertaken at the instigation of Signor Alawison (Farini), who understood well enough that it would be impossible to assemble the 55 and 50 (Garibaldi's men) who are now disbanded, in 48 (island of Elba) without the permission of the 49 of 54 (government of Piedmont), which in its turn must make sure of the support of the 49 of 27 (government of Tuscany). It was furthermore settled that the purpose for which the 55 (the men) assembled there were to be used, must be known only to you and me, Alawison and one other person in 15 (Turin). 50 (Garibaldi) himself was not to be informed until the moment when we should need him. You see that everything was settled, and that the whole affair was to be a mystery. But to-day the game is up. Simply because 51 (Fanti) absolutely refuses to allow the return of the 55 of 50 (the men of Garibaldi) under any condition whatsoever, we have been forced to abandon our plan.

While working to develop the plan for an expedition into Sicily, in order to bring about the insurrection there which the Palermo Committee could not make up their minds to initiate, Crispi did not cease from urging his countrymen to cast off their hesitancy. He pointed out that the enterprise was blocked by the existence of a vicious circle of circumstances; that the patriots at home were waiting for the signal to come from the outside, from the emigrants, from Garibaldi or even Piedmont itself, while those on the Continent willing to support a Sicilian insurrection expected it to break out first in the island.

The faint hopes Rattazzi had inspired in Crispi quickly vanished, and he now turned anew to the promotion of the insurrection in Sicily, urging Fabrizi to provide arms, writing

emphatically to the friends in Palermo and Messina against the policy of inactivity continually advised by La Farina and other exiles, and using every argument to strengthen the unitary ideal. This form of propaganda, in favour of Unity, was most opportune, for the autonomous doctrines had found a soil eminently favourable to their development, in the spirit of 'municipalism' that prevailed among the islanders.

From Malta there came complaints from Fabrizi of the great difficulty he was experiencing in arranging with the Sicilian Committees for the consignment of arms. A pressing demand for arms would reach him, the means of contraband consignment would be carefully decided upon, and then, when everything was in readiness, there would come an order to delay transmission, or worse still, the persons appointed to receive the goods would fail to appear at the proper time and place. Fabrizi's letters at this period are full of bitter condemnation of these baleful conditions.¹

Mazzini, on the other hand, could not understand how a few objections, raised by outsiders, should have sufficed to paralyse all action, when everything was ready and the leaders had pledged their word. 'My faith is indeed shaken,' he wrote. 'What difference could the royal reply to the Tuscan deputation make in Sicilian affairs? . . . What you say about the necessity of introducing a certain number of men possessing the proper qualifications is perfectly correct. We have tried to put this principle into practice.'

Crispi replied :—

Letters I have received from Sicily, bearing date of the 6th and 8th of last month, promise action in the near future, notwithstanding the injuries our party

¹ On March 17 Fabrizi wrote to Rosalino Pilo :—'At Messina they have thrown aside everything that had been prepared, letters from us are intercepted, also those from our friends, and some of their own. There exists a regular plot to neutralise, disperse, and ruin everything. Having cast everything overboard, they (these same men) now demand *our* provisions. I answered that I was bound to know to whom, and under what engagement these were to be delivered up, and that I would have satisfaction in the matter of the intercepted letters. These are all underhand dealings, that only the presence of some of our own people can put an end to.'

has suffered from the events at Bagheria.¹ The Messina friends assured me that Catania and the province are in perfect readiness, but as they distrust Palermo, they wish to wait for that city to give the signal. How much truth is there in all this? After so many mistakes and deceptions my own faith is greatly shaken. Not, however, as regards the people, whom two or three competent leaders could easily rouse and direct, but as regards the heterogeneous elements of which the committees are composed, and which thwart every serious undertaking. It is therefore imperative, it is even a question of life and death, to dislodge or at least subdue these heterogeneous elements, and this task must be accomplished by determined men of our own party, who shall go there with this special purpose in view. . . . If you are completely exhausted, I myself am no less so. I have been rushing from place to place for the last six months, and as I am not alone, my journeys have cost double, and thus all the money of my own that I had left has been used up. If things turn out well for us, I shall be able to find work and earn my living, otherwise it looks as if we should end our exile in beggary. I should have been proud indeed had I been able to realise my ardent desire and avoid applying to the party for money for these journeys, but my own means were entirely inadequate, and besides that I must consider and provide for the possibility of imprisonment.

In a moment of exasperation Crispi wrote on January 12 from Turin to Giorgio Tamaio at Malta :—

¹ Reference is here made to an attempt at insurrection on October 9. One of the Campo brothers, who was at the head of the insurgent forces at Bagheria, a large township at the very door of Palermo, was to have given the signal by presenting himself in the city with his men. He failed to do this. The police, who had been warned, made numerous arrests.

From the diplomatic point of view things are progressing favourably. The return of the Dukes, and the Pope's reinstatement in the provinces of Romagna, are so many problems solved. If the Two Sicilies could be roused from their lethargy we might achieve national unity. The Rubicon is in the South, and he who refuses to cross it is a coward.

The year 1859 has passed away, and those miserable mountebanks have accomplished nothing but a few peaceful demonstrations. To-day one third of January is gone and still they show no signs of acting.

The probability of Congress assembling becomes every day more remote, and war is very generally anticipated. There is talk of fresh Croats in Venetia and of French reinforcements in Lombardy. Do these fine gentlemen of Messina and Palermo expect an army to come over from the Continent and set them free? Every day that passes means a loss to them. Such losses quickly become irreparable and must be paid for by long years of slavery.

Towards the middle of December 1859 Rosalino Pilo arrived in Genoa from Lugano, where he had been with Mazzini, and wrote to Crispi on the seventeenth :—¹

Judging from the information you sent to Uncle (Mazzini), I thought I should find you here, and not until yesterday did I learn from Antonio (Mosto) that you were at Mecca (Turin). . . . I must see you, and it is absolutely necessary that you should come here, if only for one day, as soon as you get this.

¹ All of this Crispi-Rosalino Pilo correspondence is riddled with numbers, composed upon the seven verses of the *Trionfo della Morte* (The Triumph of Death) by Petrarch.

On December 26 he wrote :—

I have received no report from you of the business pending between Rattazzi and yourself—no communication concerning our own family (Sicily). Did you get any letters by the last courier? Have you made use of the new method to inform Pippo (Mazzini) of what you have told me? If, as I fancy, you decide to remain several days where you are, it would be well to send a full report to Pippo. He will be in London on December 30.

Crispi answered on the twenty-ninth that he had not lost all hope that Rattazzi would decide to help Sicily after all, and that he was striving to prevent the postponement of this assistance.

As far as the organisation of Garibaldi's men is concerned, all necessary steps have been taken, and the men whose participation is to be desired have all been written to. It would appear that Fanti is inclined to raise opposition, but as Garibaldi has already arrived here, I trust everything may be arranged satisfactorily. The main point is, that the people here wish to await the action of the Congress. I resisted this proposal because it is against the interests of the country. However, to-day I no longer regret it, for a letter I received from Palermo this morning convinces me that they are in no great hurry there. They demand the arms that have been promised them, but they do not say they are ready to act, as they did before; the tone of the letter is so indifferent that it is enough to discourage one completely.

But on January 2 he replied as follows to Rosalino Pilo's scepticism, which had no faith in the 'Italianissimi' members of the Piedmontese government, who feigned benevolence simply in order to discover the intentions of the men of action :—

In general I put but little trust in men. I judge them by their deeds, but I do not confide in them. If there are no deeds to judge by, then I have lost nothing. The worst of it is that for the time being there is not a single deed worth doing. You are probably aware that Cappello, Di Benedetto and other friends have been arrested, and that they are now awaiting their trial, the indictment being in the hands of the famous Calabrò. For the moment, therefore, it would be foolhardy to think of departure, and we must await letters containing positive information before deciding anything. Ask Mosto to inquire of Rebisso if any letters for me arrived from Malta last Friday.

On January 4 he added :—

Here I am being continually sent from Herod to Pilate, and I have also begun to fear that nothing will come of it. I have neither seen nor tried to see Garibaldi. He is as weak as any woman, and allows himself to be interviewed and hoodwinked by every new-comer. Here the most vital questions are only dealt with from the personal standpoint, and it is enough to discourage any one.

The two friends continued to communicate all their news, their impressions, disappointments, and hopes to each other. But one subject pervades the whole of this voluminous correspondence—the freedom of their country.

From Pilo to Crispi on January 4 :—

Letters containing minute particulars which were received by an acquaintance of mine last night had already informed me of the arrest of our friends. These particulars you will find in the Genoese papers, as they were sent especially for publication.

Cristini, the gardener of Mezzomonreale, who has

been expelled, has arrived here. He told me of the arrest of Rammacca, the powder maker. A cart in which a case of gunpowder had been concealed was stopped at one of the city gates, and the carter having confessed its contents, Rammacca was promptly arrested. This is a great loss.

Our friend, who has just arrived, says that all are eager to act, but since Campo's unwise demonstration, they have been disarmed, and are now destitute of arms. It is of supreme importance that these should be provided, and sent off at once. Do you know whether Nicola (Fabrizi) has sent off his? If not, let me know immediately.

Pilo to Crispi, January 5 :—

I have just received yours of the fourth inst., through our friend Antonio. . . . I am extremely sorry to hear of Nicola's (Fabrizi's) illness. It is especially unfortunate at this time, because if the arms are not forwarded, we shall fail to accomplish what we wish to do in our own family. If Nicola had already sent the merchandise, or were about to do so, I would leave here on the 12th of this month with Corrado and another friend. . . . But our family must raise 3000 francs to pay the bills at home. Are you quite sure our friends in Palermo have provided proper quarters and sufficient money and that they are in possession of the things Pippo (Mazzini) forwarded that you informed me had been received by Agresta (of the Messina Committee), and sent on by him? I must be sure of this.

Has Nicola received the 10,000 francs from Farini—yes or no? For if he has not received the money lack of funds will prevent his forwarding the merchandise.

Crispi to Pilo, January 8 :—

In my letter of January 4, I informed you that Nicola had not sent off the arms, and that he had not even signified to me his readiness to do so. As to the money, he can have it whenever he likes. He has been authorised to present drafts which will be honoured at once. The fact that he has not yet done so is due to certain scruples of his, and because the person upon whom he must draw is his business representative, and he fears that, by making use of him, his own private interests might suffer if things went wrong. I will go back to place in question (Modena), and try to arrange matters differently.

Agresta received the things you inquired about, and I can assure you they reached Catania the day before I passed through that city. Agresta told me he had forwarded them to Palermo, and I have no reason to doubt his word.

In Palermo sufficient money and arms, and also proper quarters for our purpose, had been provided. But since the Cappello mishap I have not heard what has happened there. It is quite possible that many things have been lost or changed. It would be advisable, therefore, to write to our friends and request them to send us a report on the situation before making any fresh arrangements. I will write again by the next post.

Pilo to Crispi, January 16 :—

I have written to Giovanni to find out if family matters are in the same condition as when you left. The answer should arrive by the regular courier on the 27th. I have also written to Giorgio, to know if he has the 700 (guns) ready to forward, and if a place for their consignment has been fixed upon,

and I also urged upon him to make haste. If the answers from both are favourable I will do my part, but if I hear that nothing has been concluded, I shall withdraw. In the meantime you have received a letter. What did they tell you? Keep me posted that I may know how to act. Did you succeed in arranging anything over there? I was told to-day that something is going to happen presently in the Marches, and that then help will be forthcoming. But I greatly doubt this.

Rosalino Pilo had decided to go to Sicily, believing that his presence there would help to counteract the influence of the temporisers, and to persuade his friends to adopt active measures. He had informed Mazzini of his decision, who warmly approved of it, declaring himself ready to help defray the expenses of the journey. Nor could Crispi disapprove; but while complying with Pilo's request for a sum of money, to be repaid out of the fund administered by Fabrizi, he nevertheless sought to delay his friend's departure, in order to minimise as far as possible the risk involved in the daring expedition.

Pilo to Crispi, February 14:—

You ask how much money I shall need to carry out my undertaking. My dear friend, how can I tell? I can make the attempt with what I have already, but if I had another thousand francs my chances of success would be greater. Therefore if you can contribute that sum it will indeed be a great boon. . . . I will delay my departure for the friends you mention, but you should know that a ship is about to start, and that I should like to take advantage of this favourable opportunity of crossing over to Palermo with three other friends.

Crispi to Pilo, February 19:—

I think you should see Garibaldi as soon as pos-

sible, and try to make use of him in every possible way. Meanwhile I beg you not to start until I have seen you.

Pilo to Crispi, February 22 :—

This morning Antonio (Mosto) came to me, and told me he could not cash the cheque you left with him, because it must be made out in Maltese 'crowns' and not in pounds sterling. Will you kindly change it into Maltese 'crowns' as soon as possible, and send it back to him by return of post.

Crispi to Pilo, February 23 :—

As regards the arms, our friends insist upon a most complicated arrangement. They demand that the ship that bears them shall be off the coast of Palermo at the exact moment when they will be needed. They declare they cannot arrange to receive them, and hold them in reserve. I really do not know which way to turn !

Pilo to Crispi, February 24 :—

I cannot make up my mind to go to Garibaldi, because, before helping us, he demands that some decisive step be taken to prove that those in the interior are ready to act. I prepared a letter with the object of persuading him at the time when our friends wrote ordering me to 'forward to the place indicated,' and authorising me to draw on them for funds to cover expenses, which 'decisive steps,' I felt I might point out to him. But as all this was quickly countermanded, I never sent the letter. If you think I had better do so now, let me know without delay, in which case I could send it off next Wednesday. . . .

My friends and I will postpone the journey in question ; nevertheless, we must work quickly, for something has been set on foot by others, and I am in a fair way to find out all about it. In order to break the ice, and to send all the intrigues of Independents and La Farinians to the devil . . . a group of our own people must go into the interior, and I myself still hold to my project. Come soon, that we may conclude this matter.

CHAPTER VI

Harassed by Cavour's police, and having lost all hope of aid from government, Crispi leaves Turin and goes to Genoa—Pilo-Crispi letters to Garibaldi, inviting him to lead an expedition—Departure of Pilo for Sicily—Uprising in Palermo on April 4—Crispi and Garibaldi—The arms of the 'Million Rifle Fund' confiscated by government—Pilo's letters from Sicily—Friends of the government advise Garibaldi not to start—His hesitancy—Telegraphic news from Malta compromises the departure—Explanations demanded—An apocryphal telegram—The Thousand set sail from Quarto on May 6—The end of Crispi's exile.

AFTER Cavour's return to power on January 21, Crispi, who had hoped to be able to remain in Turin, began to be harassed by the police. The chief of the Turin police granted him a 'permit of residence,' dated February 11, in which it was stipulated that he should 'present himself at that office on the expiration of the prescribed term, that further provisions may be made.' He was, moreover, bound to 'produce this permit for inspection at the request of any police officer.' It is interesting to note that Crispi obtained these advantages only by proving by his American passport that he had become an American citizen. The police permit described him simply as 'a native of America.'

Without waiting for the expiration of his term of residence, towards the end of February, he left the Piedmontese capital for Genoa.

Rosalino Pilo had not yet despatched his letter to Garibaldi asking for help. This letter, dated February 22, was probably not despatched until March 7, for, writing on the 9th to Giacomo Agresta at Messina, Pilo says:—

. . . The day before yesterday, on receipt of your letter of the 20th, and of another of the 9th, from

Palermo, I wrote to him (Garibaldi), requesting him to furnish us with arms, ammunition and money, placing everything in the hands of some one in whom he has confidence.

The original purpose of this letter—a request to Garibaldi to grant some help out of the ‘ Million Rifle Fund,’ now became a direct invitation to him to head the expedition for liberating Sicily. In this document, which sets forth the definite and well-matured plan for the expedition of the Thousand, Crispi’s hand is plainly visible. The style of certain passages is clearly his, and the language is sufficiently polished to show it to be the work of a clever pen, whereas Pilo’s compositions, although the sentiments are of the noblest, often leave much to be desired as regards literary form.

GENOA, 22 *February* 1860.

MOST HONOURED GENERAL,—I sent you word through our excellent friend Bertani, that something definite was afoot in Sicily. The day after you left Genoa for Caprera a letter reached me of such great import as to convince not only myself, but also my friends, with whom you are acquainted (amongst others, Nicola Fabrizi, who is not easily deceived), that the bolder spirits in Palermo are determined to have done with that despotism which oppresses them, and separates them from the rest of the Italians.

We have also received instructions as to the point of consignment of requirements necessary for the success, not of a disorderly uprising, but this time of a serious insurrection. Some of these provisions have already been sent, others are ready at the place which I believe Bertani named to you. All have been collected and prepared by M——ni, who no longer insists upon the question of a republic. Those who summon us to Palermo have

authorised N. Fabrizi to draw upon them for all extra expenses, which we take as further proof of their determination to act.

Under these circumstances, if you, General, wish the undertaking to go forward with the greatest chance of success, you must place with all speed in the hands of men in whom you have complete confidence, such as Medici, Bizio and Bertani, revol. and money for the purchase of a certain number of rifles and some ammunition here in Genoa, and also for the charter of the steamer. As soon as this is done, I, with a few friends and Medici and Bizio, should they consent to join us, would start for the place already fixed upon, to aid my fellow-countrymen in initiating active measures in the south, whither we should count upon you to hasten on receipt of a telegram from us, place yourself at our head, and thus save the cause of Italy, which at the present moment is so seriously endangered.

It is to you, most honoured General, that this Italy of ours now looks for succour. Your recent proclamations to the Italians show your conviction that there is no other way save by the sword, and that Italy must arm herself with steadfast courage and strength of purpose if she would drive out the foreign tyranny that still dares to rear its head in the Peninsula. General, the help of your name and the means at your disposal will deliver Italy from the sufferings and dismemberment to which crafty diplomacy will otherwise subject her for long years to come. I beseech you not to be insensible to this appeal which is made in the name of all true Sicilians, and do not doubt that we shall, under your leadership, make the whole of Southern

Italy resound to the cry of *Union and Liberty!* You, General, holding the military command of the country, will thus be in possession of a guarantee that there shall be no swerving from the settled programme, which alone is capable of uniting all parties of action, and in this way we may look to a new Italy.

I beg you will consider this communication as strictly confidential; with the hope of soon learning your decision, and the assurance of my deepest regard and esteem, I have the honour to be,—Your most obedient servant and friend

ROSALINO PILO.

To General Giuseppe Garibaldi, Caprera.

Garibaldi replied immediately as follows :—

CAPRERA, 15 March, 1860.

DEAR ROSALINO,—Upon receipt of this letter, arrange with Bertani and the directors (of the Million Rifle Fund) in Milan to get all that is possible in the way of material requirements. In case of action remember that the watchword is: Italy and Victor Emmanuel.

I do not flinch from any undertaking, no matter how dangerous, that is directed against the enemies of our country. But at the present moment I believe any revolutionary movement in any part of Italy whatsoever, would be ill-timed, and would have little chance of success. Our country is to-day in the hands of empirical politicians who rely upon diplomacy for the decision of all questions. We must wait until the utter futility of such doctrinaire methods shall have been realised by the Italian people. Then will be the time to act.

To-day, we should not carry the great majority of the people with us.

Make my views generally known to your fellow-citizens that they should concentrate themselves upon preparation, and I am full of hope that the moment for taking action will soon come.

My affectionate greetings to you.—Yours

G. GARIBALDI.*

To Signor Rosalino Pilo.

Rosalino Pilo replied on the 24th.

In support of what has already been suggested that the idea of the Garibaldian action did originate with Crispi, it may be noticed that the draft of this letter of Pilo's is in Crispi's hand, and that only the note that follows it was written by Pilo himself.

March 24, 1860.

GENERAL,—I am in receipt of your letter of the fifteenth inst.

As long ago as last June, Sicily might have risen had it not been for the interference of a handful of those 'empirical politicians' who wrecked the revolution of 1848. The country is in the same condition now as it was in 1847. A friend of mine, Francesco Crispi, who was secretary to the Insurrectional Committee of Palermo during the famous January days, and who became later a deputy (to the Sicilian Parliament), confirms this fact from recent personal experience. At any rate I intend to set out for my native island, in order to satisfy myself concerning the true state of things there, and to hasten active measures by preparing everything that may still be wanting, by stamping out intrigue and ousting all who advocate delay.

Having made up my mind to undertake this journey, and relying on the help you promise me,

I leave my friend Crispi—who is also a friend of Bertani—in Piedmont, to arrange with the Milan directors (of the Million Rifle Fund) about the despatch of the requirements of which you know. A letter from me will give the necessary information with regard to how and where they are to be sent.

I beg you carefully to consider the fact that the Sicilian uprising will be marked by corresponding insurrection throughout the south of the Peninsula. This is absolutely necessary at the present time, if, indeed, Italy is ever to be made. To defer this insurrection would mean to favour the designs of diplomacy, and give Austria time to wax strong and to find allies whom she now lacks. Moreover, delay is precisely what Napoleon most desires, in order that he may have time to place a member of his own family on the throne of Naples—on the other hand, the insurrection will put us in a position of such strength as to be able to prevent the hateful bartering of Nice, and to set Venice free. Remember that there is a fleet and an army in the south, which are necessary factors in the conquest of our independence, and which efforts of the people alone can place in our hands.

I have nothing more to add, General, save from our hearts to wish you success and fresh glory in Sicily, in achieving the redemption of our country.

(Note). 24 March, 1860.—*Rosalino Pilo's answer to General Giuseppe Garibaldi, despatched through Dr. Agostino Bertani, to whom Rosalino Pilo himself consigned it in Genoa, on the evening of March 24.*

After Rosalino Pilo's departure with Giovanni Corrado¹

¹ This brave patriot is generally called *Corrao*, but in all Rosalino Pilo's letters and in those of his own, which we have seen, the name *Corrado* is used.

on board a wretched craft used for rough trading purposes along the coast, Crispi, who was extremely anxious on account of his landing, decided to send a trustworthy person to warn Messina friends of his approaching arrival, and to inform them of the place near that city where he would land. On March 29 he wrote to Fabrizi :—

On the morning of the twenty-seventh Rosalino at last got away. Do not breathe this to a living soul until he has reached his destination and made his arrangements. And even then, if you can, keep the secret. It will be better. I do not doubt our friends' prudence, but every one is eager to increase his own importance by imparting news. . . . Rosalino has set out on board a sailing vessel, and is to land on the beach, and without a passport. The danger is so great that I have been in a state of terrible anxiety ever since he left . . . He has some equipments with him. . . . In order to avoid a mishap I am sending Rosalia¹ off to Malta, that on the way there she may warn our friends at Messina, and thus enable them to take the precautions necessary for Rosalino's safety. The name of her ship is *Nostra Signora del Soccorso*, the captain is a certain Silvestro Palmerino. You can make use of him as soon as he reaches Malta. . . . According to your instructions, Rosalino will write to you through Giovanni Sferuzza. You must use the usual methods for Messina when writing to Rosalino. Put the words *Monreal*, and *Tullio*, on the outside of your letters. Please get the enclosed instructions printed and send two copies to Rosalino, asking how many more he needs, and where to send them. Forward me a copy as well.

¹ Rosalia Montmasson, a woman of remarkable courage, and Crispi's trusted companion during his exile and the campaign of 1860. She was one of the Thousand.

Foreseeing that he himself would be obliged to return to Sicily, he added :—

If I go to Sicily, I shall need one hundred and ten pounds sterling. . . . Do not mention to the bearer of this letter either that I may wish, or that there may be any obligation for me, to repeat my journeys of last July and October.

The departure of his beloved friend made Crispi very restless. The period of preparation had lasted long enough—the time for action had arrived, and the mine must be fired. Rosalino, with that impetuous courage that prompted him always to go straight to the mark, without pausing to consider the strength and numbers of the enemy, was the very man to reinspire the committees, who had been paralysed with terror by a further display of militarism and by police brutality. But the insurrection that was to burst forth at last in the unhappy island, under the banner of union, could not be left to manage itself. The Sicilians were without arms, and the Bourbon would bring his well-disciplined and numerous troops against them. Upon all free Italians devolved the duty to bear a part in this struggle that was to decide the fate of Italy.

Crispi, who was ready and even eager to return, was, however, determined not to do so alone.

When the news of the uprising in Palermo on April 4 reached Genoa on the seventh, he immediately determined to seek Garibaldi and urge him to fulfil his promise, and on that very day he left for Turin with Nino Bizio. Garibaldi promised to lead the reinforcements, provided the news of the insurrection were confirmed. Meanwhile he despatched Crispi to Milan to procure arms and money.

The busy doings of those few days are set down in the ‘Diary of The Thousand,’ contained elsewhere in this volume. Suffice it to say here that all the arms that the ‘Million Rifle Fund’ was able to supply, and on which the leaders had relied not only to equip the volunteers, but also with the intention of sending a large number into Sicily, were seized by Massimo D’Azeglio, Governor of Milan. Minister Farini,

to whom Giuseppe Finzi appealed to obtain their restitution, declared that he could not act without the consent of Cavour, who was absent from Turin, and remained away for several days. But even on his return the decree of seizure was not revoked, and the arms in question were not restored to the directors of the 'Million Rifle Fund' until *after* the first successes of the Thousand.

When the day of action dawned, Crispi, who had ever been loyal to his party, began to solicit and accept help for the insurgents from all possible sources, regardless of their political bias.

The intimacy that had been established between Fabrizi and Farini and other men of his stamp, was such that a sense of delicacy led them to exclude Mazzini, but it would have been unjust to proceed to action without his sanction, and Crispi, who loved Mazzini, and respected his views, did not fail to keep him posted concerning the course of events. This he was especially careful to do after Rosalino's departure, when there was otherwise no one left to inform him. 'Important news can come to me now only from yourself,' Mazzini wrote to Crispi, on March 30. On April 7, Crispi answered: 'You will have learnt by telegram news from the South. I shall probably leave this week. If you were only here (Mazzini was in London) we might go together.' On the following day he telegraphed him, begging him to come out to Italy and help. But Mazzini was too ill to travel. At last, towards the end of April, when the expedition seemed in danger of not starting after all, Crispi wrote him the following letter:—

I wrote you on the seventh from Genoa, and telegraphed on the eighth from Turin to the Browne address. I believed you would come out here—indeed, I needed you very much at that time.

The Sicilian insurrection had not failed when you wrote to M. Bar. on the seventeenth. It was in great danger, however, because it had been suppressed in Palermo, and the insurgents had been forced to take refuge in the surrounding country.

Nevertheless, it could have been rekindled, and still may be, by means of help from the outside, which was promised, but which I greatly fear will fail us. No, I fear help will not come, and the continent will remain inactive, instead of springing to arms as you yourself thought it would. An insurrection which was maintained for sixteen days, and which it took three reinforcements of troops from Naples to suppress, is one of real strength indeed.

According to his letter of the sixteenth, Rosalino had started towards Palermo. Let us hope he may be useful there and, above all, that he has arrived safe and sound.

Nicola is ill. He wrote to me on the 14th, that he had hired a boat to transport your provisions wherever they should be needed. But his tone was discouraged, and had also a discouraging effect as well.

Fresh reinforcements for Sicily left Naples on the 17th, and two steamers from the island reached that port with wounded.

Crispi wrote to Fabrizi on the 13th:—

I cannot make up my mind whether the news from Sicily should distress or encourage us. It is certain that the entire province of Palermo is aroused, but, being unable to hold the city, the insurgents were obliged to rally again in the country. Other towns in the interior have also risen. Up to the 7th, nothing had happened at Catania, but it was hoped they would revolt on the 8th. There was some skirmishing in Messina on the 8th and 9th. This was deliberately provoked by the police in the hope of drawing the most ardent spirits into their nets. These episodes, however, were not sufficiently

serious to exhaust the people's strength. It was hoped the province of Messina would rise, and orders had been issued to that effect.

In the face of these events it is useless to discuss the capabilities, great or small, of the men with whom we had and still have to deal. Such calculations, that are natural enough in times of conspiracy, are out of place to-day. We, one and all, must follow the impulses of our own hearts, which will carry us on to the field of action. We must assemble in the island with all the provisions we can collect.

Last Saturday, the 7th, I hastened to Turin, and thence to Milan. I saw Garibaldi's committee, who promised me arms, officers, and money to charter a steamer. I hope to get everything forwarded by next Tuesday. I did my best, and I can only trust in God, and hope that all will be well.

I saw Farini and shall see him again to-morrow. I believe we shall get nothing from him. His position is such that he has little freedom of action. Nevertheless, I feel it my duty to keep him posted on all points.

Here is the information he sent Farini on the 14th :—

The news from Palermo is of the 8th, the Messina news, of the 9th.

There was no uprising in Palermo on the 4th, but an attack of the regulars upon a large body of citizens who had assembled in the convent of the Franciscan Friars, called *della Gancia*. It would appear that these citizens were to have given the signal of rebellion, to which the peasants of the region around Palermo would have replied by descending upon the town and attacking the barracks which are situated outside the walls. The police,

warned by one of the friars, caused the gates and squares of the town to be occupied by the troops, and despatched battalions of *chasseurs*, the *compagnia d'armi* (armed company) of the district and half a field-battery against those assembled in the convent. An attack was made, and the fighting continued for eleven hours. All those who had been in the convent were massacred just outside its walls.

After this struggle the city was held by the troops. The peasants, who could not get in, and the citizens, who were unable to act alone with any chance of success, decided to assemble in the neighbouring country, in order to cut off all communication between Palermo and the other towns of the island, and to harass the garrison with a series of petty skirmishes until such a time as they should be strong enough to strike a decisive blow.

After this first victory, the government refrained from action until the 8th, waiting for reinforcements from Naples, when they would be able to despatch a body of troops into the country without weakening the force necessary to maintain order in the city.

The entire province of Palermo has risen and is in the hands of the people. Catania was to have risen on the 8th. That same day messengers were despatched from Messina throughout the province, to summon all to arms. All the young men of city and province, capable of bearing arms, were to meet together in two camps, one on the south, the other on the north, for the purpose of harassing the troops and decoying them into the hilly interior. The insurrection in the city was to take place later.

In Messina, on April 8, at 7 P.M., the police, wishing to end this state of uncertainty, made an

effort to provoke the people. Several ruffians were released from prison and let loose in the streets in the hope of attracting the inexperienced. The shout of *Viva l'Italia! Viva Vittorio Emanuele!* did indeed cause some to fall into the trap, and these were all promptly arrested and shot. After the firing the cannon, which were loaded with powder only, and several rounds of blank cartridges, the city became quiet again.

Meanwhile demands for help in any form are pouring in from Sicily, where they are confident of ultimate success.

News of Rosalino Pilo was long in coming. It had been supposed that the voyage of the ship, *Nostra Signora del Succore*, would take five or six days, but on the 13th April, seventeen days after its departure, Crispi thus expressed his anxiety to Giorgio Tamaio:—

No news from our friends. A report is circulating here to the effect that Neapolitan gunboats have captured a vessel bearing exiles from Leghorn. I am appalled by this news! May God help Rosalino and us!

Letters from Rosalino Pilo reached Genoa at last, one addressed to Garibaldi, another to his friends in general, and a third to Crispi. Here are the two last:—

MESSINA, 12 April 1860.

BELOVED FRIENDS AND BROTHERS,—Here I am, on shore at last. I have surmounted the first dangers, but fifteen days at sea prevented my arriving in time for the beginning of the Palermo revolution, which took place on the 3rd. Had I reached this place or Catania in time, both those cities would now be in the hands of the people. But I was late, and both are in a state of siege. The local

Committee is a timid body, and there is no organisation. The spirit of the people is all that could be desired, and the youth of the land is quivering with eagerness, but the hellish Bourbon government has made every arrangement for firing the city. I have this day proposed to assemble the younger men and march towards Catania and Palermo. We shall see whether the Committee will accept this proposal. If they do not, I myself shall start at once on horseback to join the 30,000 who are fighting in Palermo against the royal troops, those dastardly troops who turn upon their own brothers and support the most brutal and unholy of governments.

Our battle-cry is *Unità e Libertà d'Italia!* (The Union and Liberty of Italy!) Yesterday news came that the Bourbon troops had suffered serious defeat, and that many had been driven into the sea. This report was received by a foreign consul, and was communicated to me by a member of the local Committee who succeeded in speaking with me on board a foreign vessel, for the movements of all the members of the Committee are strictly watched.

At this very moment—noon—another member of the Committee—the one who wrote me that last letter, which you saw before I left—has been here to tell me that my proposal is accepted. So to-night I shall start for Scaletta with Corrado. We shall place ourselves at the head of a body of young men, carrying with us some ammunition and all the grenades available, and press forward to attack the royalists in Catania and other places. Several towns in the province of Messina are already in a state of insurrection. Milazzo has risen. The small garrison has shut itself up in the fortress and will be attacked. Barcellona is in revolt, and Marchese Mauro is there

with 400 armed men, and all the towns around Barcellona and Patti have raised the *puro vessillo tricolore* (the sacred tricolour). Sicily feels more strongly than any other region that we must all be Italians. I believe that we shall conquer, and that the hour of the downfall of despotism is at hand; nevertheless, we must strain every nerve to help each other. Try to rouse the government (Piedmont) by means of the press; the time has come for bold action, but not the kind of behaviour that the cowardly La Farina shows us—that of staying in Turin and playing the fool.

I am writing this in haste, so excuse all mistakes, and consider carefully all I tell you. Give the news to our paper, the *Unità d'Italia*, so that it may publish anything that should be known in your part of Italy. I am glad to give my life's blood for this Italy of ours! May heaven be kind to us!

Kindly forward the enclosed. If you do not receive any letters from me after this, you may conclude that it is impossible for me to communicate with you. But I hope you will continue to write, and send your letters to Messina addressed to Mariano Granati. The packet of letters and papers for me must bear my name in full and be enclosed in the packet to Granati.

Farewell, my dear Brothers. Greet Peppinello from me and any others who enquire for me, and believe me to be,—Your grateful brother,

ROSALINO PILO.

P.S.—Write to Calvino, Cianciolo, and Ribotti in my name. Tell them that, My God, they must work! Tell them also to threaten the Abruzzi provinces.

P.S.—Read the enclosed to Mosto, and then forward it without delay.

P.S.—If Serafino is still with you, this letter is for him too, and for my dear friend Antonio Mosto.

Good-bye. Corrado sends greetings.

12 April, 8.10 o'clock.

DEAR SERAFINO, — I have just received your letter dated 30 March. Yesterday it was impossible to obtain the packet of letters that the cook¹ had. They will come on Sunday, but I shall no longer be here, as I am starting to march on Catania with a large number of our followers. Even as I write, the forts, D. Brasco and Castellacio, are firing upon the city to intimidate her, but the women and children have left the town, and only the men engaged in the movement remain. The shops have been closed for some days now. It has been decided not to do anything in Messina until the rest of Sicily is free, that we may then fall upon the city with overwhelming force.

Many bad characters have been brought over from Calabria for the purpose of plundering the country as soon as it rises. Garibaldi must make haste to consign the arms and ammunition he has promised, and it is my opinion they should be despatched at once. The enclosed letter for Bertani contains another for Garibaldi on this subject. In it I invite him to come here. He would receive a joyous welcome, and his name would produce as great an effect as Pippo's. Good-bye. I have no more time for writing, and no thoughts left. Let all brave and generous souls who are still

¹ Angelo Renzi, of the steamship *Pausillipe*.

absent, hasten to Sicily. Good-bye.—Your loving brother,

ROSALINO.

Corrado's greetings to you.

Garibaldi had decided to go to the assistance of Sicily, and preparations for the expedition were being pushed forward feverishly. On the 20th Crispi wrote to Fabrizi:—

The vessel of which I told you will leave on Wednesday next. We shall have Garibaldi and his men with us. Keep this a profound secret. . . .

He answered Rosalino Pilo's letter on the same day (20th):—

MY FRIEND, DEARER THAN A BROTHER,—Ant., Or., and I all received your letters of the 12th. I need not describe our delight at seeing your handwriting once more.

As soon as we had read the news from home, I hastened to Garibaldi to urge him to fulfil his promises. In compliance with his orders, I made two journeys to Milan to conclude the necessary arrangements. I will not try to describe the difficulties there were to overcome, the petty hostilities, the mean ambitions I encountered, especially on the part of La Farina, who, not having succeeded in accomplishing anything himself, now seeks to hinder the action of others. However, as I have succeeded in procuring sufficient equipment, I shall come to Sicily towards the 25th of this month, with others under Garibaldi's command, and with plenty of fire-arms. Arrange to have us met somewhere between Sciacca and Girgente.

What shall I tell you of the state of affairs here? The Piedmontese government was filled with astonishment at the news of the uprisings in Sicily. As usual it declares them to be inopportune,

and it fears their effect will be to disturb the even course of annexation. . . . In Paris they are crying out against the English as the instigators of the movement. The imperialists, in order to distract public attention from the ugly bargaining over Nice and Savoy, accuse John Bull of being the cause of all these European troubles. Poor John ! He is such an egotist, and they would make him out a philanthropist. In general the press is in favour of the insurrection.

While Crispi, with the aid of Bixio and Bertani, was exerting all his influence to hold Garibaldi to his decision to start for Sicily, others were working to dissuade him. Sirtori, while he swore to follow the General wherever he might go, declared himself opposed to the expedition. Colonel Frapolli, an intimate of Farini's, acting at the instigation of the government at Turin, maintained that, the Sicilian insurrection having been suppressed, Garibaldi would be marching to certain defeat, and he reminded him of the fate of Murat, of the Bandiera Brothers, and of Pisacane.

La Farina, who, on the 20th, while he advised delay, had nevertheless not had the courage to refuse the rifles belonging to the National Society, which had previously been intended for a hypothetical expedition under Giuseppe La Masa, had now left Genoa, and nothing had since been heard from him.

On the 26th, Garibaldi was still hesitating. The latest news from Sicily was bad. A telegram of the 25th, despatched from Palermo at 11 P.M., said :—

Revolution suppressed at Palermo. City under strict martial law. Strong body of royal troops. Messina quiet. Armed bands in interior, few in number and widely scattered. Coast carefully guarded. Great excitement throughout the island. Same conditions in province of Trapani. Royal government re-instated everywhere save at Marsala.*

On the 27th Crispi wrote to Fabrizi :—

. . . . The steamer for Sicily will start to-morrow. Garibaldi will be in command. Besides myself he will be accompanied by the best of the younger men. As soon as we land, our troops and men will be organised. If you could join me, it would be a very good thing.¹

On the same day he added :—

News received by the last courier may perhaps cause the execution of our plan to be postponed. However, everything is in readiness, arms, men, officers, and even the ship itself.

In reply to his friend's expressions of astonishment that all Malta should be discussing this project, concerning which he himself had been sworn to secrecy, Crispi wrote :—

Everyone, even our enemies are expecting Garibaldi's departure for Sicily. Everyone has talked of it, and is still talking of it, but they can only infer what is going to happen. No one really knows what has been done, can, or will be done. . . . When you receive a telegram in the following terms, you will know our plan has been put into execution : 'Mr. Miller—Malta. Buy the corn referred to in my last letter. Rosselli.'

On the 28th, at 6.30 P.M., a telegram arrived that Fabrizi had despatched from Malta on the 26th, at 3.15 P.M. As had been prearranged, it was addressed to A. Mosto, and signed G. Stocker, and was couched in commercial language :—

Offer of 160 casks American rum 45 pence sold
66 casks English 47 in advance pounds 114 casks

¹ We wish to point out that in this correspondence the more important words were represented by numbers which have been deciphered. No. 99 stood for 'ship' or 'steamer,' and was used both for the singular and for the plural.

147. Brandy without offer. Advise cashing of bill of exchange 99 pounds. Answer at once.

This telegram was interpreted thus:—

Complete failure in the province and city of Palermo. Many fugitives received on board English vessels, have arrived at Malta. Do not start.

Crispi's despair may be easily imagined. This despatch, coming from so reliable a source, meant the postponement of the expedition, *sine die*. Garibaldi would have no more to do with it, and immediately, on the morning of the 29th, he wrote to Fauché, the agent of the Rubattino Steamship Company, requesting to know if one of his ships could drop him somewhere in the vicinity of Caprera.

Up to that moment no further news either from Rosalino Pilo or from the committees had reached Crispi, who had written to Messina as follows:—

I have received no letter from you by the last courier, which I deeply regret, as our business has suffered in consequence. The firm that had promised to provide funds and that still holds them at our disposal cannot fail to be discouraged by your silence, especially as the news we have received from those regions is not sufficiently favourable to our commerce. . . . Our friend, Signor Monreal (Pilo) has also omitted to write to us. Kindly forward the enclosed to him with as little delay and in the safest way possible.

The news from Messina that was 'not sufficiently favourable,' had indeed been of the very worst. Mariano Granati, which was the name assumed by a member of the committee of that city, had written as follows on the 16th April:—

. . . . We should have accomplished the most thorough and humane of revolutions, had not an act of appalling villany on the part of the government

destroyed everything on the evening of the 8th, its inhuman cruelty spreading fear and horror broadcast. The barbarity, cruelty, and shamelessness of the dastardly Neapolitan soldiery defies description. . . . For three consecutive days the shooting down of perfectly defenceless and innocent persons was carried on in the streets at the caprice of the soldiery. We have lost many of our best citizens. The city was in perpetual danger of being plundered and burned by the Neapolitan troops, who longed for this event as the hyæna longs for its prey. The prospect of booty made them bold and aggressive. The citadel and fortifications, on their part, were only too eager to vomit fire and destruction upon our unhappy town. Only the energy and activity of the foreign consuls saved her from an awful fate. . . .

The letter to Rosalino Pilo, sent by way of Messina, bore the date of the 27th :—

MY FRIEND, MORE DEAR THAN A BROTHER,—As the latest courier has brought no communication from you, in fulfilment of the promise contained in yours of the 12th to Garibaldi, to point out the exact spot at which we must land, there is much hesitation here, and I greatly fear I shall be unable to get the expedition to start. Add to this that the news brought by the last steamer is far from good, and that, in two and twenty days we have not received a single letter containing reliable information from Palermo. Here everything is ready, even the steamer. It is not improbable that we may start after all, and I therefore beg you, arrange that we be met at the spot indicated in my last letter.

The news from Sicily makes my heart bleed.

The barbarous cruelty of that government is unequalled anywhere in the civilised world. If it conquers eventually, it will have to thank those timid souls who headed the movement in Messina and Catania.

Write to me here, notwithstanding the above-mentioned projects may be long delayed.

In Mosto's name Crispi replied to Fabrizi's telegram on the 29th, at 10.55 A.M. :—

Repeat telegram more clearly, as merchandise 171 (Sicily) appears inconsistent with letter received from 56 (Messina). If no purchaser, 136 (send) sacks of corn or if you prefer 113 (money) for the 19th next (Rosalino).

But this telegram remained unanswered, or rather the answer did not reach Genoa until May 4, owing, it would appear, to an interruption in telegraphic communications. The cable between Genoa and Malta passed by the way of Sicily, and the service was consequently subject to frequent interruptions.

On May 4 Crispi wrote to Fabrizi :—

DEAR NICOLA,— On April 28 we received a telegram signed Stocker, and addressed to Mosto, which I interpreted as follows : ‘ Complete failure in the province and city of Palermo. Fugitives have arrived at Malta. Do not sail.’ The next morning I despatched another cipher telegram in reply which, translated, would read thus : ‘ Repeat telegram more clearly, as news you give us of Sicily appears inconsistent, after letter received from Messina. In case of complete failure, send money to Rosalino to escape.’

I need hardly add that your despatch and the fact of mine remaining unanswered, checked the

execution of the plan I have told you of in previous letters. Having implicit confidence in you, we followed your advice not to start. But the loss of ten days has certainly been a misfortune. To-day, however, everything has been reorganised as before, and to-morrow will see the end of delay. In due time you will receive the telegram couched in the terms I arranged in my last letter. Place the fire-arms at my disposal. I will send a steamer to Malta, which you can make use of. You and the rest of our friends can come across on it, if you have a mind to join us.

P.S.—I have received yours of the 28th, addressed to Orlando. Your despatch contained the following numbers: 160, 45, 66, 47, 114, 147. The first three figures can only mean ‘complete failure in the province of Palermo’: 47 has no equivalent in our table. The other numbers are simply incomprehensible, unless you mean to announce the arrival of fugitives at Malta, and that the English are preparing to defend the island. This last piece of news would have been superfluous. The words about ‘cashing the bill of exchange for 99 pounds could only mean that we were to hold back the steamer, or, in other words, to prevent its departure. *Cashing* stands for *coming*, not for *going out*. . . . Do not risk any more telegrams.

In his letter to Luigi Orlando, to which Crispi alludes, Fabrizi sought to explain his communication even before he had learned how it had been interpreted. This letter of the 28th contained the following passages:—

For two days I have been tortured by the fear that a telegram sent to Mosto for Ciccio, on Thursday morning (28th), may be misunderstood. In the first place, the cipher Mosto gave me, and which

figured largely in the Sgroi trial, is but ill adapted to despatches that must undergo inspection at Neapolitan stations, where everything that appears suspicious is promptly turned over to the police. . . . Certain persons have been here, openly canvassing a plan that Ciccio communicated to me with the utmost precaution and secrecy. These persons said the direction was the province of Trapani. (That is to say, the expedition would start for that province.) As the newspapers wrongly declared the whole of Sicily to be in a state of insurrection, I sought thus to rectify the false position as far as possible. . . . I beg you to set matters straight, if a wrong interpretation has been accepted.

A mistake had been made which would have proved fatal had not another telegram arrived on the evening of the 29th, purporting to come from Fabrizi, in answer to the one sent him on the morning of the same day. It read :—

The insurrection, suppressed in the city of Palermo, is maintained in the provinces. News brought by fugitives arrived at Malta on board English ships.¹

It was precisely on the evening of the 29th, at nine o'clock, that Bixio wrote privately and on his own responsibility to Fauché, who had undertaken on his own responsibility to furnish the two steamers, *Piemonte* and *Lombardo*. 'I must

¹ Many writers have declared this telegram to have been an invention of Crispi's. We neither affirm nor deny it. From his papers there is nothing to be learned on this point save that he was quite convinced that the Sicilian insurrection was to be taken seriously and that it would triumph, could it be properly supported. One of Garibaldi's close companions at this time, General Stefano Türr, wrote as follows on this subject : ' For the third time his determination was shaken, when Crispi arrived with a telegram in cipher (*and, be it said to his honour, it was of his own compiling !*), which telegram declared that the insurrection in Sicily was still going on. Hereupon the General exclaimed, 'Then we must support it.'—(General Türr's answer to the Bertani Pamphlet, 1869.)

see you,' he said. 'The news is good, and we are taking the matter up again.'

Garibaldi appeared to have finally made up his mind. On the first of May he received Giacomo Medici, his old friend and companion-in-arms at Villa Spinola, near Quarto, where he had been living since the twentieth of April. Medici was one of those who sought to dissuade him from setting out for Sicily. But Garibaldi's hesitation was overcome at last by Crispi and Bixio, who declared their intention to start, even if they went without him.

On the second of May, while Crispi and Garibaldi were alone together :

'You are the only one who urges me to start for Sicily,' said the General, 'all the others seek to dissuade me.'

'I do so,' Crispi replied, 'because I know this undertaking will bring the greatest blessing to our country, and bring much glory to you. I have only one fear, and that is because of the sea.'

'I will answer for the sea,' said Garibaldi.

'Then I will answer for the land,' Crispi cried.

On the morning of the sixth of May, the Thousand set forth on their great undertaking.

The joy of that step forward towards victory, but perhaps towards death, lifted the sufferings of eleven years from Crispi's soul.

THE EXPEDITION OF THE THOUSAND

CHAPTER VII

From Quarto to Marsala—Diary kept on board the *Piemonte*—Garibaldi's first proclamation ; organisation of the expedition—Crispi appointed Under-Chief of the General Staff of the Thousand ; his preparations to govern—The Municipal Body of Marsala, acting on Crispi's instigation, proclaims 'Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, and Garibaldi his Dictator in Sicily'—Crispi appointed 'Officer in Attendance on the Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces in Sicily.'

Extracts from the Diary kept on board the steamship *Piemonte* during the Expedition of the Thousand, that landed at Marsala in May 1860 :—

May 5, 1860.

11 P.M.—In accordance with the plan arranged this morning at the house of Nino Bixio, the marines who are to take part in the expedition and the sailors who have been enrolled to form the crews of the two steamers which will transport it, met upon the *San Paolo*, an unused sailing ship, now anchored at a pier near the old mole, in the harbour of Genoa.

Here Nino Bixio reads a proclamation from General Garibaldi, in which the names of the two steamers, *Piemonte* and *Lombardo*, are revealed (names that up to this moment had been kept secret), belonging to the Genoese Steamship Company of Raffaele Rubattino, which are to be taken possession

of by force, if necessary, Salvatore Castiglia having been appointed commandant of the *Piemonte*, and Nino Bixio of the *Lombardo*.

After the reading of this proclamation the two commandants proceed to enroll their crews. All are then embarked in a couple of boats already in attendance, and each crew is rowed off to the steamer to which it has been appointed.

12.15 A.M.—The two steamers are boarded without opposition from the sailors already on board, some of whom even consent to re-enlist on the same ship. The vessels lie at anchor side by side at a pier near the dock. Those members of the crew who do not wish to re-enlist are permitted to go ashore.

May 6, 1860.

While the *Piemonte* is preparing to start, the Harbour-Police boat, on its rounds, comes to demand to what port the captain is sailing; without giving any answer the commandant orders the sailors to seize the boat that is lying alongside, and lash it to the *Piemonte*. It is detained until the steamer is nearly ready to start, when it is set free.

1.45 A.M.—The engines being ready on the *Piemonte*, but not yet so on the *Lombardo* (which is the larger vessel) the *Piemonte* prepares to tow her companion out of port. A wide détour is necessary to avoid a French gun-boat anchored near the harbour mouth, from which violence might be expected.

2.15 A.M.—General Garibaldi comes alongside in a small boat, just outside the harbour. Complains to commandant of loss of time: but the reason of the delay becomes clear to him when he sees that the *Piemonte* has the *Lombardo* in tow. Steam is not yet up on board the *Lombardo*.

The general comes aboard the *Piemonte*. The *Lombardo's* engines being under pressure at last, the tow-line is cast off. The two steamers head for the beach at Quarto, where the volunteers are assembled in small boats, each having a lantern at the helm as a signal.

2.50 A.M.—Volunteers begin to come aboard both steamers on the starboard side, while the coal and equipments prepared by Nino Bixio are taken aboard on the port side.

The *Piemonte* furthermore embarks 1000 muskets from the government depot, packed in cases.¹

6.30 A.M.—Volunteers, coal, and provisions all on board. The *Lombardo*, without stopping to parley with the *Piemonte*, starts for the Straits of Piombino, where it has been arranged the two vessels are to meet.

The *Piemonte* remains at anchor on the same spot, waiting for a boat loaded with ammunition which had been entrusted to certain smugglers to bring out.

7.15 A.M.—The ammunition not having been delivered on board the *Piemonte*, the General, supposing it to have been taken aboard the *Lombardo*, gives the order to get under way.

8 A.M.—Off Recco, the chief engineer of the *Piemonte* comes to announce that the supply of oil and grease for the engines is insufficient. One of the ship's boat is sent ashore to procure more. It returns towards 10 A.M. The *Piemonte* gets under way again, with a fresh E.S.E. breeze blowing, and a slight swell which is sufficient to affect many of the volunteers, who become sea-sick.

¹ These belonged to the 'National Society,' and were given by La Farina.

2.30 P.M.—We overtake the *Lombardo*, which makes two knots an hour less than the *Piemonte*.

May 7, 1860.

7 A.M.—The *Piemonte* and *Lombardo* drop anchor side by side at Talamone. The General, wearing his Piedmontese general's uniform for the occasion, crosses to the fortress, and by clever diplomacy, obtains the following supplies from the commandant: One bronze culverin (columbrina) mounted on a naval carriage; three cannons of 4, and two of 6, with their carriages; these also are of bronze, and there is suitable ammunition for all, and a fair quantity of powder and cartridges. Thus the smuggler's shameful theft is more than made good.

8.30 A.M.—The General issues an order to land all the volunteers. This is done immediately by means of the ship's boats and some local craft.

11 A.M.—The steamers now move forward and cast anchor in a spot nearer the quay.

3.13 P.M.—The work of re-embarking the volunteers begins. On the beach they have been divided into seven companies, six of *chasseurs*, and one of Genoese carabineers. Four of the first six companies are taken aboard the *Lombardo*, the rest aboard the *Piemonte*, on which the General with his staff also embarks.

In Talamone the General has caused a proclamation to be issued defining the mission of this corps, explaining its organisation and giving the names of the commanders of the seven companies.

About one hundred volunteers remain on land under the command of Zambianchi, who are to march across the Tuscan frontier and enter the Papal States, in order to divert the attention of the

Bourbon and Papal governments from Sicily, the real goal of the expedition.

The night passes uneventfully, as we ride at anchor off Talamone.

May 8, 1860.

5 A.M.—The anchors are hauled up, and we make for Orbetello in quest of coal, of which neither steamer has a sufficient supply to enable it to face the dangerous journey that lies before us. Finding none at Orbetello we go on to Santo Stefana, where we procure a generous supply from the coal-store belonging to the very steamship company from which the two steamers have (ostensibly) been stolen!

5 P.M.—The *Piemonte* followed by the *Lombardo*, gets under way for Sicily, steering East $\frac{1}{2}$ by S.E., the sea and wind being perfectly calm. The *Piemonte* makes from nine to ten knots, the *Lombardo* does not get beyond seven. From time to time the first named vessel is obliged to stop to allow her companion to catch up. Progress is consequently very slow.

May 9, 1860.

Sea and wind still calm. We keep the same course, with lights out. Nothing happens during the night from the 8-9.

At dawn Orsini who, after the artillery pieces had been procured, was released from the command of the second company of *chasseurs* and appointed artillery commander, organises a perfect little arsenal in a cabin on the poop, near the top-sail mast. Aided by the engineer, Achille Campo, he has the moulds cast for bullets for the 1000 muskets taken aboard at Quarto, with the lead supplied by the Commandant of the fortress at Talamone. The

necessary cartridges are also prepared as well as the charges and grape-shot for the cannon obtained from the same officer. The sailors and several skilful volunteers are employed in this task.

10 May, 1860.

We still keep on the same course, with a calm sea and no wind. Nothing happens during the night from the 9th to 10th.

At 4.30 P.M. Commandant Castiglia with General Garibaldi's consent, after acquainting Bixio with the course he must keep to catch up with the *Piemonte* again, orders full speed ahead, with the intention of looking for the island of Marittimo. Not having discovered it by nightfall, the *Piemonte* lies to, to await the *Lombardo*. The lights are extinguished to avoid unpleasant encounters. The *Lombardo's* lights were also out. At 10 P.M. we see the *Lombardo's* smoke. At 10.45 the other steamer being now near at hand, the *Piemonte* is driven forward at half speed, in order that the *Lombardo* may keep up with her. Bixio, mistaking the *Piemonte* for one of the enemy's gun-boats, seeks to board her. Our vessel changes her course to avoid the other, but the *Lombardo* still makes towards her. The *Piemonte* running full speed ahead, withdraws to a certain distance. The *Lombardo's* mistake being apparent, the volunteers are all summoned on deck, the engines slow down to allow the *Lombardo* to approach, and presently, at a given signal, all the volunteers raise the cry of 'Nino Bixio! Nino Bixio!' The Commandant becomes aware of his error at last, and drawing nearer confesses to the General that he had taken us for a Bourbon cruiser. Had the *Piemonte* not been swifter than the

Lombardo a catastrophe must certainly have resulted.

12.30 A.M.—General Garibaldi summons Castiglia to his deck-cabin to consult him concerning a landing place. Castiglia fetches a chart of the Sicilian coast and spreads it before Garibaldi, who, following the southern coast-line with a pair of compasses, pauses at Porto Palo near Menfi. This Porto Palo is but a narrow and very shallow bay, which only small craft may enter. It would indeed be a suitable place for disembarking the expedition were its waters deep enough to permit the entrance of the two steamers, and were it possible to procure the means of speedy disembarkation there, an essential point with an expedition for which the Bourbon cruisers are on the look-out.

It would take one whole day, and the better part of the next, to disembark more than 1000 men with the ships' boats alone. In the meantime the enemy's ships might well take us by surprise, for they are no doubt in communication with the semaphores of the Sicilian coast.

These difficulties are explained to the General by Castiglia, who proposes Marsala as a more suitable spot. In the first place, it has a harbour which the steamers can enter, and moreover the disembarkation may be quickly accomplished by obtaining the use—either by force or persuasion—of boats belonging to ships in harbour, which are always numerous here. It is decided to land at Marsala, unless we find the enemy already there, in which case we shall disembark somewhere else on the southern coast of the island.

11 May, 1860.

At daybreak the two steamers are not far from the island of Marittimo, which lies to the E.S.E. Nothing more alarming in sight than a few latin boats pursuing their course with a light east wind.

We steer to pass to the west of the island of Favignana. The semaphore on this island makes some signals. We perceive that they are addressed to the other semaphore at Colombaia, near Trapani. The message is : 'Two suspicious steamers are steering westward.' We are very near Favignana, and the telegraph operator can easily see the crowd of men on our decks.

Having rounded the S.E. point of Favignana we sight Marsala, and presently two cruisers riding at anchor.

10.15 A.M.—The sight of these ships arouses alarm among the volunteers and also causes General Garibaldi and his Staff some uneasiness. Nevertheless we continue to steer for Marsala.

10.25 A.M.—A slight east wind, and a calm sea. We sight a schooner that we know by her shape to be English. She is evidently on her way from Marsala with a cargo of wine. We approach the schooner and signal the captain : 'What is the nationality of the vessels anchored off Marsala ?' The answer comes : 'English.' This restores the volunteers to their usual good spirits.

We draw ever nearer to Marsala, and fall in with a large fishing smack which Castiglia recognises by its shape as belonging to Marsala.

We oblige the skipper, a certain Strazzeri, to come on board the *Piemonte*, we taking his boat in tow. We learn from him that he had left Marsala that morning, and that a company of royal troops

who had been quartered there had started the night before for Trapani. Also that at the same time a part of the Bourbon fleet, consisting of three steamers and a sailing vessel, had withdrawn in the direction of Capo Bianco, and that the English ships had dropped anchor off Marsala, one after the other. One of these is a steam corvet, and is anchored about a mile outside the port; the other is a monitor, and is anchored near the shore, on the east, and not far from Nino's farm.

On receipt of this information from skipper Strazzeri, we make definitely for the harbour of Marsala.

11.45 A.M.—Shortly before entering the harbour General Garibaldi orders Castiglia to put out to sea again with both steamers as soon as the disembarkation is effected. He is to make for Leghorn, embark another band of volunteers, and land them at some place near Palermo if possible. Garibaldi gives him two letters on this subject, one for Baron Ricasoli, Governor of Tuscany, the other for Count Cavour, to whom he is to deliver it in person, going to Turin for this purpose should Ricasoli offer any opposition to the embarkation of fresh volunteers.

He furthermore authorises him to give chase to all ships flying the enemy's flag, until such a time as the national forces shall have occupied Naples. In sign of this authorisation Castiglia is provided with a sort of decree issued in Garibaldi's own name, and as Commander in Chief of the forces of the Roman Republic, the office he held in 1848-49.

12.15 P.M.—The Bourbon naval division which set out from Marsala last night is sighted about ten miles from the city. It is steaming straight ahead with an E.N.E. wind. Although these

ships are flying the Dutch flag, they are recognised by the shape of the sails of a frigate which one of the steamers has in tow. These ships are, the sailing-frigate *Partenope*, the cruiser *Stromboli* and the steamers *Vesuvio* and *Eolo*, the first belonging to the Neapolitan Steamship Company, the other to the department of Public Works in Sicily. Both are equipped for action and carry crews composed of marines in the Bourbon service.

12.45 P.M.—Our two steamers enter the harbour. The *Piemonte* casts anchor in the deepest part of the port, and brings her prow to windward. Bixio being ignorant of the bad state of the harbour, the *Lombardo* runs aground upon the bank of sea-weed that for years has choked one side of the port, and remains with her stern turned in the opposite direction from the *Piemonte's* prow, that is to say towards the E.S.E.

The disembarkation of the volunteers begins at once by means of the skiffs which all the ships anchored in the port—willingly or of necessity—have sent alongside the *Piemonte*. One English schooner freely offers her services. The first to land are the Genoese carabinieri, part of whom are posted at one end of the mole, the rest at the opposite extremity, for the protection of the rest of the corps.

The volunteers who were on the *Piemonte* are all disembarked. General Garibaldi with his Staff is still on board.

After the disembarkation of the volunteers from the *Lombardo* had already begun, the cruiser *Stromboli*, which had cast off the tow-line of the *Partenope* some four miles out from Marsala, entered the harbour, and came to a standstill within

rifle range of the steamers of our expedition, her prow towards the harbour-mouth. She prepared for action, but to the amazement of all spectators, nothing further happened. General Garibaldi, standing on the drum of the right paddle-wheel with Castiglia, was urged by him to go below that he might not be exposed to the fire that the enemy was evidently about to open. He replied: 'I do not believe they will fire.' And, as a matter of fact, they did not fire, but stood by inactive, watching the disembarkation of the volunteers from the *Lombardo*.

Knowing who her captain was (Acton), the Bourbon cruiser's inaction cannot be explained by any sentiment of patriotism on his part, but only by his fear of provoking our steamers (which he believed to be armed) to open fire upon his ship. In fact, as soon as the other two ships of his division appeared off Marsala, he got under way, and, joining them, all three took up a position beyond the mole, which formed a bulwark between them and our steamers. They then began firing upon the harbour in the direction of the city.

The English corvet above mentioned is anchored, as before stated, outside the harbour. She has not moved, her position being outside the range of the enemy's guns. About an hour after the landing of the volunteers, the English monitor started for Malta. The sailing-frigate *Partenope* arriving outside the harbour with only her mainsail spread, fired from the right a broadside on the city. Running before the wind, she takes no further part in the action. But the three steamers keep up the fire until nightfall.

4 P.M.—After the disembarkation the volunteers

are drawn up on the mole, and with General Garibaldi at their head, march at an ordinary pace towards the sea gate of the city. Although the column is exposed to the enemy's fire, not a single man is killed or wounded. A fresh east wind producing a slight swell, renders it difficult for the Bourbon vessels to direct their firing, and the missiles either crash against the rocks of the mole or, glancing off from these, sometimes hit the store-houses along the water-front.

The disembarkation of the artillery pieces, the ammunition and what few provisions are left, still continues. Everything is deposited in one of the harbour magazines, out of range of the enemy's guns.

The numerous blankets found on board our steamers (which are frequently used for passenger service) have been distributed among those of the volunteers who need them most.

The steamers, blockaded by the Bourbon ships, being unable to leave the port, we abandon them, their crews being subsequently formed into a company of marine gunners, under the command of Castiglia, which is told off to the artillery.

We spend the night in Marsala, where the sailors are lodged in one of the store-houses. The next morning at dawn, we leave Marsala, the sailors marching with the expedition towards the interior of Sicily.

No document is better able than this to satisfy the desire for accurate information concerning the voyage of the Thousand. Simple, composed without elaboration, it nevertheless contains certain details which are not set down in any of the other numerous narratives. The danger in which the *Piemonte* stood of being attacked by the *Lombardo* was

avoided as is here described, and the episode of the two ships, bearing with them the destiny of Italy, is pictured in all its beauty—the two ships which, after the impetuous and fiery excitement of Bixio and the painful apprehensions of Garibaldi, recognise each other at last amidst the darkness and the silence of the night at the cry of ‘Nino Bixio! . . . Nino Bixio! . . .’ uttered in chorus by a thousand voices. The heroic calm of the leader is also set forth in all its true simplicity in this diary of the voyage, especially in those passages that tell of the landing at Marsala. Unmoved by Commandant Castiglia’s entreaty to go below before the Bourbon ships open fire, Garibaldi defies danger with a smile, saying simply: ‘I do not believe they will fire.’

Francesco Crispi went aboard the *Piemonte* with Garibaldi at Quarto. His first letter on landing at Talamone on May 7 was addressed to Luigi Orlando.

Yesterday, up to 10 P.M.,—[he writes],—we had a rough sea. After that, and until eleven o’clock this morning, the weather was fine, and so it continues. The General has issued a proclamation announcing the organisation of his forces, appointing his Staff, the officers of commissary, and the commanders of corps. Out of twenty-eight Sicilians—there are no more of us among the Thousand—five were given appointments, and two will be made staff-officers.

The proclamation here alluded to is the earliest in order of date, and it deserves to be transcribed in full, from the original collection of all proclamations issued between May 7 and June 4, each one of which bears the autograph of Garibaldi and of his Chief of Staff, Sirton. This original collection also contains a list of all passwords and campaign-words in use between July 8 and September 15, with an endorsement by Garibaldi himself.

On board Steamship *Piemonte*,
May 7, 1860.

PROCLAMATION.

The Corps of *Cacciatori delle Alpi* (Alpine Chasseurs).

The mission of this corps will depend, as it did before, on the most complete self-sacrifice, for the regeneration of our fatherland. The brave *Cacciatori delle Alpi* served and will again serve their country with all the devotion and discipline of the best regular troops, and with no other hope, no other claim, than the satisfaction to be derived from the consciousness of duty done.

Not rank, not honour, nor reward drew these men. When danger had passed away, they returned quietly to the humble conditions of private life. But now that the hour of strife has come again, once more Italy sees them in the foremost rank, joyful, willing, and ready to shed their blood for her.

The present war-cry of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi* shall be the same as that which rang out along the banks of the Ticino, twelve months ago,

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL !

And wherever we shall utter this war-cry it will strike terror to the hearts of all enemies of Italy.*

Organisation of the Corps.

GIUSEPPE SIRTORI, Chief of Staff.

CRISPI, MANIN, CALVINO, GRIZIOTTI, MAJOCCHI BORCHETTA and
BRUZZESI, Under Chiefs of Staff.

STEFANO TÜRRE, First aide-de-camp of the General.

CENNI, MONTANARI, BANDI, STAGNETTI, GIOVANNI BASSO,
General's secretary.

Commanders of Companies.

NINO BIXIO	.	Commander of 1st Company.
ORSINI	. .	„ 2nd „
STOCCO	. .	„ 3rd „
GIUS, LA MASA		„ 4th „
ANFOSSI	. .	„ 5th „
CARINI	. .	„ 6th „
CAIROLI	. .	„ 7th „

Intendancy.

GIOVANNI ACERBI, BOVI, RODI, DE MAESTRI.

Medical Corps.

PIETRO RIPARI, BOLDRINI, GIULINI.

Note.—The organisation of our corps is the same as that of the Italian army to which we belong, and the rank, conferred in each case according to merit and not by favour, corresponds to that already held in other campaigns. (Signed) G. GARIBALDI.

(Endorsed) *The Chief of Staff,*
SIRTORI.

In organising his corps Garibaldi was obliged to consider moral rather than military qualifications, and upon the most distinguished of his companions he conferred rank in accordance with this estimate. Crispi was appointed Under Chief of Staff, but he had no real knowledge of the science of war, although, as Secretary of the War Committee, he had taken an active part in the defence of Sicily in 1848. In his youth he had made a profound study of jurisprudence, and had ranked first at the competitive examinations for admission to the magistracy. Having relinquished this career from love of independence he had, nevertheless, continued to study law. In a letter of December 26, 1847, Federico Sclopis showed his appreciation of Crispi's learning by wishing him an opportunity 'of spreading the fruits of his profound studies'

throughout their common fatherland. The renowned jurist added :—

The science of the law is something far more than a mere exercise in rhetoric. It may be placed in the first rank among the instruments of civilisation, of active, efficacious, and absolute civilisation. For this reason above all others, I entreat you not to abandon the important studies to which you have dedicated your intellect.

During the long years of exile, when Crispi could not practise his profession, he had studied the legislation of the different Italian states and of the countries in which he had been allowed to dwell, diligently composing special treatises and articles, especially for Pietro Maestri's *Year Book*. On his expulsion from Piedmont in 1853 the domiciliary perquisition executed by the police revealed nothing save a quantity of books and writings on legal or historical subjects.

His knowledge of the political and legislative organisation of the two Sicilies was more perfect than that of any other subject, because his heart had ever been with his own country, and an inner voice had all the while assured him that his wandering life was well worth living, and that he would one day witness the consummation of the hopes he cherished for his fatherland. As he journeyed towards Sicily as a member of a military expedition, Crispi was surely thinking out for himself what must be his line of action. There was fighting to be done, and, like the rest of his companions, Crispi was fully prepared to face the dangers of war. But there was a far-reaching civil action to be performed simultaneously with the military action, and to this task of civil administration he felt himself most strongly attracted. With this purpose in view, while the preparations for departure were being pressed forward in April, he had been carefully collecting his legislative material, and on the twenty-sixth he wrote as follows to Giacinto Scelsi, who was at Turin :—‘ . . . It is desirable that you should be here on Saturday (28 April), and I beg you to arrange to arrive by the first train. Bring with you the *collection of all Sicilian laws enacted in 1848-49*.’ On landing in Sicily he immediately,

and by means of the following letter, resigned the military appointment that he had been given :—

To General Garibaldi.

The undersigned, having never been a soldier, and possessing neither the necessary qualifications nor sufficient military learning, takes the liberty of resigning his position as Staff-Officer.

FRANCESCO CRISPI.

RAMPINGALLO, 12 May, 1860.

During the voyage Crispi had been constantly with Garibaldi, and together they had discussed the place of landing and the first steps to be taken. What title should the General assume? Crispi had pointed out that the one he had borne at Talamone, of ‘General of the Roman Republic,’ was at variance with the programme, ‘Italy and Victor Emmanuel,’ which he himself had insisted upon, and which all his companions, who had remained on board, had loyally accepted, after the withdrawal of that band of unyielding republicans which had occurred at their first landing-place. Garibaldi had finally accepted the proposal to call himself ‘Commander in Chief of the National Forces in Sicily,’ and acting on the advice of the leading members of his Sicilian contingent on board the *Piemonte*, to assume the Dictatorship, in the name of Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, as soon as the expedition should have achieved sufficient success to make this possible.

Concerning the point of disembarkation, Crispi stood by the opinion he had expressed to Garibaldi before leaving Genoa, that Porto Palo, between Sciacca and Girgenti, should be chosen. He considered it would be dangerous to attempt a landing at Marsala, which place, after the events of last April, was sure to be protected by troops and gunboats, and was at any rate too near Trapani, where there was known to be a garrison.

The reason why the expedition finally disembarked at Marsala is clearly set forth in the diary. The news communicated by the schooner on the morning of the eleventh, that two British gunboats only were anchored in that harbour, and the rest of the information furnished by Skipper Strazzeri,

to the effect that the troops had been withdrawn the day before, and that the battleships had started eastwards but a few hours since, determined the decision in favour of Marsala. But these circumstances, which it was impossible to foresee, in no wise detract from the value of Crispi's suggestions, and despite these circumstances one of the ships at least, with half of the expeditionary force on board, would have stood in danger of being sunk had it not been for the inexplicable delay in opening fire on the part of the Bourbon vessel, which had returned to Marsala, full speed ahead, as soon as the commandant learned of the advent of the two suspicious steamers.

Crispi was the first to land. He was quickly followed by Pentasuglia, who hastened to the telegraph office, and, pistol in hand, obliged the Bourbon operator to relinquish his post to him. Crispi meanwhile, in order to forestall the immediate and inevitable consequences of the removal of established authority, quickly proceeded to secure the custody of the banks, the post office, and the prisons, from which he released all political prisoners. He then repaired to the seat of the *Decurionato* (the municipal body), to take possession of the town-hall, but finding it empty he ordered the town council to be convoked for that same evening. Marsala's reception of the expeditionary force had been enthusiastic at first. The city had suffered in consequence of the uprising in Palermo on April 4. Many of her citizens had been imprisoned, while others had been obliged to flee to Malta. Moreover, the troops which had been sent hither had greatly terrified the peaceful population. At a first glance the advent of this expedition seemed but the forerunner of fresh distress, and this dread was further strengthened by the cannonading which the Bourbon ships kept up during the whole afternoon of the eleventh. It was therefore important to raise the spirits of the population, to inspire them with confidence, and to make all hearts throb in unison with those of their brothers from across the sea.

Garibaldi himself was present at the meeting of the municipal body. The presence alone of this man, whose fame invested him with great authority, sufficed to overcome all timidity. Crispi addressed the assembly. He spoke of the

joy of the exiles at once more beholding the land of their birth, of the anxiety under which all Italy was labouring, of the sympathy of all the European peoples with this undertaking in the cause of liberty. He extolled the fierce, independent spirit of the islanders, who would no longer suffer tyranny. He dwelt upon the delights of dwelling in a free country, and he declared that Garibaldi and his companions were come hither to risk their valuable lives, moved solely by the conviction that the Sicilians would rise to a man and join in a struggle that should free them and unite them to the other free peoples of Italy. In conclusion, putting his appeal almost in the form of a resolution to be passed, he uttered the following invitation to the municipal body :—

Proclaim Victor Emmanuel King of Italy, and his representative, Garibaldi, Dictator of Sicily. Invite all the cities and towns of the Island to follow your example. Your proclamation will be the starting point of the political transformation of our country.

These words, written on a slip of paper, which Marsala still preserves as a precious relic (together with a photograph of Crispi, which was solicited and obtained a year later), were enthusiastically received, and resulted in the passing of the following resolution :—

The municipal body (*Decurionato*) meeting in special session on the joyous occasion of the landing of General Garibaldi at Marsala :

While expressing their gratitude to this illustrious personage who is come to fight for the liberty of this country :

Unanimously resolves that :

The Bourbon dynasty be cast down from the throne of Sicily, and

Beseeches the above named General to assume the Dictatorship in the name of Victor Emmanuel, the constitutional monarch of Italy.

This municipal body furthermore invites all the townships of the island to follow its example.

Resolved and drawn up at Marsala, this eleventh day of May, 1860.

(Signed) GIUSEPPE ANCA MONTALTA.

LUDOVICO ANSELMI.

FRANCESCO CARONNA.

SEBASTIANO GIACALONE.

IGNAZIO MONDELLO.

GASPARE MILAZZO.

BASILIO COLICCHIA.

ANDREA DE GIROLAMO.

GIULIO ANCA (Mayor).

PIETRO PASSALACQUA (Secretary).*

Garibaldi hesitated to assume the Dictatorship, but on this first occasion he was forced to recognise Crispi's qualifications for office, and the latter as early as May 17 was already signing orders as the 'Officer in attendance on General Garibaldi.' With the exception of one small note-book Crispi unfortunately lost all his papers, as well as the archives of the campaign, together with the despatch-box that contained them and the horse that carried them, on the night of May 26, during the descent from Gibilrossa. The note-book in question, in which Crispi wrote the greater part of his diary, and during those early days entered memoranda of all sorts, contains the rough copies of two letters of the thirteenth, signed with his new title. One of the letters is an invitation to some person unnamed to 'furnish a printing press with type of two different sizes, and the necessary capitals.' The other says: 'Your Excellency is requested to appoint a powder-maker to come and organise a powder-manufactory in a place to be established by Lieut. General Garibaldi.' In both it is carefully stated that 'payment in full will be made.'

CHAPTER VIII

Garibaldi assumes the Dictatorship, and nominates Crispi sole Secretary of State—A government on the march—First decrees to dispossess the established régime and deprive it of men and money—Reorganisation of the country—Institution of the militia; administrative regulations; abolition of the tax on flour; police regulations; penal justice; indemnities—The Bourbon administration breaks up—The arrest of a thief—Death of Rosalino Pilo—Garibaldi circumvents the attempt of the Bourbon troops to surround him—A terrible night march—At Piana de' Greci—Orsini's mission—An appeal to Malta for firearms, and Castiglia's mission—Nicola Fabrizi—The diversion, and a second night march—Gibilrossa—Attack on Palermo.

As the news of Garibaldi's arrival spread rapidly, first to the villages around Marsala and then to the inland towns, men, badly armed indeed, but eager for the struggle, had come forward to meet him. Already on the night of the twelfth of May, at Rampingallo, their first halting-place, Baron Santanna di Alcamo had presented himself with fifty followers. At Salemi on the thirteenth the reception the corps received had been more than cordial—it was enthusiastic. On the fourteenth, yielding to the pressure that was brought to bear upon him, Garibaldi consented to establish his own authority, both political and military, and from the position of Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces in Sicily he raised himself to the Dictatorship, in the name of Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy. This change was instituted by means of a decree composed by Crispi, who read it to the people of Salemi and to the Thousand assembled in the square of that ancient city, once the abode of kings.

A dictator must have ministers to direct the government. He himself, as military leader, bore heavy responsibilities in proportion to the difficulties pertaining to an almost desperate undertaking. He knew nothing of civil government, and he

was unfamiliar with the country. Nevertheless, this country must be speedily roused, and a call made upon its strength. It must be inspired with devotion and confidence, and the outbreak of anarchy must be prevented. But a government without a residence, constrained to follow a small body of troops ever on the march, must be embodied in one man only, in one mind, one energy. And the man chosen was Crispi.

Having conquered at Calatafimi (May 15), a battle which was immediately followed by the hasty retreat of 3000 Bourbon soldiers towards Palermo, Garibaldi's hopes of ultimate success rose a hundred-fold. On May 10, as the Thousand were nearing their destination, he had reminded them in one of his proclamations to *fire as seldom as possible, to keep cool, and be daring*.

'If you fire upon the enemy,' he said, 'you *must* kill, because by firing without inflicting injury you only encourage your adversary, and give him a poor opinion of your skill. You must, therefore, be miserly with your shots, and rely largely upon the bayonet in fighting.

'I trust that, here in Sicily, our *chasseurs* will do nothing to lessen the reputation for valour and discipline which they acquired in Lombardy, for despite the evil insinuations of those who sought to defame our corps, no better discipline existed in any of the allied armies.

'Fighting as you are about to do, in the midst of a friendly population, you must remember to treat them with all possible consideration.

'In a future proclamation I hope to be able to praise the martial bearing of my companions in arms, and I shall gladly publish it to continental Italy, who is so anxiously awaiting news of us.'*

After the first victory, with a heart overflowing with exultation, Garibaldi spoke thus to the 'Champions of Italian Liberty' (May 16):—

‘With companions such as you, I feel I may attempt anything, and this I proved to you yesterday by leading you on to an undertaking fraught with great difficulty, both from the number of the enemy and the strength of their position. I counted upon your deadly bayonets, and you see I did not miscalculate. . . . To-morrow continental Italy will unite in celebrating the victory of her free sons, and of these brave Sicilians of ours. . . .’*

On May 17, at Alcamo, the Dictator formally invested Crispi with full power.

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

General Giuseppe Garibaldi, Commander in Chief of the National Forces in Sicily,

In virtue of the power invested in him, and

In accordance with the proclamation of May 14, concerning the Dictatorship, herewith makes known that :

ARTICLE I.—A Secretary of State is appointed to support the Dictator.

ARTICLE II.—The Secretary of State will organise and direct the work of his Office, propose the necessary provisions for the national welfare to the Dictator, and counter-sign his decrees.

ARTICLE III.—Signor Francesco Crispi is herewith appointed Secretary of State.

GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI.*

ALCAMO, *May 17, 1860.*

Crispi possessed great courage, great confidence in his own powers, and took great pride in serving his native land. The magnitude of the task did not dismay him, for he was not undertaking it unprepared. He knew well what had to be done. The administrative organisation of the Bourbon must be rapidly demolished, and at the same time a new State must

be constructed, reviving all the good the revolution of 1848 had produced. The wounds inflicted by a régime of political tyranny must be so skilfully healed as to leave no scar, and the rule of liberty introduced, beneath which the citizens, breathing more freely, should acquire the consciousness of their duties and, above all, of that special duty to defend the new State by their own efforts. The existing government must be deprived of the public moneys, and these turned over to the revolutionary fund. Garibaldi's first decree after that concerning the Dictatorship established obligatory military service for all citizens capable of bearing arms between the ages of seventeen and fifty, although conscription had hitherto been unknown in the country. A second decree, bearing Crispi's endorsement, appointed a governor responsible to the Central Government in every one of the four-and-twenty districts of the island, with power to re-establish town councils and nominate chiefs and officers of police. It further decreed that all sentences, legal provisions, and public acts should be issued in the name of Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, and it restored the laws and decrees that had been in force on May 15, 1849, the day of the Bourbon's reinstatement.

The form of this dictatorial organisation, besides showing that Crispi intended to avoid an error into which the revolution of '48 had fallen, which, by neglecting to place an intermediate authority between the State and the townships, had left these overmuch to their own devices, reveals a coincidence that is full of significance.

Among the papers of Rosalino Pilo, who four days later, on May 21, received a mortal wound from a Bourbon bullet, there was found the programme of insurrectional organisation in the brave patriot's own handwriting, which he had not had time to put into execution during the brief period that had elapsed since his landing on May 11. Carlo Pisacane had also landed at Sapri with another programme he intended to proclaim to the inhabitants, which document Mazzini himself had corrected, as is proved by a rough copy of it still in existence. A comparison of the text of Rosalino Pilo's programme with that of the decree issued on May 17 clearly demonstrates it to have been the work of Crispi himself. The Pilo document stands as follows:—

ARTICLE I.—An insurrectional committee shall be established in each district. It shall be composed of five members, one of whom shall be its president.

ARTICLE II.—The president of the Committee shall be recognised as the Commissary of the Nation throughout the district. He with his companions shall reside in the capital, or, when necessary, in any commune he himself shall establish as the seat of his government.

ARTICLE III.—As soon as the insurrection shall have broken out, the Commissary having conferred with the other members of the Committee, will re-establish in each commune the town council and all such functionaries as existed before the Bourbon occupation. He shall appoint others to fill the places of those who have died, or who from any motive whatsoever are unable to serve.

ARTICLE IV.—The following persons shall be excluded from participation in the communal council and from the municipal magistracy :—

a—Those who directly or indirectly helped to bring about the Bourbon restoration :

b—Those who are known to be opposed to the redemption of our country, who *conspire* and are *enemies of the Unity and Liberty of Italy* :

c—Those who have held or still hold office under the illegitimate power that now oppresses Sicily.

ARTICLE V.—The Committee shall decide questions of eligibility according to the regulations herewith established, and shall possess full power.

The first part of the dictatorial decree reads as follows :—

ARTICLE I.—A governor is appointed to each one of the four-and-twenty districts of Sicily.

ARTICLE II.—The governor will reside in the capital of the district, or when necessary, in any commune he himself may establish as the seat of his government. He will there represent the Head of the State.

ARTICLE III.—The governor will reinstall in each commune the communal council and all such functionaries as existed before the Bourbon occupation. He will appoint others to fill the places of those who have died, or who, for other reasons, are unable to serve.

ARTICLE IV.—The following persons shall be excluded from participation in the communal council, and from the municipal magistracy, both in the capacity of judges or as agents of the public administration :—

a—Those who directly or indirectly helped to bring about the restoration of the Bourbon :

b—Those who have held or still hold office under the illegitimate power that now oppresses Sicily :

c—Those who are known to be opposed to the redemption of our country.

ARTICLE V.—The governor shall decide questions of eligibility according to the regulations herewith established, and he is invested with all the authority that was conferred upon the Commissions of the Districts (*Commissioni Distrettuali*) by the decrees of July 22, 1848, and February 22, 1849.

It would be superfluous to insist upon the obviously common origin of these two documents. It proves the intellectual influence, already alluded to elsewhere, which Crispi exerted over Rosalino Pilo, and also how thoroughly Crispi prepared himself for the office of organiser of the new State in Sicily.

On the same day (May 17), at Alcamo, Crispi prepared

another decree for Garibaldi's signature, which enjoined the municipal bodies to acquaint themselves with the financial condition of all public offices, in the presence of those who had heretofore administered those offices, and to ascertain the amount deposited in each. This decree furthermore abolished the tax on flour, all other taxes instituted by the Bourbons after the fall of the revolutionary government of 1848, and the duty on cereals. Such citizens of communes 'occupied by the enemy' as should pay revenue, rents, or taxes were threatened with punishment, all such tribute being declared the 'property of the nation.'

On the eighteenth the Thousand were at Partinico, where Landi's retreating troops, who had been received with an outburst of hostility, had set fire to the public buildings, and had committed acts of violence even against peaceful citizens. The Dictator here published further regulations, well calculated to inspire confidence and greatly to strengthen the spirit of revolution.

All damage done by the Bourbon troops shall be temporarily indemnified by the government of the district in which it occurs.

At the close of the war all expense thus incurred shall be refunded to the local governments by the State.

The chiefs of the municipal bodies shall see that such damage is appraised by sworn experts, and shall pay the amount established by them.

The local governments are instructed to succour the families of those who are fighting in defence of their country.

The whole of that May 18 was spent on the march. Towards evening Garibaldi reached the Passo di Renna, high up among the hills, and here Crispi presented for his signature the appointment of a council of war, which plan he had certainly thought out while on the march. The administration of penal justice, which required to be swift and severe in its operations in order to gain the confident support of honest

men, and effectually to safeguard the honour of the revolution, was thus organised.

ARTICLE I.—While the war is going on all crimes, whether committed by the military or by civilians, shall be tried by court-martial.

ARTICLE II.—In passing sentence the following rules will be observed until such a time as the Piedmontese military and penal code shall have been proclaimed in this Island.

Continental Italians shall be subjected to the punishments prescribed by the aforesaid code. The islanders shall suffer those prescribed by the military penal statute, and by the laws that were in force until May 15, 1849. For certain crimes specified by these two codes the lightest form of punishment shall be inflicted. This exception will not be made in cases of thieving, highway-robbery, or sequestration of persons.

ARTICLE III.—The court-martial shall be composed as follows :—

A president, four judges, a judge-advocate (military), an officer of indictment, a secretary.

ARTICLE IV.—The following persons are herewith appointed Officers of the Court-Martial :—

President.—Colonel Calona.

Judges.—Bixio, Carini, and Forni, Commanders of the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*, and Santanna, Commander of the *Cacciatori dell' Etna*.

Judge-Advocate (Military).—Manin, Officer of the General's Staff.

Officer of Indictment.—Salterio.

Secretary.—Mazzucchelli (Salterio and Mazzucchelli both being Lieutenants in the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*).

ARTICLE V.—Should circumstances make this

necessary, a court-martial will be established in every one of the twenty-four districts of Sicily.

In the neighbourhood of Monreale, Rosalino Pilo had received Garibaldi's greetings, and at the same time news of the victory of Calatafimi, which resulted in the hasty retreat of Landi's troops and the opening up of the road to Palermo. As bearer of his message Garibaldi had sent one of his staff officers who was an old friend of Pilo's. Salvatore Calvino also brought instructions concerning the manœuvres to be executed by the squadron Pilo had collected, and which was now, under his command, almost at the door of the capital of the island. We may easily imagine the joy of this brave man, who with but one companion, Giovanni Corrado, had landed in Sicily not much more than a month ago, and had so successfully revived the courage of these islanders by the example of his own energy and the glad news of speedy help from their brothers of the Continent.

The tidings of the defeat of the Bourbon troops on the open field, followed a few days later by the news of Garibaldi's landing, had spread rapidly throughout the island, everywhere fanning the fire that had smouldered beneath the ashes into a clear blaze. Those who supported the throne and had long been conscious of the rapidly growing aversion of all classes of society to their régime were filled with dismay by these events.

The following letter from a military leader to Prince Castelvicala, which was intercepted and brought to Crispi, gives a fair idea of the situation :—

III. ARMY DIVISION OF THE FORCES

BEYOND THE LIGHTHOUSE.

No. 52.

Subject :

4 companies of the Second Infantry Regiment,

2 " " Fourth " "

6 " " Carabineers.

Half a Battery —

1 Squadron of *Cacciatori*.

Private and confidential.

GIRGENTI, May 28, 1860.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—Your folio of the fifteenth of this month was received by me yesterday at

7 P.M., at the very moment of my arrival here with the troops as per margin, for the purpose of restoring order. I will carefully carry out all that Your Excellency prescribes in aforesaid folio.

I deem it my duty, nevertheless, to inform Your Excellency that, although Girgenti is quiet at the present moment, no sooner shall the troops have withdrawn than the revolt, which is now in a state of suppression, will break out afresh. I have therefore judged it prudent to authorise the Commander of this place and the resident Officers to withdraw with the troops, in order not to expose them to a sacrifice which would be unavailing.

I hear that Gualgarnera in the province of Caltanissetta has revolted, and that Piazza is about to do the same. I shall start for Caltanissetta to-morrow, and there wait for events to develop. I assure Your Excellency I shall bear myself always like a true soldier.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have taken 4000 ducats from the revenue office of Girgenti for the formation of a campaign fund, with which to meet the expenses of the troops under my command, in case of a retreat on Catania.

AFAN DE RIVERA,

Field-Marshal (Highest in Command).

Giuseppe La Masa, to whom, when the corps forming the expedition was organised, the command of a company had been entrusted, had asked to be relieved of this charge, partly from a sense of injury, because he felt the position to be unworthy of him, partly because he honestly believed he would be more useful if employed in organising the Sicilian volunteers. After Calatafimi, Garibaldi had authorised him to proceed into the interior of the island and rouse the towns, establish Insurrectional Committees, and muster armed men.

Within the space of a few days La Masa had collected nearly 4000 volunteers, who were called the *Picciotti* (the little ones), in allusion to the extreme youth of most of them. La Masa pitched his camp on Gibilrossa, one of the hills which surround the *Conca d'Oro*, and overlook Palermo itself, which was the ultimate goal of the expedition.

Here is a sample of the circulars issued by La Masa.

GENERAL GARIBALDI, Dictator.

Head Quarters, Commander-in-Chief of the
National Army, in Sicily.

May 26, 1860.

Head Quarters in
Gibilrossa.
No. 31.

*To the Presidents of Committees, and
where these have not as yet been estab-
lished, to the Mayors, Officials, and
Chief Citizens of all the Communes
of the province of Girgenti.*

GENTLEMEN,—The province of Girgenti will certainly not be the last to answer our country's call and drive out the Bourbon. In the name of that dauntless soldier, General Garibaldi, who has been appointed Dictator for the defence of Italian Unity, and for the annexation of Sicily to the kingdom of Victor Emmanuel, I exhort you to show your zeal in the common cause by founding a temporary Committee immediately on receipt of this, for the purpose of furthering the general uprising that shall free our land from oppression. With this end in view, you must choose among the population those who are most daring and eager for action, provide them with arms and ammunition, and send them to join my forces.

You must furthermore make appeal to the generosity of all good citizens to support the squadron by voluntary contributions.

I am entrusting this delicate and important mission to those two exemplary citizens, Achille Caratozzolo and Giovanni Valenza. G. LA MASA.

THE EXPEDITION OF THE THOUSAND 187

Rosalino Pilo meanwhile, who was in communication with the Palermo Committee, redoubled his efforts, and prepared to improve and better equip the squadron under his command, and to obtain control of the city itself.

Here is a letter from Crispi to Pilo.

PASSO DI RIGANO, *May 19, 1860.*

DEAREST ROSALINO,—Yesterday we addressed an official communication to the mayor of Carini, because we did not know of the existence of a Committee in that commune. Nevertheless, you may have recognised our mistake from the way in which the letter was addressed: *To the Head of the Municipal Body.*

We propose to reinstate the municipal bodies as they were in 1849. Later on, the country can decide for itself.

Enclosed you will find the decree nominating Signor Pistone president of the fiscal magistracy.

I send you a letter from your brother. Let him have an answer without delay.

Among the volunteers we have Mosto, Savi, Peppino Orlando, and Mustica. Mustica is in the engineer corps, the others are with the Genoese Carabineers. These last covered themselves with glory during the fight that took place on the 15th. There were sixty of them, and eight were put out of condition to fight. Our good friend Savi was hit by a bullet that ricocheted, and is still doing mischief.

What a splendid fight it was! The Sicilians who particularly distinguished themselves were Carini, Orlando, and Calvino. The General stood unmoved and apparently invulnerable in the midst of all this fierce fighting. The royal troops were driven back at the point of the bayonet. I cannot understand

how Antonio (Mosto) ever came through it all safe and sound.

Good-bye, my dear friend. I have no time for further particulars. R. (Rosalia) has followed us, and has done her duty among the wounded.

I embrace you warmly.—Yours, F. CRISPI.

P.S.—A governor must be appointed for the province of Palermo, and another for Trapani. Pray suggest two suitable candidates. Would you yourself be willing to accept one of these posts? Let me know immediately.

To Signor Rosalino Pilo Gioeni, Carini.

By this time the small stock of money in the hands of the Intendant-General of Finance was exhausted. The property of the communes and of private citizens had been scrupulously respected, but the cost of victualling the corps, which had been steadily increasing in numbers since the twelfth, was very heavy. On one of the pages of his little note-book Crispi made the following entries among the memoranda for the nineteenth and twenty-first:—‘10 hundredweight of cheese—1000 litres of wine—4000 loaves of bread—each day. Total of daily expenses = 350 *onze*.’ On the nineteenth he returned to Partinico to obtain a loan from that commune, which willingly contributed a few thousand lire. This sum came as manna to the expedition.

But even in these straitened circumstances Crispi never failed to impress upon the authorities he was gradually instating that all attempts on property must be punished with relentless severity, and the note-book itself gives a sketch of the arrest of a thief, a certain Santo Meli of the commune of Ciminna. There is also the rough copy of an order dated *Montagna di Renna, May 19*, to the Commandant Cavaliere Santanna, to keep this man under arrest, to see that his wounds were carefully attended to, and to hold his ‘musket and horse at the disposition of the government.’ Then follows a short account of the examination to which Crispi himself subjected Santo Meli, who was accused of having stolen the funds of the

commune of Santa Margherita, and of further thieving from a jeweller at Corleone.

This Santo Meli succeeded in escaping, but was recaptured later on, tried by court-martial, and shot.

A letter from Crispi to Nicola Fabrizi, written on May 21, informed him of recent events.

DEAREST NICOLA,—I received your communication on the 15th, and am answering from our camp near Monreale. I understand the general sense of your letter, but not the particulars, as I have not got the key to your cipher. I sent you word from Genoa that, when writing to me, you must use the cipher I forwarded you by Rosalino. I think you meant to announce that firearms have been sent to Catania or Messina. That was all I can make out. But if it is so, it is a good thing. Do your best.

What news can I give you from this place? From the time we landed at Marsala until we encamped here, near Monreale, it has been one long triumph for us. Armed men are now pouring in from all sides, and every commune seeks to furnish us with information. We have organised the government, the finances and the municipal bodies, and we shall organise the militia presently. The militia will make us independent of the armed bands.

We won a great victory on Tuesday. The enemy were posted on the hill called *Li Chiusi*, opposite Calatafimi. They numbered 3000 with the artillery, and half a squadron of cavalry held the main road. We dislodged them, took one of their cannon, made four prisoners, and forced the enemy to quit Calatafimi. About three hundred of their men were put out of condition to fight. We had sixteen killed and one hundred wounded.

Those who were killed were among our best men, and this makes our grief all the greater.

Inform Dr. Bertani in Genoa of these particulars.
. . . Good-bye.

PIOPPO, 21 May, 1860.

In another letter written the same day to Alberto Mistretta, who had been governor of the district of Mazzara since the seventeenth, after having mentioned that, since Calatafimi, the expedition had everywhere been welcomed with enthusiasm—at Alcamo, Partinico, and Borghetto—and that they were now within a short distance of Monreale, Crispi went on to say: ‘Up to the present there has been no important fight, only some slight skirmishes.’ He then requested Mistretta to see that the collecting of the taxes began again without delay, to attend to the reorganisation of the militia, and to get the legal decrees and proclamations printed.

While on the march he was continually devising fresh provisions, and despatching messengers to solicit the recognition of Garibaldi’s Dictatorship by the different communes. Besides all this, at each bivouac he wrote numerous letters and composed proclamations.

Thus on May 23, writing from Poggio del Castro, he explained the views of the government concerning the reorganisation of the police service.

To His Excellency the Governor.

I am in receipt of yours of the 22nd of the present month.

The Questor is the absolute head of the police force of each district. He is invested with preventive and tutelary authority for the suppression or checking of crime in his district, or for its punishment. His authority in his own district corresponds with that which was invested in the Chief-Judge, by the laws that prevailed up to May 15, 1849. In order

that his authority may be firmly established the Questor shall be represented by a deputy in each commune.

It is unnecessary for me to remind you that at the present moment the duties appertaining to the office of Questor are of a most delicate nature. I am satisfied, however, that the person appointed by you for this office will be sufficiently discreet and active to safeguard successfully the interests of the State without rendering the new order of things a burden to the country, as was the police system we have recently abolished.

Kindly instruct the Questor to report to me on the condition of public opinion in his district either once a week or as often as circumstances may demand it.

While the volunteers were encamped on the heights of Renna, the news reached them that Rosalino Pilo had been killed during the fight at San Martino. This was a terrible blow to Crispi, who had spent so many years of grief and hope on the soil of exile in the close companionship of this man who had been as a brother to him. But there was little time for tears, however, and what the loss of such a man really meant soon became apparent, for his company immediately began to disband.

It was then that Garibaldi thought out and established the future movements of the expedition. They must push on to Palermo as rapidly as possible, and for many reasons. But which road should they take? During a reconnaissance made on the *Pizzo del Fico* hill the General's field-glasses had revealed the presence of a large body of troops on the Palermo-Monreale road, and also the fact that Monreale itself was bristling with military.

His first plan had been to descend upon Palermo from Monreale. This would be a dangerous manœuvre, for it would involve the necessity of twice facing and routing the enemy, who greatly outnumbered the volunteers, and were also much better armed. The fact that the support he had expected to

receive from Rosalino Pilo would not be forthcoming, and his own scant knowledge of the locality and of the difficulties to be overcome, made him hesitate.

Crispi, who in 1848, as Secretary of the War Committee, had made a study of the defence of Palermo, was consulted, and expressed the opinion that the great city should be attacked, not from Monreale, but at one of its weak points. The General decided to act on this advice, but before abandoning his present position he determined to lead the enemy to believe that he really intended to attack them at Monreale, in order to induce them to withdraw more troops from Palermo. On the afternoon of the twenty-first the squadrons worried the Bourbon troops with greater insistence than usual. A strong column marched down to the main road from Pioppo, and pressed forward until they were at close quarters with the enemy. Some few shots were fired on both sides, and then, as darkness began to close in, Garibaldi gave the order to retreat. The volunteers returned to the camp at Renna believing their day's work to be at an end, but no sooner were all assembled than the order came to break up camp and prepare to march.

All were now convinced that the General had relinquished his intention of attacking Palermo and was about to withdraw into the interior of the island, and the bands could not refrain from muttering their disappointment.

Garibaldi's plan was, under cover of the darkness, to reach Parco and outdistance the Bourbon troops, who would, so he believed, execute a circular manœuvre on the morrow, and seek to cut off his retreat at Piana de' Greci. But in order to reach Parco he must leave the military road and make his way down into the Fico valley, only to climb again up the opposite slope, in order to reach the road leading from Parco to Piana de' Greci and to Corleone.

In total darkness and under a heavy downpour the volunteers started along a mere goat-path, some honest peasants acting as guides. It was a terrible march. Falls and other accidents were of frequent occurrence, and of these the most serious was the bursting open of the box containing the funds of the expedition, which had been entrusted to the care of Acerbi. The money was in silver coins, and as all of these rolled upon the ground much trouble was experienced

in picking them out from among the rocks, and in finding them in the muddy soil.

Under such conditions the transport of the artillery was fraught with much difficulty. The cannon were dismounted, carried up hill on the peasants' shoulders, and rolled down hill, narrow boards having first been lashed along their length to preserve them from injury. Orsini and Castiglia who, with their gunners and sailors, worked steadily until night-fall on the following day, had the satisfaction of presenting the five pieces safe and sound for Garibaldi's inspection at Parco on the evening of the twenty-second.

At dawn on the twenty-third, two columns, 3000 strong, marched forth from Palermo. They were under the command of von Mechel, a Swiss officer, and of Beneventano del Bosco, a Neapolitan. One column took the main road to Monreale, the other, that leading to Corleone, with the intention of placing the volunteers between two fires. Garibaldi, who had taken up his position on the height above Parco, called Cozza di Crasto, showed his willingness to face the enemy. The cannon were posted at the cross-roads, and the *picciotti* and Garibaldi's own volunteers prepared for action. Early on the morning of the twenty-fourth, the first shots were fired, but presently the General ordered a retreat on Piana. The Bourbon troops, convinced that they had carried the day, prepared for pursuit, but from the hill-tops to right and left, whither they had climbed, the Genoese carabineers and the armed bands, especially the Albanese band from Piana, covered the retreat of the main body so successfully that the Bourbon troops soon gave up the pursuit. The expedition was thus enabled to reach Piana where they were warmly welcomed and refreshed.

While the volunteers were enjoying their well-earned rest, the Council of War was assembled for the first time, and disregarding Sirtori's advice to retreat into the interior, it was decided to avoid pursuit, and withdrawing under cover of the darkness, to march by way of Marineo and Misilmeri, and join the strong contingent that La Masa had collected at Gibilrossa, on the last spur of the hill that slopes thence abruptly to the sea. But before deciding upon this plan Garibaldi inquired of Crispi what point besides Corleone, would be best adapted for a defensive position against an

enemy of superior force. Crispi suggested Giuliana, a little town perched near the summit of a steep hill, and accessible from one side only.

This suggestion seemed to meet with the General's approval. He sent for Orsini and ordered him to start at once for Giuliana by way of Corleone, with the artillery and all the baggage. When asked for further instructions, he replied: 'You will get them from Crispi.'

Shortly after Orsini's departure with a company of soldiers, the artillery and the baggage, the main body of the expedition started marching along the same road towards Corleone. The volunteers believed they were about to withdraw into the interior, and of course the enemy was of the same opinion. But, about two miles beyond Piana, the corps turned off from the high-road, and, passing Santa Cristina del Gela, entered the Ficuzza forest. It was a starlight night, and Garibaldi was in the best of spirits. They marched onwards in silence until midnight, when a halt was called. The troops rested until the sky began to brighten, but at dawn on the morning of the twenty-fifth, they were pressing forward once more.

Some hours later, at Marineo, a large village situated on a hill-top above the main road, a second halt was called and rations were distributed. In the afternoon the march was resumed as far as Misilmeri, where, despite the lateness of the hour, an enthusiastic welcome and brilliant illuminations awaited this handful of men who, although weary and badly accoutred, after enduring a protracted guerilla warfare, were happy in the certainty of being led on to attack a great city defended by a garrison 20,000 strong.

On that same day, the twenty-fifth, the Bourbon troops had marched along the Corleone road, firmly persuaded that they were pursuing Garibaldi and would surely capture him, or at least disperse his followers. News of a victory had even been despatched to Palermo, and the *Giornale Ufficiale di Sicilia* issued the following 'Bulletin':—

The Mediterranean filibusters, led by Garibaldi, took up a position at Parco on the twenty-third of this month, and fortified it with four cannon.

Yesterday two columns of royal troops made a fierce attack upon the invaders, dislodged them, put them to flight and pursued them hotly among the mountains of Piana dei Greci.

The royal columns are still pursuing the bands. Some captures were made, the prisoners being treated with the utmost consideration, although, strictly speaking, they have no claim to be considered as prisoners of war.

V. POLIZZY.

Chief of General Staff.

PALERMO, *May 25, 1860.*

But as a matter of fact, the 'Royal Columns' were pursuing only Orsini, who was proceeding towards his destination in accordance with the instructions contained in the following letter:—

Secretary of State.

No. 16.

PIANA DE' GRECI, *May 24, 1860.*

To Colonel Orsini,

SIR, — Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Garibaldi, Commander-in-Chief of the national forces in the Island of Sicily, has commissioned me to order you to remove into the commune of Giuliana with the artillery already under your command. You will proceed to this place, entrench yourself there and organise a force not only sufficiently strong to defend your position, but also to facilitate your removal to another post which will be pointed out to you in case of necessity.

In organising your forces you will avail yourself of the militia of the districts of Corleone, Bivona and Sciacca, over which you are given full authority in the execution of your mission. You will equip your militia with the arms which you will take from the suburban police of the different communes.

The militia shall be composed of all the able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. These shall be divided into three categories: those between the ages of 17 and 30, to be mobilized and consequently affiliated to the army in action: those between 30 and 40, to be used for the defence of the district: those between 40 and 50, to be entrusted with the defence of the communes.

The soldiers of the first category must be armed first, the other two groups will be equipped afterwards. You yourself will appoint the officers of the first division. Those of the other two categories will be chosen by the soldiers, in accordance with the rules regulating the National Guard.

The General who holds the Dictatorship of the entire island herewith invests you with his own authority in full, for the accomplishment of your mission.

The General is gratified to be able to entrust you with so delicate a mission, and is fully persuaded that you will fulfil it with all the zeal and alacrity for which you are distinguished.

Kindly send in a daily report of your operations, whenever this is possible, and receive my best wishes and friendly greetings.

The Secretary of State,
F. CRISPI.

To Colonel Orsini,
Commander of the National Artillery.

A second letter followed this, sent probably from Marineo.

DEAR ORSINI,—Enclosed you will find the orders issued to the authorities of the districts of Corleone, Bivona and Sciacca, charging them to facilitate the accomplishment of your mission in every way. If

anything further is needed, write to me, and it shall be attended to.

I beg you to make all possible haste in getting the militia organised, that we may rid ourselves of the armed bands. You possess the necessary means and authority.

The General would like to collect all the gunsmiths in the three districts under your control, and in the districts of Palermo and Termini, and found a manufactory of arms where you are (Corleone?). Orlando would manage it. Write me if you know of any building there that might be used for this purpose.

Good-bye, and good luck to you.—Your affectionate

F. CRISPI.

25 May.

Ever since their landing at Marsala, the scarcity of firearms and ammunition had been a source of great anxiety to Garibaldi and his officers. They could not count upon the young men who hastened from all sides to join the Thousand, for they were without arms, and the rifles of the original corps were always in danger of becoming useless through lack of powder and lead.

Crispi was aware that Nicola Fabrizi held several hundred muskets at Malta, which were intended for use in the Sicilian insurrection, but which it had as yet been impossible to smuggle into the island. For these he determined to send. Salvatore Castiglia, Giuseppe Mustica and Bartolomeo Vitale were commissioned to obtain them. They set forth with Orsini, whom they were to accompany as far as Corleone, and proceeded thence to Sciacca and Porto Empedocle, where they procured a boat which succeeded in avoiding the Bourbon cruiser, and carried them safely to Malta. They there presented the following letter to Fabrizi :—

DEAR NICOLA,—Castiglia and Mustica are going to Malta. They are the bearers of a recommendation to you, and with your consent, will be able to

fulfil the mission with which they have been entrusted. Everything (III) 2.3.23 (II) 14 that is in (II) 24.25 (v) 6.19.12.19.11 is at (IV) 10.9.15.9. Should you need money for this undertaking, draw on Bertani at Genoa. The General has authorised this, and Dr. Bertani has been communicated with. The great matter is to get everything done quickly.

Our friends will acquaint you with our condition here, which, indeed, could not be better. Nothing worth recording has happened since my last letter to you, of the 21st. There have been some skirmishes which led to nothing, but in the one that took place near Monreale, on the hill that overlooks the town, we lost our incomparable Rosalino. While encouraging and leading on part of the troops under his command, a bullet hit him on the head, and he fell without a word. Calvino witnessed this painful scene.

I cannot dwell upon this irreparable loss without groaning in spirit.

But enough! We have our duty to perform, and who knows but what the same fate may be hanging over us all at this very minute!

Good-bye, my dear Nicola. My greetings to all our good friends.—Yours,

F. CRISPI.

25 May.

But the rifles from Malta were not destined to reach Sicily until many days after Garibaldi had entered Palermo, owing to the following circumstances.

The news of the landing of the Thousand was quickly conveyed to Malta by the English corvet, the *Argus*, which had left Marsala on the afternoon of the eleventh. It was generally known by noon the next day. Nicola Fabrizi, who, for two-and-twenty years (even before Mazzini himself had conceived the same idea), had been looking to Sicily as the

point whence the signal for decisive action in the Italian cause must come, and who had, during all these years, been mounting guard, as it were, over the island, inculcating with unabated fervour ideals of patriotism, of national dignity and of self-sacrifice—on hearing the glad tidings, was seized with a feverish desire to effect a landing upon the eastern coast of Sicily, at a point directly opposite that at which the Thousand had disembarked.

Immediately after the sailing of the expedition, which Crispi had announced to him by means of the prearranged telegram: 'Buy the corn of which I spoke to you before.' Fabrizi had sought to facilitate matters by sending messages to the friends at Catania and Messina, begging them to take a decisive step at last, to accept the arms he had repeatedly offered them, and to rise in rebellion—declaring himself ready to join them at any point they might fix upon. Nevertheless, he was fully determined, should the answers from Catania and Messina prove unsatisfactory, to repair immediately to the place where Garibaldi would by that time have effected a landing.

On the 12th, at noon, the news reached me of the splendid disembarkation,—[Fabrizi wrote on the 27th].—At three o'clock I secretly embarked four hundred rifles, ammunition, etc., with a quantity of barley sufficient to cover the whole. This smuggling was unavoidable, because the request for the *seven hundred* deposited at the customs had raised difficulties, and it was necessary to purchase and arrange the cargo without these, which were being guarded. On Saturday, 12th, owing to the habitual dilatoriness of the officials, we failed to get through the formalities of clearance. On Monday morning everything was in readiness, but the state of the wind kept the boat in port until Tuesday night. Then it was held up at Gozo, and detained until Wednesday morning (16th), when a customs-guard having made revelations, the (Neapolitan) Consul

denounced the nature of the cargo to the Maltese authorities, who caused it to be seized at Gozo.

The cargo had borne the address, Cagliari (Sardinia). A fine was imposed and the ammunition confiscated, but the rifles were safe, and it was now proposed to send them openly and directly to Cagliari. But the English authorities demanded a guarantee in the form of 500 pounds sterling, that the rifles would indeed be delivered at Cagliari, and they furthermore exacted an oath from the captain—himself a Maltese—that would not only bind him morally, but also entail most serious consequences, should he be convicted of perjury. In the end the boat was despatched to Barbary, whither a confidential agent was sent the next day, to transfer the cargo to another ship which would be taken in tow by a steamer.

We still have the two Provinces in view, where, up to the present, things have moved very slowly. In the Catania regions the nobles in command of the bands, seek to prevent rather than encourage the taking of the city. At Messina all depends on the prompt arrival of arms. Fresh ammunition had to be obtained, the smuggling repeated, and the powder we had bought here on deposit exchanged for another lot, on deposit in Barbary. The expenses were so heavy that we were obliged to ask for help. I have despatched the whole *thousand* (rifles), including those that were on deposit. As soon as all this gets under way I shall make my own plans. I think I shall be able to get off by Tuesday, and start for the province of Catania, by way of Noto. For the present you must continue to write to me at Malta, care of Emilio (Sceberras), who will forward to the Committee at Noto. . . . My object is to force those regions to immediate action and rouse them from their passive attitude. . . .

The following are extracts from some notes jotted down by Fabrizi on May 29 for Crispi's use :—

It is believed that, as events develop, the Maltese authorities will relax their severity. Generally speaking, the English and the townspeople sympathise with us. Plenty of ammunition, that is, powder and lead, to be had at Malta. The rule is that powder shall be sent to Barbary, where it may not be unloaded, but where the trading is done on board the boats.

There is a large deposit of powder on board boats at Sfax, where a certain Portelli, a native of Malta, has six hundred barrels.

In that part of Barbary that is under Tunis traffic in firearms is tolerated ; it would be well to found a deposit there under an English name, and forward arms thence into Sicily.

There is a small steam-tug for sale here, price something over 1000 pounds sterling. The captain is reliable and holds an English charter. Could we buy this boat, it might be used for transport work. To-day's transport alone has cost 90 pounds sterling.

Giorgio (Tamaio) and Cesare (Napolitano) would be useful where Malta is concerned, and also to act with Emilio (Sceberras) and that admirable Cesareo, who knows all about chartering, and is in a position to facilitate the purchase of powder, etc. But there would have to be a personal order from the General, to avoid hurting their feelings.

A line of official recognition of the services Emilio Sceberras and Giuseppe Cesareo have rendered is much to be desired. It would also act as a stimulant to the zeal of others ; and that worthy old patriot Cesareo would look upon it as a precious moral recompense.

The Neapolitan government has bought up all the coal at Malta, and wished to charter the steam-tug. It has already chartered a number of other vessels.

Thus it happened that the mission of Castiglia and Mustica proved unsuccessful.

On May 30, Fabrizi wrote to Crispi :—

Castiglia, etc. . . . arrived here last night. . . . (Their mission) is too late for the merchandise in question. . . . It is now far out at sea, and a contrary wind is blowing. . . . It had to be sent to Sfax, where it will be reloaded and forwarded to the place where I shall be.

Garibaldi spent the twenty-sixth of May at Misilmeri. During the preceding night he had summoned La Masa from Gibilrossa and conferred with him concerning the support his bands were to afford in the impending action. In the early morning he had assembled the superior officers, who one and all declared themselves ready and eager to attack Palermo. It seemed, indeed, a most propitious moment for the assault. The best of the troops were absent from the city they should have defended. The Revolutionary Committee had sent word to Garibaldi that he need only show himself, and the inhabitants of Palermo would do the rest, while several persons, among others the Hungarian, Eber, the *Times* correspondent, and some of the officers of the English ships in the harbour, had furnished valuable information concerning the plan of defence and the position of the troops within the city.

On the evening of the twenty-sixth, Garibaldi issued the order to advance. La Masa's squadron claimed the honour of marching at the head of the column, but notwithstanding his partiality for the *picciotti*, the General placed them behind a vanguard under the command of the Hungarian, Tükery, composed of 24 soldiers of the Thousand and some 15 of the most resolute among the Sicilians. The Genoese carabinieri followed, with the first battalion under Nino Bixio, 300 men in all. Then came the second battalion, consisting of 400 men, while some 700 peasants, who had joined Garibaldi at

his various halting places, brought up the rear. The corps numbered some 4500 men, all told, of whom about 800 belonged to the Thousand.

That very night the column started forward, Garibaldi calculating to cover the distance that separated him from the Bourbon outposts, before dawn. The order was to advance in silence, but the *picciotti* were too fresh and undisciplined, and what with their outcries and the alarm they were continually experiencing at every slight incident, at every noise, they seriously compromised the success of the undertaking. Bixio, with his battalion, who was immediately behind the squadron of *picciotti*, having protested hotly, Garibaldi had them divided into three groups, placing Crispi, Bruzzesi, and Bassini in command, but these officers found it most difficult to maintain order. On reaching the Scaffa mills, near the 'Admiral's Bridge,' the *picciotti* began to waver, and their shouts and cries gave the alarm to the Bourbon sentinel. At the first shot fired Tükery, followed close by Bixio, rushed forward to attack. After a moment's hesitation, on seeing the battalion in their rear rush madly past them, the *picciotti* themselves dashed forward at a run. The royal troops could not withstand this human avalanche. The *Garibaldini*, with fixed bayonets, gave hot chase, but on reaching *Porta Termini* the fugitives flung themselves over the lofty barricade that had been erected there, and entered the city. But the fight was not over. The highway, along which the invaders must advance to reach the *Termini* gate, was swept by the cannonading of a cruiser in the harbour, and by the firing of the troops, which retired at last on the arrival of a strong contingent of Garibaldi's men under Vincenzo Fuxa, who entered the city by *Porta Reale*.

If it be true, as the Bourbons themselves confessed, that the royal troops in charge of the Sicilian provinces numbered 36,000, then on that twenty-seventh of May Palermo must have held some 20,000 soldiers. It must be admitted, however, that but few of these had an opportunity of contending with Garibaldi, who, most unfortunately for Ferdinando Lanza, His Majesty's Lieutenant-General, attacked the capital at the point where its defences were weakest.

CHAPTER IX

Three days of fighting in the streets—Palermo almost entirely destroyed by shells and conflagrations—The action of government during the heroic struggle—Decrees concerning barricades, the reconstruction of the town-hall, the militia, and capital punishment for larceny, murder and pillage—Crispi takes the main office of the Bourbon police by surprise, and seizes the police archives—General Lanza asks Garibaldi for a suspension of hostilities—Crispi formulates the armistice of May 31—A letter from Crispi to the foreign Consuls—Capitulation of royal forces—Military organisation—Garibaldi and Crispi appeal to Bertani for arms and ships—1000 rifles and 100,000 cartridges brought by Agnetta expedition—The Ministry on June 2—Crispi's legislation—Conscription regarded with disapproval—Recovery of the steamer *Lombardo*.

HAD not the city of Palermo been already definitely lost to the Bourbon cause, Garibaldi and his filibusters, passing through her gates, would have walked into a trap, and that zealous officer Salvatore Maniscalco, Chief of Police, would have reaped fresh honours and earned another handsome increase of salary.¹ The long suffering Sicilians, when discussing politics in secret, had long been in the habit of uttering the ejaculatory petition: 'When shall our necks be freed from this yoke of infamy?' Since Garibaldi's arrival, and especially since the battle of Calatafimi, this nostalgic yearning for deliverance had developed into a firm faith, and Palermo—oppressed by a merciless police and a numerous garrison who despised the citizens and were despised by them, and amongst whom there were no Sicilians—had prepared to meet the final crash. And thus it happened that when, on the morning of May 27, the deliverers aroused her citizens not only from sleep, but from the lethargy of slavery, those citizens having

¹ A first increase was granted him as a compensation for a stab he received on Oct. 27, 1859, from a working-man, who succeeded in hiding his identity.

rubbed their eyes hard, and strained their ears to make quite sure the noise at Porta Termini was not a trick such as the police had frequently resorted to to ensnare the patriots, sprang up to wrench the city, inch by inch, from the clutch of the enemy's troops. They erected barricades, fought bravely behind them and from their houses, and boldly faced death that was assailing them from all sides, and even from above, in the form of shells from the fort of Castellammare and the men-of-war in the harbour. The bombardment lasted for three days. No one counted the dead, but all witnessed the awful fires, and, in the end, saw more than a quarter of the city in ruins.

It is difficult to conceive the tumult of sentiments that must have raged in the breasts of Garibaldi and of Crispi during that heroic struggle, whose vast field of action was a whole city. While the Bourbon domination was passing away, and amidst the din of bursting shells, the cries of combatants and wounded, the ceaseless jangling of the bells of all the churches sounding the summons to arms, those two men had to create and establish a new executive to meet the ordinary needs of the population as well as the necessities of war.

On that very day, May 27, a General Committee was constituted, which was divided into sub-committees for the interior, for victualling, for military affairs, etc.

On the twenty-eighth, Crispi presented several decrees to Garibaldi for signature. By virtue of the first of these the municipal body of Palermo was dissolved and reconstituted with men of energy and liberal opinions. A second decree nominated a Commission which should 'with the utmost despatch, provide everything necessary for the construction of barricades in regular order throughout the city, and place her in a position to defend herself, independently of those generous spirits who have hastened from other Italian provinces to the relief of Sicily.' A third edict established another committee in Palermo for the organising of the national militia, in accordance with the law published at Salemi on May 14. Capital punishment for larceny, murder and pillage was prescribed by another decree, which justified this severe measure in the following terms: 'With a steadfastness worthy of the ancients the inhabitants of this splendid and heroic city have suffered

famine and faced all the dangers that have resulted from the civil war brought upon us by the traitors to Italy. These conditions notwithstanding, private property has been scrupulously respected and protected. The merit of this rests with the people, and the country owes them much. Nevertheless, in order to forestall the possible action of some malicious persons, who, having nothing in common with the mass of the people, and who, for the purpose of furthering the cause of our enemies by creating confusion and branding this noble population with infamy, should commit such acts of larceny and of pillage, we have resolved as follows, etc. . . . ' A last decree appointed the Intendant-General of the National Forces, Acerbi, temporary Treasurer and Paymaster-General for Sicily.

That same day Crispi appointed the Questors of Palermo, after having made an unexpected appearance at the office of the Chief of Police, preventing the removal of important documents and arresting all the functionaries and employees on the premises. Maniscalco himself, who was with General Lanza at the Royal Palace, was not captured. The arrest of these functionaries and police agents was a measure greatly to their own advantage, for, hated as they were by the people, they had all been in danger of being massacred, and many, indeed, to whom the nickname of *Surci* had been applied, did not escape that fate.

The fighting continued for three days. Palermo, like all old cities, with her narrow streets flanked by high buildings, lent herself admirably to barricading, which would be both impossible and unavailing in the arteries of modern towns. Some of these barricades were stationary, others movable ; the first, placed fifty metres apart, were constructed according to rule, with paving-stones, sand-bags, etc. ; the others were raised where and when circumstances demanded, for the protection of the combatants as they pushed forward under the enemies fire. (Article II. of decree.) Both sides fought fiercely over these fortifications, and the *picciotti* rendered excellent service. On May 30, however, the ammunition began to give out, and Garibaldi appealed to D'Aste, Commandant of the cruiser *Governolo* of the Piedmontese navy, for a fresh supply, which was refused.

The following letter will give an idea of the efforts made to meet this difficulty :—

DEAR GIULIO,—As regards saltpetre, its importation was forbidden some time ago, and what was here already was removed to the fortress.

Paolo Muccio, however, has 47 small barrels of it, near the entrance to Caltanissetta at the Fiera Vecchia. Each barrel contains 80 rolls.

There are some bars of lead in private store-houses, and 150 bars (each consisting of about 50 rolls) in Paolo Briuccio's store-house. Lo Vico has 100 bars on hand.

That is all the information I can give you. Good-bye.—Your brother,

VINCENZO.

PALERMO, 30 May 1860.

Fortunately for the revolutionists who lacked powder, provisions were beginning to run short at the Royal Palace where most of the Bourbon troops were assembled, the besiegers preventing all communication with the sea, that was so near at hand. The royal troops, moreover, were fast losing all hope of ultimate victory.

General Lanza had appealed in vain to Admiral Mundy, first, to intercede with Garibaldi for an armistice, and then to grant him the protection of the English flag, at least for the transport of the wounded from the Royal Palace through the enemy's lines to the fortress of Castellammare. But on the morning of May 30, he finally determined to appeal directly to the Chief of the filibusters, by means of the following letter :—

General Lanza to General Garibaldi.

PALERMO, 30 May 1860.

The English Admiral having informed me that he would gladly receive on board his vessel two of my Generals to open a conference with you, at which he himself would act as mediator, provided you would grant them a passage across your line, I

beg you to let me know if you will accept this arrangement, and if so (hostilities, of course, being suspended on both sides), I beg you to inform me of the hour at which said conference shall take place.

It would likewise be advisable for you to provide an escort for these two Generals from the Royal Palace to the Sanità, where they would embark to go on board.—In anticipation of your reply,

FERDINANDO LANZA.

It is a matter of general knowledge that Garibaldi, having caused hostilities to be suspended, went on board the *Hannibal* to confer with the Bourbon generals, Letizia and Chrétien, and that this conference resulted only in an armistice of four-and-twenty hours for removing the wounded from the Royal Palace, and burying the dead. But this armistice was provisional, for it prevented von Mechel and Bosco, who had returned from their fruitless chase, and forced their way by Porta Termini as far as the Fiera Vecchia, from attacking the city.

The afternoon of the thirtieth, and the night that followed, were employed by both parties in preparations for the struggle to be renewed on the morrow. Garibaldi had addressed the people and encouraged them to fresh resistance by the promise of speedy victory. But on the morning of the thirty-first, General Lanza sent a messenger to him with a request that the armistice should be prolonged. Crispi, representing the Dictator, repaired to the Royal Palace, where the *outlaw* found himself treating on a footing of equality with His Majesty's *Alter ego*, surrounded by an army. He made his own conditions, which were, that the Mint should be yielded up and two of the Thousand, Mosto, and Rivalta who has been missing since the skirmish on the twenty-fourth, should be restored. Here are the

ARTICLES OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNDERSIGNED, THIS 31ST DAY OF MAY 1860,
AT PALERMO.

1. Hostilities shall be suspended for a further space of three days, beginning from this

moment, noon, on the 31st. At the end of the time specified, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will despatch his aide-de-camp to confer concerning the hour at which hostilities shall be resumed.

- II. The Royal Mint shall be surrendered to the representative, Crispi, Secretary of State, who will sign a regular receipt, and the detachment at present guarding it, will withdraw to Castellammare with arms and baggage.
- III. The embarkation of all the wounded and of the families shall continue, every precaution being taken to prevent abuse of this privilege.
- IV. Free passage at any hour will be granted to provisions for both sides, and measures adopted to facilitate this operation.
- V. The prisoners Mosto and Rivalta will be exchanged against 1st Lieutenant Colonna (or another officer) and Captain Grasso.

*The Secretary of State,
Representing the Dictator,*
F. CRISPI.*

The Commanding General,
FERDINANDO LANZA.

This convention which was of the greatest importance to the city as well as to the *Garibaldini*, was brought about by Crispi's efforts alone, as is clearly demonstrated by the letter he addressed to Lanza on the same day (May 31):—

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have submitted the articles of the convention concluded between us to my General, and His Excellency has granted them his entire approval.

His Excellency commands me to beg you to issue the necessary orders that the clause designated as

Article II. may be put into execution before the day is over. We shall despatch a messenger to Your Excellency to ascertain at what hour I am to be at the Mint with the detachment necessary to to guard it. . . .

The financial difficulties with which the Intendancy of Finance was struggling, rendered the possession of the Royal Mint especially providential. Only 134,000 ducats belonging to government were found there, General Lanza having drawn heavily on the bank, but even this small sum helped greatly in defraying expenses until such a time as regular taxation could be resumed.

After signing the armistice Crispi repaired to the fortress of Castellammare to receive the two prisoners, Mosto and Rivalta, but Rivalta alone was consigned to him, as Mosto was not there. Greatly incensed, and suspecting the authorities of the intention of avoiding the fulfilment of the compact, he returned at once to the Royal Palace. Here it was made clear that Mosto had not been captured, but had fallen during the encounter on the mountain, and of this Lanza was ignorant. It was declared, later on, that the uniform of the Genoese carabineers he had been wearing was brought to Naples as a trophy !

On June 2, all Palermo believed that hostilities would be resumed without fail on the morrow, and both volunteers and citizens were fully prepared. The spirit of the people was so ardent and so determined, and the news that was coming in from all parts of the island was so reassuring that Garibaldi judged it opportune to express his personal satisfaction by a proclamation which contained the following passages :—

Sicily to-day presents one of those spectacles that stand forth pre-eminent in the political life of nations, that are remembered and enthusiastically revered from generation to generation, and that set the immortal seal of lofty virtue upon a great and magnanimous people. In order to become a

power, Italy must have concord, and Sicily alone sets her the example of true concord. . . .*

On May 27, 28 and 29, the Bourbon soldiers had been guilty of horrible deeds of violence against unarmed citizens. They had invaded houses, had committed theft and murder, and started many conflagrations in the more remote quarters where it had as yet been impossible to organise resistance. The reopening of hostilities meant the renewal of all the acts of shameful cruelty of which these inhuman bands had been guilty. Hoping to prevent fresh bloodshed, Crispi sent a copy of the following letter to each one of the foreign Consuls, on the morning of the third :—

PALERME, 3 juin 1860.

MONSIEUR LE CONSUL,—La guerre qu'on combat dans notre ville, a été marquée jusqu'à ce jour par la barbarie d'un gouvernement que les grandes puissances d'Europe avaient stigmatisé au Congrès de Paris de 1856 comme indigne de régir un peuple civilisé. Le bombardement, les incendies et le pillage auxquels les troupes royales se sont livrées, sont bien connus par tout le monde. Ici, j'aime seulement a relever que les endroits, qui ont été le plus ravagés, sont ceux où les gens inermes ont cherché un abri : ceux-ci ont été cruellement massacrés ou brûlés sans aucun de ces motifs que l'état de guerre peut légitimer.

Aujourd'hui les hostilités vont recommencer ; il n'y a rien de difficile que l'ennemi revienne à ses cruautés habituelles. Sûr de vos sentiments d'humanité, et que vous ne pourrez recevoir de votre conduite que l'approbation de votre Gouvernement, je vous prie, Monsieur le Consul, de vouloir bien faire vos démarches pour que la guerre, bornée entre les combattants, puisse épargner les femmes et les enfants.

Agréez, Monsieur le Consul, mes salutations très
empressées, FRANCESCO CRISPI.

But General Lanza had taken advantage of this time of respite to impress the King of Naples with the necessity of renouncing a struggle from which no good could be derived either for the monarchy or for humanity in general. Palermo was full of barricades. It might indeed be destroyed by bombardment, but it would never surrender. This, at least, must have been Lanza's conviction, who was a Sicilian, an old man, and gentle at heart.

The Royal troops, moreover, were the objects of assiduous propaganda in favour of the Italian movement, and many, not only common soldiers, but superior and non-commissioned officers as well, had fraternised with the citizens. One of those printed sheets that were being freely distributed among the troops at that time, reads as follows:—

SOLDIERS!—Jealous of your honour as such, you have fought bravely, and those whom you look upon as enemies have praised your courage and your mistaken loyalty, treating you with far greater care and consideration than you have ever received from your own government. You have lost, or rather you have been sacrificed through the cowardice and ignorance of your leaders, and also because the cause for which you stand is the cause of one man only, and is opposed to your own interest, the welfare of your families, of your children, and of your country which is Italy. Influenced by his fatal and personal connection with Austria, this man disposes of the property and lives of nine million subjects, whom he treats like slaves, that Austrian domination may be maintained in Italy, and the instruments of his authority are all those persons of evil repute, the ambitious and the intellectually weak, who have waxed fat upon the

degradation and misery of an entire people. Your life and your honour have been placed in the keeping of such beings, and they have most wickedly destroyed them, as they have destroyed your substance and your liberty! Three thousand wounded and ten thousand more killed or taken prisoners have failed to satisfy this King who once more drives you on to the struggle, sacrificing you like a herd of sheep. A worse man than his father, encouraged by his faithful cut-throats, he has formed the truly Christian resolution to destroy the whole population and every one of the cities rather than relinquish his odious power, thus following the example of that fierce wild beast of royal lineage, Caroline of Austria, who declared she would gladly leave us nought but eyes with which to weep! You yourselves are to be made the instruments of this crime, and you who do not know the true meaning of your oath hold it a sacred duty to obey the Sovereign's each and every command. Soldiers, your duty is to defend the nation to whom your parents, your brothers, children and friends belong. You are bound to defend them against any enemy who may seek to injure, and this you swore to do, to the Head of the State, whose duty is identical with yours. The power then, which has impoverished the people, has degraded them through ignorance, corruption, larceny and hypocrisy, has made them the slaves of Austria and bombarded their cities, is most certainly the enemy you are bound to destroy. This enemy is the government and all who aid and abet it in its wicked caprices and cruelties. These ambitious and worthless men brought you into Sicily to be slaughtered that their power may be maintained, but like the cowards

they are, they turned and fled at sight of the danger that prevails. . . . On the other hand, we exhort you to admire the man they call a Brigand, and to whom a venomous journalist has dared to apply a scurrilous epithet. Mark his courage, his loyalty, his disinterestedness, his generosity. He, who holds the lives and hearts of the Italians, who is admired and respected in foreign lands, hastened with twelve hundred other brave Italians, to succour Sicily in her peril. With a daring that is a revelation, he fights against overwhelming odds, and in a fortnight has destroyed an army strong in numbers, in artillery, and well supplied with money!!! This great man has shown you that courage is derived from merit and from a just cause, and that only the cowardly and the wicked are on the side of despotism. Admire also this people of Sicily which, preferring death to servitude, has risen up in its wrath to wage desperate war against would-be oppressors.

If, unmoved by this terrible example, you still persevere in sacrificing yourselves for a King who bombards his own cities, for a race accursed because it is faithless, if you are still determined to use your strength to keep your country in bondage, then prepare to meet the punishment so black a crime deserves; for the sin of faithlessness will rest upon you also, and you shall be mercilessly crushed when the day of wrath, that is fast approaching, shall force us to strike down our oppressors, their children and their children's children, sparing none of those who, in the past as in the present, have brought so much evil upon this unhappy people. Our blows will be aimed above all at the police, the magistrates and public functionaries of all classes, who shall lose their positions, their pensions and property, and

whose wretched bodies shall be exposed in the public place as an eternal reminder that the wrath of a people and the wrath of God are one. . . .

If, on the other hand, you will be persuaded that by virtue of your oath you are bound to defend your country against the government and its creatures who are that country's true and only enemies, you will save your honour, your position, your lives, and the substance and lives of your families and of your children.

Let us have done with civil discord! Forsake the banner of oppression and of the faithless race that is accursed of God! Rally round the standard of the only Italian King, because Italy is our country, and we are bound to defend her instead of shedding the blood of our brothers upon her soil. Let these wicked and accursed princes withdraw from our land, carrying with them their ill-gotten treasures, and bitter remorse for the evil they have so long wrought amongst us, if, indeed, they be capable of remorse. We ourselves shall soon recuperate our lost talents, our dignity, light-heartedness, greatness and prosperity, and stand once more upon an equal footing with other lands of Italy freed from the Austrian yoke. That brave soldier General Garibaldi shall lead us. He who, at the head of the people, broke the might of your rascally generals and conquered an army, when you shall have made him your chief, will lead you on to deeds of valour on the field of honour in the struggle against the real enemies of Italy, beneath the glorious banner of a gallant King, to whom we, one and all, are ready to give our lives, our all, for the redemption of Italy!

3 June, 1860.*

Instead of resuming hostilities before noon on June 3, General Lanza requested the Dictator to grant a further respite of three days, that proposals of peace might be made, and to this Garibaldi gladly consented.

That same day he received the following letter :—

PALERMO, 3 June, 1860.

GENERAL,—This part of the city being practically deserted, I can find no one to assume the care of the unhappy lunatics at the asylum. I should, therefore, be grateful to you if, as you proposed, you would appoint some one to take charge of the institution.

I have issued orders that the person appointed by you shall be allowed free passage across our lines, with the provisions necessary for the asylum. I enclose the pass, as a guarantee.

I take this opportunity to beg you to see that sufficient food is supplied to the inmates of the *Reale Albergo dei Poveri* (the Royal Alms House), who are complaining of short rations.

By replying thus to your communication of—
(sic) I desire to convey to you the assurance of my perfect consideration.

The General in Chief,
FERDINANDO LANZA.

To His Excellency General Garibaldi, Palermo.

(Enclosed) PALERMO, 3 June, 1860.

The Commanders of the Outposts will grant free passage in both directions across our lines to Signor P. Amari and Signor N. Daita, who are appointed to take charge of the insane asylum. Provisions for said asylum shall also be allowed to pass at any hour.

The General in Chief,
FERDINANDO LANZA.

The following letter was despatched by Lanza on the fourth :—

PALERMO, *June 4, 1860.*

GENERAL,—You may assure the families of the political prisoners, that they need have no apprehensions concerning their safety.

To-morrow at twelve o'clock, one of my Generals will wait upon you, to arrange concerning their incarceration, and to acquaint you with my views on this subject.

With the expression of my consideration, I have the honour to be,

The General in Chief,
FERDINANDO LANZA.

To General Garibaldi, Palermo.

There were seven political prisoners confined at Castellammare, and arrangements for their release were initiated on the fifth.

On the sixth the well-known convention was signed, which guaranteed free embarkation with arms and baggage to the Bourbon forces, insured the exchange of all prisoners and the surrender of the seven political prisoners, which was to take place on the day of the evacuation of the Castellammare fortress.

The expulsion of the Bourbon from Palermo was a mighty victory indeed, but it did not imply that Sicily was free. While the 24,000 or 25,000 soldiers were embarking for Naples, for such was their number after the return of von Mechel and Bosco, of General Bonanno's Monreale detachment, and the arrival of the two battalions of Bavarians under Colonel Buonopane—numerous other royal forces were holding the greater part of the island in subjection. The immediate programme was to liberate the entire island, and as the successes achieved had not blinded Garibaldi and Crispi to the further difficulties to be surmounted, the insufficient supply of arms caused them much anxiety, and they felt keenly the pressing need of organising a force capable of withstanding the final attack for which the enemy was most certainly preparing. As a matter of fact, there was still everything to be done.

There was no lack, indeed, of bold spirits, fully determined to have done with the Bourbon, and whom Garibaldi had inspired with a firm faith in their own powers to accomplish the heroic deeds to which he had summoned them. But there was no militia, which meant that military organisation and discipline left much to be desired, while the transport and ambulance service, the artillery and navy, simply did not exist.

As early as May 13, Garibaldi had written to Bertani that 'the directors of the Million Rifles Fund must send us as many firearms and as much ammunition as possible.' On the thirtieth, Crispi who, as before stated, had applied to Fabrizi for the arms in his keeping, ordered Mustica to leave Malta and deliver the following letter to Bertani in Genoa :—

DEAR DOCTOR,—I had neither the means nor the time to write to you by either of the last two couriers.

We reached Marsala, safe and sound, on the 11th of this month, having encountered no unpleasant adventures, and we were able to disembark everything without accident—men, ammunition and artillery—notwithstanding sharp firing from four Neapolitan ships. Had we arrived two hours earlier, when these ships were in port, or one hour later, when they returned, our vessels would have been sunk. We really owed our safety to a miracle.

The first number of the *Official Journal* which I enclose, and whose edicts and articles we beg you to publish widely, will inform you of all that has happened since our landing. And now let me inform you of our needs.

. . . Send us as many arms as possible, by means of English ships bound for this port. Send us superior and non-commissioned officers, for we are greatly in need of them. You might despatch the arms via Girgenti, as we are now masters of that

port. In any case, you will act according to the instructions the General sent Besana.

Kindly forward the enclosed to their several destinations.

Our most affectionate greetings to you, and believe me to be your friend, F. CRISPI.

16 June, by courtesy of MUSTICA.

(In Bertani's) handwriting.)

On the thirty-first, Garibaldi again wrote to Bertani, saying, 'only send us arms, and we shall soon accomplish the task we have undertaken!' On June 3, he was even more emphatic: 'I authorise you not only to borrow for Sicily to an unlimited extent, but even to contract a debt, no matter how large, in order to provide us with means sufficient to satisfy every one. Send us, therefore, as many firearms and as much ammunition as possible.'*

Crispi, on his part, was equally pressing.

DEAR DOCTOR,—I wrote to you by way of Messina, and am now sending off these few lines in haste. Everything is going on splendidly. But I entreat you to send us arms, officers and non-commissioned officers. The Mint and the administration of the treasury have been surrendered to us, and we are thus placed in a position to issue money. We shall be able to purchase six steamers, and you are the person to manage this transaction. Second-hand steamers—and send them on at once. The money is at your disposition. Meanwhile push on the enlistments and get the expedition off as quickly as possible, for, having conquered at Palermo, we must now go on to Messina.

We all embrace you.—Yours F. CRISPI.

June 3.

On June 1, there arrived at Marsala a transport-boat called the *Utile*, bearing a small expedition consisting of sixty men

under the command of Carmelo Agnetta, a Sicilian exile. This patriot brought 1000 rifles and 100,000 cartridges. These were the first reinforcements of arms and volunteers which had reached Garibaldi from the Continent since his arrival in Sicily, and it would appear that the merit was due to La Farina who, repenting, perhaps, of having allowed the Thousand to set out equipped with such inferior fire-arms, had now been influential in getting this convoy under way. It is a fact that on May 16, La Farina had despatched the following letter to Garibaldi. We copy it from the original :—

GENERAL GARIBALDI,—Let me know where the arms and ammunition are to be landed. The bearer of the present, Captain Dunne, an Englishman, may be trusted in every way. LA FARINA.

TURIN, 16 *May*, 1860.

We do not know when this letter reached Garibaldi.

Agnetta's expedition left Genoa in the night from May 25 to 26. It landed at Marsala, and started at once for Palermo, following the same route the Thousand had travelled. Agnetta wrote to Crispi from Salemi, on June 3 :—

. . . And now about my journey. It has been fraught with much fatigue and many dangers, as you will see from my report to the General. Nevertheless, I have the satisfaction of having accomplished it. I have brought more than 1000 rifles and 100,000 cartridges. I should like to hand these over to you in person, but I will do whatever the General orders. I shall move forward again to-morrow, as the last march of my sixty men, who are escorting the convoy, was six-and-thirty miles long. I beg you to ask the General in my name and theirs, to do us the favour of placing us in the front rank at the very first engagement. Good-bye. . . Yours C. AGNETTA.

Agnetta wrote to Crispi again, from Monreale, on June 7 :—

Yesterday, while advancing towards that much longed for goal where I shall be relieved of the responsibility that now weighs upon me, an order from the General reached me, which constrained me to turn back and wait for further instruction. My men's impatience and my own have reached the highest pitch, and I beg you to inform the General of this. You may add that the handful of volunteers I am bringing will suffice to form the square for a whole battalion, for they are all picked men, and should not be allowed to fret too long.

But all this is idle talk, after all, for here I am the slave of an order. I write out this babble for the mere pleasure of talking with you, and I am taking advantage of the departure of the courier, who must of necessity be despatched to Palermo.

However, I will gladly talk to you of serious matters, when I am relieved of all these anxieties.

Please arrange to have my men lodged in the convent of the *Santo Spirito*, over behind the hill, for I know there are comfortable quarters there. Good-bye.

Garibaldi devoted the first days of June especially to the creation of a regular militia. The Sicilian bands were dissolved, and those who had composed them were invited to enlist. The Thousand themselves formed the squares of about ten battalions which had been recruited in Sicily, which became the nucleus of the divisions under Bixio and Türr, and whose numbers were increased later on by the enlistment of individual volunteers from Northern Italy. Besides these, Türr instituted and organised the National Guard.

Up to the second of June, Crispi had impersonated the government, legislating and exercising full power. This unity of direction and initiative was of inestimable value during that

first period of revolution, when radical and decisive measures were necessary in order to establish the new political system upon the ruins of the odious system of the past. The country's acquiescence in the action of Garibaldi and his Thousand, which could not have been dispensed with, was all the more enthusiastic and steadfast because the people immediately felt the hand of government in the removal of the tax on bread, felt that their needs were understood, knew that their losses would be made good, and protection afforded them. And all this they owed to the Dictatorship and to Crispi, who lent it intellect, heart and energy.

But, Palermo once delivered, it became necessary to establish an administration that should provide for the reconstruction of the political, economic and intellectual life of the citizens; that should revise and amplify the laws already proclaimed, if a moral result was to be achieved. With this end in view, Crispi proposed to Garibaldi to divide the Secretariate of State into six Ministries—for War and Navy, Interior, Finance and Public Works, Justice, Public Instruction and Religion, Foreign Affairs and Commerce. The edict confirming this arrangement was signed on June 2, Crispi retaining the two most important ministries—interior and finance—and assigning the others to Colonel Vincenzo Orsini, Andrea Guarneri (Advocate), Monsignor Gregorio Ugdulena and Baron Casimiro Pisani.

Crispi continued to follow a policy well calculated to insure the devotion of the Sicilians to the new order of things. On that same day (June 2) he proclaimed that 'whosoever has fought for his country shall receive his part of the communal lands to be divided among the inhabitants, in accordance with the law (of 1849, now re-established), without being obliged to draw lots for the same, and that in cases where the soldier has been killed, this right shall pass to his heirs.'

On June 4, a circular addressed to the four-and-twenty governors of the island reinstated the communal magistracies and the town councils, much as they had been on May 15, 1849, but with such changes as altered political conditions and a different epoch made advisable. This circular furthermore laid down rules to be observed in the levying of taxes and in the administration of the police service. Another

decree, also dated June 4, provided that 'the children of those who fall in defence of the national cause shall be adopted by the country,' and nurtured, educated and dowered at the expense of the State; the widows were to receive pensions, and all who, 'in consequence of wounds received while fighting in defence of their country and of the national cause are unable to work, and such as are crippled or maimed,' were to be maintained in special institutions.

But Crispi soon found that his time would not allow him to accomplish all he had undertaken, and retaining the ministry of the interior, he resigned the departments of public works and finance, which were entrusted to Giovanni Raffaele and Domenico Peranni.

On June 8, the Secretary of State issued an edict instituting a mounted police force in each district, who were to be recruited among the soldiers of the second category of the National Militia. The edict also contained rules for the organisation of this force, and instructions concerning the services it was expected to perform, and in accordance with the decree issued on May 18, it furthermore appointed a Commission to verify and appraise the damage done in the city of Palermo by the Royalist troops.

On June 9, revolutionary measures were adopted, owing to the immediate necessity of helping those unfortunate persons who had lost their all, either in consequence of the bombardment, or through the inhuman cruelty of the soldiers, or the Bourbon police. The public Exchequer which, as has already been stated, had contained but 134,000 ducats, was now practically empty. Crispi therefore ordered that all charitable societies, trustees and institutions, both lay and ecclesiastical, should pay into the Treasury, where a separate account of these moneys would be kept, all legacies, monastic and marriage dowers and other bequests, with the exception of those devoted to the support of hospitals, to the direct relief of poverty, and to the celebration of masses.

The decree that established a special Commission in each district to deal with questions of common law in the place of the military tribunals, is also dated June 9. But it was impossible to organise the administration of civil justice with equal rapidity. The judges who had been appointed by the

Bourbons were not trusted, and before confirming them in office, their past behaviour was submitted to the judgment of a commission composed of citizens whose reputations were above reproach.

By means of other edicts Crispi created the Councils of Government (to-day they would be called Prefectorial Councils), which being installed in the capital of each district, were to replace the Councils of Intendancy, that had been dissolved. He also abolished the title of 'Excellency' and the custom of the kissing of hands among men, 'being of opinion that a free people must destroy all customs that are the outgrowth of past servitude.' He adopted the Piedmontese crest for Sicily, engraving upon it this formula which, if inaccurate, was nevertheless of good omen: 'Let the crest of Sicily be that of the Kingdom of Italy!'—which at that time, had not come into existence! He also ordered all Sicilian vessels to fly the Italian flag. 'This flag, when used on war-ships, shall show the crest of the House of Savoy in the centre, surmounted by the crown. For all other vessels the crest alone will suffice.' Crispi dissolved the Society of Jesus and the Order of the Redemptorists, 'in consideration of the fact that the Jesuits and Liguorians were the most steadfast supporters of despotism during the unhappy period of Bourbon occupation.' He expelled the members of these societies from Italian territory (!), and declared the incorporation of their possessions with those of the State.

These laws, with many others, too numerous to mention here, were received by the country with intense satisfaction. Only the regulation concerning conscription failed to please. The Sicilians were not accustomed to compulsory service, and considered it an intolerable burden. It had been established by an edict signed by General Garibaldi at Salemi, on May 14, but not by Crispi, who had not as yet been appointed Secretary of State. But Crispi had supported the measure, and perhaps even written the decree, as Türr would lead us to conclude in his *Risposta all' Opuscolo Bertani* (1869). He had certainly recognised its expediency and necessity, had indeed instructed the governors to make all haste in forming the national militia, and appointed a Commission to organise that of Palermo, as early as May 28.

It is interesting to read how the governors kept Crispi posted concerning this important undertaking. As an example, we transcribe the report of Giacinto Scelsi, governor of the district of Cefalù, who later became a prefect, and finally a senator of the kingdom. Scelsi's report was drawn up on June 12.

I wish to inform you in confidence, that the edict concerning conscription has awakened dissatisfaction. Two men out of every one hundred inhabitants are considered too many. The people wish to be allowed to send substitutes, and they demand that only sons be exempt from service.

For my part, until such a time as I shall have received orders to the contrary, I intend to stand firm and exact obedience to the law. I have explained the necessity for this measure, the expediency of putting it into practice, the duty of all to make some sacrifice to the national cause, and to refrain from vexing our magnanimous Dictator. I have had that edict republished that promises compensation by the State to those who shall have fought for their country, and I have addressed the population in firm but gentle language, assuring them of my conviction that the patriotism of the citizens will not fail us. . . .

The next day Scelsi dealt with the same subject in a still longer letter.

. . . The first section of the second category of soldiers is already organised, and they are now testing horses. The communes are so anxious that order should be maintained, that they are willing to support the militia until other arrangements have been made. Should the government demand financial aid, this could be easily obtained, but I

must confess that the dissatisfaction caused by the regulations concerning the first category is very general, not only in the communes of this district, but in others beyond. The communal councils I have already succeeded in establishing hesitate to take hold of the municipal administration, fearing they may be unable to check the rising indignation of the populace, which is based upon an old and fatal prejudice against conscription. Even the Committees in those communes where the municipal body has not as yet been reorganised, decline to expose themselves to what they consider a most serious danger.

The law on conscription is generally considered impracticable. Even the most loyal, the radicals and the true patriots, are discouraged, and entreat me to do everything in my power to avoid a catastrophe. For my part I assure you that I am insisting upon prompt and faithful execution of the regulations, and that I answer all the proposals and prayers addressed to me, by seeking to demonstrate the justice of the law, the expediency of obeying it, the necessity of quickly organising an army to safeguard the fruits of our splendid and providential victory, and the obligation that rests upon us all to avoid vexing the great Dictator, to whom a sense of boundless gratitude should bind us for ever in blind obedience. I repeated all these arguments this very morning when summoned to explain the situation to the legally constituted Communal Council of this town, and I furthermore added that it is the government's one intention to save Sicily at any cost, and to provide itself with the means of putting its determination into execution. But such considerations, that suffice

to convince persons of intelligence, weigh lightly enough with the ignorant. On these I have sought to bring religious influence to bear, by begging the Bishop, who has recently called upon me, to allow the more ardent spirits among the clergy of his diocese to preach in favour of the holy war, to convince the faithful of their duty to further it by every means in their power, and to exhort parents not to oppose the departure of their sons. But all my efforts are unavailing. This very day two hundred and fifty women wished to come to my place of residence and obtain a promise from me that conscription should not be enforced, and they were prevented from coming only by my assuring them that my duty would forbid my receiving them. While on his way to the Town Hall, to enroll the soldiers belonging to the first category, the chancellor of the commune was forced to turn back, by a crowd of persons who, while protesting that they meant to avoid all acts of violence, declared their determination to *prevent the ruin of their families*—those were the words they used. Were it not for the great affection they bear me, serious trouble would already have arisen, which that hastily assembled and ill-organised body, the National Guard, would not have the courage to prevent.

In conclusion I entreat you to cast about for a remedy. . . . Some conciliatory expedient should be found. For instance, instead of beginning with the recruits of the first category, those of the third might be enrolled first, to be followed by those of the second. Thus, before enrolling the first category, a strong contingent would be ready to hand, capable of silencing sedition, ignorance and weak-

ness. Substitution might even be permitted, only sons exempted, and an arrangement made by virtue of which communes that will not or cannot furnish recruits shall pay the government a sum of money. This they would, doubtless, most willingly do. The law on conscription came too suddenly; the country was not prepared for it, and it has therefore produced a painful impression which, at present, no one is in a position to remove.

There you have the facts of the matter, set forth with my usual outspokenness, which you will recognise. I repeat that if I am ordered to stand firm and disregard popular feeling, I shall do so with all the energy I possess, and even at the cost of my life. . . .

Garibaldi and Crispi were convinced that concessions must be made, and in reply to Scelsi's letter of June 13 Crispi wrote as follows:—

The regulations concerning conscription must be obeyed. We are willing, however, to modify the clauses that are at variance with popular prejudice. Substitution will be permitted and only sons exempted. I demand one thing only, that these modifications be made to appear as already inherent to the law, and not as concessions on the part of the government, whose authority must be safeguarded.

In consequence of this decision the following circular was sent to all the governors:—

PALERMO, 17 June, 1860.

To the Governor.

SIR,—You will see from a ministerial letter of the 16th, as well as from a second one signed this morning, which you will receive by post, that the conditions of conscription have been modified, and

you will consequently experience no further trouble in enforcing the law.

Substitution will be tolerated, only sons, married men and those who are bound by religious vows, shall be exempt from military service, and the number of volunteers will be subtracted from the contingent each commune is bound to supply.

Thus modified, conscription cannot be considered a burden, and it now becomes the governors' duty to see that it is prudently and wisely enforced.

These modifications seem to me to exclude all possibility of opposition on the part of the people. The country cannot desire her own downfall, and opposition to the only means of raising an army to defend her liberty, would indeed be equivalent to desiring her ruin. The people must rely upon themselves, and defend their institutions with their own hands. You must, therefore, stand firm in the performance of your duty. Exhort the people by wise counsels, worthy of the nation to which we belong, and set the example of vigour and energy, that the wicked may not triumph, nor the weak yield, and that the law may be respected.

Garibaldi went still further. 'Too humane for a revolutionist,' so Türr wrote of him, 'he declared that until the work in the fields should be over, no recruits would be called for.' The edict of June 16, indeed, was precisely to this effect. 'Those soldiers of the first category who are at present bearing arms, and who are under the necessity of returning to their homes to gather in their crops, are herewith temporarily dispensed from service.'

The lowering of the Bourbon flag at Palermo was the signal for the surrender of the eastern and southern portions of the island. Thanks to the withdrawal of the Trapani garrison, Marsala was now perfectly safe, and as ships were necessary for the future conduct of the war, Garibaldi remembered the

Lombardo that was still aground at the entrance of the harbour, and sent a commission of engineers to make arrangements for setting her afloat at once. After much patient labour what the Bourbon navy had tried in vain to do was accomplished, as the following reports, which also contain further interesting information, show.

Royal Frigate *Partenope*.

MARSALA, 15 May, 1860.

To His Excellency the Commandant.

This morning, in accordance with your orders, I went on board the steamship *Lombardo*, which is aground at the entrance of this harbour. The vessel rests somewhat upon her left side, is full of water, and is in an extremely dilapidated condition. I questioned the Harbour Master, Signor Cafiero, as to the reason for this, and he assured me that, on the 12th, when this royal cruiser and the royal corvet *Stromboli* had left Marsala, the populace boarded the *Lombardo* and rifled her, he being unable to prevent this owing to an insufficiency of troops. The truth of this statement is endorsed by the enclosed letter from Messrs. Ingham's agent, requesting you to send and withdraw certain objects which he succeeded in saving. Hoping to rescue the above-named vessel, and desirous of trying every possible means, I began by sending the divers and a gang of marines to stop all the taps of the boilers and all the holes that had been made in the vessel's keel on the evening of the eleventh and the morning of the twelfth, by our own marines and those on board the *Stromboli*. I then proceeded to have her emptied by means of numerous pails, hand-pumps and fire engines, having first fixed an anchor firmly at her stern, and cast a couple of cables across her.

The entire crew of this ship worked incessantly

until 3 P.M., and succeeded in pumping about five feet of water out of the hold, but perceiving that the water did not diminish in proportion to the amount extracted, I began to suspect some hole had been overlooked, for which reason I ordered the divers to make further research, which, however, proved fruitless. I ordered two cables to be attached to the *Stromboli* that, getting up full steam, began to haul at the *Lombardo*, and by dragging with all her force upon the anchor, sought in vain to get the *Lombardo* afloat. But as the pumping had been suspended during these operations, the water mounted rapidly, attaining its original level once more.

Having lost all hope of quickly rescuing the vessel and getting her afloat, I carried out your further instructions and ordered the 2nd engineer and the stokers of the *Stromboli* to break up and dismount all of the machinery they could reach, and I took all of the small pieces with their screws and rivets on board this ship. I can therefore assure you that I have made it impossible for the *Lombardo's* engines to be set in motion, and I have also opened some fresh holes in the body of the vessel.

I enclose a list of the things I succeeded in saving. Owing to the lateness of the hour and the unsettled condition of the weather, which threatened our return to our own ship, I was obliged to leave behind five lengths of chain, an anchor and the mast, for all of which, together with the engines and the hulk itself, I have made the Harbour Master responsible.

*The Captain of the Frigate,
2nd in Command,*

EDUARDO D'AMICO.

*To the Cavaliere Don Francesco Cossovich,
Commandant of His Majesty's Frigate Partenope.*

His Majesty's Frigate *Partenope*.
(No. 260.)

Cruising off C. Granitola,
16 May, 1860.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that on the morning of the 13th of this month, notwithstanding the unsettled condition of the weather, I felt it my duty to approach the Trapani coast, in order to be able to send you a reliable report, and also to reassure myself concerning Trapani, as I was unaware what route the party that landed at Marsala had taken. I reached Trapani at 1 P.M., and there found His Majesty's ship *Stromboli*, and the royal brigantine *Valoroso*.

I came to a standstill near the docks, whereupon the commandants of the above-named vessels informed me that the Intendant of the province of Trapani had requested them to protect the city, which he believed to be in great danger. The Captain of the *Stromboli* furthermore communicated to me the order he had received from Your Excellency to undertake a cruise along the coast between Trapani and Girgenti, and this immediately, and in the company of the royal vessel of which I have command. First, however, we were to seek to rescue the *Lombardo*, if it were possible to do so in a few hours, otherwise we were to sink her.

In consideration of the state of affairs with which the Intendant of the province has already acquainted Your Excellency, I decided that the *Stromboli* should join me upon this cruise, as soon as she should have coaled, and that the *Valoroso* should remain

at Trapani and await Your Excellency's further orders.

Having consigned my reports to the Harbour Master to be forwarded to Your Excellency as quickly and as safely as possible, I immediately put out to sea. In the night bad weather overtook us from the W.N.W., and I spent the whole of the 14th over beyond Marittimo, without being able to approach the coast, owing to high cross-seas.

Yesterday morning at dawn I sighted the *Stromboli*, and we both advanced towards Marsala, because, although I had left that port as recently as the morning of the 12th, after having incapacitated the *Lombardo* for further service, nevertheless, in accordance with fresh orders received from Your Excellency, I wished to make an attempt to rescue the vessel, or, if this prove impracticable, to complete her destruction.

The copy of the report made to me by the officer 2nd in command, whom I despatched to direct the work on board the *Lombardo*, will acquaint you with the efforts that were made to save the vessel, and with what was done to incapacitate her. Meanwhile it is my duty to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the *Lombardo* was rifled by the inhabitants of Marsala, which action the Harbour Master was unable to prevent, whereas when these, His Majesty's ships, left the harbour on the morning of the 12th, she had not been tampered with. This will explain the brevity of the list of things saved, which I have the honour to enclose. Some of these objects were consigned to me by the Harbour Master, others by Messrs. Ingham's agents, and some we ourselves found on the ship.

I have the further honour of informing Your

Excellency that while the *Lombardo* was being rifled, the Harbour Master received a protest from the Sardinian Consular Agent, the original of which I saw fit to claim, and which I herewith forward, as it may be of use to His Majesty's government.

At Marsala I was informed that the lack of troops is causing great apprehension. The agents of the police and of the *Macino*¹ have disappeared, and seven prisoners have escaped from gaol. I also ascertained that the company that landed recently at Marsala is now somewhere in the neighbourhood of Salemi; that all the worst elements of the surrounding country have hastened to swell their ranks, and that they have cut the telegraph wires and destroyed the semaphores throughout the region, and carried off all the instruments from the telegraphic station at Marsala.

Last night the *Stromboli* towed my vessel up the coast. I then ordered her to keep moving backwards and forwards, and as far inland as possible, along the coast between Trapani and Girgenti, while I myself propose to cruise between the same points.

While regulating my cruise according to the instructions Your Excellency imparted to me on April 25 (Naval Department), it is nevertheless my duty to warn you that, although all on board this ship, as well as those on board the *Stromboli*, are making every effort to attain the end for which this cruise has been prescribed, one vessel is entirely insufficient for the guarding of so extensive a coast line; and that, while this frigate is ever ready to hasten wherever her presence may be needed, and

¹ Agents of the *Macino* = those officials who controlled the grinding of the wheat for purposes of taxation.

never relaxes her vigilance, she is greatly handicapped in her movements, as any large sailing vessel would be, by the dangerous nature and shallow waters of this coast.

Meanwhile, as I am sending this report to Trapani by the *Stromboli*, I will conclude with a word of praise for the zeal and devotion which the officers and men of my crew display in the service of the King, Our Master, one of those most distinguished for his activity, intelligence and judgment being the officer second in command.

CAPTAIN FRANCESCO COSSOVICH.

To His Excellency

Prince Castelcicala,

General in Chief,

Lieut. General of Sicily,

Palermo.

The protest presented by the Sardinian Consular Agent, Sebastiano Lipari, to which Captain Cossovich alludes, reads as follows :—

On the 11th of this present month there disembarked from the vessel now lying in the harbour, a body of men led, it is said, by General Garibaldi, who have come hither, it is further declared, to open hostilities against the Sicilian government. The vessel in question belongs to the Rubattino Steamship Company of Genoa, and was taken by force in that harbour where she lay at anchor. This information was imparted to me by members of her crew.

It has now come to my knowledge that thieving has gone on, on board the above-named ship, and I consider that, whether she become the property of the Sicilian government, by right of seizure, or be claimed by the Sardinian government, to be returned

to her rightful owners, it is expedient that the rifling of this ship be prevented, and that she be carefully guarded.

Desirous, therefore, of fulfilling my duty, and also of freeing myself from all responsibility, I herewith request you to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the safety of this vessel, and prevent further thieving.

The *Lombardo* was eventually towed into Palermo harbour, and became the first ship of the Sicilian fleet, to which were presently added the *Veloce*, which had deserted from the service of the King of Naples, and two vessels purchased in England. At the close of the campaign the fleet numbered fifteen ships. The main idea in organising the Sicilian navy was the necessity of providing a reliable and convenient means of transporting volunteers beyond the Messina Lighthouse.

CHAPTER X

The victory of the Thousand and Italy—Count Cavour—His unjustifiable prejudice against the Party of Action—Giuseppe La Farina—His previous career and his former intimacy with Crispi—Cavour sends him to Palermo to control Garibaldi—Intrigues, boasting, and lies—Bertani and the Piedmontese government—Finance, arms, and the navy—Bertani's letters¹—Rivalry between the representatives of Garibaldi—Mazzini and Bertani in favour of an expedition into the Abruzzi by way of Umbria and the Marches—Their correspondence with Crispi and Garibaldi.

THE news of the departure of the Thousand for Sicily had caused much surprise. The Sardinian government itself was amazed when it became known that a handful of men had set out to conquer a State that was defended by sea by the strongest navy in Italy, and by land by a numerous and well-disciplined army. The thoughts of many flew to the noble folly of the Bandiera brothers and of Pisacane; while others suspected that Cavour had secretly aided Garibaldi in his advance towards what would probably prove total destruction, because the hero had become embarrassing to him. But the country in general, and especially the youth of the nation, in whom ideas of liberty and of nationalism were fomenting hotly, saw only the heroic beauty of the action, and knowing little of the true state of Sicilian matters, anticipated not bloody defeat but splendid victory.

When the news of the successful landing became known, and was quickly followed by that of the victory at Calatafimi, where on the open field the Thousand had defeated regular troops three times as numerous as themselves, a great flame of enthusiasm swept the peninsula. The impulse to hasten thither, to have a part in the glory, to help in some way, seized one and all, for all now knew that the time had come when Italy would indeed be made.

The Sardinian government was also quick to perceive this fact.

Revolution was shaping national destinies, and Count Cavour's chief anxiety was for the security and prestige of the Piedmontese monarchy. Diplomacy could ignore these events, for the 'non-intervention policy' had been accepted by the whole of Europe. England would certainly not be opposed to a popular uprising in Italy—she who had encouraged Italy to fight her own battles against her oppressors. Louis Napoleon could not bring back as enemies those very troops whom, but the year before, he had brought as comrades to the Italians on the battlefields of Lombardy. But how about history? History would declare that the domination of the House of Savoy, of that small country at the foot of the Alps, had spread throughout Italy not by virtue of its own policy and prowess, but thanks to the strength of the people, directed by the revolution.

Personally also the haughty minister, conscious of his own worth, and proud of having forced this aged Europe to observe the fluttering in the breast of the sleeping beauty, about to awake—proud of having constrained the powers to accept the liberation of Lombardy, and furthermore of having prevented them from offering any resistance to the annexation by Piedmont of the small states of Central Italy—personally also Count Cavour must have experienced bitter humiliation on seeing the fruit he had believed to be still unripe about to be boldly gathered by the hand of another.

The state of Cavour's mind may therefore be easily imagined when the first fabulous news (the adjective is his own) reached him in Turin very shortly after the occurrence of the great events. He had not prevented the expedition—it would perhaps be more exact to say he had been unable to prevent it—but he had used every means in his power to persuade Garibaldi to relinquish it. For a year the General's friends among the Sicilian emigrants had been urging him to postpone the action in Sicily for an indefinite period, and even as late as the fifth of May several persons had repaired to Villa Spinola at Quarto to seek to dissuade him. But when he was once on his way, and the probability of success immediately became apparent, could Cavour still persist in his disapproval? It

would have been impossible indeed. Public sentiment became suddenly so inflamed by this triumphant audacity, and it so thoroughly roused the spirit of chivalry in Victor Emmanuel himself, that had Cavour not consented to support the undertaking he would have been forced to retire from government. He therefore lent it his support by openly tolerating enlistment, removing the ban of confiscation from the supplies of arms, offering no opposition to the sailing of ships from Genoa with volunteers, and granting various other favours. But although forced by the good conduct of the revolution to lend it his support, he had not relinquished any of his early animosity against it. Nevertheless, the moment had arrived when monarchy and revolution must cease to look askance at each other and join hands, for revolution was creating for monarchy what monarchy was incapable of creating for herself—Unity.

Cavour's animosity was indeed unjustifiable.

No one had any right to doubt Garibaldi's sincerity when he landed at Marsala with the Italian flag and in the name of Victor Emmanuel. Better than any one else Cavour was acquainted with Garibaldi's personal devotion to the King; he knew of the letter the leader of the Thousand had despatched to the sovereign on setting out from Quarto, and was aware of his long-established conviction that the great majority of the people were not in favour of a republic, and his consequent declaration that he would contribute neither morally nor materially towards its establishment. Cavour was, moreover, aware that since 1849 Mazzini and Garibaldi had not been on good terms.

Nor could he doubt the monarchical sentiments of Garibaldi's lieutenants, of such men as Sirtori, Bixio, Türr, and others, no matter what their origin might have been, for he had always reckoned them among his own friends.

Crispi he knew only through police reports, which in all countries reveal only the darkest side. Had he taken the trouble to sift the truth of these reports he would have discovered an ardent patriot and a man of sterling characteristics in this Sicilian exile who was expelled from Piedmont in 1853, and forced to leave Turin at the beginning of 1860. Minister Farini, Urbano Rattazzi, Lorenzo Valerio, Cesare

Correnti, and Sebastiano Tecchio could all have given him a good account of Crispi. But he listened only to Giuseppe La Farina, who probably described his fellow-countryman as a rabid Mazzinian, perhaps even as an implacable anarchist, and certainly as an enemy against whom all means were justifiable.

Cavour was equally unjust to Mazzini.

As long as the period of dark conspiracy against the existing order lasted, that is, conspiracy against those foreign governments that oppressed and those national governments that from prudence or weakness endured oppression—as long as the persistent propaganda for the principles of nationalism was based upon the republican ideal—the resentment against the formidable conspirator felt by men who judged the Italian problem by other standards, and with different sentiments, may easily be accounted for. But when, moved by the joy of seeing Italy delivered from the foreigner, and united, Mazzini publicly and privately renounced his prejudice, and in no ambiguous language, saying: ‘I will freely accept unity under the King. . . . The dream of my life has ever been Unity!’—when it became manifest that, if a people in whom consciousness of their rights had been awakened had risen up in their pride of nation to achieve liberty, this praiseworthy action was due precisely to that persistent propaganda, then Cavour’s attitude towards Mazzini ought to have become unbiassed and more just. But, on the contrary, he continued to regard Mazzini as the enemy. *Mazzinian* still remained a term of opprobrium, and stamped a man as dangerous, and the anti-Mazzinian phraseology of the conservatives, which had been formed during the long years of preparation, retained all its significance, all its strength. Mazzini therefore had much to suffer during the year 1860. The monarchical party continued to hate him; the ex-republicans who had sacrificed their early principles that Italy might be made were forced to drop him in order to avoid the accusation of insincerity. Had Cavour possessed a more generous spirit, instead of allowing him to be hunted like a beast of prey, he would have recognised the services Mazzini had rendered, the results of which were shining with so pure a light at that very time. He might even have been able, had he seized the solemn moment when Mazzini declared he would create no division by



COUNT CAVOUR

‘talking republic,’ to hold him to these sentiments, and attach him definitely to that Italian monarchy which was being established by the suffrage of the entire nation. Thus the great epic of Italian Unity would have been enacted without the renewal of the story of Saturn in connection with one of its greatest workers.

Count Cavour’s human weakness found a pernicious ally in Giuseppe La Farina.

The individuality of this other Sicilian exile who, although once a republican, became an important and ambitious supporter of the Count’s policy, must not be overlooked. It would be unfair to deny that La Farina possessed both genius and patriotism combined with a strong will, but there can be no doubt that these qualities were tarnished by his unbounded presumption and foolish vanity.

Minister in Sicily in 1849, and later an exile in France, he was on friendly terms with Crispi for some years. On August 27, 1849, he wrote to him from Paris: ‘Command me always whenever I can be of use to you, and rest assured that I shall never forget your friendship nor the proofs of affection you gave me when I was occupying a position that weighed heavily upon my shoulders.’ On January 25, 1850, he wrote again: ‘Let me know if the *Concordia* is still appearing, and if it would print a letter from me—a sort of declaration of republican faith.’ On October 10, 1853, Crispi heard from him from Tours. ‘I need hardly assure you that, had I been able to help in procuring a French passport for you, I would have spared neither pains nor trouble in so doing.’

But as time passed this friendship faded. It declined rapidly after 1857, when La Farina joined the ‘National Society,’ and being recommended to Count Cavour by Giorgio Pallavicino, repudiated his political past and his allegiance to Mazzini. In 1858, wishing to return to Italy after his wanderings in Malta, England, and France, Crispi applied to him for his opinion concerning the validity of the decree of expulsion from Piedmont that had been issued against him in 1853. La Farina replied: ‘If your passport is in order I believe you will encounter no obstacle here . . . but this I dare not promise you. Cavour’s methods are not those of Rattazzi, who took all responsibility upon himself; Cavour

leaves the police and the intendants . . . very free to act. The personal assurance of the Minister is therefore no longer sufficient. . . . I have known several cases where Count Cavour refused to revoke an order issued by the chief of police. I am extremely sorry not to be able to give you a more satisfactory answer.' At that very time he was on terms of intimacy with the Minister!

When he became converted to the Piedmontese monarchy La Farina naturally carried his great activity into the opposite camp. In a letter to Nicola Fabrizi of September 8, 1856, he wrote: 'I am firmly persuaded that at the present crisis the majority of the nation are for Victor Emmanuel. . . . Let the revolution come in the name of Victor Emmanuel, but only let it come! . . . I do not place my trust in them (*the men who were then in power* in Piedmont), I trust in the inexorable logic of events.' In speaking thus La Farina was looking far ahead, and he foresaw a situation that did eventually develop, thanks to the war of 1859, but of which at that time there was no other indication than a certain tendency in men of action to turn towards monarchy after the failures of the Mazzinians.

Possessing as he did this happy intuition of the destiny of the House of Savoy, he formed a project to hasten its accomplishment which it will be well to study, as it throws much light upon his conduct in 1860.

Towards the close of the year 1856 England's irritation against the King of Naples was being widely discussed, and there were those who hinted that, by means of diplomacy, Murat was to be raised to the throne hitherto occupied by Ferdinand II. Upon this hypothesis La Farina became the champion of a movement among the Sicilian exiles in favour of the annexation of Sicily by Piedmont. Francesco Ferrara, a professor of political economy, who later rose to celebrity, and who was himself a Sicilian refugee, exposed this propaganda which his fellow-countryman was conducting in all secrecy, and condemned it in an article that appeared in the *Il Diritto* (October 21). Ferrara believed that Sicily's position, in case of a Muratist restoration, would be both impossible and disadvantageous, and that the annexation to Piedmont would bring about a war and everlasting enmity between that State and Naples; whereas if Unity was to be achieved, it

would be wise to avoid all jealousy and animosity between Italian provinces. La Farina, who had previously written against the Muratists in the name of the unitary principle, now showed himself inclined to accept the succession of Joachim's son if Sicily were but allowed to become a Sardinian province, and he proposed that she should revolt and 'openly and clearly manifest her will' that the Powers might be forced to take this desire of hers into consideration. He added, however (*Il Diritto*, November 4): 'As to the form the union shall assume, that must be left to the future. Sicily would not be a conquered country—she would freely bestow herself, and therefore have a right to stipulate conditions. And as Professor Ferrara insists, not indeed without a grain of malice, upon the word *fusion*, I venture to point out to him that the idea of fusion with the despotism of centralisation has never been entertained by intelligent unionists, and that the different regions of Italy are sufficiently instinct with life to exclude all fear of a reproduction of French centralisation in her case.'

Count Cavour, who was no longer either able or willing to disregard the events that were succeeding each other with such amazing rapidity in Sicily, arranged with La Farina—who probably supplied him with information tinged with his own personal estimate of men and things—that the latter should be placed by Garibaldi's side to control him, to direct matters according to his own wishes, and make absolutely sure of Sicily for Piedmont. In a word, he was to catch up with events that had not waited upon Cavour's convenience.

But if the plan was a daring one, the choice of an instrument could not have been worse.

After the events of 1859 Garibaldi could entertain no pleasant memory of La Farina. During the dispute between Garibaldi and General Fanti concerning the advance upon the Marches which had first been arranged with the King's approval and then countermanded, La Farina, in his determination to overthrow at any cost the party in favour of the advance, had shown so little consideration for Garibaldi's feelings that he himself, writing to Cavour on November 20, 1859, was obliged to confess that he was 'no longer on the same terms of perfect confidence with Garibaldi as before.' Nor

could the General's sentiments towards him have been modified by his conduct on the eve of the departure of the Thousand, and by his consignment, at the last moment, of inferior fire-arms to men who were about to face a mighty struggle for their country's welfare, the 'National Society' being known to be in possession of a good supply of superior arms.

Giuseppe La Farina, in his official capacity, landed at Palermo from the *Maria Adelaide*, Commandant Carlo Persano, on June 7, the day following the capitulation of the Bourbon troops. He had despatched a first encouraging message to Cavour from Cagliari on the fifth: 'Some intimate friends of mine are members of the temporary government at Palermo.'

La Farina immediately set about conquering both Garibaldi and Sicily. Up to that time Crispi had governed without encountering open opposition, but it is not to be supposed that there was any lack of adversaries, not only among the Bourbons, whose domination was declining so fatally, but also among those whose ambition had remained unsatisfied, among the patriots of the eleventh hour, the autonomists, and, above all, the conservatives, and this motley throng that formed the opposition was but waiting for a leader.

Garibaldi consented to receive Count Cavour's envoy, inquired somewhat ironically concerning his journey and the state of his health, and then listened absent-mindedly enough to what he had to say, frequently interrupting him to assure him that everything was progressing favourably, and that his services were not needed. In the end he dismissed him coldly, and a moment later the General was entertaining Crispi with an account of the interview.

Three days after his arrival La Farina despatched the following letter to Cavour, which is full of untruths, and which, although it has already been printed elsewhere, we nevertheless transcribe, as it gives a clear idea of Turin's intentions, and of the unscrupulousness, the unbounded vanity, and the spirit of intrigue of its writer.

PALERMO, 10 June, 1860.

DEAR COUNT,—The impression produced by Palermo upon a new-comer at the present moment

is one of mingled astonishment and horror. More than one fourth of the city has been reduced to a heap of ruins; the convents and the churches of *Santa Caterina*, of the *Angeli*, the *Martorana* and the *Grazie*, the entire *Porta di Castro* district and the magnificent and splendid palaces of the *Carini*, *De Riso*, etc., are nothing but heaps of stones and ashes. In some places there is no trace left of the old streets, and from all these shapeless masses there issues a stench of decaying bodies that is sickening. The dead already removed from beneath the ruins number more than six hundred. The story of the barbarous cruelty and rascally deeds of the Bourbon Janissaries surpasses belief and fills one with loathing.

The presence of Neapolitans at the fortress and in its neighbourhood, and the distrust with which they are regarded, notwithstanding the terms of the capitulation, keep the city in a state of perpetual siege, so to speak. All the streets are torn up and barricaded, and these barricades are so high and so frequent as to prevent all horse and wheel traffic of any kind, even making it difficult to get about on foot. The city swarms with people armed with guns, pistols, pikes, pruning-knives and spears. Many priests and friars may be seen among the armed throng, blunderbuss on shoulder and crucifix in hand, and they one and all preach the crusade against the Bourbons in the name of God and the country, and deify Victor Emmanuel. Most of the shops are closed; entire classes of the population have been reduced to poverty; the streets are full of beggars. The cost of all provisions has risen tremendously, and certain articles of prime necessity are being sold at four times their cost under ordinary conditions.

Even water must be bought, as most of the aqueducts are broken.

The sight of the ruins, the loss of life and the damage done, the fresh memory of atrocious torment inflicted, the excitement of the prisoners and of those under sentence for common crimes whom the Royalists turned loose to the number of several thousand, all this has aroused a fierce spirit in the lower classes. They are kind and generous with the soldiers, who are every day deserting in large numbers, but they have no mercy for the police, and when they discover the hiding place of one of these it is difficult to prevent their murdering him. Garibaldi makes every effort to prevent such acts of violence, and many owe him their lives, among others that famous Captain Chinnici, inventor of the *sedia ardente* (the burning chair) and other modes of torture that have filled Europe with horror. Garibaldi rescued him from the hands of the people, and is keeping him in prison. But the General sometimes errs through kindness. Thus, for example, he wished to place a certain Giordano, a most wicked satellite of the past tyranny, at the head of an armed band, and the people murdered him. He not only pardoned, but gave military command to Scordato and Miceli, who were famous for their evil deeds in the Bourbon cause. They made a first appearance in the city with their armed bands, but were immediately obliged to retire for fear of being torn to pieces.

Garibaldi is greatly beloved, and the gratitude the Sicilian people feel for him is immense, but no one believes him capable of governing the State. In fifteen days these Sicilians have read Garibaldi as if they had known him for fifteen years. No one

wishes to wound him, but all are determined not to tolerate a government which is the negation of all government. In a country where conscription was unknown he thought seriously of raising 300,000 men, and it took Orsini's most strenuous efforts to get the number reduced to 40,000.

An edict excludes all servants of the past government from participation in the town councils, and in certain towns these men are the only ones who know how to read and write. The seven provinces are cut up by the appointment of a governor for each one of the districts, which number five-and-twenty. A young man from Mancilepre, whom no one knows anything about, is made governor of Palermo. The men serving in the bands are being paid four *tari* a day, while their officers get but three.

The army-intendant also performs the duties of treasurer and paymaster-general, as if the Sicilians were a tribe of wandering Bedouins! You can imagine the effect produced by such provisions as these in a country where it is difficult to elicit applause even for good government, and so great is the discredit into which those in power have fallen that were it not for the fear of displeasing Garibaldi, they would all, by this time, have been driven out with every mark of contempt. The most unpopular among those in power is Crispi, who is not held in any consideration in this country, and who has already furnished proof of his utter incapacity.

He is secretary of state for the interior and minister of finance. Raffaele, one of his colleagues (public works), is a most suspicious character and extremely unpopular, so much so that Garibaldi himself, at whose suggestion I do not know, ordered his arrest some days since. Monsignore Ugdulena

and Baron Pisani are honest men, but have proved themselves incompetent. The government, therefore, is anything but firmly grounded in the people's esteem; it is isolated and, as it were, encamped in a hostile country. No one believes it can endure, and its authority is laughed at.

Under such conditions as these, all eyes are now fixed upon me. Beginning with the leaders of the aristocracy — Mirto, Butera, Cesaro, San Marco, Cerda, Torremuzza, etc.—down to the leaders of the populace, all come to me for advice and direction. In the streets I am greeted with enthusiasm, while no one thinks of saluting those in power. Many of the chiefs of armed forces, including even the questors of Palermo, have placed themselves at my disposal. My house is always as full of people as that of a minister. The immediate convocation of the Assembly, to vote the annexation and regulate universal suffrage, is greatly desired. The government knows it would not be allowed to stand a single day if the Assembly were convoked, and is therefore opposed to the project, alleging as a pretext, that to hasten the annexation would be to render the execution of the Neapolitan scheme impossible. Garibaldi is irritated, troubled and weary beyond belief, and his conversation plainly shows that the cares of government are crushing and overwhelming him. I have never seen him in such a state.

Amidst all these evils that afflict this unhappy country, amidst the bloody discord that distracts the interior, it is a comfort to observe the unanimity of the people in wishing for the annexation, in hating the Bourbon reign, in ardently desiring the establishment of an honest, strong and intelligent govern-

ment. The evil is known to all, and its remedy is pointed out. We have some unpleasant days before us, but I have faith that by a strong effort, Sicily will be able to emerge from the present crisis.

Addresses are already being prepared by municipal bodies, by the National Guards and by religious communities, demanding a government that knows how to govern, and the speedy convocation of the electoral colleges. A deputation of prominent citizens and true patriots will probably present themselves before Garibaldi to-morrow to explain the real condition of the country to him, and point out the persons who enjoy the greatest share of the people's confidence. Should this not suffice, the citizens will repair in a body to demand that the General make suitable provisions.

Count Persano is doing his duty admirably, and his presence in Palermo harbour is a piece of great good fortune.

P.S.—June 12.—During the last two days the unpopularity of the government has increased to such an extent that it will not possibly be able to stand another week. The nomination of the governors was the last straw—had they tried to do so they could not have chosen men less competent and more unpopular.

The government (or to be more accurate, Crispi and Raffaele), knowing that the great majority of the citizens are against them, are now seeking to make friends among discredited persons. Already three partisans of the Bourbons who are cordially detested, and who were frequently to be seen in the Minister of the Interior's ante-room, have been kicked out of the palace by the people. Baron Pisani came to implore me to enter the governing

body and assume its presidency, and thus avoid a probable explosion of popular feeling. I replied that I would not and must not jeopardise my popularity which may presently be of service to the Italian cause, by seeking to save Crispi and Raffaele, whom I believe to be opposed to the King's policy and perhaps even to the House of Savoy itself. The Prince of Torremuzza and the Prince of Mirto have also been here as well as the most prominent citizens of Palermo, to beg and entreat me not to forsake them.

Carini who is suffering from a severe wound, and who enjoys all Garibaldi's regard for the valour he has exhibited, sent for the General and laid the state of the country plainly before him. The same remonstrances have been repeated to him by the deputies of Messina, Catania, Girgenti, Patti, Barcellona Lionforte, Bronte, etc. He is appalled, but has not the courage to cast off Crispi, who has been with him throughout the campaign.

Such, then, is our position, but do not be discouraged. This crisis cannot last more than four or five days longer, and soon Sicily will have an honest and respected government. I give you my word for that. The disorder is great, and might easily discourage one not born in Sicily, but I feel myself sufficiently strong to conquer it, and I am confident the faith the people of Palermo have placed in me will enable me to purge the government of all Mazzinians and Bourbonists in disguise. I shall act with the utmost prudence, but I cannot allow Sicily to be ruined by the machinations of rascally or foolhardy individuals.

June 14. — The Ministers have answered the petition of the leading men in the country by de-

claring that *they intend to retain the reins of government at any cost*. Pisani alone tendered his resignation, which was not accepted. When this news spreads I am confident there will be a terrible outburst of popular indignation.

Persano has acquainted me with your despatch concerning Mazzini. I will do my duty. Have confidence in us and in the strong good sense of this country.

All the untruths and foolish boastings contained in this letter, which were disproved later on when they came to be known,¹ were, it would appear, credited by Count Cavour, who thus showed himself but a poor psychologist, and a person whose conclusions were easily influenced. Before leaving Turin, La Farina had evidently exposed to his master the plan he intended to put into execution, and had obtained his approbation, and he had also probably submitted for his inspection samples of the manifestos with which he papered the walls of Palermo. Nuvolari, who was one of the Thousand, wrote later: 'Hardly had La Farina landed with several boxes full of placards upon which were printed the words "We demand annexation!" than in less than a twinkling of an eye there was not a wall in Palermo than did not display this motto.'

Cavour was so sure of being able to risk everything with La Farina's help that no sooner had he been incorrectly informed that Mazzini was at Palermo amongst the men of Medici's expedition, on board the *Washington*, than he telegraphed as follows to Admiral Persano on the twelfth:—

Envoyez La Farina à Garibaldi pour qu'il l'invite au nom du Roi à faire arrêter Mazzini et à vous le remettre. Il lui dira que la présence de Mazzini en Sicile nécessiterait le rappel de l'escadre et perdrait la cause nationale en Europe. Vous enverrez Mazzini à Gênes sur le *Carlo Alberto*.

¹ See Appendix A.

The bandit Cavour was looking for was not on board the *Washington*, but had he been there we may rest assured that neither Garibaldi nor Crispi would have refrained from offering Giuseppe Mazzini a warm welcome to Palermo.

As has already been stated, Crispi had written to Mazzini in April, requesting him to come to Genoa and exert his influence in getting help sent out to the Sicilians who were about to revolt. But at that time Mazzini could not leave London, and he did not write to Crispi until the ninth, and again on the seventeenth of June. Here are the two letters.

I.

DEAR BROTHER,—Let me first say a word about myself. I was about to set out to join you when a slight spinal attack—the second I have had—doubled me up with pain and caused me to walk at a snail's pace for a fortnight. Then for a long time the news from the Island was so uncertain, so contradictory and so full of the threat of ruin! As soon as I could I came to Italy, but you and the expedition had left two days before my arrival. For me to appear on the Island in Garibaldi's wake would be useless, perhaps even harmful. I concluded I could be of much more use here, and I will tell you for what reasons.

The Sicilians—may God bless them forever!—have, for the second time, taken a glorious initiative. If Italy will but second them, we may indeed say they have saved Italy. But their example must be followed, and we will follow it!

Keep this to yourself, but, if no unforeseen obstacles arise to bar our path, we shall be in the Roman States and marching towards the Abruzzi with a sufficient force, before the month is out! We are working to promote uprisings in other provinces of the Kingdom, especially in the Basilicata.

If Garibaldi could be prevailed upon to advance and meet us when we cross the frontier, the Kingdom would be ours.

Upon occasion send me your letters care of the Mosto brothers or to the *Unità Italiana*, and give me an address that is not your own, but that of some shop-keeper, little known to the authorities, so that I may telegraph you the exact time we shall cross the frontier. Any despatch signed *Silva* will mean: 'We are crossing the frontier at this very moment.' I will send it when we are all assembled on the frontier, and when there is no further fear of delay.

Bertani is writing to you for the authorisation to raise a loan and for instructions concerning it. I beg you to help him. We work together, only, as usual, I am obliged to keep in the background like a criminal, in order not to scare anybody.

As to your own affairs—beware of La Farina's diplomacy! I presume he is with you by this time. Beware also, of proposals for an independent kingdom. Should you yield, you would destroy the immense good already accomplished for Italy. It must be either the acceptance of annexation or a temporary government until the movement has spread in the South, as it will not fail to do.

Let nothing dismay you.

Neither L. N. nor any one else can move against you without provoking a European war.

Good-bye. Do not forget your friend in the intoxication of victory. For my part, Rosalino's death deprived me of half the joy of it.—Yours always,

GIUSEPPE.

June 9th.

To Signor Crispi.

II.

17 June, 1860.

FRIEND,—I have written to you already, but I now add a few lines.

For Heaven's sake beware of La Farina and of all foreign intervention as well as of the whole tribe of Torrearsa & Co.!

Within the Kingdom there is the danger of Royalist uprisings, of the concession of a constitution, etc. . . . Woe to us if this should come about! Then it would be good-bye, Unity!

It is therefore most necessary to make all haste with our own attack on the Kingdom. Everything is practically in readiness here, but Cosenz and Bertani still hesitate, and there is need of a word in secret from Garibaldi to Cosenz, to say: '*Invade by the over-land route. It is your duty!*' I entreat you to obtain this secret communication and send it on without delay.

I also beg you to steal a moment from your overwhelming occupations, and write me a line.

Press Orsini's hand for me.

Where is Correo, whom I never hear mentioned?

Good-bye.—Yours ever,

GIUSEPPE.

Here is Crispi's answer to this letter.

PALERMO, 24 June, 1860.

DEAR BROTHER,—I duly received your letters of the 9th and of the 17th, and now reply to both.

I deeply regret that you are not with me, and only the thought of all the good you can do where you are consoles me for your absence. I had chosen a comfortable house for you here, in a retired position where the air is wholesome. I rejoiced in the

thought of greeting you once more in my native land, which we have delivered from the persecutions of despotism. I may not have this happiness, but let us hope it is for the good of our Italy.

Nicotera, who is returning to the Continent, will explain all the General's intentions to you. I need not go into that here.

La Farina, who arrived here on the 7th, remains shut up in his lodgings, and devotes his time to conspiring against me, whom he looks upon as the one obstacle between himself and power. The General received him coldly and not without a touch of severity. The people took no notice of his arrival. The tales of the applause with which he is everywhere greeted, reported by the Sardinian press, are all lies.

At first he tried to persuade me through his friends, of the necessity of taking him into the government. Then he began organising hostile demonstrations, which did not succeed, spreading damaging insinuations that failed to affect us, and his last move was an attempt to bring about a ministerial crisis, which resulted in the resignation of three of my colleagues—Torrearsa, Pisani and Guarneri. His lightest accusation is that I am a republican and am endangering the success of the Sicilian revolution. He declares that Garibaldi and I wish to carry the revolution on to the Continent in order that, once arrived in Rome, we may force the King to accept our conditions, and establish a republic. What more need I add? The battle of Calatafimi and the taking of Palermo caused me less anxiety than does this mean and petty opposition. There are times when I long to fly from it all.

Try to get the press to discuss our affairs, and above all seek to make people in Italy understand that La Farina's presence here is an evil, and that he is simply sowing the seed of discord. In this country of ours, with its hot-headed inhabitants, we may look forward to serious danger, if his intriguing is not checked. It is indeed painful to think that, after so many sacrifices, after the spilling of so much blood, they should seek to deprive us of the joy of gathering the fruit of so many years of study and suffering!!

I have caused Bertani's bills of exchange for the sum of 200,000 *onze*¹ to be honoured. I did not carry out his plan for raising a loan in a foreign country, because it would not be wise to do so.

Public credit here is in a most flourishing condition. Our exchange stands at 116, notwithstanding this time of crisis, and it is therefore wiser to raise a loan at home and thus avoid depressing it. We intend to do so indeed, to the extent of fifty million francs.

Write me whenever you can. Should you wish to telegraph, direct to Signor Giovanni Oliveira.—
Ever yours, F. CRISPI.

Opposition to those friends of Garibaldi who were charged with collecting and forwarding help to the expedition began in Genoa even before its existence became manifest at Palermo. Bertani especially, who had undertaken to represent the General, and who was extremely active, ill-health notwithstanding, was dogged by Cavour's agents and attacked by the government organs and the entire conservative press. The most serious accusation hurled against him was that of being a Mazzinian, or in other words, of working for a

¹ The Sicilian *onza* was worth twelve lire and seventy-five centimes of Italian money.

republic. By means of this argument they sought to discredit him and to attract public favour to the government's policy, the opinion of the people having surrounded Garibaldi and his followers with a very nimbus of glory. There was indeed no dearth of calumny of every species. Thus Bertani was accused of favouring desertion from the Piedmontese army, and of arbitrarily devoting large sums derived from subscriptions to other purposes than those sanctioned by Garibaldi. In the rivalry between the committees of the *Cassa Centrale di Soccorso a Garibaldi*, founded by Bertani, and the *Società Nazionale*, the prestige of one or the other was ever being lowered or raised by the news from Sicily and the utterances of Garibaldi himself.

On June 14, the paper called *La Perseveranza* printed the following information received from Genoa on the thirteenth :—

All of our more or less liberal papers . . . are seeking to demonstrate that Garibaldi must of necessity stir up revolution outside the island. The *Corriere Mercantile* is precisely of this opinion. It would appear, however, that Signor La Farina, who recently betook himself to Palermo on board a vessel belonging to the Royal Navy, has orders that are entirely contrary to this. Read the latest communication on this subject from the Turin correspondent of the *Espérance* of Geneva. These articles come from the office of the *Espero*, and to-day the *Espero* is the official organ of the conceited and malicious president of the National Society. Yesterday's issue of this same paper launches the insinuation that Bertani makes bad use of the money he collects in Garibaldi's name, because, so it is affirmed, for all the expeditions that have set out, he has provided but 20,000 francs, and this unwillingly. Such is the man, and such the journal that is his mouth-piece !

The following letters reveal the state of Bertani's mind at that time :—

I.

GENOA, June 8, 1860.

DEAR CRISPI,—The Deputy, Antonio Mordini, is going to Sicily to help you. He will prove most useful, and will fill the great vacancy left by Pilo.

Mordini is an excellent adviser and is of great and well directed activity. He is acquainted with all my views.

I have received a few lines from you, but the letter sent via Messina has not arrived. Send me a copy of it, I beg of you. The government has all my letters opened.

I have already got hold of three steamers and hope to procure a fourth presently. I count on receiving money from Sicily, and I beg you to send me some. Meanwhile I am trying to arrange for a loan, but it will take time. It would save time if you could send over a few hundred thousand francs, which would put everything right. I could then immediately despatch the trans-Atlantic Steamer *Torino*, with 2000 men and a quantity of firearms.

Courage and *avanti*! Do not allow intrigue to triumph.—Your devoted,

AG. BERTANI.

II.

GENOA, June 9, 1860.

DEAR CRISPI,—I did not get your letter from Messina. Repeat it. *Bravo!* I congratulate you! Go ahead, and let others swallow their rage as best they can.

Garibaldi has authorised me to raise a loan to meet the Sicilian expenses for which I am responsible.

To do this it is necessary :

- I. For you to send me a perfectly regular Dictatorial Decree, authorising me to raise the loan *in his name as Dictator*.
- II. That he should assign and specify the capital or income that shall be set apart as guarantee, and that this also should be made the subject of an official decree.
- III. That I be authorised to make use of this fund to meet all expenses, rendering an account to the Dictator himself or to whom he may appoint.

Without these guarantees it will be impossible to raise money.

Should this method present difficulties, or prove too slow—for the matter is pressing—send me bills of exchange on Genoa or some other place, or, if necessary, the coin itself in barrels, but do this in the quickest and surest way. You might send the friend who brings you this letter, back to me with the money. I shall expect a *prompt decision on this point*.

The steamers are ordered and will be here, or perhaps, even in Sicily, in the course of twelve or fifteen days. I have arranged for the frigates, and now I am arranging for the cannon.

I will despatch more men and arms to you presently. Have you thought about clothing them ?

Be careful to have all important business transacted through our bank, which represents Garibaldi, and not through that of Amari & Co., which represents La Farina. Garibaldi's name must be made all-important in Sicily, here and everywhere.

I wish you to know that I have been informed by

a London merchant that 70,000 rifles have been purchased there for Sicily, and that they are now looking out for a means of transporting them to that country. I should like to know whether you are aware of this order, or whether it is, as would appear probable, a trick on the part of Napoleon or of some other person.

All letters to me are either opened or suppressed. When sending them by Cagliari, address them to Signor Francesco or the Fumagalli brothers, with a request to forward to Professor Efsio Contini, with the same request. Via Malta, use the same addresses Nicola Fabrizi will suggest—either Sceberras or Dr. Zamutti. Inform the General of these directions also.

Mordini, who left yesterday by the Imperial Packet-Boat, will bring you much good advice from Carlo Cattaneo. I hope you will appreciate it.

Deal with me on all occasions and as often as possible, in order to lend authority to the name of Garibaldi, whom I represent.

The time is short and we must make good use of it if we would triumph.

I wish you all good fortune, and the energy necessary to accomplish the great work we have undertaken.

Remind the General that I shall be able to procure arms at a very reasonable price, if only I have the money.—Your affectionate,

AGOSTINO BERTANI.

Be careful the General is not prevailed upon to leave Sicily and resign his command before having firmly established our political future there. Yours,
BERTANI.

I cannot fulfil Mustica's commission as quickly as I should like, because I do not possess the large sum necessary. He is staying here with me *for the time being*. I really *must* have either the money, the bills of exchange, or the decrees. Meanwhile I will try to get some merchant here to undertake the forwarding. But do not expect the miracles I might have performed had I had money. Charity and free gifts never amount to much.—Yours,

AG. BERTANI.

III.

16 June, 1860.

DEAR CRISPI,—I did not receive your letter from Messina of May 30 until to-day.

I will carry out your instructions in full as soon as I shall have sufficient money.

I beg you to see that my bills of exchange, that will come to Sicily through bankers, are duly honoured. Also send me the decrees I suggested. I shall then be *strong and independent*, and you will *witness miracles*. But I am not good for anything, as it is! I count upon you and your clever brains. There is great agitation among the aristocratic separatists, and agents of all sorts are bestirring themselves.

Be on your guard! Do not allow La Farina to seize even a *crumb* of power. Thank God the power is in your hands—hold on to it!

Comfort Garibaldi. The *Union of Strength!* The Dictatorship of Sicily and you for it, and with Garibaldi! I, here, the sole representative of Garibaldi, and between us we will turn Italy upside down. I am deeply grieved at the rumour that the steam-tug and the American ship have been captured. I

hope you will arrange to exchange prisoners, should it prove true.

Send me an accurate list of all you need in Sicily. I repeat — with money in hand, I shall work miracles!

I shall despatch C. Cattaneo to London to help in securing the frigates, etc.

I send you an affectionate good-bye. Be brave, don't let your courage fail, and go ahead!—Yours,

A. BERTANI.

Mustica has been staying here at my disposal.

I am sending you some papers to show you how the Cavour manœuvres are betrayed by the polemics of his own party.

IV.

GENOA, June 17.

DEAR CRISPI,—I am sending you the first steamer for regular service—and let it be as frequent as possible — between Genoa and Sicily. The Bank which I have founded has produced this first fruit!

The steamer is at the General's disposal, but send it back to me soon, that I may despatch it again.

You can say whatever you like, and confide anything you may wish to forward to me, to that excellent man, Avvocato Ponte, who is acting as my *confidential agent* in bringing you this letter.

Certain proposals for interviews with the Ministers have been made to me. I am not sure they are meant seriously. At any rate I have returned no answer as yet.

I beg you to second me financially.

I think the wisest plan will be to honour my bills of exchange, even if you have to postpone the date on which they fall due.

Give me a list in detail of all the things I am to get for you. Very soon you will have all the arms you need.

Pray insist upon the importance of my remaining the *Sole Representative of Garibaldi* outside Sicily.

I will send you the local papers if you want them. Please let me have the Sicilian ones. The Royal Post is most unreliable in my case.—Yours heartily,
AG. BERTANI.

V.

23 June, 1860.

DEAR CRISPI,—I am sending you a letter which I was told was important when it was given to me. It concerns the loan.

Get Garibaldi to make haste with my loan—with the necessary decrees and the bills of exchange for three millions.

If you and he do not help me I shall be bankrupt. You should support me as representing the banner of Garibaldi and consequently the insurrectional and democratic banner. You must help me by providing me with means if I am not to become a miserable caricature beside Amari who represents you officially—legally.

Let others have the honours—I do not grudge them—but let me have the money. I shall then become a power to intimidate the lukewarm, and we will make Italy.

My name, already associated here with Garibaldi's, must stand for strength, honesty, and decision.

Have you seen how the *Opinione* treats you and all the others? Who is going to defend you, I should like to know?

I am glad La Farina has been sent off, but else-

where his creatures only are prominent, and Cavour declines all dealings with me.

Get Orsini to do his business through my Bank also.

I have established Commissions for clothing, for arms, and for transport by sea—all depending on the loan.

You see, my friends, that I have protected myself, and shall continue to do so, for my good name is as dear to me as is the undertaking.

Find a means of insuring our correspondence by official seals, and by receipts for despatches.

But above all reflect that I represent Garibaldi and his programme, while Amari and the others represent your fatal '48 and our fatal '59.

This very day a messenger of mine bound for Sicily, Dr. Achille Sacchi, has been refused passage on board a war-ship from Cagliari, whereas such passage is freely granted to others.

A hearty good-bye to you. The moments made for victory are fleeting. Take advantage of them, and Italy will be of our making!—Yours,

AG. BERTANI.

Here is a letter from Crispi :—

PALERMO, 23 June, 1860.

MY DEAR BROTHER,—Mordini has handed me your letter of June 8, Cianciolo another of the 7th, and Mustica that of the 16th. I will answer them all together.

Your bills of exchange will be accepted, and to-morrow I shall confer with the Minister of Finance and with Signor Bonino, and get everything done. But do not load us with further expense, for we have other obligations to meet, and I greatly fear

Sicily will not be able to bear the weight of them all.

On the 15th of this month we commissioned Signor Oliveira of London (8 Upper Hyde Park Street) to purchase six steamers, four of which were to be frigates, and further, to procure 200 cannon and from 50,000 to 80,000 rifles. All this will, of course, mean a great deal.

For the present it would be unwise to seek to raise a loan outside the Island. Our public credit is in excellent condition. The old government bonds which we have recognised, and on which we shall pay three months' interest on the first of July, stand at 116. We do not wish to depress them, and this would certainly happen if we offered them on the Continent, for we could not possibly expect to obtain better terms than those proposed to the Sardinian government. We have therefore decided to raise a loan of 50,000,000 francs here, which sum will, I believe, suffice for this year's extra expenses, as the regular budget is well balanced.

Medici arrived four days ago, and had a magnificent reception. A rumour is circulating concerning him that he is an ally of La Farina.

La Farina is at work doing his best to upset our peace, but fortunately he has not succeeded as yet. What may happen to-morrow? This man's presence is a great drawback, and he might easily stir up trouble in this country of mine, where civilisation is not yet sufficiently advanced. He may force me to adopt measures I should prefer to avoid.

Enclosed you will find a letter for Count Amari, instructing him to place such sums at your disposal as you may need, besides those you yourself have collected for Sicily.

I am told that certain Piedmontese journals are accusing me of partisanship. When will they finally decide to hold their peace? Our friends among the republicans accuse us of forsaking the banner; Cavour's followers say we want a republic! What we really want is Italy, and we will have her!

Kindest regards to all the friends, and a warm hand-clasp for yourself.—Yours, F. CRISPI.

The above letters show how sharp was the contest for the right of representing Garibaldi. Count Michele Amari, who had been appointed the Dictator's political representative, had been caught in the nets that La Farina and Cavour had spread, both at Genoa and Turin, but Cavour must have considered him a somewhat useless tool after all, for, on June 28, he wrote as follows to Persano :—

Garibaldi's attitude towards His Majesty's government is unsatisfactory. After having made Count Amari his sole representative, he now confers full powers upon Signor Bertani, and leaves Amari without instructions. The government is holding its peace, but it will not long put up with being played with thus boldly. . . .

Cavour's violent language was unjustifiable. By maintaining both a political representative and one for military matters, Garibaldi was certainly not 'playing boldly' with the Piedmontese government. It was indeed necessary, and this for obvious reasons, that the two missions should be separate. Moreover, there had been no stipulation that the Dictator of Sicily should sacrifice Bertani, which would practically have meant relinquishing the direction of the campaign and placing himself in Cavour's hands. As a matter of fact, however, finding himself placed between two contrary currents, Garibaldi wavered. Although at first he had been entirely on Bertani's side, after the arrival in Sicily of Medici, who had recently been thoroughly coached by Cavour, the General began to

show himself more reserved in his dealings with Bertani, to whom Crispi wrote on July 2: 'I found it impossible to convince Garibaldi of the importance of your representing him. But I did succeed in getting your bills of exchange recognised.'

To be Garibaldi's sole representative at that time meant being in a position to venture on any enterprise. The country was ready to grant him everything, men, money and blessings, while upon its adversaries it would bestow nothing. Garibaldi's name would serve as a magic password, a talisman for any fresh undertaking which might become necessary; for the people, who had witnessed the miraculous dissolution of an army thousands strong and the ready surrender before him of populous cities, now believed no obstacle too great to be overcome by him. Agostino Bertani appreciated the value of this blaze of enthusiasm that surrounded the Chief, and wished to turn it to account, not only to send such help into Sicily as had been applied for, but also to prepare another expedition that, boldly entering the Papal States, should cross them, invade the Kingdom of Naples from the Abruzzi, and divide the enemy's forces, thus seconding Garibaldi's efforts in the South. The plan was admirable, logical, necessary indeed, if we consider the conditions of that period. Could the Thousand unaided possibly hold their own for any length of time against repeated attacks both by the army and the navy of His Neapolitan Majesty? And how were they to cross the Strait of Messina and march upwards through the hostile Kingdom? Bertani's plan, therefore, found many advocates. On leaving Quarto, Garibaldi had sent him a letter in which he declared that 'the Sicilian insurrection must be supported not only in Sicily, but in Umbria, the Marches, the Sabine region, the Neapolitan provinces, etc. . . . everywhere indeed, where there is an enemy to be striven against.' *On May 13 he again wrote to Bertani from Salemi: 'Medici should be attending to the Papal States,' *and he issued orders to Zambianchi to place himself at his disposal.

On his return to Italy Mazzini himself had, as has already been stated, conceived the same idea, and had gone to work with a will, assuming the task of helping Garibaldi by extending the movement in favour of union throughout those provinces that were still unredeemed.

Here are a few of his letters which explain his views.
The first is addressed to Crispi.

BROTHER,—I wrote to you a few days since. Did you receive my letter? You must know that I have not had a line from you since Genoa.

As I told you, we have resumed the old plan of reaching the South through the Centre with a large contingent. There is no need to dwell upon the importance of this operation; besides, I have already pointed it out to friends who will discuss it with you.

Gosenz having abandoned him because the Piedmontese government does not approve, Bertani is now in search of a chief, and has sent to ask Garibaldi himself to come and lead the undertaking.

But it is my opinion the General should—

- I. Immediately send a perfectly reliable messenger to Bertani with orders to act at once, with or without Cosenz, with or without influential names.
- II. The General should prepare to enter the Kingdom from his side, when we enter it from the Abruzzi. Caught thus between the two expeditions the Kingdom must yield. Let him consider the necessity for immediate action if we are not to lose the well-organised elements we now possess.

If he does this, if he despatches the order for action, we shall achieve our purpose.

If, contrary to what he has declared, he should send counter-orders, I much fear that nothing will be accomplished, notwithstanding what has recently been decided. In that case, mark my words. The contingents are largely mine, and I shall be able to obtain others, but I have not the means to assemble and mobilise them. The money is not mine, but

Bertani's. Nevertheless, I have something of my own, and if I could secretly obtain from you or from Sicily 100,000 or 120,000 francs, I would carry out the plan unaided. This I will guarantee to do. In matters of such importance, and with a man like yourself, every proposal must, of course, be thoroughly examined. This expedition may prove the salvation of the country. Think it over carefully.

It is now too late for me to go to Sicily. I should appear to be following La Farina's example and seeking to grasp authority for myself, or to undermine that of others. I have not the courage to go there.

For the love of Heaven hold on to the authority you have acquired!—you yourself, Orsini and all the other honest men! Have no dealings with diplomacy and with men who ruined the cause in 1848. Do not allow La Farina and others like him to usurp your places.

And always love—Yours,

GIUSEPPE.

19 *June*.

The second letter is addressed by Mazzini to his friends Nicotera, Mosto and Savi.

BROTHERS,—I have received yours of the 14th, and I cannot tell you how welcome it was to me, here in this very desert, as far as all affection is concerned, in which my sense of duty condemns me to wander for a time.

As I was unable to go to Sicily before the action took place, I will not do so now. I am tired of being misjudged, and should I go there now, everyone would say I had come to undermine Garibaldi's position or with Heaven only knows what other evil intention. At any rate it is too late for Sicily. As

to what is to be attempted on the Continent, I shall avoid displeasing Garibaldi, who is not fond of me, for indeed it would be wrong to oppose him.

Here, then, is what I propose to do. I shall penetrate into the Kingdom of Naples from the opposite side, and this while military action is in progress. Do not reveal this plan. We are preparing an incursion into the Kingdom through the Papal States. Thanks to Bertani's energy and capability, and also to my having been willing not only to accept a subordinate position, but even to hide myself like any malefactor, we have succeeded in getting ready to act by the first of next month.

They had thought of making Cosenz our leader. He accepted at first, but he now refuses because the government does not wish the question of the Roman States to be stirred up. Nevertheless, I believe we shall act all the same, and it is my opinion that any captain will do, who is equipped with energy, insurrectional ideas and a quick insight. The bearer of this, however, is to ask Garibaldi if he is willing to assume the leadership after we have made a beginning.

I believe it would be a much better plan for him to attack from the other side when we begin to be heard from in the Abruzzi. Thus placed between two fires, the Kingdom would yield to the insurrection. Not only, therefore, should he accept at once, but he should impress upon Bertani the necessity for immediate action, with or without a leader of prestige, and he himself should also prepare to help us. You are well aware that our party has never been able to collect a fund, and so, as the money is not mine, but Bertani's, and moreover, as I may not

show myself in order not to stir up eternal discord and strike terror to the souls of those who look upon my name as a gauntlet ever ready to be hurled at the much dreaded Napoleon, I am absolutely unable to establish a programme. I need not tell you that I shall do everything in my power that we may enter with the cry of ITALY alone—thus giving the sovereignty of the country a fair chance to manifest itself. I hope to succeed in this, but nevertheless, I declare to you here and now that, should the official leaders of the undertaking persist in uttering the cry with which Garibaldi descended upon Sicily, I will not withdraw, nor will I advise our friends to do so. I will follow the column in silence and ‘en amateur,’ abstaining, of course, from the signing of any act, and swearing no allegiance to any living being. If I reach the Abruzzi safe and sound I shall consider myself free, and will then see what the soil is capable of bringing forth.

Is it necessary for me to bare my soul before you? I trust not. But let me say that it was not I who created the present state of things. Italy is convulsed, she is drunk with a materialism that worships force, or what it believes to be a force. Neither I nor anyone else can change her now. Only events, misadventures and delusions will be able to do that. To withdraw, to banish our country from our hearts because she has banished us, either morally or materially, would benefit only the personal dignity of the individual. Now the individual in me is long since dead. No further joy will come to me from Italy. Even should her union be proclaimed from Rome to-morrow, I should take no delight, for the country, with her contempt for every ideal, has chilled my soul. Thinking, there-

fore, of the country only, and not of myself, I see how essential it is to stand by this invalid. She has no consciousness of herself—we must awaken it in her. Little by little we must convince her that neither Cavour nor L. N., nor the monarchy will create unity for her ; that she herself must create it with her sacrifices and her battles. We must firmly establish union of purpose, we must confront monarchical Piedmont with the alternative of throwing off the mask and acting *against* our country's unity, or of breaking openly with Imperial France. However this may be, I am convinced of the importance of carrying out the operations on the mainland, with which you are acquainted, and that at any cost, and I believe it will be well if it becomes known that I am with it, when the campaign is once opened. Yes, I shall be with it, and these things I say, not for you, who have set out under similar conditions, but for Nicotera, whose blame would weigh upon me, as heavily as a reproach that should come to me from my mother's grave. For my part I applaud him for declining to serve beneath a banner that is not our own ; but to march in silence and as a simple soldier behind a column of men who, even though it be the banner of monarchy that waves above them, are advancing to do battle with Papal despotism and the despotism of the Neapolitan Bourbons, does not trouble my conscience sufficiently to induce me to withdraw, especially when I consider the immense good that must result.

If, therefore, there be any among you who are on terms of intimacy with Garibaldi, let them urge him to send orders to Bertani by the bearer of this, instructing him to act at once, with or without

Cosenz, with or without influential names. Let the General consider the advisability of descending upon the Kingdom from another point as soon as we shall have crossed its boundaries. If Nicotera is free and feels he can do what I am undertaking, let him set out with the bearer, join me, and march at my side as a common soldier, refraining, as I shall refrain, from any binding oath. Once within the Kingdom, we can decide upon our course, and as individuals, shall be free to say in public whatever we may deem it good for the country to hear.

Should you learn from the bearer that Garibaldi, for any reason, good or bad, is sending a counter-order, you may rest assured that notwithstanding Bertani's present intentions, no attempt will be risked. In that case I have a small fund which I have held in reserve, and if Crispi could manage to provide me with 100,000 or 120,000 francs, which Nicotera could bring to me, we might carry out the undertaking ourselves, and independently. Men are not wanting; it is the means of arming and mobilising them that I lack. I am mentioning this to Crispi, and it will be Nicotera's duty, should circumstances demand it, to urge him to comply with my wish and to assure him that absolute secrecy will be observed.

And now I believe I have made everything perfectly clear.

I have only to add that I have always admired and loved you all—to say to Antonio that I love him, and sympathise with him for the loss of his brother, to repeat to Nicotera what I have already written to him in a letter he must have received some days since, that the news of his deliverance from captivity was the only joy I could have

experienced in these heavy days, so full of sadness for me.

Good-bye Savio, Mosto and Nicotera. Love me, and believe me that I am yours with my whole soul.

GIUSEPPE.

19 June.

Again he wrote to Crispi.

I.

BROTHER,—I have written to you twice, but another occasion presents itself, so I send you a few lines.

Our arrangements here are all made. Do manage to send our messenger back with an order from the General to act, and do you also prepare to move, that we may get the Kingdom between two fires. If, for some unforeseen reason, Garibaldi should refuse, I beg you and the other good friends in Sicily who are in favour of the expedition, to send me *at once*, the sum of 100,000 or 120,000 francs, which, together with what I have on hand, will suffice. The organised contingent is at my disposal, and we should open operations with 4000 or 5000 men, while many more would join immediately afterwards.

Now concerning yourselves in Sicily. If you are sure of remaining in power you should prolong the duration of the temporary government as much as possible, so that the operations on the mainland may have time to form a basis firm and strong enough to allow you to dictate your own conditions. If you are not sure of remaining in power, that, of course, alters matters. In that case, rather than allow the Independents to get a footing, push on the elections and the convocation of the Assembly, but above all,

if this is done, seek to make it clearly understood that a straightforward *yes* or *no* is expected, and *immediate* acceptance.

In any case, do not forget that Naples will give you Messina, and that the vital question for you, as for us all, is the attacking of the Kingdom. From this fact our faction derives its immense, its decisive importance—action *with or without* the consent of Garibaldi or of any one else.

Remember me affectionately to Orsini, upon whom I rely as upon one of ourselves.

Let me know what Garibaldi's intentions are concerning the Kingdom.

I suppose you have seen Mario. Place him somewhere near Garibaldi.

Should you be forwarding me money send it by a messenger with instructions to deliver it at the *Unità Italiana*, in Genoa, where they will inform him of my whereabouts, when he tells them he comes from you. Or you might entrust the money to Nicotera who would certainly be willing to come to me.

Continue to love me.—Your GIUSEPPE.

22 June.

To Signor F. Crispi.

II.

28 June.

DEAR CRISPI,—Steal a few minutes' time, and tell me exactly how matters stand. You must have received a few lines from me. God grant Garibaldi has sent the consent we want. We will then act immediately, and perhaps we may be in time to prevent the realisation of the Neapolitan concessions. If we do act, you on your part must urge Garibaldi to do so also. Naples will save the Island

once for all. If we do our part, a small force will suffice for his operations, but if possible, he should avoid descending on the Kingdom from lower Calabria. Salerno should be his first goal, or, failing that, some other not too remote place in Calabria.

Please let me know how you stand with the Piedmontese government.

Remember me to Orsini and to our other friends.
—Yours ever,

GIUSEPPE.

To Signor Crispi.

His self-imposed task once begun, of preparing the expedition that was to march through Central Italy into the south, Bertani knew no rest. First Medici then Cosenz, who had been looked to for leadership, slipped through his fingers. Medici had joined Garibaldi in consequence of Cavour's declaration that, considering the present state of alarm of European diplomacy, it would be perilous in the extreme to stir up an insurrection in the Papal States. Cosenz soon followed Medici. The demands from Sicily were eating up the funds Bertani had hoped to bestow in another direction, and the following letters to Crispi and Garibaldi respectively testify to his painful anxiety.

I.

16 June.

DEAR CRISPI,—I propose two decrees to you which would greatly strengthen us.

Time is flying, and if it is not myself it will be La Farina. Consider this point, and make up your mind.

I have written to Garibaldi about the firearms I am in a position to send to Sicily. Enough to equip you all at the same time.

Make up your minds and send me your answer by Cianciolo. Ask him to read you the letter I wrote him.

Arrange to have the telegraphic message I mentioned to Garibaldi sent here, care of Messrs. Rocca.

I shall then be able to raise money here also.—
Your A. BERTANI.

II.

Help for Garibaldi.
Head Branch, Genoa.

DEAR GENERAL,—Only a few words, but weighty ones!

I need *all* your help, *all* your confidence to carry out your programme, which is encountering opposition both from government and from diplomacy. By means of slander, tricks and baseness of all sorts the government seeks to prevent your helping me, because it knows that *money is powerful*, especially when it *comes from you*.

I do not need to entreat you to place your confidence in me, for this you have done already, and I know I am not unworthy; but I do entreat you to show your trust in your own power, which I represent here.

I have more than 100,000 rifles ready for you— all of the same calibre, which will be in Sicily some time within a month. There are others I myself shall use in different parts of Italy. I have secured one steamer and shall have another presently, which I have purchased in London, together with several pieces of ordnance. I have already organised the service (it will be as nearly regular as possible) of a packet-boat to travel between Genoa and Sicily, which will make its first trip to-morrow, June 17.

But for all this I must have money and regular authority from you.

A messenger is going out to you from Messrs. Parodi & Co., Bankers, who are in company with Rocca Brothers here. He is the bearer of bills of exchange signed by me at different times and amounting to 3,000,000 francs. I chose this method as being the best, the quickest and most economical. I entreat you to honour them, and you shall receive the accounts and goods through a *patriot* who is *above reproach*.

I will forward nitre and lead at the earliest opportunity, and the guns *very soon*.

And now for another subject. *Cosenz* is all uncertainty as to where the struggle should begin. As you yourself once believed and once wished to do, it will be necessary to cut the Italian continental question short and simply turn Umbria and the Marches upside down in order to get into the Abruzzi. Everything is ready for a mighty invasion of the Papal States by sea and by land.

I therefore beg you to send *Cosenz* *precise* and *decisive* orders to confer with me, and to begin operations in the Papal States. In less than a month Italy will be on fire. Do not forget that the post is unsafe.

Send me a list of everything you need most. Is it really true that La Farina is making overtures to you? Alas, then, Garibaldi mine! He will surely take you in—and Italy will suffer a third time for your deception—perhaps even a fourth time, and who knows for how long!

Let us fight with the pen to ensure the victory of the sword.

Farewell, O Redeemer of Italy!—Yours affectionately,
AGOSTINO BERTANI.

III.

June 16.

I am in receipt of your two letters of the 8th and 10th of June. I thank you for your confidence. I am not unworthy of it, and after you, the country will perceive this also. I wish to confirm what I have stated above, and I will obey your orders. But the bankers will not make any payments without *regular decrees*. First arrange to meet the bills of exchange that will soon be presented, and then forward me the two decrees for which I have sent you a model. Then indeed I shall be strong in the *power of your name*.

I have seen your letter to Brusco. We will arrange together. But I must insist on the decrees.

Garibaldi mine! This time, indeed, we are going to make Italy!—Your AGOSTINO BERTANI.

CHAPTER XI

La Farina and Crispi—Firmness of provisional government in maintaining established programme—Text of the instructions issued to diplomatic representatives in Turin, Paris, and London—Garibaldi's credentials—La Farina's correspondence with Cavour—Garibaldi alters the Ministry—Crispi remains Secretary of State, at the Dictator's disposal—He declines appointment as Procurator-General of the Court of Accounts—The scarecrow of 'Mazzinianism'—Crispi, Cattaneo, Correnti, Asproni ; their correspondence—La Farina expelled from Sicily—Cavour's ill-humour and his unjust attitude in the question of the immediate annexation of Sicily to the kingdom of Piedmont.

WHILE Bertani and Mazzini were struggling at Genoa, Crispi was undergoing still fiercer attacks at Palermo. All the dissatisfied had gathered around La Farina, who, strong in his authority as representative of Cavour and consequently of Piedmont, was encouraging rebellion. That this action was particularly inopportune is clearly apparent.

At the moment when La Farina was entrusted with his unfortunate mission Garibaldi still had the entire, unbroken body of the Bourbon forces to overcome ; for the communication despatched by Cavour to Persano bears the date of June 3, and is to the following effect :—' This is to introduce Signor Giuseppe La Farina, a member of our National Parliament, who goes to Sicily with my entire approval, but who must not reveal either his name or the nature of his mission. . . . He is completely in my confidence, and is acquainted with my opinions. You may, therefore, rely implicitly on his word.' The capitulation of the *Alter Ego* of the King of Naples was not signed until June 6 !

As he wrote to Ricasoli on June 3, Cavour was ' sending La Farina to organise a regular government.' How could he know that Garibaldi would not be capable of doing this

himself? His prejudice is evident, and his intention of depriving the man who had risked his life of the satisfaction of completing his work could not be more plainly manifest.

But Cavour did still worse. He published his intentions, and the official organs joined in a chorus of condemnation of the revolutionary government even before any of its acts were known. Independent patriots were scandalised, and Giorgio Pallavicino, who later succumbed to Cavour's influence, wrote to Garibaldi on June 13 entreating him to beware of the government at Turin.

All were acquainted with the nature of La Farina's mission. Among the many letters received by Crispi at that time we cite the following from the Deputy, Giorgio Asproni.

In Turin the news of your appointment was received with disapproval by Cavour and his supporters,—[he wrote on June 17].—But we, the true liberals, exulted. . . . For the love of Heaven, of Liberty and of our country beware of La Farina, both you yourself and Garibaldi! He set out equipped with the authority of an *Alter Ego*. Should you commit the error of allowing him to circumvent you and participate in the affairs of state, he would be your ruin. His secret mission is to place every possible obstacle in the way of the revolution. It is not generally believed in Turin that he will succeed in persuading you, but they count on Colonel Malenchini's influence, which is supposed to be very great, with you especially. Be on your guard, both of you! Malenchini is of the same type as La Farina, and Medici is also smeared, to some extent, with the same pitch. Those who bartered away Garibaldi's birth-place are now seeking to turn his immortal victories to their own advantage. Be inflexible, my dear Crispi! And I beg you to salute Garibaldi for me, and exhort him to be as cautious as he is brave.

Do not seek to hasten the annexation or the convocation of a parliament, which would end by depriving you of authority and by disarming you. Carry on the work of revolution with the greatest possible energy, and write to me often. For my part, I will faithfully supply you with accurate information on all points. If, moreover, you think I could be of use in Sicily, say so, and I will come, not for the purpose of obtaining a position, money and rewards, but to work for the cause of the liberty of Sicily and of Italy. Farewell.

The following letter from the Deputy, Lorenzo Valerio, is also noteworthy. He had become acquainted with Crispi in 1848, and had kept in touch with him throughout the period of his painful and adventurous exile.

DEAR CRISPI,—I have been to Turin, and was fortunate enough to be able to contradict the evil reports that certain persons who have either been deceived, or who themselves seek to deceive, are spreading concerning you. No one could perform this office better than myself, for you were associated with me for years in my work, and I found you ever a loyal friend and an ardent champion of Italian unity. I am convinced that, at the side of our Garibaldi, you will be able to further the holy cause most effectually.

I was pleased to find that Farini and Cavour are disposed to support the new Sicilian government (!), and I gladly offer my services to Garibaldi to act as his private agent with the King, Cavour and Farini, in all matters of a confidential nature. In doing this I should simply be continuing the work I undertook when, amidst untold difficulties and trials, our immortal and beloved friend was organising his heroic

phalanx, the *Cacciatori delle Alpi*. I extend the same offer to you also. In matters where Amari is unable to help you, do not hesitate to apply to me, and I shall be delighted to be of service in dissipating the slander and removing some of the obstacles that add to the trials and difficulties of this noble undertaking. You who are both open-hearted and clever, will be able to accomplish much if you do not allow yourself to be circumvented by intriguers whose assaults you will certainly not be spared.

Do you believe that Naples will accept the concessions offered by the Bourbon?

Good-bye. Salute Garibaldi, La Masa, Türr, Cairoli, Bixio, etc., for me, and believe me to be, your affectionate friend, LORENZO VALERIO.

COMO, 27 June.

P.S.—This noble province of Como is preparing more men and more money. Do not forget to remember me to Cosenz, Medici and Malenchini.

Garibaldi and Crispi soon became conscious of the unjust and illegal interference of the Piedmontese government, from which they had expected not opposition but warm support. As long as they could avoid doing so they did not retaliate, but continued to direct affairs with perfect loyalty, facing the immense difficulty of governing a country in a state of revolution, and ever faithful to the programme, 'Italy and Victor Emmanuel.' We have elsewhere alluded to the edicts countersigned by Crispi, by means of which the Piedmontese crest was adopted for Sicily, Sicilian vessels instructed to fly the Italian flag, and warships ordered to hoist the same banner with 'the arms of the House of Savoy surmounted by the crown, in the centre.'

The 'Instructions given by the provisional government of Sicily to its diplomatic representatives in Turin, Paris and London' are dated June 14. We give them in full as irrefut-

able proofs of the loyalty of those men whom La Farina denounced to Cavour as 'opposed to the policy of His Majesty's government, and perhaps even to the House of Savoy itself.'

In casting off the yoke of the Bourbon military occupation, which she has borne for eleven years, Sicily is but returning to that previous independence which was conferred upon her by the revolution of 1848 when, the downfall of the Bourbon dynasty having been proclaimed, and a new prince called to the throne, her representatives were received by the governments of France, England and Sardinia, and her flag was saluted by the most powerful nations of the Mediterranean.

Military strength re-established in the Island that Bourbon government which was not only illegitimate, because the laws of the land condemned it, but proved itself a monstrous tyranny, a very anachronism in this century of civilisation, and which became proverbially notorious throughout Europe. The freedom to control her own destiny which had been wrenched from her is to-day, therefore, but a just vindication of the Island's rights.

In January 1848 Sicily generously and of her own free will threw in her lot with the Italian movement that had been set afoot two years before in Rome, in Tuscany and in Piedmont, and from which she had been previously excluded by the despotic, Austrian policy of the second Ferdinand of the Bourbons.

At that time the aspirations of Italian patriots did not go beyond a system of local reform and improvement in the different Italian States, the founding of a league, and the Confederation of these States, freely constituted and retaining their independence.

The Sicilian revolution of that period rested upon and was justified by the following principles :—

- I. The restoration of the constitution of 1812, sworn to by the Bourbons and subsequently violated by them, after which act they were no longer legally entitled to the throne.
- II. Autonomy for the Island, and her separation from the crown of Naples.
- III. Her solemn vow to participate in the longed-for league and Confederation of the States, as an independent State, ruled by her own prince.

Since that time events and opinions have greatly matured throughout Italy.

The nation that then aspired to take her proper place and assert her importance in Europe, and whose first conception was a Confederation of States, as the only means to that end then available, and who looked upon this only as a temporary phase that should prepare her to realise full unity in the distant future, has now conceived the hope and foreseen the possibility of quickly reaching the higher goal of her ambition.

On the other hand, the project of a league or confederation that twelve years ago was satisfactory and acceptable to all, has to-day become a practical and moral impossibility, in consequence of the complete disruption on the part of the courts of Rome and Naples from the national cause and ideal, and of the downfall of those minor states that formed the centre of the Italian peninsula.

It has become plain that but one course is open to Italy, who desires and intends to obtain a free and independent place among the nations. She must rally round the glorious monarchy of Savoy, that

stands for life, strength and national dignity. Should she disregard this one course she would find herself confronted with the return of Austrian rule, with short-sighted and cruel governments and the discord and weakness that distract those small nations that are the victims of their own folly and of foreign influence and intrigue.

The sentiment that moved Lombardy to welcome with delight the triumph of those allied forces that threw her into the arms of Victor Emmanuel; the sentiment that incited Tuscany, the Legations and the Duchies spontaneously to declare their union under the sceptre of that magnanimous prince; the sentiment that burns to-day in the hearts of a great people, from the Alps to the southernmost point of Lilibeo, is the identical sentiment that has stirred and is still stirring Sicily.

Sicily, who is to-day her own mistress, intends and desires to remain always Italian, and sacrificing all idea of political separation, that would be at variance with the new epoch and new needs, she desires to become part of the national monarchy, in whose inauguration civilised Europe to-day sees and welcomes with rejoicing, a fresh guarantee for the order, the equilibrium, the peace and progress of the world.

Free Sicily remaining beneath the yoke of the Neapolitan government, would be in the future, as she has been in the past, a continual menace not only to Italy, but to Europe, and if in the past the moral barrier that separated Italy from the Bourbons of Naples appeared insurmountable, there can certainly be no hope of reconciliation now, after what has so recently transpired, after the horrors of the present war when the government of Naples, having de-

stroyed and exterminated half of Sicily, withdraws from the country, leaving it swimming in blood.

For Sicily to remain isolated would be at variance with the movement of agglomeration and assimilation that is swaying the rest of Italy. Alone, she would be too weak to withstand an attack by any one of the greater modern states, and would therefore be in danger of becoming the prey of some ambitious stranger. Moreover the choice of a prince to govern her would be fraught with many difficulties and infinite complications, owing to the general and deep-rooted hatred for the present reigning house of Naples, and the jealousy and rivalry such a choice would occasion among the great powers of Europe.

All those considerations that can and do weigh in the balance of diplomacy are in harmony with the national desire to-day so loudly expressed throughout the Island, and should persuade diplomacy to satisfy Sicily by the speedy recognition of her annexation, which has already been proclaimed to those other parts of Italy that are united under the dynasty of Savoy. This desire that was the first cry of the insurrection which broke out in Palermo on April 4, was also the war-cry of the Sicilian armed bands who faced the Royal troops for two months among the mountains of the Island. It rang out amidst the war-like clamour of the populace while, for four days, shells, grape-shot and conflagrations were rending and distracting the city of Palermo, and it still speaks from the numerous and pressing petitions, all identical in purpose, that are continually coming in from every part of the Island.

Concord, then, reigns throughout Sicily, as it did in 1848, uniting the different communes, uniting all classes without exception or distinction.

The contingent under General Garibaldi which the Italians of the Continent—inspired by their natural and brotherly affection—despatched in the name of our common country, to succour the Island in revolt, has but contributed towards ensuring the triumph of that principle in defence of which the whole of Sicily rose once before, and for which she has striven and bled. The volunteers themselves, who came hither from the Continent to shed their blood in the Island, were astonished to find the sentiment of a common nationality so strong and active throughout the country.

An assembly of deputies may meet presently in Palermo to give legal expression to Sicily's wishes and intentions.

Or we may be able to convoke the electoral colleges, and obtain a universal vote, as was done in Tuscany and the Emilia.

In either case there can be no doubt as to the result.

Such is the purpose, such the true character of the present Sicilian revolution, which you, as the special representative of the Provisional Government, will seek to make known and explain to the government to which you are accredited, amplifying these principles by means of all those arguments which your enlightened patriotism may suggest.

The Neapolitan government will certainly seek to misrepresent events, and will heap slanderous accusations upon the Island. These you will be active in refuting by placing matters in their true light, and you will also seek to frustrate the secret machinations which a power that is essentially malicious and disloyal will not fail to set in motion.

Together with the present instructions you will

receive all the numbers of the *Official Journal* that contain accounts of the acts of Garibaldi's Dictatorship since his arrival in Sicily. Upon occasion you will explain the disastrous conditions that must accompany a bloody revolution in a country which for many years has been the prey of a brutal and all-corrupting tyranny, in a country where the ancient edifice of government suddenly crumbles and collapses. You will furthermore point out that under such conditions, prompt and extreme measures are of imperative necessity.

It is superfluous to beg you to keep the government informed of the sentiments towards the cause of this Island, which prevail both in official circles and among the people in the country to which you are accredited. This is of vital importance both in order that we may supply you with all necessary explanations, and that we may know how to regulate our policy.

You are, moreover, entrusted with the control of such sums as may be collected by voluntary subscription for the benefit of this Island. Wherever the contributors are not opposed to this arrangement, you yourself will receive the money on deposit, and hold it in readiness to be used in the service of the cause, either in Sicily or in any other part of the Kingdom.

The instructions imparted to the representative at Turin contained the following amplifications:—

Although the Provisional Government entertains full confidence that the mission of its representatives will everywhere be well received and approved, and that the cause of the Island will find warm support, it is nevertheless from the Piedmontese

government that it expects most, which must of necessity look upon our cause as its own, because it is the cause of Italy. Sicily having broken irrevocably with the Neapolitan Bourbons, her subjects residing in foreign countries in all parts of the world are, for the time being, deprived of official protection, as they must not, cannot continue to seek, that of the diplomatic and commercial agents of Naples. This Provisional Government therefore desires most ardently that His Sardinian Majesty's Government should undertake to provide this protection, and impart the necessary instructions to its representatives and consuls in foreign lands.

The truly Italian mission of that glorious King, Victor Emmanuel, and the memory of what was done one year ago for Tuscan subjects, even before annexation had been established by vote and legally recognised, inspires this Provisional Government with confidence that its request will encounter no hesitation, no opposition.

On joining the concert of national union, Sicily intends from the very beginning, and to the best of her ability, to form her political, military, administrative, and economic conditions upon the model of those of the sister provinces that are now united around the throne of King Victor Emmanuel. As regards this, the most important question is that of the commercial relations between the Island and these sister provinces. It being desirable to establish a system of customs which shall be uniform and general, you will kindly collect and transmit to us, carefully revised reports on the rules and laws of customs of the Italian provinces, together with any further information you may deem important. Meanwhile you may open negotiations with the

Sardinian Government, informing it that our government is ready to grant free and immediate admission to all ships flying the Italian flag, and you will demand that reciprocity shall be granted at once.

As regards the organisation of the system of public instruction in the Kingdom of Piedmont, it would also be well for you to supply us with the necessary information for the same purpose.

The letter by means of which the Dictator presented his representatives to King Victor Emmanuel, Emperor Napoleon, and Queen Victoria, ran as follows :—

My duty to my native Italy having summoned me to defend her cause in Sicily, it became expedient for me to assume the Dictatorship of this noble people, who, after a long and heroic struggle, now cherish no other ambition than to share the national life and liberty, beneath the sceptre of that magnanimous Prince in whom Italy has placed her trust.

The agent, therefore, who has the honour to present himself before Your Majesty in the name of the Provisional Government that controls this island at the present time, does not pretend to do so as the representative of a separate and independent state, but rather as the interpreter of the ideals and sentiments of two million and a half of Italians.

It is as such that I beg your Majesty to deign to receive him, to grant him an audience and to hear, with gracious attention, what he will respectfully report to Your Majesty, for the good of this beautiful and noble region of Italy.

Meanwhile each day was bringing fresh difficulties to Crispi. His task no longer consisted only in providing for public needs, in completing the organisation of the new *régime*, in directing the newly instituted authorities, in destroying all traces of the

past, in gathering and concentrating the forces for the continuation of the undertaking—a difficult matter in itself, for the Bourbon troops still held firmly to certain parts of the island—he had also now to face the dangers of internal discord and of civil war.

Supported by Admiral Persano and encouraged by Cavour, who, on receipt of the letter already quoted, wrote to him on June 19: ‘I am anxiously awaiting further communications from you,’ La Farina had openly placed himself at the head of the party of intrigue, that he might the more easily possess himself of the reins of government. Awakened to the fact that Garibaldi did not relinquish them, he sought to precipitate the annexation of Sicily to Piedmont, believing that this once accomplished, Cavour would allow him to dominate her.

And here, in connection with immediate annexation, of which La Farina had now become the champion, pointing out imaginary dangers, organising popular demonstrations and encouraging all sorts of petitions to the Dictator, it will be well to recall as a document in proof of this man’s unbounded ambition, a declaration of his, made but a few years before, during the controversy between Francesco Ferrara and himself.¹ La Farina then affirmed that by uniting herself with Piedmont, Sicily ‘would be entitled to stipulate her own conditions,’ and he repudiated the ‘despotism of centralisation’ as an idea that had never been entertained by ‘enlightened Unionists.’ He furthermore declared that fusion would come about should the crown of Naples pass to Murat. But now, on the contrary, he was clamouring for fusion while the Bourbons were still at Naples, and, moreover, still held a part of Sicily under their domination. Nor did he stop to consider the question of conditions, which were not stipulated even when the annexation finally took place, nor that of centralisation, which was indeed carried to excess.

Count Cavour, who was so anxiously awaiting further communications from La Farina, received them in profusion during those days. We glean from the letters of the eighteenth, twenty-second, twenty-fifth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth of June, and of July 2:—

¹ See page 243.

Public indignation has reached such a pitch that were it not for the memory of recent benefits conferred upon them by Garibaldi, the people would have long since pitched present governors out of the window. They still persevere in their insane policy . . . by a stroke of the pen they abolish the tax on flour that brought twenty-five millions of francs into the treasury.

It is difficult to reconcile 'growing public indignation' with the benefit conferred by the removal of a tax that was an odious imposition.

The Dictator replies: that no one can doubt that the Sicilians will vote for annexation, but that should annexation be hastened, it would be impossible for him to continue the war. There are not fifty persons in Sicily who share this opinion. The desire for immediate annexation would overthrow Garibaldi should Garibaldi dare to oppose it.

The enthusiasm for Victor Emmanuel amounts to frenzy here. . . . After that of Victor Emmanuel your name is the one most esteemed and revered. O how well everything might go on here, if only the present government would not meddle.

(18 *June*.)

The conditions of this unhappy province are not improving. The town council of Palermo recently presented itself before the Dictator, and begged him to accept certain demonstrations in his honour. The address contained some passages in favour of speedy annexation, and the Dictator replied that his programme was indeed 'Italy and Victor Emmanuel,' but that there must be no question of annexation for the present . . . because it would

prevent his carrying out his undertaking. Meanwhile the petitions for immediate annexation, and for the constitution of a capable and responsible government, continue to exhibit long lists of names, and more than three hundred addresses from municipal bodies, containing the same request as the petitions, have reached the government, which refuses to publish them in the official journal. . . . The pressure of public opinion is such that yesterday . . . the government was forced to publish the regulations for the elections, which contain the assurance that *the Sicilian people will shortly be called upon to cast their vote upon the question of the annexation of the Island to the Italian provinces that are already emancipated*, words which contain a complete retraction of the programme proclaimed by the Dictator himself.

What was but a proof of loyal intentions, becomes to La Farina an act of weakness and a contradiction.

But ill-humour is growing and will soon break out, especially if the report be confirmed that Avvocato Calvi has been appointed Minister of Justice. He is a man *who is detested by all honest men*,¹ and a rabid Mazzinian.

As a matter of fact, Calvi was greatly to be esteemed, both as a patriot and as a jurist. He later became president of the *Corte di Cassazione* (Court of Appeals) of the Kingdom of Italy.

Colonel Medici has used his best efforts with the General, but to little purpose.

Yesterday a rumour having spread that I was to

¹ These words were suppressed in the *Epistolario di La Farina*, vol. ii. p. 338.

confer with the Dictator, the people crowded around me as I passed down Via Toledo, saluting and acclaiming me, and shouting: *We want you at the Palace.* . . . From six in the morning until eleven at night my rooms are crowded with visitors.

This is but a clear proof of the determined industry with which he worked to create difficulties for the government!

But besides the exaggerations inspired by his ill-will, La Farina noted certain facts that were at variance with the pretended public indignation.

More than nine thousand volunteers have enlisted in the army. . . . Notwithstanding the disorderly condition of the finances people pay their taxes. . . . The national spirit manifests itself with irresistible force, even in the small communes of the interior, and among the uncouth mountain people.

On the twenty-fifth La Farina obtained an audience with Garibaldi, which was granted at Admiral Persano's request, and was held in his presence. On the twenty-eighth La Farina wrote to Cavour:—

I expressed to the General my opinion of the Ministers and their way of governing, but I simply wasted my time. He replied by singing the praises of Crispi and his colleagues, and declared with some heat, that everything was progressing favourably, that the people were perfectly satisfied, and that the government enjoyed the country's full approbation. . . .

On the 27th, at eight a.m., the people began to gather in Via Toledo. The crowd increased rapidly, and shouts of: 'Long live Garibaldi! Down with Crispi! Down with the Ministry!' rang out on all sides. . . . The crowd repaired to the Royal

Palace, and a deputation waited upon the Dictator and frankly set forth the people's wishes. The Dictator was greatly enraged, declared that Crispi was a worthy patriot, that the expedition into Sicily was largely due to him (strange assertion, this!) and that he would never set him aside. . . .

Palermo, 29. . . . It is rumoured that Garibaldi has appointed Crispi his private secretary. This will be awkward for the new Ministry, as the General is in the habit of publishing decrees without consulting his ministers.

In this La Farina was telling the truth. By his forbearance Garibaldi had given Cavour's ambitious instrument time to trouble the waters, and when the noise of the demonstration carefully prepared by him reached the General, it could not fail to dismay him. He declared his willingness to alter the ministry, if that was what the people wanted, but he made an exception in Crispi's favour. As to immediate annexation he repeated what he had said to the Town Council some days before, that he had come to the island to fight for the cause of Italy, and not for that of Sicily alone, and that 'should the annexation of Sicily alone take place to-day, the responsibility of government would, in the future, rest on other shoulders, for I should then be obliged to give up the direction of affairs, and withdraw entirely.'

Crispi tendered his resignation from the ministry, and declined to withdraw it, but he could not refuse to remain by Garibaldi as 'Secretary of State at the disposal of the Dictator.' By means of the following letter and decree the General gave him proof of the high esteem in which he held his services :—

SIR,—On separating from you, which I do with the greatest regret, I wish to express to you my lively appreciation of the services you have rendered, and to thank you in the name of Sicily, or better

still, in the name of Italy herself, for the spirit of self-sacrifice and of abnegation with which you have seconded my efforts in governing this Island.

Your love of Country and of Liberty is so great that both, I am convinced, will ever find in you a warm defender of the common cause, which is that of Italy. Believe me to be,—Yours affectionately,

G. GARIBALDI.

PALERMO, 27 June, 1860.

To Signor Francesco Crispi.

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL

Giuseppe Garibaldi, Commander in Chief of the National Forces in Sicily,

In virtue of the powers conferred upon him, and

Upon the proposal of the Secretary of State for Finance, and

Having consulted the Council of the Secretaries of State:

Hereby decrees that :

ART. I.—Signor Francesco Crispi is appointed Procurator General of the High Court of Accounts, in substitution of Don Pietro Ventimiglia.

ART. II.—The Secretary of State for Finance is charged with the execution of this decree.

*The Secretary of State for the
Interior, acting for the time as
Secretary of State for Finance.*

GAETANO DAITA.

PALERMO, 29 June, 1860.

The Dictator,

G. GARIBALDI.

By means of the following letter Crispi thanked the Dictator, but refused the Procuratorship General and the salary that accompanied it, amounting to some 15,000 francs :—

I cannot but consider your decree of June 29, by

which I am appointed Procurator General of the High Court of Accounts, as a mark of your esteem for me, of which I am proud. But you are well aware, my dear General, that we did not come into this Island to obtain high offices and rich emolument. We came to help this noble people to rend their chains asunder, and with them, to join in forming a united and free Italy, the dream of our youth, the one hope and comfort of our cruel exile.

You will therefore permit me to decline this high office, and to declare myself,—Your devoted servant,

FRANCESCO CRISPI.*

PALERMO, *June 1, 1860.*

In those letters of La Farina's already quoted, as well as in those he continued to write to Cavour,¹ the scarecrow of Mazzinianism is frequently made use of. This myth had not even a semblance of foundation. As has already been said, Mazzini would not go to Sicily, and the same reasons that deterred him from so doing also prevented him from exerting any influence whatsoever upon the events that were taking place there. But the clever intriguer was well aware of Cavour's aversion to the agitator, and invented a purely imaginary peril in order to dominate him the better. We have no reason to believe that any militant Mazzinian was exerting his influence in the island at that time. Maurizio Quadrio had remained in Genoa; Nicotera, released from the Favignana prison in early June, by Garibaldi's order, would not stay in Sicily; Fabrizi, Mosto, and Savi had indeed once been Mazzinians, but had all accepted Garibaldi's political motto: Italy and Victor Emmanuel; Mario was devoting his attention to the founding of a military college, and had neither part nor influence in the government.

Crispi, for his part, convinced that only by the alliance of

¹ These letters saw the light in 1869, when Ausonio Franchi (pseudonym of the priest, Cristoforo Bonavino) published *L'Epistolario di Giuseppe La Farina*, and were the cause of a celebrated law-suit, of which an account is given in Appendix A.

the party of action with the Piedmontese monarchy could Italy achieve unity, never for a moment dreamed that he could be accused of swerving from the path he had voluntarily chosen for himself, simply because he maintained intercourse with men who, like himself, and influenced by other conditions, had until recently been active in the republican camp. Perfectly loyal himself, and with his every thought fixed upon the great national purpose to be achieved, he had invited first Mazzini and then Carlo Cattaneo to come to Sicily. Mazzini's reply has already been quoted. Cattaneo replied as follows to a letter despatched to him on June 23, which contained an invitation in these words: 'Come, then. You can serve Italy better here in Sicily than on the Continent. With your knowledge and your experience you can make yourself extremely useful.'

To Signor Francesco Crispi,
Palermo.

LUGANO, 18 July, 1860.

I am taking advantage of the departure for Palermo of Signor Pedrali, a nephew of the Ciani brothers, to get this answer to your kind letter conveyed safely to you. Young Pedrali is going to enlist. I believe he is barely eighteen, but he has already served in the *Regina* Brigade at Palestro. If you can help him in any way I shall be grateful to you.

I thank you most heartily for your invitation, and I beg you to convey my thanks also to all who are my friends in Sicily. I wish I could accept, and have my share in the wonderful achievements to which your Washington is leading you.

My whole past forbids my acceptance of public office, and I must avoid all appearance of running after it, as I should immediately be accused of doing by the whole tribe of scandal-mongers, should I set out without some motive of an entirely private nature.

As I must then remain at a distance, although indeed, I am one of you, I wish to assure you most warmly that if there is anything you think I could do to help your Island, command me, and I will obey your orders.

I am not aware what influences you count most upon, but remember that good-will is an influence that penetrates everywhere, even into our adversaries' camp.

Never tire of repeating to the General that it is not sufficient to *know how to take*, one must also *know how to hold*. Tell him to trust only to himself and to those who hold his will sacred.

I see you are thinking about a military education, and that is a good thing. But you must enlarge the institutions still more, and the sooner the better. Why not introduce 'Sunday Drill' for all the young people, as they have it in the canton of Ticino?

By introducing the different branches of military science into the schools as part of the regular courses in mathematics, drawing, etc., you will obtain well prepared material for making soldiers, marines, and officers. Make the schools so many military colleges. But you must also think of *production*. Now I say to you as I said to our Sardinian friends : agriculture on a large scale is trade, and must have markets and roads. The railway cannot go everywhere. Each commune must have its roads, and those without delay. This will immediately raise the *value* of produce, and cause it to *increase in quantity*. The communes of Lombardy have spent at least forty millions in fifty years ; but Sicily cannot wait fifty years.

A general plan should be made at once, that the work may proceed with order, and begin with the

most important branches. Then a *special* loan should be raised. I say a special loan, for otherwise the money might be put to some other purpose that would appear more important, whereas this project of the roads is the most important of all, because it helps all the others. You can raise the money by selling or mortgaging crown or communal lands; but as I possess no precise information on this point, I cannot advise you.

If you could, *at one and the same time*, insure the construction of all the roads necessary, you would be able to transform the island as *by magic*. These are matters that should really be treated in a *dictatorial* manner, otherwise a thousand difficulties may arise. Act at once, before you become subjected to the authority of a general parliament, which will consider that it is performing its duty towards Sicily if it meets three or four times a year to discuss her affairs. Look at Sardinia, who has enjoyed the blessings of a parliament for twelve years and is worse off than Sicily to-day, for although nearly as extensive in area, she has but half as many inhabitants.

Do not allow the opposition you are sure to encounter discourage you. Keep your eyes on your Chief. If he has learnt *how to take* and *how to hold* he will by now be quite independent of any government. The people of all the different regions will follow him. Let him strengthen his forces upon the sea.

My cordial greetings to him, as also to Signor Mordini and to the Marios, husband and wife.

I wish you all happiness, and I beg you to continue to love me.—Yours,

DR. CARLO CATTANEO.

Crispi did not remain idle because he had been forced to relinquish the direction of affairs. His successors were commonplace men, and totally unprepared to govern, but even had they been more capable, his eagerness for action was so great that he could not have brought himself to stand by as a simple spectator. A man born to command, he had accumulated, during the long years of his exile, when his thoughts had been ever with his country, a great fund of energy and of knowledge, and now, when his beloved country stood in need of both, he would not suffer others to debar him from accomplishing the mission he knew was his.

In a series of letters, from which we will quote the most striking passages, Crispi confessed his dissatisfaction, vindicated his rights and spoke openly of his own qualifications. To-day, with our knowledge of his adversaries, derived from the publication of their correspondence, we must admit that the opinions he expressed concerning these men were fully justified.

To Bertani, July 2:—

The cabinet of which I was a member has fallen. Another has taken its place, composed of separatist and *La Farinian* elements. Garibaldi, who will not be guided and who seeks no one's advice, has yielded. Our cause is in great danger.

To Asproni, July 3:—

La Farina, who has been in Palermo since the seventh of June, remained unobserved and unseen so long as he did not seek out those by whom he wished to be observed and seen. But he has now sown discord in our unhappy country. Having had but a cold reception from Garibaldi, who cannot forgive the men who sold Nice, he sent his friends to me, seeking to persuade me, both by threats and prayers, to admit him into the governing body. Encountering determined opposition on my part, he resorted to intrigue and disloyal machinations, which, thanks to General Garibaldi's forbearance, I was

obliged to tolerate. At any other time and with any other man at the head of affairs, he would have been arrested and despatched by sea, For twenty days or more he was busy organising popular demonstrations against me, and at last, on the 27th, with the help of the police, whose chiefs I have been forced to remove owing to their utter faithlessness, La Farina sent a deputation to wait on Garibaldi and demand our withdrawal. Everything turned out as he had hoped. The cabinet of June 2 fell, and another took its place, composed of separatist and La Farinian elements. What will come of all this ?

Much evil will come of it, my friend, unless Garibaldi can be brought to retrace his steps. On that day the individual policy gave way to the policy of the streets, and it was the conservatives who brought this about. Those demonstrations will probably be followed by others, and not only will the government fail to obtain a firm footing, but will be ever at the mercy of the first comer. I know that matters have been purposely brought to this pass in order to reduce the country to such a state of weakness and exasperation that she will beg Cavour, as a favour, to annex her to Piedmont.

Farewell, my dear friend. It is painful to reflect that it has been our lot to make all the sacrifices, to risk our lives even, only to see our enemies usurp the power, and ruin the country.

To Cesare Correnti, July 5 :—

I have not written to you before, because I have had no leisure. I had so much to do after our landing at Marsala that it was impossible for me to send so much as a line to my friends, although my heart was with them.

Why is that Cavour of yours still so antagonistic to me? Are we really to end by rending each other? And is this the way to make Italy?

Mark my words:

There are none here who are truly Unionists from principle, save your friend and the handful of young men who follow me. The country in general is indifferent; the people hate the Bourbons because they were tortured by them, but they take no thought of how best to get rid of them, or of what form of government is to take their place. Among the men of 1848, through whom the country was lost at that time, there is not one who is really in favour of national union. They pretend to wish to see Sicily united to the other Italian provinces that have been emancipated, but in their hearts they are casting about for an excuse to change sides, and demand a prince for Palermo. The marvellous achievements of Garibaldi's expedition, and my rapid organisation of the country, forced this party to remain silent. But now La Farina has sown discord throughout this unhappy land.

Failing to get a hearing from us who one and all distrusted him, he joined hands with our enemies, who once more raised their heads, and now seek to defeat us by launching the filthy and cowardly accusation of republicanism against us.

In this country whose inhabitants are distrustful and suspicious by nature, slander never fails to produce its effect; and if my country still continues to love and respect me, it is only because of what I have suffered for her and of my manifest devotion to her cause. Nevertheless, she is beginning to doubt my motives. Then help me at this crisis, and help Italy, you who can help!

I love Italy above all else, and as Italy is destined to come into existence through the House of Savoy, I accept this condition without *arrière pensée*. The title of *King of Italy* for Victor Emmanuel was suggested by me. It was I who set the arms of Savoy in the place of those of Trinacria on all public acts and in the national establishments, and this despite the hostility of the separatists who are unrelenting in their opposition to me. I am the man to save Italy in Sicily. I have retired from office, in which at all times I take but little delight, in order to deprive my enemies of all pretext, and that my name may be forgotten; but I assure you that among those who are prominent in the political arena to-day, you will not find another man like me. I alone, among the local magnates, am capable of bringing Sicily to Italy. The magnates of Piazza Castello would therefore do well to refrain from combating me. They should rather seek to make my path more smooth. To do this, remove La Farina, whom I have twice saved from death, and whom, to avoid scandal, I have neither caused to be arrested nor despatched across the seas.

P.S.—After my fall from power all the most distinguished personages of Palermo came to call upon me. The new Ministry appointed me Procurator General of the Court of Accounts, an office that brings with it fifty-two francs a day, but which I declined, as I am not in search of high posts and rich emolument. Have you, in Turin, many examples like this among the conservatives? Still, Cavour's journals do not cease to abuse me! It is infamous!

To Giovanni Piacentini, July 9.

The new ministers, who are incapable of handling the political situation, were received with amazement by the country. The General himself perceived their incapacity and has already dismissed one and intends to serve three others in the same way. They are all separatists on *principle*.

Three of them, the former deputies Daita, Santocanale and Natoli, voted in favour of Baudin's intervention on April 17, 1849, and consequently for a reconciliation with the Bourbons. Daita and Santocanale signed the retraction of the Decree of Deposition, on April 13, 1848. This year Daita remained in hiding in his own house until the sixth of June, and Santocanale hid on board a vessel in the harbour of Palermo until the Royal troops had all left the city. Natoli, while in exile, never mixed in politics, but in April and May last he went about heaping ridicule upon our projected expedition. And finally, Santocanale (it is well to go back to him) spoke so disparagingly of the Italian nationalist principle at a meeting of the Chamber that was held in April or May, if I am not mistaken, of the year 1848, that his fellow deputies reduced him to silence by their angry protests.

If I omit all mention of the other members of the cabinet, it is simply because they are not worth considering.

Notwithstanding these ministerial changes, the Dictator wished me to remain near him. In order to satisfy public opinion which is entirely in my favour the new Ministry appointed me Procurator General of the High Court of Accounts, a fine post that brings with it fifty-two francs a day, but which I declined, because I did not come here to promote my own interests or to better my own position.

But enough for to-day, for time presses, and the post will be going out presently. Let me impress upon you, my dear Piacentini, that my party and I are not the representatives of *separatism*.

We shall be the ones to bring Victor Emmanuel to Rome and place the 'crown of Towers' upon his head.

(10 *July*).—Daita, Santocanale, Natoli and Lanza have been dismissed. Interdonato has been appointed Minister of the Interior, Errante, Minister of Justice, and Michele Amari, the historian, Minister of Public Works and Instruction. These are all true men. A Neapolitan steamer, the *Veloce*, has come over to us. This is one of the three vessels that were taken from Sicily after the collapse of the revolution of 1848. Her commandant, Signor Anguissola, brought the vessel to us this morning at 9.30, with the full consent of her crew, and she was warmly welcomed. It is the power of the unitary principle that works such miracles as this.

The following letter from Giorgio Asproni explains the point of view of the anti-Cavourians of Turin.

You made a mistake in tolerating La Farina in Sicily. An exceptional measure would have been justified in his case. I myself should have expelled him at once.

All men of heart, all liberal and sincere devotees of the cause of Italy, extolled Garibaldi's wise answer to the Municipal Council of Palermo. The news of his change of attitude, that reached us later on, filled us with sorrow. It was precisely what Cavour and La Farina had hoped for. Immediate annexation will bring about the speedy ruin of

your splendid and marvellous achievements. The authority will be held by conservatives, and you will find yourselves not only set aside, but persecuted and slandered. An assembly elected under the feverish influence of impatient annexationists will obstruct the action of the revolution which should now become even more rapid, more precipitous, more far-reaching and decisive. Diplomacy will intervene with deceit and treachery, and bind the gallant General's strong hands. If there is still time, rid yourselves of your insidious adversaries and issue a short and concise proclamation to the Italians of Sicily, declaring that this is no time for the casting of votes and the convoking of assemblies, but rather a time for them to take up arms and to lay about them vigorously.

Our Chamber has been prorogued because the attendance was insufficient.

Cavour is still the same—vain, mendacious, aristocratic, superficial, overbearing, inconsiderate and unscrupulous. I am told he intends to use Depretis as an instrument against Bertani. The instrument is certainly not a docile one. But remember that ambition is blind, and during the last twelve years I have witnessed so many changes, that a fresh conversion would not surprise me. I think you should be warned of this possibility.

Garibaldi became aware of the deficiencies of the new ministers as soon as the change was accomplished, and on learning the insidious nature of the movement that had induced him to yield, he became greatly enraged with La Farina, who was already beginning to assume an air of patronage. The idea of ridding himself of this restless spirit, which his forbearance had heretofore led him to disregard, now occupied his thoughts once more, and he awoke to the

necessity of putting it into immediate execution. On July 7 La Farina was consigned to Admiral Persano, on board the *Maria Adelaide*. He had reached Palermo safely on board a man-of-war, and he now left the city by the same safe means. At the same time two spies, one belonging to Napoleon and the other to Cavour, were also expelled from Sicily. These men were Giacomo Griscelli, who had once been an agent in the employ of the prefect of police, Pietri, and a certain Pasquale Totti. The information concerning them furnished by the police was to the following effect:—

Signor J. Griscelli presented himself to the Piedmontese Government (Cavour) as a friend of General Lamoricière, over whom he allowed it to be understood that he exerted a powerful influence, and he promised to persuade that General to invade Romagna and Tuscany. The Piedmontese government gave him 10,000 francs and further assigned to him the sum of twenty-five francs a day. He crossed Tuscany and entered the Papal States, where he sought the acquaintance of persons occupying high positions, and was often with Lamoricière. He was, however, working to achieve the opposite purpose. He revealed the plans of the Turin government, and stopped Lamoricière's advance. He also caused *Avvocato* Silvani to be arrested. Our own agents having succeeded in inducing a battalion of Papal soldiers to desert, he brought about the arrest of a major and ten other officers. He also caused the capture of an individual who was trying to bring a consignment of arms up from the Roman coast. On being found out he wrote that his original mission, and another still more important, had obliged him to hasten to Naples. It is probable that he also extorted money from the Papal government, for the government of Tuscany

telegraphed news of what had happened to Turin, and the banker who had been instructed to remit the 10,000 francs to Griscelli, for which he had again applied, was promptly ordered to refuse payment. From Naples he wrote: 'Write to me to Palermo, post-office, or in care of the Admiral of the Sardinian Navy, with whom I shall be in communication.' It is quite possible that he has also received money from the Neapolitan government, and that he has set some intrigue afoot here.

Pasquale Totti, non-commissioned officer in the *Légion Étrangère*, during the campaign of 1859; had previously served seven years in the 39th infantry regiment; came here to enlist; had a French passport issued at Trieste on November 29, 1859. Came by way of Rome, Naples and Messina to Palermo.

Knew Griscelli in Paris when Griscelli was under the prefect Pietri; was with him in Italy last year.

When arrested at the hotel in Via Cartari, he saw Griscelli writing to Farini; at Naples saw him frequently in the company of Marchese Villamarina.

Left Naples on 26th of last month.

Was in Paris in 1857, after the Crimean War, in which he had participated as a non-commissioned officer.

Griscelli wrote to the Emperor and to Farini every other day.

The letter addressed by Griscelli to Crispi was composed twenty-four hours before his arrest. *Avvocato* Palmieri has seen it. It contains the following offer: If General Garibaldi wished him to do so, he was ready to place one of our agents in the immediate neighbourhood of Clary, another

at Naples, near the Conte di Trapani or near Monsieur Gruelle des Près.

The *Official Journal* thus announced the expulsion :—

On Saturday the seventh of this present month, Signor Giuseppe La Farina, Signor Giacomo Griscelli and Signor Pasquale Totti, were expelled from our Island, by special order of the Dictator. Griscelli and Totti, who are Corsicans by birth, are the type of men who succeed in enrolling themselves successively in all the police forces of Europe.

The three men expelled were in Palermo for the purpose of conspiring against the present order of things. The government, ever eager to protect public tranquillity against any form of disturbance, could no longer tolerate the presence among us of these individuals, who had come here with such evil intentions.

It is difficult to decide what part Crispi had in the resolution adopted by Garibaldi. This was, in all probability, a sudden resolution, for on the day preceding the expulsion Crispi wrote to Bertani :—

Here, the General is surrounded by hostile elements. La Farina, having failed to get in by the door, is trying to get in by the window. Three of the Ministers are for La Farina, and all of them are separatists. Their own incapacity is working out their destruction. Let us hope their downfall will not shake the foundations of the government. . . .

The police regulation that expelled the President of the National Society created a great stir, especially in Piedmont, and Cavour himself was much disturbed. On July 14 he sought to console La Farina by writing to him as follows :—

The article in the *Official Journal* has aroused

the indignation both of myself and of Farini, and it cannot fail to have the same effect upon all honest men. It is a savage act!

He was, moreover, uneasy about his spies, and added :—

As you will certainly print something about this, I must request you to avoid any allusion that might confirm the accusation that Griscelli and Totti are spies.

La Farina, as was to be expected, affected complete indifference, but took this opportunity of sounding his own praises in his own small paper, the *Piccolo Corriere d'Italia*, and of attributing every defect imaginable to the dictatorial government. But the affront offered him by a man so popular as Garibaldi destroyed his prestige with the members of the National Society. Some of the sub-committees demanded that he should resign; the committees of the Romagna held a meeting at Bologna, where he was deposed without more ado, and Depretis appointed president in his stead.

The accusations launched by the *Piccolo Corriere* were refuted in an article published in *Il Diritto* by General Türr, whom ill-health had obliged to return to Piedmont. He defended the acts and proclaimed the honesty of the provisional government, and concluded his long article with the words :—

I am convinced that it would have been better both for Signor La Farina and for the national cause had the President of the National Society never gone to Sicily, where, until his arrival, *a perfect understanding had reigned between the parties, which understanding was not again possible until after his departure from the Island.*

Cavour, who looked upon La Farina's expulsion as a personal offence, determined to retaliate. As *he himself* could not dominate Garibaldi, *Italy* should no longer be allowed to help him.

On July 10 the vice-governor of Genoa, P. Magenta, received the following order by telegraph:—

Vous ne fournirez plus rien aux agents de Garibaldi, sans un ordre précis du ministère. Communiquez cet ordre à l'amiral.

How are we to explain this attitude of Cavour's? No matter how much we may be prejudiced in favour of the great diplomatist, it is impossible to justify his conduct.

Cavour was well aware that at that moment the military question was of greater importance in Sicily than any political question could possibly be, and he should have seen that it would be a crime to distract Garibaldi with other cares than those of the war, and to withhold the help for which all Italy was clamouring. He knew, moreover, that the annexation had been accepted on principle, and publicly declared inevitable, and was now simply delayed for reasons that could in no way affect the principle. His knowledge of certain secret obligations assumed by the King towards Napoleon of necessity deterred Cavour from lending his support to Garibaldi's plan for carrying the war into the Papal States, but in July the Roman question had not yet been touched upon. The Bourbons still appeared firmly seated upon their throne, and they still maintained a hold on Sicily. Before Garibaldi was able to attack Rome a long road had to be travelled, and many obstacles overcome that then appeared even greater than they really were.

Had Cavour's motives been more lofty he would never have despatched as his emissary a man like La Farina, who was both an intriguer and a sower of discord, or, at least, when his emissary was returned to him he would have acknowledged his mistake and have accepted the opinion of such a friend as Türr. But, on the contrary, he continued to listen to La Farina alone, to make use of him and of his friends Cordova and company, and he despatched others with imperative orders to annex the island without delay.

When Cavour first demanded immediate annexation, in early June, it was already illogical and impossible. Even should it have been proclaimed by an assembly, or by direct appeal to

the people's votes, it would not have represented the will of all the Sicilians, for important towns such as Messina, Syracuse, Augusta, and Milazzo had not yet been emancipated. The battle of Milazzo, indeed, did not take place until July 20.

And, even after the emancipation of the whole island, was it not clear that Sicily was a necessary base for further operations if the war was to be carried on to the Continent? How could Garibaldi relinquish this base, which in case of defeat would also be a refuge? And, Sicily once annexed to Piedmont, how could Cavour, the minister of King Victor Emmanuel, countenance Garibaldi's preparations in Sicily for an assault on those Continental possessions which his French ally, with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, had declared must be left to the Bourbons? In a word, how much justice, discretion, and knowledge of human nature did Cavour display by his demands?

The first effect of annexation proclaimed and accepted would have been the immediate abolition of the dictatorial government and the advent of a Royal Commission. But could the men who had risked their lives in the undertaking that was to unite Italy consent to withdraw after the emancipation of but a single province? Could they be expected freely to relinquish their position to the men who, having witnessed operations from a safe distance, now came forward to gather the fruit of so many sacrifices?

It must, moreover, be remembered that there were certain provisions to be made by government which were indispensable and urgent in a country that was but now casting off the conditions of mediævalism, which provisions could be accomplished with despatch only by means of the dictatorial authority. Sicily becoming by annexation a province of a constitutional monarchy, these provisions must naturally follow the course of ordinary legislation, and would encounter insurmountable obstacles.¹

¹ The truth is that Cavour, annoyed in the very beginning by the initiative taken by the Party of Action in succouring Sicily, sought to deprive that party of the glory of carrying the undertaking through to its completion.

Efforts are still being made to give Cavour a part in these events, but his participation is disproved not only by simple logic, but by a series of

well-known documents. It will suffice to quote from two that are cited by Chiala (*Lettere di Cavour*, iv., clvii.), and that were composed within a few days of the sailing of the Thousand.

1. 'En revenant de Florence, j'ai visité le golfe de la Spezia et Gênes. Dans cette ville l'agitation mazzinienne reprend un peu de force et se rallie autour de Garibaldi. *On veut pousser le gouvernement à secourir la Sicile, et on prépare des expéditions d'armes et de munitions. Je soupçonne le Roi de favoriser imprudemment ces projets. . . .*'

2. 'Garibaldi's followers speak in the King's name, as it were, and unfortunately, appearances, and especially Trecchi's presence at court, form a solid foundation for these rumours. . . .' (*Lettere di Cavour*, April 24, 1860).

CHAPTER XII

Garibaldi requests the King to send him Depretis as Pro-Dictator—La Varenne's mission to Victor Emmanuel—Rattazzi and the European press; his report—Arms and ships—The Bertani-Crispi correspondence—English Admiralty offers to sell two ships to Garibaldi—Letter from Admiral Sir Rodney Mundy—The desertion of the *Veloce*—The pretended convention between Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel for the cession of Sardinia and Liguria to France—Sirtori appointed Pro-Dictator—Crispi composes his proclamation to the Sicilian people—Crispi once more Minister of the Interior.

DETERMINED to carry out the programme he had proclaimed, and convinced that he was choosing the wisest course in seeking to co-operate with the Piedmontese government, Garibaldi addressed himself directly to Victor Emmanuel, with the request that Agostino Depretis should be sent to him to fill the office of Pro-Dictator, when the General should be obliged to leave Palermo and assume command of military operations at Milazzo and Messina. Garibaldi had more faith in the King than in his minister. He knew that the monarch was his friend, that he was daring, and fully aware of the importance of his mission. On July 2 Major Trecchi, who had once been Victor Emmanuel's aide-de-camp, left Palermo with the request. Depretis, who aspired to this office, had already sought Bertani's support, and on the same day (July 2) Bertani wrote to Crispi as follows:—

If you must have a government commissary from Piedmont in Sicily, let it be Depretis; and to obtain him, ask for him directly. At least he is an honest man. Refuse Valerio, who is also a candidate; he is too easily influenced.

The King would have liked to send the Deputy, Lorenzo

Valerio, but he yielded to Garibaldi's wish and determined to despatch Depretis, although Cavour declared him to be a 'weak man,' and one who would allow himself to be 'led.' Garibaldi desired Depretis' immediate presence in Palermo, but as he failed to arrive, and as the General could no longer postpone his own departure for Milazzo, he decided to appoint a temporary Pro-Dictator in the person of the Chief of Staff, Sirtori.

The following letter from Asproni is interesting in that it bears upon the personality of the man who was to be the first Pro-Dictator of Sicily.

GENOA, 9 July, 1860.

MY DEAR CRISPI,—This morning your much longed-for letter of the third came to hand. I will not tell you how deeply grieved I am by this deviation from the true revolutionary movement. I foresaw this as soon as Signor La Farina started for Sicily. My heart sank when I heard that Garibaldi was tolerating his presence. Nurse a viper in your bosom, and only the Almighty Himself can save you, for vipers can do nothing but bite and poison. For several days Cavour was greatly disconcerted by the chilling reception his emissary had received, and was on the point of recalling him and flinging him aside as a worn out and useless tool. Torrearsa was finally despatched to support him, and Cavour's spirits rose at news of the demonstrations in favour of annexation. The splendid response to the Municipal Body of Palermo once more disheartened him, and for a time they contemplated sending Farini. Then they thought of Lorenzo Valerio, who was eager to go, and who, it was believed, would exert a *powerful influence* over Garibaldi. I am not sure they have, even now, entirely abandoned this idea. You can guess what my opinion of this scheme is. Depretis made an indirect tender of his services, and

Bertani was enthusiastic in his support. Cavour does not trust him, and long ago christened him the *Jesuit of the Left*. It is true that at the time of the *Nazione Armata* he fought us sharply, and by underhand means, and I fancy he is as ambitious as he is cunning, but, on the whole, I believe him to be a true Italian and a democrat. Nevertheless, amidst all these scandalous doings, and daily acts of shuffling, we must be on our guard. In Piedmont true national virtue has become very rare—I had nearly said that it has either never existed or has disappeared entirely.

D'Ondes, Cordova, Interdonato and the rest, who pronounced you all *mad* when you set out on your glorious and daring expedition, have now been hovering over the chance of usurping your places like vultures over a dead body. You will see how eager and unanimous they will be in ruining your splendid achievements. Garibaldi knows how to conquer, but he does not know how to make the most of his victory. The political wisdom of the reactionaries should have taught him how to exercise the power of his dictatorship. And you yourself, my dear Crispi, should have been more severe and resolute. I longed to be near you, to stimulate you to adopt those energetic measures without which, in solemn and supreme moments, the country cannot be saved. For the time being they have ousted you, and it is plain enough that you were the object of their greatest hatred, but it is really Garibaldi they are seeking to overthrow. Will they succeed?

For his part Crispi continued his efforts to convince Turin that His Majesty's government was pursuing a false course.

Among the many journalists who had hastened to Palermo there was a Frenchman, Count Charles de la Varenne, a man

of great intelligence and filled with the spirit of adventure, who had been in Sicily in 1848. Crispi placed much confidence in this man, and determined to make him useful. He entrusted him with a mission to King Victor Emmanuel and to Rattazzi, with whom de la Varenne was personally acquainted, and he also charged him to defend the Sicilian revolution and the acts of the provisional government in the European press. In order to provide him with a title that would at once facilitate his undertaking and gratify him personally Crispi caused de la Varenne to be appointed Political Agent attached to the Sicilian Mission at Paris. (June 23.)

The letter conveyed by de la Varenne to Rattazzi read as follows :—

PALERMO, 23 June, 1860.

MOST HONOURABLE COMMANDER (*Commendatore*),—Count de la Varenne who will present this letter, will explain to you the true condition of Sicily, and tell you of the great hopes and numerous resources this country offers for the redemption of Italy, in which we are determined to participate. He will also acquaint you with the disgraceful intrigues and the malicious insinuations of the agents of Cavour's court, who, in order to snatch the power from us, do not hesitate to conspire in the most dastardly manner. At this crisis I take the liberty of begging you to be my spokesman with His Majesty the King, and to convince him that we are in all ways fulfilling our duty as faithful servants of the cause of Italy, to-day personified in the glorious House of Savoy.

They have sought to damage us by bringing up our origin against us as a crime. They proclaim that, being republicans, we are not working for the good of Italy. This epithet of 'republicans' is hurled at us in every way and in every tone.

Our party that was formed as early as 1831 is, above

all, unionist. On several different occasions we have declared that we are for the King, if the King is for Italy. No one to-day can possibly be so blind as not to see that our country will find salvation only in the shadow of the cross of Savoy. Will any one dare to go the length of denying us sufficient intelligence to recognise the signs of the times? Is not Garibaldi's presence at the head of the government a sufficient guarantee? Do not the regulations and laws we have enacted amply prove our capability? In days gone by even my enemies were just to me, and recognised in me that loyalty and honesty of purpose which are to be found only in men of strong convictions. Will they now seek to deny the existence of these noble qualities, of which I am justly proud?

Signor Commendatore, I have nothing further to add, either as regards myself or what I have done and will do for the national cause. You cannot be entirely uninformed on this point, and I am confident you will prove the best of advocates.

I beg you to express my sincere devotion to His Majesty, and to believe me to be most respectfully at your orders.—Your servant and friend,

F. CRISPI.

Here is Rattazzi's answer.

MOST HONOURED SIR,—I thank you for the kind letter you sent me by Count de la Varenne. I am deeply grieved to learn that insidious reports have been circulated in Sicily for the purpose of defaming you, and that base intrigue has been used against your administration. These are but the familiar weapons that certain intriguers are wont to use in the name of Italy, and for the sole purpose of cloaking their own petty ambitions.

I am fully convinced that your one aim, like that of our illustrious and most loyal General Garibaldi, is to redeem Sicily and unite her to the rest of Italy beneath the sceptre of our gallant King, Victor Emmanuel, and I have done and shall continue to do all that is possible that you may receive full justice. But be this as it may, do not allow this most unjust opposition to move you; pursue your course calmly, and rest assured that, in the end, the secret of the malicious wiles that have been used against you will become manifest. I am sure that these accusations have heretofore failed, and still fail to impress the King, who is well aware that, from the moment in which he became the first soldier of Italian Independence, all those who cherish the same purpose have lent him honest support, although, in former days, they may have sought to achieve this purpose by other means.

If I can be of service to you in any way, command me freely, and believe me to be, with sincere respect and esteem,—Your devoted and obliged servant,

U. RATAZZI.

De la Varenne sent Crispi a full account of his interview with the King, from which we choose the most interesting and important passages :—

TURIN, Sunday morning, *July 1.*

DEAR SIR,—I reached Genoa on Friday evening, and Turin yesterday (Saturday) morning. As the King was at the Royal Palace, I went there at once, and was granted an audience with His Majesty that lasted nearly two hours. I will give you an exact account of our long conversation.

To begin with, I protested warmly against the attacks that are being made upon you personally,

and upon General Garibaldi's government, for the purpose of making you appear as agents of Mazzini and as men who feign devotion to the King with the secret intention of betraying him at a given moment. I said all you told me to say, and *more*. His Majesty, who had been listening attentively, replied as follows: 'As for Signor Crispi, I know him well for an honest man, a good man; but there are many others in General Garibaldi's *entourage* whom I do not trust, and I have good reasons for not doing so.'

I hereupon explained the situation in Palermo to the King. His Majesty, who is well informed on *all points*, and has followed the course of events with close attention, told me that he could wish you to unite with the high (*sic*) Sicilian party, which union would strengthen you sufficiently to enable you to govern more resolutely, to organise your forces, and take all necessary precautions against the invader. I told La Farina's story in full. The King, who was much annoyed, expressed his regret at the line of conduct Cavour and his agent have pursued in this matter, and added that he would arrange to have him recalled at once. I believe this will be your illustrious fellow-countryman's last exploit. The affair of the money belonging to the National Society excited the King's indignation most.

His Majesty asked me why the Sicilian government is opposed to annexation, and protested that there is no time to lose if Piedmont is to make use of the vote of the Sicilian people with the Powers, the horizon having recently assumed a threatening aspect, and Russia but now having declared her intention of taking up arms and intervening actively,

both in Sicily and at Naples. This intervention would certainly be checked by France, who, however, refuses to make any promises for the future. I replied. . . .

The King then informed me that he had recently proposed that Signor Valerio be sent to Palermo to bring about an amicable understanding between the Ministry and General Garibaldi. Signor Valerio is an upright man, and very clever, but I have good reason to believe that in this matter he would side with Count Cavour. Therefore, should you see fit to accept him, be on your guard, and act accordingly. I mentioned Depretis' name, but His Majesty ignored my suggestion. If you could but have him, all would be well.

Under the present circumstances I think you would do well to get the country to declare herself without delay. Certain compromises might be made. For instance, why not allow the voting to take place at once, and then postpone the execution of the vote *until the island shall be entirely free*, and local conditions such as shall be established by the dictatorial government?

The King takes an active interest in the sending of help to Sicily. He gives special attention to all questions of armament, finance, and ships. He had much to say about a certain Captain Derohan, who is, I believe, an American, and whom the General sent to His Majesty in connection with the purchase of some steamers. Bertani, whom I saw in Genoa, also mentioned the matter to me.

In a word, Victor Emmanuel is with you, heart and soul. He has perfect faith both in Garibaldi and yourself, but he fears some act of treachery on the part of the Mazzinians, that would ruin every-

thing, and compromise Italy's redemption for years to come. Remember this.

I informed the King that I intended sending you a full account of our interview, and he advised me to do so without delay.

Signor Rattazzi has received your letter, and will act at once. You will find a letter from him enclosed herein.

I have conferred at length both with Count Amari and with Prince di San Giuseppe. We have arranged to combine our efforts and to act together here, as well as in Paris and London. I am leaving to-morrow with Prince di San Giuseppe. Let me know when Signor San Cataldo is to arrive, and whether he will have a successor.

We are going to organise a journalistic campaign on a vast scale in Paris and London, and we intend to establish committees of action. Besides my work on 'The Sicilian Revolution and the Expedition,' I shall get my colleagues to spread some pamphlets signed with well-known names. In Paris I have a sketch of Count Cavour nearly ready for publication. A colleague will assume its authorship. . . .

You will receive communications by every courier, of which some will be for you, others for the *Official Journal*. . . .—Your devoted

CHARLES LA VARENNE.

14 rue Chaptal, Paris.

Although he was no longer a member of the cabinet, the real power, nevertheless, still rested with Crispi. Garibaldi could not do without him.

After the expulsion of La Farina, on the night of July 7, the ministers, Natoli, Daita, Santocanale and Lanza, who had been nominated under his auspices on June 27, found themselves in an awkward position. They were requested to tender

their resignations, and were replaced by Errante, Interdonato, and the historian Amari, on July 10. But already on the eighth the editor of the *Official Journal* had received the following order :—

Beginning to-morrow, you will henceforth send the proofs of each number of the *Official Journal* to these headquarters before they go to press. This arrangement will not prevent the paper from appearing at the usual hour, and is in accordance with an order from the General, in whose name I write.

CRISPI.

Garibaldi's main preoccupation was that of increasing his forces—arms, volunteers and ships. Although Bertani had full authority to act for him, rifles and ships had been commissioned in England directly from Palermo. As early as June 20 Crispi had written to Luigi Scalià in London :—

Signor Peranni, Secretary of State for Finance, will write to you, and empower you to act in England in certain matters of great importance to our country. It is unnecessary for me either to reiterate my colleague's instructions or to beg you to act at once and to do your best. Further injunctions on my part would be entirely superfluous.

From the copy of a letter, herein enclosed, you will see that a certain Signor Oliveira who was recommended to us by Goodroin, and who lives in London (8 Upper Hyde Park Street), has been commissioned to purchase six steamships, two hundred cannon, and thirty thousand rifles. He will co-operate with you, who, being our real agent, are bound to act in the interest of this country. So do your best, and, above all, arrange to let us have the arms and steamships without delay.

It happened that a steamer which was offered to Garibaldi was purchased by one of Bertani's agents before the General's acceptance reached Liverpool.

Crispi to Bertani, on July 9:—

We have ordered the purchase of a large steamship, the *Queen of England*, and of two other smaller vessels, from Thomas Parker of Liverpool, 20 Fenwick Street. We want four frigates and two small steamers, all told.

Continue your negotiations for the two frigates. Only when you are sure that the bargain will be concluded, let Oliveira know, in order that he may not purchase other ships. His address is 8 Upper Hyde Park Street, London.

Bertani to Crispi, on July 16:—

The *Queen of England* was purchased by me, and for something less than 20,000 pounds sterling, through the firm of Rocca Brothers, of Genoa and London. The vessel is now being equipped with rifle-cannon, and will be handed over to you very soon. I bought one other ship only, which makes fifteen knots an hour, or more, and I do not intend to purchase any more vessels. I will continue negotiations for the two frigates, but who is going to pay for them? Thomas Parker insists upon being paid cash down in Liverpool, before the ships leave the harbour. At least half the sum will have to be paid down. I forwarded the telegram to Garibaldi. As for my steamers, they are all either paid for in total, or a part of the money at least, has been advanced. I will communicate with Oliveira, and instruct my agents to do so also.

I am sending the brig *Nettuno* to Cagliari

to-day. The General must send the steam-tug to fetch her. She carries over 6000 guns, about 300 Enfield rifles, cartridges, percussion-caps and powder, all as set down in her bill of lading. By the end of the month you will receive another shipment, four times as large.

Crispi to Bertani, on July 23:—

Just a few lines in answer to yours of the 16th. . . . We are anxiously awaiting the arrival of the *Queen of England*, and the result of your negotiations for the two frigates. We need four powerful gunboats.

The brig you despatched to Cagliari with 6000 guns and 300 rifles has not reached us yet.

Another time send nitre instead of powder. We have powder-mills here, and can get it at small cost.

The General will not send the money to Liverpool for Thomas Parker. He must bring his ships here, and if we are satisfied with them, we will buy them.

You need not have anything further to do with Oliveira, as the General has relieved him of the mission with which he was entrusted.

Bertani to Crispi, on July 30:—

. . . I have suspended all negotiations with Parker, because his vessels were nothing but river-boats.

The *Queen of England* will leave Liverpool tomorrow for Cagliari, carrying sixteen cannon in her hold, to be used in arming her. The work will all be finished—part has been done in Liverpool, and the rest will be done at sea. I hope you will be satis-

fied with her. . . . The courier-boat left Liverpool this morning, and is on her way here to load. . . . If Piola had only sent the steam-tug for the *Nettuno*, you would have had the guns by this time. The *Washington* will bring you more than 4500. I am sending some to Naples, to the Abruzzi, etc., etc. . . . for I intend to start a blaze everywhere.

Crispi to Bertani, on July 31 :—

. . . The *Nettuno* has arrived. When will the *Queen of England* get here? The two frigates, for which you negotiated in England, are now ready, and in the course of a fortnight the 70,000 pounds sterling, which is their price, will be sent to London.

It is interesting to note that these two frigates were sold to Garibaldi by the English Government. This fact is established by a letter from Luigi Scalià to his brother Alfonso, in Palermo :—

LONDON, 17 July, 1860.

MY DEAR ALFONSO,—I am writing you these lines from Lella's office, he having requested Prince Pandolfina and myself to call upon him here.

Our friend Lella has had a proposal from a *person in a prominent position*, who is connected, in a way, with the Admiralty, for the sale of two steamers, built expressly for gunboats of the latest and swiftest model, and capable of making $15\frac{1}{2}$ knots an hour.

The price of each is thirty thousand pounds, without armament, which consists of six cannon, and would cost five thousand pounds apiece more.

The person who proposes this sale desires that the offer be made to government by a British sub-

ject, and has reason to hope that the above-named price may be reduced to seventy thousand pounds sterling for both.

Signor Lella is prepared to get this offer presented if he can be put in possession of a letter of credit on the firm of Florio. . . . It being important that this matter should be known to as few persons as possible, we have decided, with the Prince's approval, to despatch this letter to you, with the request that you communicate its contents to Colonel Orsini, who may then submit it to the Dictator, if he thinks best. . . .—Your brother,

LUIGI.

One of the steamers is of 627 tons and 160 horse-power, the other is 694 tons and 200 horse-power. Both are of wood.

The first was built three years ago, and the other will be finished in a fortnight.

On July 7 the British man-of-war *Hannibal*, which had witnessed all the phases of the struggle and saluted the triumph of the revolution, left the harbour of Palermo. On this occasion Garibaldi sent a cordial letter of farewell and thanks to Admiral Mundy, who replied as follows :—

Her Majesty's Ship *Hannibal*,
at sea, off Palermo.

7 July, 1860.

SIR,—Your letter of this date reached me as I was leaving Palermo.

I thank you most heartily for the sentiments therein expressed. I feel that they are sincere.

It is indeed true that I placed my ships as near the shore as possible, with the intention of providing a refuge for those who would not otherwise be able to escape the terrors of bombardment, and I am

glad to know that, to a certain extent, I was able to mitigate the sufferings of the inhabitants.

I shall always remember with pleasure that the flag of my ship waved above the neutral ground where the conference was held, which prevented further bloodshed and brought about an armistice that led at last to the complete cessation of hostilities.

I thank you most sincerely for your good wishes, both for the welfare of the *Hannibal* and for myself.—I have the honour to be, Sir,—Your most obedient and humble servant,

RODNEY MUNDY.

Rear Admiral.

In early July Crispi founded his fourth newspaper, *Il Precursore*, of which *L'Oreto*, *L'Apostolato*, and *La Staffetta* had been the predecessors. In a letter of the ninth to Luigi Orlando he wrote:—

I have started a newspaper called *Il Precursore*. A trial number has already been issued, and on the 16th the journal will begin to appear regularly.

This journal which waged war upon autonomists and conservatives alike, immediately began to receive correspondence from men of standing, such as Farini and Angelo Brofferio, and it survived the vicissitudes of that year.

Ever since the moment when the proclamation of the armistice had made communications with the Bourbon troops possible, men had been deserting from their ranks. Desertion was encouraged by every means possible, and the rough copy of a letter in Crispi's handwriting, dated June 22, and beginning, 'Dear Raffaele,' contains the following passages:—

I learn with satisfaction that the sentiment of liberty and independence has begun to penetrate among the Neapolitan troops, and that many are anxious to desert the Bourbon flag and enlist beneath

that of our common country, on condition that officers and non-commissioned officers retain their original rank. This the Dictator has already promised in one of his proclamations, but I herewith formally authorise you to guarantee to all the certain preservation of their positions, and I may even add that I believe the General will grant promotion to the most zealous, when they have joined our ranks. Let them but become soldiers of Italy and they may rest assured their interests will be furthered.

Besides the full faculty with which I herewith invest you, that this garrison may be brought to desert, I will send you by the next post a special authorisation from the Dictator, Garibaldi himself, in order that the important undertaking may be more thoroughly successful.

Good-bye, my dear friend. Let us all work together in the cause of the revolution, and the revolution will be crowned with victory.

On July 11 Crispi wrote to Brigadier-General Medici :—

There was great rejoicing here yesterday. At nine in the morning the Neapolitan gunboat *Veloce* came into port, and her commandant, Signor Anguisola, animated by the true spirit of nationalism, and acting with the unanimous consent of the officers under his command, presented this magnificent gift to us. The *Veloce*, equipped with a crew and marines of our own, has been sent on a mission in the waters of Messina. Let this knowledge guide you in all matters in which this mission may effect the defence of the Province. . . .

Under the name of the *Indipendenza*, the *Veloce* had belonged to the Sicilian government in 1849, and upon the downfall of the revolution had been seized in April of that year, in the

harbour of Marseilles, by order of the Neapolitan government. Her passage to the national cause now produced an enormous moral effect, and was the final signal for the disintegration of the Bourbon defences. Garibaldi accepted the *gift* with rejoicing, and went on board the vessel to harangue the crew. Rechristened some days later with the name of *Tukery*, the Polish hero who had succumbed to wounds received on May 27, this first unit of the revolutionary navy proved a precious possession indeed, for the mission to which Crispi had alluded in his letter to Medici was admirably accomplished, and the *Veloce* returned to Palermo with two other steamers from the Bourbon navy, the *Elba* and the *Duca di Calabria*.

During the last days of June and the first week in July, a rumour had spread that the King of Sardinia had promised to bestow further compensation upon Napoleon III. when, Garibaldi having successfully accomplished his undertaking, the southern provinces should be united to the north. The rumour, which was in harmony with the Emperor's usual system, was generally credited, and caused much excitement, but it was speedily and formally contradicted. As a mere curiosity, we give the pretended convention in the form in which it reached the Sicilian government:—

The Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia have concluded the following arrangements, which remain a secret between the two High Contracting Parties.

1. The Emperor of the French consents that the King of Sardinia, continuing his efforts for national unification, shall annex that *part of the peninsula now known as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies*, and this by any means, direct or indirect, which may appear to him expedient. The Emperor of the French will continue to exert all his diplomatic influence, and will, if necessary, even take up arms in order to enforce the respect of the principle of the *non-intervention of foreigners* in Italian affairs. For this purpose the offensive and defensive alliance

already established between the two Crowns is once more confirmed.

II. The King of Sardinia will in every way respect the Papal States as they now stand. He will abstain from all direct or indirect action, not only of annexation, but even of simple agitation, as the Emperor of the French will neither permit nor tolerate any form of *deceit* (*finzione*). If, however, a real insurrection should break out as the spontaneous expression of the will of the inhabitants of the Papal provinces, that is to say, without the co-operation of patriots from the Italian provinces, in this case, and in this case only, will the Emperor of the French consent to the annexation of the Marches and of Umbria, as a connecting link between the provinces of the south and King Victor Emmanuel's present States. But in this case also, the cabinet of Turin will co-operate with that of the Tuileries in establishing order in the provinces that have been disturbed, resorting to arms, if this be necessary. The two crowns, moreover, formally and expressly bind themselves to recognise, preserve, and guarantee for all time, the maintenance of the temporal power of the Pope in Rome and throughout the region now forming the Patrimony of St. Peter.

III. In exchange and compensation for the above-mentioned consent, defence, co-operation, and eventual support by force of arms which the Emperor of the French concedes to the King of Sardinia, that Monarch, when he shall have effected the annexation of the Two Sicilies, of the Marches and of Umbria, or even after the annexation of the Two Sicilies alone, shall surrender to France the Islands of Sardinia and Elba, as well as the whole

of Liguria, including Genoa and Spezia, the frontier of France being thus brought forward as far as the real Maritime Alps. Such surrender shall be made unconditionally and without appeal to the suffrage of the inhabitants.

iv. Should the King of Sardinia see fit, at a later date, to redeem Venetia, engaging in war with Austria for this purpose, the Emperor of the French will offer no opposition to this fresh annexation and acquisition. But should it be necessary to take up arms, the King of Sardinia will engage in war at his own risk and on his own responsibility, and will not demand that France follow or support him in this undertaking, etc., etc. . . .

(Verbal and confidential communication received in Paris on June 15, 1860).¹

It had become necessary for Garibaldi to take the field, for a decisive battle was imminent. On the seventeenth Medici telegraphed from Barcellona: 'The enemy has sought to turn our flank on the extreme right. Four companies were sent forward against us. The enemy, who numbered 2000 men, with artillery and cavalry, were repulsed. They withdrew to Milazzo. Our losses: seven killed and several wounded. The enemy's losses were much heavier. Several horses left with us.'

As it was necessary for the Dictator to leave Palermo without delay he entrusted his 'full dictatorial powers' to General Sirtori. But Sirtori was not a man of government, and Crispi was requested to remain at his side. 'My dear Sirtori,' Garibaldi wrote to him, 'I recommend Crispi to you—I have asked him to remain near you, at your orders, and I think you will find him immensely useful. He will be considered as occupying the position of Secretary of State'—A graceful little letter in which the susceptibilities of both of his friends were handled with tact.

On July 17 the *Official Journal* published the decree of

¹ There exists an important letter on this subject in Crispi's handwriting, but it was probably composed by Mazzini, and addressed to some person unknown. We give it at the end of this chapter.

appointment. 'Signor Francesco Crispi, who has heretofore acted as my Private Secretary, is appointed Secretary of State, with a place in the Council of State.' Practically he thus became a minister without a portfolio.

On July 18 Crispi drew up the proclamation to the Sicilians which Sirtori signed :—

The Dictator, being obliged to absent himself from this capital for some days, has entrusted the reins of government to my care. Although the mission I am summoned to fulfil is far beyond my powers, I accept it without hesitation, in the firm conviction that I shall find you ready to co-operate honestly with me, by obeying the laws and exercising that virtue of self-sacrifice, without which no liberty is possible and no state can wax strong.

The Dictator goes to place himself at the head of our army, which is operating in the province of Messina. I have firm faith that, as he has heretofore conquered in every struggle against the enemies of Italy, he will once more triumph gloriously. While regretting that I may not share with him the dangers of these impending battles, I am consoled by the thought of dedicating my energy to promoting the welfare of your country, whose victories, both of recent and of ancient date, have inspired me with a veneration for her which is truly filial. Help me in the accomplishment of my task, with the same devotion you cherish for the man I am proud to recognise as my Chief.

G. SIRTORI.*

On the nineteenth Crispi caused a decree to be issued which he himself countersigned, ordering solemn obsequies at the expense of the state, for Rosalino Pilo 'who fell in defence of Italian Unity,' and the erection of a monument in the church of San Domenico, the Sicilian Pantheon, 'in the company of those who have deserved well of their country.'

On the day following he wrote to Garibaldi :—

PALERMO, 20 July, 1860.

DEAR GENERAL,—I have received yours of yesterday. I will arrange with General Sirtori about chartering the *City of Aberdeen*. I must point out, however, that the agent wishes us to bind ourselves for one month at least, and by this arrangement we should incur such heavy expense that it would be wiser to purchase the vessel outright. Reckoning her hire on an average of five francs per day for each person, we should spend at least 50,000 francs for the one month. . . .

Yesterday the city celebrated your anniversary with true enthusiasm. The houses were decorated with fine hangings, and in the evening, were ablaze with lights. Your portrait and the King's were everywhere. . . .

NOTE

Here is the letter (alluded to on page 334), which is entirely in Crispi's hand, but which was probably composed by Mazzini, on the subject of a pretended arrangement to surrender Sardinia to France :—

BROTHER,—I cannot send you the notes you ask for. They are contained in one of those gigantic volumes they call *Blue Books*. But here you have the most important extracts.

In a despatch of May 21, which Lord John Russell addressed to Sir James Hudson in Turin, he said : ‘ I shall not hide from Count Cavour that a rumour is circulating to the effect that in case of further territorial acquisitions on the part of Piedmont, France would demand, and the Sardinian

government would consent to, the cession of Genoa, or of the Island of Sardinia, or even perhaps of both, to France. The cession of Genoa would totally destroy the independence of Italy. The cession of the Island of Sardinia would seriously disturb the balance of power in the Mediterranean. . . . A further addition to French territory could not be contemplated with indifference by the rest of Europe.' And he requested Cavour to bind himself not to cede further territory.

This request was formally presented by means of a despatch, on the 26th of the same month.

A despatch from Cavour of the 30th, declared 'qu'il se réfère aux déclarations qu'il vient de faire à la Chambre des Députés à la séance du 26 mai. Dans ce discours j'ai déclaré sans aucune hésitation que le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait, même pour délivrer Venise de la domination étrangère, consentir à céder un pouce de terre italienne. *Je pense que ces déclarations rendront superflu aux yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique tout engagement diplomatique à cet égard.*'

It is curious to note that in the same despatch he binds himself 'à s'abstenir soigneusement de tout acte d'agression envers l'Autriche tant que cette puissance s'abstiendra loyalement à son tour de tout acte qui puisse violer le grand principe de la non-intervention.' And he adds: 'pour ce qui regarde le royaume des Deux Siciles, je n'hésite pas à faire, avec les mêmes réserves, la même déclaration.'

Now, from our point of view, Cavour did well to violate this promise, but he had no right to make it, and moreover, having 'failed to maintain the one, he may also fail to maintain the other.' You will note how he entrenches himself behind his speech

at the Chamber, and refuses to assume any diplomatic engagement, as the English government had requested him to do.

These declarations notwithstanding, it would appear that the English government received fresh warning—and to those who are acquainted with the slow caution of that government it will be plain that these warnings must have come from some reliable source—for in a despatch of July 10, Lord John Russell charged Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, to say to Thouvenel that, ‘a rumour is circulating concerning the cession of the Island of Sardinia to France, under certain circumstances, but that the English government must consider this rumour as devoid of all foundation.’

To this Thouvenel replied by a denial—as appears from Lord Cowley’s despatch of the 12th. It is singular that he should remark: ‘France would never risk a war in order to obtain possession of an island that has no resources, and that is in a state so barbarous that the Sardinian government has every reason to be ashamed of it.’

Nevertheless the English government continued to receive information. On July 23, Lord John Russell, in a despatch to Cowley in Paris, told him that ‘Her Majesty’s government is in receipt of information from various sources, that France has consented to the annexation of Naples and Sicily by Piedmont, on condition that Liguria and the Island of Sardinia be transferred to France. The Emperor’s government must be aware that Great Britain would look upon such an arrangement with the utmost disapproval.’

Lord John Russell once more alluded to these suspicions in a despatch of August 21, addressed to

S. Fane, the English agent at Vienna, and charged him to inform Count Rechberg that 'the English government would oppose any further annexation of Italian territory by France.'

There are no other despatches dealing with this project in the latest volume of official correspondence, which is vol. VII. The one you allude to either does not exist, or is unknown.

Now allow me to add a few words of my own.

These interpellations concerning Sardinia may be useful in forcing Cavour to make fresh declarations.

Another most useful thing would be to inveigle the all-unconscious Chamber into uttering some phrase—perhaps during the response to His Majesty's address—that should bind her, by an expression of friendship for the German nation, using the vote of the Prussian Chamber in answer to De Winke's declaration, as a pretext.

You must have heard from Naples, of the manœuvrings between Napoleon and Cavour to arrange for granting Rome to us, on condition that Italy shall co-operate actively with Napoleon in an expedition he proposes launching against the Rhine Provinces.

But the two most important matters, for promoting which you and all our other friends should work together, are : a remonstrance against the prolonging of the French occupation, and a project for national armament, as it exists in Switzerland, dividing all, between the ages of 18 and 50, into three categories, and thus procuring a contingent of over 80,000 men.

The first question is rendered even more pressing by the compact which threatens us, and to which I have alluded above. If we obtain Rome through

the intervention of the country and the pressure of public opinion throughout Europe, we shall owe nothing to L. N. Now a solemn manifestation on our part would bring about the European manifestation. The English government is disposed to support us. It was with this end in view that I caused those addresses to be circulated in Rome, which, had you and the others but realised their importance, would have collected half a million signatures. They will be presented, nevertheless, and you must make the most of them.

The usefulness of this project for national armament is obvious, as a means both of combating and of supporting negotiations. It moreover corresponds with a wish expressed by His Majesty himself.

Both of these measures would meet with Italy's entire approval, and would place Cavour before the alternative of either yielding, or forfeiting his popularity. They would form the most favourable ground I can think of for a parliamentary battle.

Arrange everything with Brofferio and Mauro Macchi. I am in communication with both. Should you wish to write to me, address to: James Stansfeld, Esq., M.P., Southend House, Walham Green, Fulham, S.W. London.—Yours with fraternal affection and esteem.

19 February.

CHAPTER XIII

Agostino Depretis, Pro-Dictator—Crispi consents to remain in office—
The battle of Milazzo—The annexationists count on Depretis' support
—Letters from Cordova—The Albertine Statute declared fundamental
code of Sicily—Crispi writes to Garibaldi begging to be allowed to join him—Garibaldi replies : ' Every one tells me you are
more necessary in Palermo '—The Bourbon troops leave Messina ;
the De Clary-Medici convention.

ON the evening of the twentieth Agostino Depretis reached Palermo, whither Garibaldi had urged the King to send him, believing his fidelity was to be relied upon. That same night Depretis set out with Crispi to present himself to the Dictator. They reached Milazzo on the day after the great battle whose result ensured the freedom of Sicily.

' Our people took the city of Milazzo at cost of great sacrifice,' Crispi wrote to Luigi Orlando in Genoa. ' The Fortress is surrounded by our troops, and as the garrison is short of food and water, they will be obliged to surrender. In the course of a couple of days both the garrison and the famous Bosco who commands it will be our captives. Yesterday the royal troops evacuated the Island of Lipari.'

Garibaldi was too busy to devote much time to the new arrivals. He thanked Depretis for coming, and expressed his full confidence in him. Having requested Crispi to draw up the decree appointing him Pro-Dictator he signed it at once, and then turning to Depretis, said : ' I am not leaving you to your own devices. I am giving you a precious auxiliary in Crispi.'

Crispi had no wish to return to Palermo, and had already acquainted the General with his desire to remain by his side.

‘With a man of Depretis’ experience at the head of affairs,’ he declared, ‘the government must go on smoothly. Therefore let me go on to the Continent with you, and share your risks.’

‘No, no,’ the General protested, ‘there is still much for you to do at Palermo. Depretis needs a person he can rely upon to familiarise him with men and things he is now unacquainted with.’

‘Be it so then,’ was Crispi’s answer. ‘But if I am to assume any responsibility we must come to an understanding upon the most important question of all in your presence. Depretis must engage not to bring up annexation until such a time as you shall order him to do so. Otherwise I refuse to act with him.’

Depretis had conferred both with the King and with Cavour before leaving Turin, and had undertaken to push on the annexation. He was already in possession of a royal decree, with the date left blank, that appointed him Royal Commissioner, in order that he might assume the command as soon as the annexation should be proclaimed. He was greatly embarrassed by Crispi’s outburst, but when Garibaldi added that on this point there could be no doubt, and that immediate annexation would bring about ruin, Depretis did not dare to demur.

On the evening of the twenty-first Crispi and Depretis were once more in Palermo.

La Farina must have informed his friends that Depretis was going to Sicily with favourable intentions towards themselves, for Filippo Cordova wrote to him as follows on July 16 :—

MY VERY DEAR FRIEND,—The situation has remained unchanged since you left. People have become more calm in the hope aroused by the prospect of the Dictator’s speedy departure, and Depretis’ arrival. Nevertheless there is no time to be lost, either administratively or politically speak-

ing, and I entreat you to hasten the coming of the person who is to replace Garibaldi.

Depretis' attitude afforded the annexationists immediate encouragement. On July 24 Cordova wrote to La Farina.

I write in a spirit of confident hope, almost of rejoicing. . . . I could not see him (Depretis) alone even for a moment, for Crispi was present, but I understood him perfectly.

And on August 3 :—

The day before yesterday in the evening, a meeting was held by a group of prominent men, at Butera's house. They were *unanimous* in favour of annexation, and *almost unanimous* in favour of unconditional annexation. . . . This is Depretis' idea. . . . Yesterday Depretis pressed me to accept the post of Minister of Finance with Crispi (Interior and Police) . . . but I would not, precisely on account of Crispi, who is most unpopular. But Depretis believes he is indispensable. . . .

Yesterday I wrote to incite the communes of the interior to pass resolutions in the nature of that passed by the Town Council of Palermo, which proved so obnoxious, and last night the Pro-Dictator approved the proposal to prepare for the elections some time between the first and the fifteenth of September. God grant Crispi does not succeed in putting a herd of heroes in as governors and intendants, now that such have got to be appointed according to the laws of communes and provinces ! ¹

¹ Cordova had risked nothing in going to Sicily, and it was therefore but natural that the *heroes* should be obnoxious to him. But as regards heroism, it may not be inopportune to quote the following passage from

The dictatorial decrees, one of which revoked Sirtori's appointment, while the other nominated Depretis Pro-Dictator, both bore the date of July 22, and were countersigned by Crispi. But they were certainly signed by Garibaldi on the twenty-first, for a letter written by Crispi from Palermo on that day contains the words: 'Depretis has been appointed Pro-Dictator.'

Depretis went to work at once. He was eager to acquaint himself with everything appertaining to the island and its administration, and he soon saw (so he wrote to Bertani) that the deficiencies were not the fault of the administrators, but a natural consequence of events. Crispi remained minister without a portfolio until August 3, but a decree bearing that date, and countersigned by Errante, appointed him Minister of the Interior in the place of Interdonato; and on the same day a proclamation to the Sicilians, and a decree signed by both Depretis and Crispi, were made public, in which the Statute of Carlo Alberto was declared to be the 'fundamental code of Sicily.'

Precisely at that time Cavour wrote as follows to Cordova in a letter dated August 1860, and contained in the *Epistolario*, compiled by Chiala (vol. vi. p. 576).

I am confident that Signor Depretis, freeing himself entirely from Crispi's influence, will take your advice and publish the Statute. . . .

The paragraphs composed by Crispi, and beginning 'Whereas,' that preceded this decree, whose execution was

a letter that La Farina, Cordova's devoted friend at the time, wrote to Crispi on December 18, 1849.

'Speaking of weakness—would you have believed that . . . refused to sign our protest? I am willing to forgive him however, because he was honest in declaring his true reason for refusing. But can the same be said of . . . , who not only refused, but posed as a hero and talked about the "childishness" of an act he had not the courage to support? I can say the same of Cordova. Torrearsa and Scordia said: "We have no intention of making this sacrifice." But Cordova talked of honour, of the red policy, Mazzinianism and Jesuitism, and wrote things that opened a gulf between myself and him. One may say to Torrearsa: "You are weak, and unworthy to represent the revolution." But to men who, like Cordova, seek excuses for their cowardice, and pretexts that are insults to their friends, one can only cry: "Henceforth betwixt you and me there can be naught in common!"'

postponed to some future date to be fixed by the Dictator, are worthy to be quoted.

Whereas the wish of the Sicilians, expressed during the glorious revolution of April 4, by the cry that the insurgents uttered as with one voice and that was answered as with one voice, by the entire population of the Island; whereas the wish furthermore expressed through the flag beneath which they elected to fight, through the addresses submitted by every commune, was and is annexation to the Italian and Constitutional State of that August Sovereign, Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy;

Whereas this wish is in conformity with that highest and eternal national right which urges the people of one Nation to constitute themselves one united State, and was sealed with the blood of the insurgents and of the brave men who, led by General Garibaldi, bore on to victory and decked with fresh laurels the tri-coloured banner upon which has been engrafted the Cross of Savoy;

Whereas the other provinces of Italy as well as all civilised nations have welcomed the programme of 'Italy and Victor Emmanuel' and the banner of the Sicilian Revolution, with loud applause;

Whereas, although the extraordinary powers invested in the Dictatorship, which are necessary to consolidate the new order of things and to accomplish the purpose of the Revolution, do not, at this moment, allow of the immediate application of the fundamental law of the Italian Monarchy, it is nevertheless desirable that this law be promulgated without delay, that it may serve as a basis for the elaboration of all new laws, for the

organisation of authority, and for all future jurisdiction ;

It is therefore decreed, etc. . . .

The new Pro-Dictator had come to Sicily equipped with a complete collection of the laws of Sardinia, and of these he published as many as possible. Crispi, while seconding him in this, kept the object he proposed to accomplish ever steadily in view, namely, to prepare gradually the unification of the administration.

In the beginning, and indeed for some time, he had no reason to doubt Depretis' loyalty, and he therefore felt justified in his desire to join the army once more. Here are some letters on this subject.

'Dear General,' Crispi wrote to Garibaldi on July 26, 'by Mordini I have sent you some letters which have arrived for you from foreign parts, and two packets, one of which contains some documents you should read, the other, certain decrees and a paper, which please sign and return to me. I shall await your orders concerning both. . . .

'I am anxious to come and join you. Ever since you left, life here has been a burden to me. Depretis is beginning to become familiar with the conditions of the country, has already made many acquaintances and formed some friendships, and can very well do without me. Then let me come and join you, I beg of you. . . .

'I have nothing more to add, save to embrace you will all my heart.—Your most devoted

'F. CRISPI.'

MILAZZO, 27 July, 1860.

DEAREST CRISPI,—I am returning the decrees which I have had signed, and also the credentials for the Prince of Belmonte.¹ As to his letter, the

¹ The Sicilian *chargé d'affaires* in London.

Dictator says he was already aware of the opinions of Cavour, Farini, Hudson & Co. As regards the other questions contained in the same letter, he wishes the Pro-Dictator to arrange as he thinks best. Meanwhile the General has authorised Carlo Arrivabene, correspondent of the *Daily News*, to follow the General Staff.¹ Do not forget to name Agostino Bertani as the correspondent to whom Belmonte and Scalìa can send their communications, and you also, if you wish to do so.

Medici is within two miles of Messina. The General left for Gesso at nine this morning. Cosenz will start to-night or to-morrow morning, Sirtori and Malenchini will remain here. We have been summoned to judge the captain and crew of the *Veloce*, who, by this time, have been consigned on board ship.

I have not even seen Civinini.

Keep well, and believe me to be, your affectionate friend,

ANTONIO MORDINI.

Garibaldi is willing that the proposal concerning the heliographic telegraph should be accepted, but he will leave it to you to decide.

PALERMO, 28 July, 1860.

DEAR GENERAL,—I am sending you the letters that have come to Palermo for you. If there are any on State affairs, which I can answer, kindly return them to me, and give me your orders.

We have begun the examination of the act of concession for the Sicilian railways. It includes a loan which would bring a profit of 7% to Messrs. Adami & Co., and without the slightest risk on

¹ Arrivabene, who had recently arrived in Sicily, had been recommended to Garibaldi by Crispi.

their part. This would be an obstacle in the way of the National Loan we shall raise presently, and which we cannot do without, and it would in no wise guarantee the building of the railways.

Once more I beg you to summon me to your side. *I want to go on to the Continent with you.* This monotonous existence here, amidst dirty papers, does not suit me at all. The life of the camp is far better. You yourself have spoiled me in this. Moreover, my mission is not yet accomplished. I must go as far as Rome with you, unless a ball finds me out before we get there.—
Your most devoted F. CRISPI.

PALERMO, 30 July, 1860.

DEAR GENERAL,—Again I send you letters, newspapers and other printed matter that has come over from the Continent for you. I also send a despatch from our Agent in Turin, and the cipher for our correspondence. I await your orders on all these matters.

The Municipal Council of Trapani has conferred the freedom of the town upon you. They have sent in a most flattering address. I shall expect instructions from you, that this act of courtesy may be properly acknowledged.

I am forwarding you the original decrees that are missing in the collection of government acts bearing your signature. Some were lost when my box was stolen, others I know not how. They are not to be found at the office of the Secretary General. Kindly sign them and return them to me. . . .

The English government is willing to sell us two frigates, but wishes to be paid immediately.

Give us your orders on this point, for we are ready to make any financial sacrifice.

Dear General, you will soon be crossing the Strait to complete the work of national redemption on the Continent. Call me back to you—it would be a great grief to me to be debarred from following you amidst the dangers of this new campaign. Meanwhile send me news from the front. The country is feverishly anxious for news, and our adversaries keep the people in a state of excitement by spreading all sorts of false reports. Yours heartily,

F. CRISPI.

P.S.—I have received your despatch concerning the purchase of the frigates. We will do all that is necessary.

MESSINA, *August 1, 1860.*

DEAR CRISPI,—I enclose the decrees, signed.

Send a few words of thanks to the city of Trapani.

As to frigates and steamships, purchase as many as you can.

I should be only too happy to have you with me, but every one tells me you are more necessary at Palermo.

An affectionate good-bye to you.—Yours

G. GARIBALDI.

The whole of Italy was in a state of rejoicing over the victory of Milazzo.

‘By this time,’ Luigi Orlando wrote to Crispi, ‘I trust Bosco and his men are in your hands. Garibaldi’s achievements seem almost incredible, and their moral effect is immense. The fall of the Bourbons is inevitable, for their ranks

are becoming demoralised, while enthusiasm is ever on the increase among our own people. The young men are all wild to follow the hero, and volunteers are coming in fast.'

Brusco wrote :—

We have this day heard the news of the taking of Milazzo, and also of the heavy losses, that were unavoidable. All are eager to learn the particulars, and my family and I are especially anxious on account of one who is dear to us, and who was among the combatants. This is a certain Lazzaro Gagliardo, one of Colonel Simonetta's orderly-officers, and my wife's brother. If you could manage to send me news of him you would be conferring a great favour upon me, for which I should be eternally grateful.

Here is Alexandre Dumas' description of the battle of Milazzo, addressed to his friend Giacinto Carini in Palermo, who was still suffering from a wound received on May 30.

MILAZZO, 21 July, 1860.

MY DEAR CARINI,—A great fight, and a great victory! Seven thousand Neapolitans have fled before two thousand five hundred Italians! I reflected that this news would be as balm to your wound, and so I am writing it to you, beneath the cannon of the Fortress, which is firing (let us honestly confess, ineffectually enough) upon the *Città di Edimburgo* and upon your most humble servant, the *Emma*. While Bosco burns his powder, we shall have plenty of time to converse, so let us do so.

I was at Catania when vague rumours reached me that a Neapolitan column had left Messina, and was going to have a brush with Medici. I immedi-

ately despatched a messenger to the French consul at Messina, who confirmed the rumour. We raised anchor at once, hoping to reach Milazzo in time to witness the fight, and in fact, when we entered the east bay, two days later, the engagement had just begun.

This is what happened, and you may trust my report implicitly, because I was an eye-witness to the action.

General Garibaldi, who had left Palermo on the 18th, reached the camp at Merì on the 19th, and found that skirmishing had been going on for two days past. On his arrival he immediately passed Medici's troops in review, and was greeted by them with the greatest enthusiasm. At dawn on the following morning all the troops moved forward to attack the Neapolitans, who had ventured forth from the town of Milazzo, which they had been occupying.

Malenchini commanded the extreme left, Medici and Cosenz the centre, while the mission of the right wing, composed of a few companies only, was simply to protect the rest of the contingent against surprises. General Garibaldi took up his position in the centre—that is to say at the point where he judged the fighting would be hottest.

Firing began on the left, about half way between Merì and Milazzo. The Neapolitan outposts were found concealed among the canes. After about half an hour of musket-firing on the left, the centre, in its turn, found itself face to face with the Neapolitan infantry, which it attacked and dislodged from its first position. Meanwhile the right wing had been driving the Neapolitans out of the houses they had occupied.

The difficulties presented by the nature of the field, however, were preventing the arrival of reinforcements, and Bosco sent forward a body of 6000 men against the five or six hundred assailants who had previously forced him to fall back. The General sent for reinforcements, and as soon as they came up, a fresh attack was made on the enemy, who were in hiding among the canes or had taken refuge behind groups of prickly-pears (*Fico d'India*). This placed the Italians at a disadvantage as they could not charge with the bayonet.

Medici, advancing at the head of his men, had his horse killed under him. Cosenz was hit in the neck by a spent ball and sank upon the ground. We all thought he had received a mortal wound, but he sprang up again directly, shouting, '*Viva l'Italia!*' Fortunately his wound was but slight.

General Garibaldi now placed himself at the head of the Genoese Carabineers, with some scouts and Missori. His plan was to face the Neapolitans and attack them on the flank, thus cutting off the retreat of many. But unfortunately, he ran into a battery, whose cannon checked this manœuvre.

Missori and Captain Statella now pushed forward with some fifty men, and General Garibaldi placed himself at their head and directed the charge. They were not twenty paces off when the cannon fired a volley of grape-shot. The result was awful! Only five or six men remained standing. The General himself had the sole of his boot and his stirrup carried off, and his horse, which was wounded, becoming unmanageable, he was obliged to turn it loose, forgetting to remove his revolver from the saddle. Major Breda and his bugler were both shot in the side. Missori went down with his horse, that

had received a mortal wound from a splinter. Statella remained standing amidst a perfect hail-storm of grape-shot, while all the others were either killed or wounded.

All details were now lost in the general struggle, in which every man was fighting bravely.

Seeing the impossibility of taking the cannon that had wrought all this havoc from the front, the General commanded Colonel Dunne to choose a few companies, and with them, to beat the cane thickets. He furthermore instructed Missori and Statella to climb over the wall they would find in front of them when they had passed through the canes, and fling themselves upon the cannon, which could not be far distant.

This manœuvre was executed by two officers and some fifty men, who followed them closely and eagerly. On reaching the road the first person they saw was General Garibaldi, on foot and sword in hand. At that very moment the cannon opened fire, killing several men, while others flung themselves upon the piece and captured it, bearing it away to the Italian side. Hereupon the line of Neapolitan infantry opened to give passage to a cavalry charge that had been ordered forward to recapture the cannon. Colonel Dunne's men, who are unaccustomed to being under fire, instead of meeting the charge with the bayonet, scattered to either side of the road, where they were stopped on the left, by a hedge of cactus, and on the right by a wall. The cavalry passed like a whirlwind. But immediately the hesitation of a moment had vanished and the Sicilians began to fire from either side.

With shots coming from right and left, the Neapolitan officer paused, wishing to turn back, but

his path was blocked by General Garibaldi who, with Missori, Statella and five or six men, stood firmly planted in the middle of the road. The General clutched the Neapolitan officer's bridle, shouting: 'Surrender!' The officer's answer came in the form of a sword-thrust which Garibaldi parried, severing the Neapolitan's throat with a back-handed thrust. The officer swayed in his saddle and sank to the ground, while three or four sabres were raised against the General, who wounded one of his assailants with the point of his sword. Missori, with three shots from his revolver, killed two Neapolitans and the horse of a third. Statella, meanwhile, was also laying about him, and presently another assailant fell. A soldier sprang from his saddle and flew at Missori's throat, who blew the fellow's brains out at close range, with a fourth shot from his revolver.

While this heroic struggle was going on General Garibaldi rallied the scattered troops and led them on to attack, killing or capturing every one of the fifty cavalymen. Then, supported by the centre, he charged the Neapolitans, Bavarians and Swiss at the point of the bayonet. The Neapolitans fled at once. For an instant the Bavarians and Swiss stood their ground, then they, too, turned and fled.

The fortune of the day was decided, and victory, although not yet wholly achieved, would rest with Italy's Hero in the end.

The entire Neapolitan army beat a hasty retreat upon Milazzo, pursued by the Sicilians as far as the first houses, where the cannon of the Fortress began to take part in the fight.

You are acquainted with the position of Milazzo. The town sits astride of a peninsula, and the fighting

that had begun in the east bay had been gradually carried into the west bay, where the frigate *Tùkeri*, formerly known as the *Veloce*, rode at anchor. Garibaldi, remembering that he had begun his career as a sailor, hastened aboard the *Tùkeri*, and climbed up into the mast, where he clung, watching the fighting.

A squad of Neapolitan cavalry and infantry was just issuing from the fortress to reinforce the royal troops. Garibaldi ordered fire to be opened upon them by one of the ordnance-pieces, and a hail-storm of grape-shot was poured out upon them from short range. The Neapolitans did not wait for a second discharge, but turned and fled. Hereupon a struggle began between the fortress and the frigate. Having succeeded in drawing the fire in his direction, Garibaldi sprang into a small boat with some twenty men, and made for Milazzo once more, where he flung himself into the midst of the battle.

The firing lasted an hour longer, and then the Neapolitans, driven out of one house after another, took refuge in the fortress.

I had witnessed the whole struggle from the deck of my vessel, and I was all impatience to embrace the conqueror. After dark I had myself rowed ashore, and we entered Milazzo as the last shots were being fired.

It is impossible to convey an idea of the disorder and terror that reigned in the city, which is said to be somewhat wanting in patriotism. The dead and wounded were still lying in the streets, and the French consul's house was full of the dying. General Cosenz was among the wounded.

No one could tell me where Medici and Garibaldi were. I recognised Major Cenni in the centre of a

group of officers, and he volunteered to conduct me to the General.

We went along the shore-road, and found Garibaldi beneath the porch of a church, surrounded by his Staff. Stretched upon the ground, with his head resting upon a saddle, he was sleeping the sleep of utter exhaustion. His supper stood ready beside him—a piece of bread and a jug of water.

My dear Carini, I assure you I was set back 2500 years, and I was in the presence of Cincinnatus.

May God preserve him to you, my brave Sicilians, for should fate snatch him from you, not another such as he would you find in the whole world!

I have much more to tell you, but will do so by word of mouth.

The General has opened his eyes, has recognised me, and is gazing at me with astonishment!

Good-bye until to-morrow.—Yours heartily,

ALEXANDRE DUMAS.*

On August 1 Crispi sent the following information to La Varenne to be communicated to the press.

I am forwarding you herewith accurate information concerning the capitulation of Milazzo.

After twelve hours of most strenuous fighting, our brave volunteers, who have worked miracles of daring with the courage of veterans, entered the city of Milazzo, with bayonets fixed in the bore of their rifles. Garibaldi, who was deeply moved by his great victory, was justified in refusing to grant the Neapolitan soldiers anything save life alone. But some of their officers, obtaining an interview with him, explained to him that their men had been forced to fight the Italians by orders from superiors in the pay of the foreigner, but that they were our

brothers nevertheless, and Italians like ourselves, and that their honour as soldiers should be respected. These arguments touched a chord that never refuses to vibrate in Garibaldi's generous heart, and the following conditions for the surrender of the Fortress of Milazzo were established.

The artillery with its equipments that was in the Fortress of Milazzo has been consigned to Garibaldi; the mules and horses of the Neapolitan army have been divided, half to be consigned to Garibaldi, the other half to be shipped to Naples. The Neapolitans left the Fortress with the honours of war, and have embarked for Naples with arms and baggage, with the exception of that dastardly Lieutenant-Colonel Bosco, who left the Fortress unarmed, and whose two horses have been given to Brigadier-General Medici and to General Cosenz.

Later on, Garibaldi was welcomed as a saviour by the city of Messina, and the enthusiasm of the citizens is most intense. The General has reinstated the Municipal Body and the Police Force in that city, and has organised the civil administration without neglecting the cares of war. In everything and in all ways he is supported by the people.

A telegram just received informs us that the Lighthouse Tower, situated on the shore at the extremity of the Citadel, and Fort Gonzaga, that dominates the hills around the city, are now held by our men. Fort Salvatore is ours also. Garibaldi has captured a battery of 14 cannon. Only the Citadel proper now remains to be conquered, and that will soon be evacuated after capitulation.

In confirmation of the preceding statements here are some 'war bulletins' that reached Palermo during this period, and the text of the capitulation of Messina to which they allude.

General Sirtori to the Pro-Dictator.

Messina is cleared, save for the Citadel. The Dictator, General Garibaldi, started this morning in that direction. We shall follow.

MILAZZO, 27 July, 1860.

General Garibaldi to the Pro-Dictator in Palermo.

Battery of 14 cannon and Lighthouse Tower ours. Two Forts, Gonzaga and Salvatore in our possession.

MESSINA, 31, 9 A.M.

The Dictator to the Pro-Dictator.

Have arranged with General Clary for evacuation of Siracusa and Augusta. Do what is necessary.

MESSINA, 1 August, noon.

This 28th day of July of the year 1860, in Messina :

Tommaso de Clary, Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Messina, and *Cavaliere* Major-General Giacomo Medici, animated by a sentiment of humanity, and with the intention of avoiding the bloodshed that must result from the occupation of the city by force on one hand, and her defence and that of the forts on the other, have, in virtue of the powers invested in them and set forth in their credentials, drawn up and signed the following convention :—

ARTICLE I.—The royal troops will be allowed to withdraw from Messina without being molested, and the Sicilians will occupy the city also without being molested by them.

ARTICLE II.—The royal troops will evacuate the fortresses of Gonzaga and Castellaccio within two

days of the signing of the present convention. Two officers and a commissary shall be appointed by each of the contracting parties to make an inventory of the different cannon, the war requisites, the victuals and whatever else may remain in the forts at the moment of evacuation. The Sicilian government undertakes to have all the articles set down in the inventory transported to the neutral ground indicated below as swiftly, and as soon as possible after the evacuation.

ARTICLE III.—The royal troops shall be allowed to embark without suffering molestation from the Sicilians.

ARTICLE IV.—The royal troops shall retain possession of the Citadel with its forts, *Don Blasco*, *Lanterna* and *San Salvatore*, but only on condition that under no circumstances shall they injure the city in the future, save in the event of an attack, and if offensive operations are conducted in the city itself. These conditions established and abided by, the Citadel will remain inoffensive as regards the city, until the end of hostilities.

ARTICLE V.—A strip of ground parallel with and in close proximity to the military zone is declared neutral territory, and shall extend 20 metres beyond the present military zone, which follows the walls of the Citadel.

ARTICLE VI.—The maritime commerce of both parties shall remain perfectly free. The flags of both parties will therefore be respected.

It is left to the kindness of the respective commanders, who are the authors of the present convention, to arrange for the comfort and well-being of the soldiers as long as the royal troops shall remain in Messina.

Agreed, read and signed on the day and in the month and year above set down, at the house of Signor F. Fiorentino, Banker at the Quattro Fontane.

TOMMASO DE CLARY, *Field-Marshal*.

CAVALIERE GIACOMO MEDICI, *Major-General*.*

CHAPTER XIV

The expedition into the Papal States once more—Garibaldi orders Bertani to bring volunteers, collected for that expedition, over to Sicily—Letters from Mazzini—Napoleon proposes to England to prevent Garibaldi's passage to the Continent by force—To save himself Francesco II. consents to grant a constitution and to seek an alliance with the King of Sardinia—Victor Emmanuel is asked to request Garibaldi not to cross the Strait—Conditions proposed by Cavour accepted by Bourbon government—Letter from Victor Emmanuel to Garibaldi, and the General's refusal—Had Sicily already been annexed to Piedmont, Garibaldi would have been obliged to obey.

IN Genoa, Bertani and Mazzini had continued preparations for the expedition against the Papal States. The chiefs who had been appointed one after the other—Medici, Cosenz, and Sacchi—had failed them, and the organisers had now centred their hopes in Colonel Charras, a Frenchman, who did nothing beyond drawing up a plan of invasion. At last, an army of 6000 men having been raised, that was to disembark at some point on the Mediterranean coast of the Papal States, and thus deliver them without attacking Rome or Civitavecchia, which city was occupied by the French, Colonel Pianciani was summoned to lead the expedition.

On July 29 Luigi Orlando wrote a long letter to Crispi informing him of what his brother Paolo had accomplished in Liverpool in getting the big steamship *Queen of England* transformed into a frigate, and added :—

Within a week action on the Continent will have begun. Charras has been placed over against Lamoricière, and I think he will prove a valuable acquisition. We are working desperately hard here

to make the expedition a success. The battery of four rifle-cannon that I was prepared to send to Sicily will now be used in this undertaking, which will be the last blow to the Bourbons. Nicotera and all other friends who are still here are going. I trust we shall make Italy before diplomacy puts a spoke in our wheel.

On July 18 Mazzini had once more complained to Crispi of Garibaldi's hesitation.

We have been ready once or twice before, but each time imperious orders from Garibaldi have deprived us alike of requisitions and leaders — Cosenz, Sacchi, etc.—and his half-prohibition has now unsettled Bertani. It is not right.

It is clear that Garibaldi considers the problem from the military standpoint alone. Now any delay may prove fatal. L. N. and Cavour are doing their best to arrange an alliance between Piedmont and Naples. Woe to us should they succeed!

I cannot understand Garibaldi. When a foe has become demoralised then is the time to follow up one's advantage. Three thousand volunteers and the name of Garibaldi, descending not upon a remote corner of Calabria, but upon the Salerno-Naples road, would take the kingdom in one week. And we, on our part, would be able to facilitate his advance by entering from this side, and making a stir in the Abruzzi. For the love of God, send us word, if you will, to 'go to the Devil,' but only let us act! You can then profit by our initiative and make your descent.

I do not know what your influence with Garibaldi may be at present, but at any rate, I am saying all

this to you that you may work with this end in view.

Be this as it may, why do you not send us what it would probably be unwise for you yourselves to print, on the *life and miracles* of La Farina? This war we are waging upon him will benefit Sicily also.

Do send me a few lines about the condition of things with you. Which party is going to dominate? Will you have immediate annexation or not? What party do Amari, Errante and Interdonato belong to?

Here is Crispi's answer.

PALERMO, 31 July, 1860.

I am of your opinion that the Island will be saved at Naples, and in order to bring Garibaldi to this way of thinking, I have endured certain things from him, which I could not have borne at another time.

Depretis is on the best of terms with the Piedmontese government. As to annexation, it will be established by vote as soon as this can be done without interfering with our operations on the Continent. Errante, Interdonato and Amari, who were nominated at my suggestion, are of the same opinion, or at least, pretend to be.

La Farina certainly did us much harm, and continues to do so through his emissaries. Perfect concord reigned before his arrival here, and the country could be led by a silken thread. He stirred up the separationists who had given way before the name of Garibaldi and before our victories, but who now demand the convocation of the assembly and conditional annexation. But we shall overpower

them in the end. Sicily shall be annexed unconditionally, and Italy shall *be*!

As to the rest, everything is going on well. A few days more and we shall be hastening towards Naples.

The expedition was despatched by instalments to the Golfo degli Aranci, where it was to be reorganised. Bertani hastened to Sicily, hoping to induce Garibaldi to lead the intended invasion. He came up with the General at Torre del Faro on August 12, and believed he had succeeded in persuading him, for the Dictator decided to set out for the Golfo degli Aranci that very night on board the *Washington*. But on arriving there he found but 4000 men, as 2000, under Colonel Eberhard, had started for Palermo in obedience to an order received from the commandant of the Sardinian battleship *Gulnara*. Pianciani had not yet arrived. Impatient at the delay, Garibaldi ordered the expedition to start for Sicily. He himself paid a flying visit to Caprera, as if in need of an hour of solitude and, like Antæus, of the touch of mother earth to restore his strength. He returned to Messina, however, immediately.

What was Garibaldi's true opinion of this expedition into the Papal States, which appeared so important to Bertani and Mazzini as to induce them to devote their every effort to its preparation?

He had certainly encouraged it in the beginning, but he forgot it later on amidst the absorbing preoccupations of war, and in the end it became a source of uneasiness to him, when he found himself caught between the persistent pressure brought to bear by Bertani and Mazzini's friends, and the urgent exhortations from Turin not to encourage an action that would furnish diplomacy with an excuse for interfering even against himself. Moreover, the thought that the forces at his disposal in Sicily were still insufficient to overcome the difficulties yet to be encountered must have weighed in the balance. This much, at least, is certain, that before Bertani reached Sicily, Garibaldi had telegraphed to the Pro-Dictator on August 6, at 7.50 P.M., in the following terms:—'Write to Bertani to come to Messina at once with all the men and

arms he has ready.’¹ However, Garibaldi could not bring himself to declare his disapproval, nor had he any right to do so, for the freeing of the Papal States was part of his programme of action. He encouraged the launching of insurrection and its energetic support in those states, but how was this to be done if the means no longer existed?

The situation that resulted from this state of things is explained in a letter from Mazzini to Crispi (August 15).

BROTHER,—When you were acting as Minister of the Interior for the first time, I asked you for a sum of money to be used for the good of Sicily and of Italy.

On relinquishing your post you told me that, had you not been obliged to do so, you would have complied with my request, and that should you return to power, you would do so, should it still be necessary.

Now, as others will not help me, I repeat my request, but I ask for a smaller sum than at first.

Our proposed action in the Roman provinces now enjoys Garibaldi’s entire approval.

It is unnecessary for me to point out the advantages to be derived from it, which are many, but the greatest of all is the continuation of our movement, which will enable thousands of young men who desire to act, but find themselves checked by the sea, and the lack of ships, speedily to form an army 30,000 strong, in the very heart of Italy, and, rushing southwards across the land boundaries, quickly to decide the question.

The question, moreover, is no longer open to

¹ The following words, contained in a letter from Bertani to Crispi of July 24, are also noteworthy :—‘ I do not see what good I could do by going to Sicily. Here I am able to offer a certain amount of opposition to the wave of Cavourism, but over there I might be perfectly useless. I believe I know how I could help Garibaldi in Naples, however.’

discussion. By obligations assumed and by the dangers which others have incurred we are bound to act and to act at once, and it remains to be seen whether our action will be *well carried out*, or *not*. My career, Nicotera's and the careers of the many truly righteous men among us should be a guarantee that it *will* be *well* carried out.

Owing to certain incidents which I refrain from criticising, we now find ourselves abandoned by the Bertani agency, and in very straitened circumstances. We are penniless, and as we must of necessity weigh heavily upon the poor communes of the mountains, from the very first, our chances of success are reduced by half.

We must therefore find help, and find it at once.

A sum of 50,000, of 40,000, or even of 30,000 francs must be placed at the disposal of the bearer.

As an Italian with your whole heart, as a co-religionist of our own, as my friend and Nicotera's, I should feel I was doing you an injury by insisting on this point. You shall have as many documents as you wish, to prove that you gave to the country. If necessary we will return the money to Sicily as soon as we are in a position to do so.

I count upon your help, and in the name of the country, I thank you in anticipation.

The bearer of this is a man you will be glad to know, and who is deserving of your full confidence. Love me.—Your friend, GIUSEPPE MAZZINI.

Be firm as regards deferring annexation until this land of Italy has been conquered. Union depends on this.

The money could be refunded either by us or by means of a subscription which you might open for the

benefit of the Italian provinces. Italy has done much for Sicily—Sicily should do something for Italy.

*To Francesco Crispi,
Minister of the Interior,
Palermo.*

Crispi's answer could not have been what Mazzini had expected.

Garibaldi is opposed to any action in the Romagna. I should be glad to support any undertaking of yours, but I must beg you not to place me on a false footing with the General.

Garibaldi's victory at Milazzo, that forced the Bourbon out of Sicily and obliged him to entrench himself within the limits of his Continental possessions, once more aroused in Napoleon III. the desire to intervene that he had exhibited at the moment of the Thousand's first successes. At that time the French government had sought to induce England to participate in a movement to prevent the annexation of Sicily by Piedmont, but Lord John Russell would not hear of this.¹ The royal troops once expelled from Palermo, Francesco II., in his terror, sought the mediation of the Powers. Napoleon advised the separation of Sicily from Naples, under a Bourbon prince, the granting of a constitution, and an alliance with Sardinia. King Francesco accepted all of these conditions. On June 25 he pre-announced a constitution 'based on national and liberal principles'; the alliance with the King of Sardinia, 'in the interest of the two Crowns in Italy'; and as to Sicily, he promised to establish 'like representative institutions,' and to send over a prince of his house to act as viceroy.

The Sicilians had little faith in these tardy concessions of King *Bomba's* son, but Cavour was not averse to an alliance, and wrote as follows concerning it to Villamarina on June 27.

Nous sommes disposés à le seconder s'il adopte

¹ See the despatch of May 21 from Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, to Lord John Russell.

une politique vraiment nationale, ayant pour but d'arriver à l'indépendance absolue de la Péninsule.*

He had no liking for 'les macaroni,' as he had stated in another letter of the twenty-fifth, because he did not believe they were 'cotti' (sufficiently boiled), which meant that he did not believe Garibaldi would persevere and set Naples free. He declared, nevertheless, that he fully intended to eat the 'aranci' (*oranges*, Sicily) that were already on the table, and this explains his eagerness for speedy annexation; while Garibaldi and Crispi, who had faith in the ultimate success of the campaign, wished to postpone annexation until a more propitious moment.

The accommodating spirit displayed by the King of Naples did not fail to make a favourable impression in England. In a despatch from Monsieur Persigny, French Ambassador in London, the following words are repeated, which Lord John Russell had spoken to him on June 30.

Après tout il serait bien plus avantageux pour tout le monde que l'Italie formât deux groupes amis et unis par un intérêt commun, que de courir après une unité peut-être impossible à réaliser, et dont la conséquence la plus immédiate serait d'amener infailliblement une nouvelle guerre avec l'Autriche.*

Russell's declaration was extremely welcome to Napoleon, who ardently desired two things—to obtain England's co-operation and prevent the unity of Italy.

Cavour meanwhile, urged by France to accept and second the demands for friendship made by Francesco's government, of which the very first condition was that Victor Emmanuel should oblige Garibaldi to suspend operations, was at once troubled and undecided. His views were greatly influenced by the current of public opinion. The Bourbon's concessions, which had impressed the cabinets of Paris and London so favourably, were regarded in Italy as a mark of cowardice and a confession of impotence, and added fuel to the fire of patriotic longing for union which had now spread every-



NAPOLEON III.

where. Cavour who, on June 25, had believed the Neapolitan 'macaroni' to be insufficiently boiled, had altered his opinion a week later, on July 4. With great skill he managed to avoid arousing Napoleon's displeasure by manifesting his readiness to accept an alliance with King Francesco's government, while rendering such an alliance impossible by the conditions he imposed. On July 4 he wrote:—

We do not absolutely refuse to accept the proposals the Neapolitan government intends to make to us, but concerning Sicily and the Roman question we shall speak in language that will leave them no illusions. If Naples accepts our conditions, she is lost, for in Sicily she loses her one means of overcoming internal difficulties. The Neapolitan liberals, if they are obliged to relinquish the domination of Sicily, will certainly one and all declare for unity. If Naples does not accept, we shall wash our hands of her and leave her to her fate, concerning the nature of which there can be no doubt. After the fall of the Bourbons the choice must rest between annexation and revolution.*

Victor Emmanuel was to exert his influence over Garibaldi? He would do so then, although Garibaldi was a difficult person to control; but only on one condition would he act, that he should be allowed to use a strong means of persuasion, for otherwise a painful refusal would be the only result. The Neapolitan government must engage not only to grant the Sicilians freedom to shape their own destiny, but must refrain from further hostility against them, no matter what the result of the negotiations might be. Sicily guaranteed against future attacks would form an argument that might suffice to check the conqueror.

Baron Talleyrand, French Minister at Turin, reported this condition to Thouvenel, expressing his opinion that it was unjust. The Neapolitan government very naturally replied that it would 'never consent to a dismemberment of the kingdom

as long as Naples should still hold even the smallest fraction of Sicily.' Lord John Russell, however, gave Cavour to understand that he considered his demand modest enough.

The negotiations were prolonged by these divergencies of opinion, but when the news of the battle of Milazzo and its consequences to the Bourbon troops reached Naples, Francesco II. no longer hesitated to relinquish what was already lost. Hereupon Cavour determined to advise Victor Emmanuel to request Garibaldi to desist.

On July 22 Victor Emmanuel despatched his orderly-officer, Count Litta-Modignani,¹ to the Dictator of Sicily with a letter which every historian has quoted, and which we here transcribe for the sake of lucidity, from a copy in Crispi's hand :—

GENERAL,—You are well aware that I could not sanction your expedition into Sicily, to which I remained a stranger. But to-day the serious conditions that prevail throughout Italy oblige me to communicate with you directly.

In the event of the King of Naples' consenting to evacuate Sicily entirely, of his freely consenting to suspend all further action, of his formally undertaking to refrain from bringing any form of pressure to bear upon the Sicilians, thus allowing that people perfect freedom to express their desires and choose the government which they prefer, in this event, I repeat, I believe you would do well to refrain from all further action upon the Continent.

In case of developments of an opposite nature, I herewith declare that I should hold myself perfectly free to act, and that I should feel under no obligation to discuss your projects with you.²

¹ On this point see Note at end of chapter.

² We give another version of this letter, also in Crispi's handwriting, the accuracy of which no historian has been able to vouch for :—

‘TURIN, 22 July, 1860.

‘DEAR GENERAL,—You are well aware that when you started for Sicily you did so without my approval. To-day, in view of the present

Litta delivered this letter to Garibaldi on the twenty-sixth, and the following answer was consigned to him on the same day :—

SIRE,—Your Majesty is well aware of the profound respect and devotion which I cherish for you, but the present state of affairs in Italy forbids my obeying you as I should wish to do. Summoned by the people, I restrained them as long as it was possible to do so, but should I hesitate now to comply with their demands, I should be failing in the performance of my duty, and should seriously compromise the sacred cause of Italy.

Permit me, therefore, Sire, to disobey you in this. When I shall have fulfilled my mission, and freed the people from the hateful yoke, I will lay down my sword at your Majesty's feet, and obey you for the rest of my days.*

While these letters were being exchanged, Thouvenel had made a formal proposal to Lord Russell that France and England should unite in seeking to bring about a long armistice, and in intimating to Garibaldi through the naval commanders of the two powers that he would not be allowed to cross the Strait. But the English premier declared he would not violate the principle of non-intervention, and that if France ventured to act independently, England would look upon this with disapproval, and would protest. Napoleon hereupon decided to adopt the line of conduct Russell had

serious conditions, and knowing as I do how sincere is your regard for me, I have decided to give you some advice.

'In order to put an end to this war between Italians, I request you to relinquish the intention of crossing over to the Neapolitan Continent with your army, in case the King of Naples should consent to evacuate the whole island, leaving the Sicilians free to decide and shape their own destiny.

'Should the King of Naples be unable to accept this condition, I reserve perfect freedom of action for myself as regards Sicily.

'General, take my advice, and you will see that it is for the good of Italy, whose prestige you will be increasing by furnishing her with the means of showing Europe that she knows how to conquer and how to use her victories.'

pointed out, informing his minister in London, Count de Persigny, of his intention by means of a letter which Persigny made public through the press.

Thus did diplomacy leave the rule of the Bourbons in Naples to its fate.

At this point it may not be superfluous to observe that, had the annexation of Sicily been an accomplished fact when this diplomatic battle was fought, that is to say, at the end of July,¹ Cavour's manœuvres for resisting the pressure brought to bear by France would have been impossible. That this pressure was very strong is demonstrated by the following telegrams, sent by Cavour to Count R. d'Azeglio, Piedmontese Minister in London :—

23 July.—La France propose à l'Angleterre d'appuyer un armistice de dix mois entre Naples et Sicile. Proposition bonne en théorie (?), inapplicable toutefois. Que deviendrait Garibaldi ? Que feraient les Siciliens laissés dans le provisoire ? Sans vous y opposer directement, tâchez de faire repousser la proposition.

24 July.—La France insistant beaucoup pour l'armistice de six mois, en apparence du moins, montrez-vous favorable sans vous engager pour Garibaldi.*

If Napoleon's wishes were overruled, this was due entirely to Garibaldi's opposition and refusal to yield, and to England's refusal to accept the French proposition to interfere by force of arms. And Garibaldi was in a position to refuse, because he had obtained a firm footing in Sicily, whose people were now his devoted slaves.

On the other hand, had Sicily already been annexed to the Kingdom of Piedmont, Count Cavour would not have been able to answer the demands of France and the King of Naples' appeal, that was supported by the powers, and at one time, even by England herself, by declaring that Victor Emmanuel

¹ As early as June 2 Cavour had established his programme. 'Quant à l'annexion de la Sicile, nous sommes décidés à marcher droit au but.'

possessed no means of coercing the Dictator, and this for the simple reason that there would no longer have been either a dictator or a Sicilian government, and General Garibaldi—even had it been possible for him to concentrate his forces at Messina—would have been obliged, willingly or unwillingly, to obey his King.

What the result of all this would have been, is clear enough. Union would not have been achieved! It may therefore be accepted as a fact beyond discussion, that the resistance offered to Cavour's programme by Garibaldi and Crispi was providential for Italy.

NOTE

CONCERNING THE LITTA-MODIGNANI MISSION

In the first number of the review, *Risorgimento Italiano*, for the year 1909, Colonel D. Guerrini, a diligent student of the history of the *Risorgimento*, published a *Diary* by Count Giulio Litta-Modignani.

Guerrini is loud in his praises of this *Diary*, but, as a matter of fact, a glance suffices to reveal the prejudices its author had imbibed at Turin. Concerning the solution of the problem of the hour, Litta simply voices the opinions of others, and as these opinions are those of members of the government or of its supporters, his acceptance of them is a natural result. Hardly had he landed when he declared that all the Sicilians were clamouring for annexation to Piedmont. All those who, like Crispi, were obnoxious to Turin, he pronounced to be *mountebanks* and *tricksters* (sic!) upheld by Garibaldi. The General's headquarters at Milazzo, after the terrible battle in which more than 800 volunteers had fallen, inspired him with no more lofty consideration than this: 'I felt as if I were in the midst of one of those numerous bands of brigands who at one time infested certain parts of Italy; or else in the company of a large party of masqueraders. . . .' And he goes on to add an observation that reveals a paltry mind: 'The airs of importance which these people give themselves may impress those who are living in the midst of these strange events, but

in one who has lived where order reigns, and who appreciates only such success as derives from order, they can awaken only a sense of disgust and incredulity.'

The really important point in the Guerrini communications is the revelation of a hitherto unknown document which it seems strange should have remained unpublished for half a century, whereas Litta, who outlived Victor Emmanuel, might have honoured his Sovereign by revealing it, and also have rectified the accounts given by most historians, of the King's attempt to stop Garibaldi at the Lighthouse, an attempt which, had it succeeded, would have prevented the Union of Italy. This document is a confidential letter which Litta was to deliver to Garibaldi after the official one. In this second communication Victor Emmanuel said: 'The King having spoken, Victor Emmanuel now suggests that you answer him more or less in the spirit which he knows is yours. You must declare that the General is all devotion and reverence for his King, and that he longs to be able to follow his advice, but that his duty to Italy forbids his refusing to help the Neapolitans should they appeal to him to free them from a government in which honest men and true Italians can place no trust. The General is therefore unable to comply with the King's wishes, it being necessary that he should be perfectly free to act.'

Guerrini gives a facsimile of the original letter, which he declares remained among Litta's papers. It is comprehensible that a piece of writing of so compromising a nature at that moment, when Victor Emmanuel was assuring Europe of his disapproval of the Thousand's undertaking, should not have been left in Garibaldi's possession. On other occasions, when secret communications had been necessary, the King had sent short autograph notes to be *shown, but not left* (see Mazzini, *La Questione Italiana e i Republican*). But it is hard to believe that Litta should not have returned it to the King, or that the King should have consented to leave it in the hands of his orderly-officer. We ourselves would have been better satisfied if we had been told the letter was discovered among the Royal Archives.

Could this point be made clear, the document would be of obvious importance, in confirming what is already accepted as

a fact: that the full approval of Victor Emmanuel, who was more daring than his Prime Minister, went with Garibaldi from Quarto to the Volturno.

The doubt we may entertain that this second letter was ever submitted to Garibaldi rests upon the fact that neither Crispi nor any of the General's intimates were aware of its existence, and that Garibaldi himself, who lived so long after 1860, not only never alluded to it, but repeatedly, in his writings, deplored the fact that the monarchy should have sought to thwart each one of his undertakings in turn. In a famous letter of August 24, 1869, he wrote: 'The government's prohibition to cross over to the Continent is an historical fact.' It is to be supposed that, had he possessed the right to distinguish the King from his government, Garibaldi would have done so.

In commemorating the battle of Milazzo in 1897 Crispi said: 'The victory of Milazzo opened the way to the Continent to us. At the Royal Palace in Naples its importance was understood at once, and steps were taken to ward off its consequences by means of diplomacy. On July 26 an emissary from Victor Emmanuel arrived with *a letter* for Garibaldi. The King demanded that the victorious captain should interrupt his onward march. The Bourbon Francesco would relinquish his dominion of Sicily, leaving her free to shape her own destiny. Napoleon III. proposed to England to intervene by means of their joint navies and prevent the volunteers from crossing the Strait. The secret intentions of France are clear enough in all this, and she revealed them repeatedly during the period of our national constitution. *Garibaldi's reply was a respectful refusal.* John Russell answered Napoleon with good advice, and by enjoining him to respect the principle of non-intervention in Italian affairs. The Bourbon was thus left to his fate.

CHAPTER XV

Garibaldi prepares to cross the Strait—Public opinion in England and France in favour of this step—Letters from Michelet and Lamartine—De la Varenne's reports—The Parker letter—Crispi advises Garibaldi to make amends—Report of his mission by Sicilian *chargé d'affaires* at Paris—More news from Paris through de la Varenne—Cavour's press against Garibaldi and Crispi—False reports in English papers—Crispi's estimate of England's sentiments regarding Italy.

ON August 6 Garibaldi issued the following proclamation to the 'inhabitants of Continental Naples':—

Checked by the opposition of the foreigner, whose interest it is to weaken us, and torn by internal factions, we have hitherto been unable to unite and form a confederacy. To-day, however, it would seem that Providence is about to put an end to our misfortunes. . . . The exemplary unanimity of purpose displayed by all the provinces, and the smile which victory has shed upon the arms of the sons of liberty, are proofs that the evils which afflict this land of Genius are about to cease.

One step still remains to be taken . . . but it does not daunt us. If the scanty means which have led a handful of brave men as far as this Strait be compared with the enormous means at our disposal to-day, it becomes evident that the undertaking will be fraught with but slight difficulty.

My desire to avoid the spilling of blood among Italians urges me to make this appeal to you, sons of Continental Naples!

You have already given proof of your courage, and I would not demand the repetition of that proof. We must mingle our blood over the bodies of Italy's enemies, but among ourselves let peace reign.

Oh, brave hearts! grasp this right hand of mine, this hand that has never served a tyrant, but has grown callous in the service of the people. Help me to make Italy without the slaughter of her children, and, with me, serve her or die for her!

G. GARIBALDI.

MESSINA, 6 August, 1860.

While the governments of Europe, jealous of the *status quo* and desirous of re-establishing peace, were seeking in vain to check the course of events, the people of all countries, who are ever influenced rather by sentiment than by political calculations, were following the Garibaldian epic with fervent prayers for its success, and numerous applications to be enrolled beneath the hero's banner were continually coming in from noble-hearted men of all countries, while public subscriptions for the relief of the wounded were yielding important sums of money.

The people of England displayed their sympathy in many ways. Lord John Russell himself spoke before the House of Commons in Garibaldi's defence, and called him a man of 'most remarkable character.' Queen Victoria alone remained hostile and reserved.

The brave and chivalrous people of France felt the moral beauty of the undertaking, and were filled with exalted enthusiasm for a handful of men who had succeeded in overthrowing a kingdom.

Towards the end of July, de la Varenne acquainted Crispi with the state of French opinion by means of the following letter:—

PARIS, 26 July, 1860.

DEAR SIR,—I am in receipt of the few lines you sent me from Palermo on July 16. . . . You tell me

you are leaving to follow the General, and I am therefore in doubt as to where this letter will find you. But in order that you may know what is going on here with us, I am forwarding you a copy of the despatch which Signor di San Cataldo sent to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs at Palermo. This despatch reflects the situation most accurately.

Some doubt seemed to exist here concerning Sicily's true intentions as regards annexation, and those of her present rulers. Thouvenel and the official world openly talked of the contrary. I hereupon took the liberty of translating and communicating to the journal *Opinion Nationale* the text of the instructions you sent me, accompanied by the introductory lines herein enclosed. The effect of this publication has been prodigious, especially in France and England. It came at the right moment in connection with the La Farina incident, and overthrew all the calumnies that individual was seeking to spread concerning your colleagues and yourself.

I have sought to rectify through the press the false ideas that have prevailed about Garibaldi's *entourage*, and especially those that concern you. I think I have succeeded. The tone of the *Siècle* of July 7, and of other numbers, as well as certain articles in the *Opinion Nationale*, the *Presse*, the *Indépendance Belge* (especially a letter from Paris that appeared on July 25), and even some articles in the *Constitutionnel*, must have been most unwelcome to those gentlemen at Turin.

Here, I make use of the leading organs of our party as well as of provincial and foreign correspondents, which is most important. Pending the publication of my own book, and in spite of shortness

of funds, I manage to get out a few *brochures* and books that deal with these questions. Yesterday a pamphlet appeared under my auspices, which I am just sending you. It is to be followed by many others.

I now come to the most important point in my letter, and I must beg you to lend me your especial attention. No more weighty words were ever written.

When first I, and after me, Signor San Cataldo, arrived in Paris, the French government and public opinion were most favourably disposed towards the Italian movement and General Garibaldi. The Sicilian expedition had surrounded him with such glory that not even Napoleon I. ever enjoyed greater hold over the popular imagination. The Emperor himself spoke of the General in terms of praise, and made no secret of his admiration for his achievements. He had also *already ordered the official press to support him*. Of this I had absolute proof.

Suddenly, one fine morning something over a fortnight ago, an English paper came to hand that contained a letter concerning a steamer, and addressed by the General to a certain Parker, a ship-broker in Liverpool, I believe. In this letter Garibaldi declared that it would be to England's advantage if she helped Italy in her struggle for union, because, *having once achieved Union and Liberty, Italy would ally herself with England against the ambitious designs of the Emperor of the French!*

I cannot describe to you the sensation these words produced. As regards England, the Emperor is France, and you who have lived in Paris will understand this. There was an explosion of indignation and of grief that defies description. Italy with

England against France so soon after 1859, and when France alone, and but a few months since, had prevented Russia and Austria from interfering at Naples and in Sicily! And this unholy alliance is proposed by that same Garibaldi who has been so greatly beloved in this country that 100,000 have sought to join him, and whose glory has been praised throughout the land for the last two years! This thought was distressing to the entire population, and to myself no less than to others, I assure you.

But the most serious point is this, that the government itself was deeply offended, and having verified the authenticity of the letter which *the English had made public for purposes of their own*, immediately altered its attitude, and allowed its organs to reply with asperity. At the same moment the government began to support the King of Naples' appeal at Turin, and refused permission to open a subscription here, or to form committees, and both Monsieur de Thouvenel and Prince Napoleon on meeting Signor di San Cataldo informed him of the Emperor's intense displeasure at the letter, and gave him to understand that all this might lead to serious complications in the future.

We must not deceive ourselves in this matter, and you, my dear Sir, know as well as I do that without the open or secret support of France, without her moral consent, the Italian movement, in spite of the determination of Garibaldi and his volunteers, has no probability of success. It will not be England, the natural ally of the Germans, the furious adversary in the war of 1859, who now flatters Italy but to betray her to-morrow,—it will not be England who will ever do anything for you. If France withdraw her hand, Italy must succumb

—she may do so gloriously, but, nevertheless, she will succumb. Now let us be perfectly frank—Who is it who holds aloft the sword of France that it may weigh in the balance? Who conducted the campaign of 1859 *in defiance of public feeling that was averse to war*? Who is fighting the allied Powers? The Emperor, and *he alone*! The ministers, the base tribe of traders, the stupid and selfish *bourgeoisie*, all are weary of the Italian question, of these jars that depress the stock exchange and compromise speculation. Let them but have their way and they would promptly saddle you with the Dukes, Austria, and the King of Naples once more. It is true the people are with you, but how much is popular sentiment worth under a *régime* such as ours?

If to-morrow the Emperor, using as a pretext some fresh and no less significant manifestation of opinion on the part of Garibaldi, or of one of his friends, should say openly to France: ‘See all that I have done, what, in defiance of the other Powers, I have allowed to be done, and now see how they repay me, in what terms they speak not only of me but of France herself!’—I assure you that your most devoted friends would immediately turn from you, and as to those who do not love you, that is to say all the *powerful and great*, they would shout ‘Have done with them!’

Now, I appeal to your own judgment. Should a question of a lost church-spire, of a city given to France, which was already half French (Nice), be allowed to prevail against interests so vital, against the future welfare of the whole of Italy?

This is what the Prince and I wish to submit to you, my dear Sir, and now as to what we expect of

your lofty patriotism, of the ability of which you have given proof, of the influence you possess with that good and great-souled man, Garibaldi. A communication must be despatched to Cataldo or to any one else residing in Paris, not necessarily disclaiming the letter to Parker, but containing some mark of confidence for the Emperor, some manifestation of gratitude for his friendship for Italy, of *faith in his future support*. The good that would result from such a communication is incalculable. I will say no more, but I entreat you, in the name of all here who are interested in the welfare of our dear Italy, in the *cause that represents her complete redemption*, to persuade the General to adopt some measure with this end in view.

Then follows the report, alluded to above, from the *chargé d'affaires*, Prince di San Cataldo, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michele Amari:—

PARIS, 26 July, 1860.

SIR,—In my preceding letters I have sought to give you a simple account of everything of importance that has happened to me since my arrival in this city. To-day I shall seek to describe our diplomatic position, the methods I have adopted to render it more influential, and the acquaintances I have cultivated in order to facilitate the success of the mission with which I have been honoured.

Your Excellency is aware that, not being the representative of a recognised government, it is impossible for me to obtain an audience with the Emperor. International law forbids my reception by His Majesty, as Sicilian *chargé d'affaires*. I might, indeed, ask for an audience in my private capacity, but I know that the audiences of this nature granted last year availed nothing in the case

of the official envoys of Central Italy, who, when they found themselves in the presence of the Head of the State, did not venture even to allude to those matters which were of such vital importance to the provisional governments of Tuscany and the Emilia. Nevertheless, the Imperial Cabinet was obliged to communicate with both of these gentlemen during the Italian war, and also at the time of the Reiset and Poniatowski mission.

The person therefore, whom it was most necessary for me to see in order clearly to define my position in this city, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was by special order of the Emperor that His Excellency Baron de Thouvenel granted me an audience which, although it did not clearly reveal to me the line of conduct the Imperial government proposes to follow, sufficed, nevertheless, to convince me that, far from finding in the Cabinet of the Tuileries a more or less open adversary, we may, on the contrary, count upon its amicable sentiments.

It must not be forgotten that the reforms recently granted by the King of Naples are the result of instigation from the French government, upon whom pressure was brought to bear by the other great Powers, and although the Imperial government may share the general opinion that these reforms are insufficient to save the Bourbon dynasty, still, in consideration of the oft-repeated protestations of loyalty that are arriving here almost hourly, Napoleon III. cannot do less than lend his approval to the desperate resolutions of Francesco II., and support him diplomatically in consequence.

At any rate my short interview with Monsieur de Thouvenel, a coldly reserved personality, convinced me that when this constitutional experiment in

Naples has proved the futility of the reforms granted, France will offer no opposition either to the immediate annexation of Sicily or to the work of Italian unification.

This fact became even more apparent to me during my interview with His Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon, who reiterated the assurance of the great interest he takes in the triumph of our cause.

The truth of all this was more deeply impressed upon my mind by a conversation I had with the Viscount de la Guéronnière, to whom I had been presented by our friend de la Varenne. You are doubtless aware that this distinguished journalist, who collaborated with Napoleon III., or was perhaps the sole author of those famous *brochures* that paved the way for the Italian war and the annexation of Romagna, has an intimate knowledge of the Emperor's opinions and intentions. His words proved to me that the Sicilian question is here looked upon, in high political circles, as a mere episode of the great Italian question, towards whose triumphant solution France, being unable to contribute openly without violating international agreements, will nevertheless contribute by obliging other foreign powers to maintain inviolate the principle of non-intervention by force of arms, and also by insuring the right of suffrage, that the will of the people may have free expression.

One of my first acts on arriving here was to put myself in communication with the editors of all the liberal papers, and in accomplishing this Signor de la Varenne's zeal was of the greatest service to me. He is on a footing of equality with all the leading journalists, and I was received with enthusiastic

warmth by all of these gentlemen. I am convinced that the explanations I was able to furnish them have sufficed to place our revolution in its true light. We have already arranged for the publication of several articles dealing with our affairs, and to-day we shall arrange for the issue of several pamphlets signed by well-known authors, which will enlighten public opinion as regards our situation and the legitimate nature of Sicilian aspirations. I have moreover placed myself in communication with the leading correspondents of the provincial and foreign press, all of whom are friends of de la Varenne's, and I have done this in order that our sphere of action may not be confined to Paris alone. This will cost something, but I am sure you will approve of what I have done despite the sacrifices you may be called upon to make.

The changes that have recently taken place in the Sicilian ministry alarmed public opinion somewhat, and aroused suspicions which our enemies were careful to feed by all the powerful means they possess. In order to ward off the danger that threatened, Monsieur de la Varenne and I determined to publish in the daily papers the text of the instructions I received on leaving Palermo. This produced an admirable effect, and to-day the press of Europe is unanimously applauding the wise provisions of the dictatorial government. On this point I wish to call your attention to the articles and criticisms contained in the *Débats*, the *Indépendance Belge* and the *Morning Post*.

As to the subscriptions and committees for collecting funds which have long existed here, they are not in a position to achieve as much as might be expected of them. All my efforts and those made

by de la Varenne before my arrival, to give them a certain publicity, have been frustrated by the severe and clearly expressed intentions of the imperial government, which refuses to authorise such subscriptions and committees, in order not to compromise itself diplomatically, and to avoid unduly exciting public feeling. I have furthermore been unable to get possession of any funds from these subscriptions, as the directors have long since either sent the money collected to Signor La Farina, or used it in equipping volunteers.

All these official prohibitions, however, that are prompted by a judicious policy, have been insufficient to stem the outburst of sympathy for Sicily which is everywhere manifest in France. Thousands of French volunteers are ready to enlist and fight in your ranks had I but the money necessary to equip them and send them off. But I am of opinion that it would be unwise to accept their services, as ill-feeling might result among our own people.

The biographies of Garibaldi, his portraits and medals with his likeness are selling here by the thousand, for the French labourer and the soldier have a sort of cult for the Deliverer of Sicily, and these sales are moreover authorised by the prefecture of police.

I have entered into regular and frequent correspondence with my colleague, Prince di San Giuseppe, who being charged to represent Sicily in a country possessing a parliamentary government, has found no difficulty in communicating with the Queen's ministers and with the committees that are publicly established in England. The news I get through him is most satisfactory.

As to myself, supported as I am here by all the

most illustrious partisans of the Italian cause, I neglect no opportunity of proving myself worthy of my country and of the arduous and sacred mission with which I have been honoured. The results obtained by me may appear relatively small, but they will acquire importance with the help of this strong government whose support I am seeking to obtain, and from the generosity of the French people, upon whose fraternal sentiments we may safely rely.—I have the honour, Sir, to be

The Chargé-d' Affaires of Sicily at Paris,

SAN CATALDO.

On receiving de la Varenne's letter (August 2) Crispi hastened to call Garibaldi's attention to the passages it contained concerning the expression that had wounded French patriotism.

By de Rohan . . . I am sending you the letters and papers which we have received from the Continent for you. I also send you an extract from one of Count de la Varenne's letters which I beg you not only to read, but to weigh well in your mind. This letter tallies exactly with a despatch forwarded to our Minister of Foreign Affairs by our representative in Paris. You know how I detest Napoleon . . . nevertheless it is necessary to outdo him in dissimulation. . . . Frankness is a first requisite when honest men are dealing with honest men, but when one has to do with the butchers of humanity, who are strong in arms and rich in means, frankness is but a poor policy. Now, in order to neutralise the effects of the Parker letter, do you see your way clear to writing another letter in which—while leaving Bonaparte entirely out of the question—you declare your sympathy for France? I beseech you,

my dear General, in the interest of our country, whom her enemies are ever seeking to ensnare, and who is not yet strong enough to stand alone, to make up your mind to this. From the bottom of my heart I beg you to do so . . . ! Your glory would be in no way dimmed by this action—on the contrary, it would shine with greater lustre. . . .

Garibaldi saw the wisdom of this advice, and authorised Crispi to arrange matters without obliging him to intervene personally. Thus it came about that in Crispi's answer to de la Varenne, although he did not formally deny the existence of the Parker letter, he credited the General with entirely different sentiments. Minister Amari did the same in a circular to all the representatives of the Sicilian government. Count de la Varenne, as he tells us in a letter from which we shall quote further on, judged it opportune to give the explanations of Crispi and Amari the form of an official denial, and in this shape they appeared in many daily papers, among others in the *Constitutionnel* of August 20, and in the *Opinion libérale*. We give this article translated.

About one month ago the London papers published a letter purporting to have been addressed by Garibaldi to an English merchant, a Mr. Parker, in which letter the General expressed certain opinions concerning France which we strongly resented. We have to-day been requested to print two extracts from despatches forwarded to Paris by Signor Crispi and Signor Amari, from which we gather that the letter to Parker was an invention. For the sake of impartiality we are bound to publish these two documents. Here they are.

1.—I have not the slightest knowledge of the letter to Mr. Parker. I am aware that the General is much gratified by the sympathy which the English people are *at last* showing for the cause of Italy,

but at the same time I feel fully justified in assuring you that this does not blind him to the strong and generous support lent by the Emperor Napoleon in helping us to achieve independence. Our cause is that of nationalism, of civilisation and of humanity, and it is precisely Napoleon III., the man of his century, who has laid down the principle that every nation has a right to govern itself. . . . The General will certainly find a means of reassuring public opinion on the subject of his true sentiments towards the Emperor and towards France.

(Signed) CRISPI.

PALERMO, 6 August.

II.—As to that unfortunate incident of the letter attributed to General Garibaldi, I will tell you, first of all, that we have good reason to doubt its authenticity, as the General has never mentioned it to *any living soul*, nor has any copy of it been discovered. Other letters of his give abundant proof that the great Italian chieftain cherishes sentiments differing widely from those attributed to him, for the brave and generous nation whose sons shed their blood for our independence on the fields of Magenta and of Solferino. In any case I can assure you that the opinions of the Dictator's government coincide in every way with those of His Majesty's government at Turin. And this puts an end to the question.

(Signed) MICHELE AMARI,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

PALERMO, 10 August.

In France Garibaldi enjoyed the admiration of great writers, who contributed in large measure towards establishing his fame upon a solid basis. Victor Hugo, Dumas, Michelet, Lamartine, proclaimed their opinions so loudly that all democratic France could not but hear them.

From copies made by Dumas himself we take two letters addressed to him by Michelet and Lamartine.

ÉTRETAT, août 15, 1860.

Du fond de mes pluies normandes, je vous vois nager comme un trait de lumière dans cette lumineuse mer de Sicile. Je suis avec vous du cœur, cet homme étrange et *unique*, adoré, vainqueur, heureux — ce dernier mot dit beaucoup.

Oh ! qu'il soit toujours heureux, notre grand ami, notre étoile.

Vous me demandez de vous écrire mes vœux. Mais qui n'en fait pas et qui n'est pas avec vous dans un journal qui serait la pensée de Garibaldi ?

Je vous envie, je vous admire et je voudrais vous voler ces quelques boulets égarés qui ont effleuré l'*Emma*.¹

Je vous ai aimé toujours, mais beaucoup plus, croyez-le, aujourd'hui qu'on vous aime en lui.

J. MICHELET.

ST. POINT, PRÈS MÂCON, août 15, 1860.

CHER ET ILLUSTRÉ AMI,—J'ai dit non sentiment, que vous me demandez, dans non 'Entretien sur l'Italie' à l'occasion de Machiavel. Vous y lirez sur Garibaldi ce mot qui peint l'homme.

Ce héros cosmopolite, dont la patrie est le feu, et dont les exploits personnels tiennent de la Fable plus que de l'Histoire.

Quant à vous, vous connaissez ma définition de Dumas : l'indéfinissable ! Quant aux Italiens, ils ont été l'amour de toute ma vie, je me sens aussi Italien que Français. Mais quant aux annexions piémontaises et monarchiques, je diffère entièrement de vous et du Dictateur de la Sicile.

¹ The *Emma* was the yacht on which Dumas went to Sicily.

Comme républicain de 1848, je ne me sens pas logique, en monopolisant l'Italie par la main des républicains.

Comme Français, je ne me sens pas patriote en créant aux portes de la France, entourée d'ennemis, une puissance de 30 millions de sujets, appuyée par l'Angleterre.

Enfin, comme Italien de cœur, je ne sens pas l'Italie émancipée, aussi durable sous une épée et sous un sceptre piémontais, que sous une Confédération italique. Une bataille perdue brise un sceptre, une Confédération est immortelle.

J'ai cru toute ma vie que la renaissance et la liberté de l'Italie s'appelaient Confédération. Je le crois encore.

A cela près, soyons bons amis, et soyez le barde des Héros et le Héros des bardes.

Adieu. Je ne m'occupe plus de politique. Je travaille pour payer honorablement avant de partir l'écot de ma vie.

Vous avez été souvent le charme et toujours l'étonnement de mon existence.

LAMARTINE.

Thanks to de la Varenne, the European press published accurate accounts of Sicilian events. Under the heading, 'The Situation in Sicily,' *L'Espérance* wrote in August:—

One month ago, in order to cast suspicion upon Signor Crispi's patriotism, he was accused of republicanism, Mazzinianism, etc., and a handful of street-beggars having been collected, they were made to shout, 'Down with Crispi!' Depretis, the man chosen by Garibaldi, found, on entering upon his position, that the General's programme was identical with Signor Crispi's and his own, whereupon he

reinstated the chief of the cabinet of June 2. At the first Council of State it was decided to proclaim the Statute, to reorganise the tribunals, to provide for public safety. . . . The decisions were made public through the *Official Journal*, in which the decrees appeared in full. And here we have these same men who once accused Crispi of Mazzinianism, accusing him to-day of having delivered Sicily over to the King of Piedmont. . . . Marchese di Torrearsa calls a meeting at the residence of Prince Butera. The leaders of the aristocracy take the trouble to go to the Minister of the Interior and beseech him to alter his policy and revoke the measures taken to annex Sicily to Piedmont. And what is the reason for all this? Simply to avoid demonstrations in the streets and a 'general revolution' in Sicily. Naturally Minister Crispi has remained unmoved by these arguments, and the population is perfectly quiet. . . . A memorable day for Sicily has come and gone—the festivities connected with swearing allegiance to King and Constitution. In the forenoon the Ministers took their oath before the Pro-Dictator in his private office, then, all together, they repaired to the *Sala dell' Ariete* in the Royal Palace, which is perhaps one of the finest halls in Europe. Here they were met by the archbishop of Palermo with his clergy, all the judges, high civil and military authorities, the cream of the society of Palermo and the *grandes dames*, most magnificently attired. When all had sworn allegiance to King Victor Emmanuel, the Pro-Dictator Depretis delivered an address to which the press grants unreserved praise.

Here are some extracts from de la Varenne's reports to Crispi.

16 *August*.—. . . Along with other things I am forwarding a pamphlet entitled ‘Napoli e Piemonte,’ which appeared this morning. Read it carefully. It is a sign of life from the Muratist party, which has raised its head again and is stirring vigorously. Do not think for a moment this party may be neglected—it must be dealt with.

I also send you a pamphlet which Naples has paid for and which is extremely poisonous—‘Garibaldi, Napoli e l’Inghilterra.’ Under cover of much flattery to the Emperor this pamphlet, which has been spread broadcast, excites the national sentiment of the French against Garibaldi and the Sicilian revolution. The Parker letter has indeed done us much harm, and will continue to do so, unless you find some remedy for it.

I write you freely and openly, and knowing you to be one of the directing minds at this crisis, I once more repeat to you: draw closer to the actual head of the French people, give him some unequivocal proof of sympathy. Let him know, and above all, let it *be known*, that you are grateful to him. . . . And so Garibaldi believes in English loyalty. You have but to remind him of England’s attitude towards Sicily in 1815, 1821 and 1849!

August 17.—It would be useless to hide the fact from you that Cavour loves neither the General nor his friends, nor has any liking for any of the events that are taking place in Sicily and southern Italy. He feels himself outdone and on the eve of losing the power, if things go on as they have begun, and the men of the Party of Action continue to cover themselves with glory. He can find nothing better to do than to seek to ruin them with the public by means of calumny. For the last fortnight,

wherever his agents have had a voice, both in the official world and in the press, one has heard the same accusations repeated over and over again, and the epithet 'Mazzinians in disguise' hurled against you all, even against the General himself. It is furthermore proclaimed that your one intention in making yourselves masters of Naples as you have made yourselves masters of Sicily, is to 'found a republic there' and 'march against Rome,' with the ultimate purpose of 'waging war on France.' The *Journal des Débats*, long since sold to Signor di Cavour (I know the price paid and the way the transaction was conducted) recently had the audacity to publish a note which excited very general indignation by the assertion it contained that Garibaldi was loudly proclaiming his intention of marching upon *Nice*, after having entered Naples!!

In conclusion I must tell you that I have received information from a 'reliable source,' that a most violent article directed against the leading men in the Italian movement, and emanating from the Ministry, is to appear in the *Constitutionnel*. The notes for this article came from Turin, and it is said that even the Emperor himself has been impressed by them.

24 *August*.—The famous manifesto launched by Cavour against the leading men in the Italian movement, appeared in the *Constitutionnel* on the 17th, as I warned you it would. I enclose a copy. I have had it carefully answered in the *Opinion Nationale* (20 August) by an article entitled 'Le mouvement et la résistance en Italie.'

As a last straw, on the day following, the *Pays* published a speech by Garibaldi translated

from the *Morning Post*, which you will also find enclosed, and of which you will grasp the importance.¹ A regular *tolle* has raged against us here in Paris, which lasted quite four-and-twenty hours. Cavour's insinuations could not have arrived at a more propitious moment. Having received timely warning I was able to prevent the publication in the *Constitutionnel* and elsewhere of that version which had already been communicated to the Emperor as 'official.' As good luck would have it, I received the Italian papers with the correct version of the address, that very night. Determined to destroy all these calumnies, old and new, at one blow, I added to this address some extracts from a communication from yourself, and a few passages from Signor Michele Amari's circular, and succeeded in getting the article printed in the *Constitutionnel*. The effect was simply prodigious! The Ministry obliged the *Pays* to print the rectification in full, and I forwarded to the *Opinion* the note you will find enclosed in this packet. . . . Our correspondents have also undertaken to deal thoroughly with the subject. Concerning this, glance at the *Indépendance* of the 21st. . . . On the whole we have benefited by this incident which has produced a most desirable revulsion of feeling in official circles. . . . Monsieur Mocquard, Chief of the

¹ A short address to the National Guard of Messina is here alluded to. Garibaldi had said: 'Sicilians, my duty now calls me elsewhere, and I must leave you. It is time that Sicily should look seriously and vigorously to her own defence. Yes, you yourselves must defend your country against all intruders. I have done what I could for you, but to-day Italy calls me to other regions. Diplomacy has failed in her attempts to check me, and I will tolerate no compromise with her.'

The *Morning Post* had given Garibaldi's words differently, making him say at the end: 'France is directing all the efforts of her diplomatic agents against the formation of a united and compact Italy, but no one any longer listens to the voice of France. For my part, I know what it is worth.'

Emperor's Cabinet, said to a friend of mine a day or two ago: 'There are only two men in Europe, Napoleon III. and—Garibaldi!'

Look in the Paris papers of the 20 and 24 August for a synopsis of an article in the *Times*, and you will see that the English, who approved so heartily of the overthrow of the King of Naples, now predict a thousand misfortunes for Garibaldi and his followers, should they dare to touch Venice.

On September 7 Crispi answered this letter of de la Varenne's, and having thanked him and praised his activity, he added:—

I am not of your opinion that England makes a display of sympathy for the Italian cause simply because she is jealous of France. Great Britain is the classic land of constitutional liberty, or at least of liberty as the English understand it. In their pride they believe that no country can prosper unless it adopt their institutions, and they therefore expect every nation that would be free, to rend its own chains asunder by its own efforts. Hence the principle of non-intervention in Italian affairs. . . . I know, as well as you do, my dear Count, that we may not reckon on England in case of failure, and that she would immediately form an alliance with Austria, should Austria succeed in crushing Italy; but it is none the less true that she will never seek to quell the ardour of a people who are determined to obtain their freedom. After all, we have seen the dawn of a day for which forty generations have yearned in vain. Yesterday we were asking in all humility, that Italy be allowed to form herself according to her own wishes; to-day we ask only that there be no meddling in our

affairs; to-morrow, thanks to the abnegation of the noble-hearted youth of our land, we shall be boldly proclaiming that we will not tolerate interference in our country's affairs. Each one in his own place, if you please!

The article from the *Times*¹ that predicts misfortune for Garibaldi and his followers if they dare to touch Venice is based on two false premisses:—

I.—The *Times* believes that Garibaldi is acting simply for his own personal glory, and I do not feel called upon to contradict such an absurdity.

II.—The *Times* believes that it is in the power of Garibaldi or of any other warrior or diplomatist, to stem the tide of the Italian revolution, which can only end with the complete expulsion of all foreigners, for only in that event is Italian Union possible. In obtaining possession of that really formidable, but unduly feared Austrian Quadrilateral, Garibaldi will have with him two towers of strength that Napoleon lacked—the devotion of the Italian people and their implacable hatred of the foreigner. Remember that Garibaldi's programme was not drawn up either in Paris or London, but upon the field of battle, and with the firm determination not to sheathe his sword until he should have exterminated our tyrants and driven out the foreigner.

¹ The French papers printed a synopsis of this article, dated 'London, 21 August.' The *Times* declared that the fate of Italy hung upon Garibaldi's intentions, which were better fitted to inspire dread than hope. The project of attacking Austria after having taken Rome was not only to be considered as audacious, but as absolutely foolhardy. Against the discipline and valour of the Austrian army his revolutionary forces would weigh lighter than smoke. Should Garibaldi fail to take those formidable fortresses before which Napoleon himself with his victorious legions had deemed it wise to pause, he would lose, one after the other, the cities and provinces already delivered, and there would remain of the monument of Italian liberty only the glory of its foundation, and the shame of having destroyed it.

CHAPTER XVI

Crispi frets at being obliged to remain in Palermo—His work in governing—His adversaries not disarmed—Cordova and Bottero—Depretis, urged by Cavour, works for annexation—Crispi breaks with Depretis—His resignation—Depretis' attempt to persuade him to withdraw it—Letter from Crispi to Garibaldi—Crispi and Depretis set out for Naples together that Garibaldi himself may judge between them—Depretis resigns the Pro-Dictatorship—Garibaldi hastens to Palermo, whither Crispi refuses to accompany him—Cordova and Bottero expelled from Sicily—Mordini, Pro-Dictator.

AT Palermo his duties as minister were becoming ever more irksome to Crispi. His friends all shared Garibaldi's opinion, and Antonio Mordini, who was then president of the Council of War, wrote to him on August 1 :—

I hear from mutual friends on the General Staff, that you wish to come and join us. I praise the intention, but I should blame the act, for we need clever, trustworthy men in Palermo, and without flattering you, we can assure you that you are most necessary where you are.

But it was Crispi's ambition to be where the power and danger were greatest : he wished to watch over Garibaldi, and help him to avoid those errors of policy into which his superficial knowledge of the country might easily lead him. On August 5, after repeating his appeal, Crispi wrote : ' I wish to be with you, to cross the Strait with you,' and he then proceeded to make some suggestions :—

I am sending you the letters and papers that have arrived from the Continent. If you have any

orders for me, forward them, and I will make a point of writing to you.

You will find enclosed a list of those persons who are coming to you from Naples. Have them watched, for besides those who come to fight for our country, there may be some who come simply for the purpose of injuring us. The fact alone that they are from Naples must make us cautious. . . . Yesterday I had two spies arrested.

I will send a line of thanks to the city of Trapani, which has made you an honorary citizen. . . . Try to rouse Messina. You are surrounded by La Farinians. Amodio, the Sardinian consul, Lella, Pirrotta, Bartolomeo and the Pisani are all faithful servants of him who came to Sicily to overthrow our government. Messina is a most important point. We must not allow our enemies to get it into their hands.

This advice to Garibaldi to be cautious was not superfluous, for on August 15 the Pro-Dictator wrote to the Minister of the Interior :—

I have been informed that a certain Donato Busico, who appears to have come from Naples, arrived here some days since. He is a most dangerous individual. Find out if he is in Palermo, and have him arrested.

Crispi collaborated untiringly with Depretis in re-establishing quiet throughout the country. This was no easy matter, for the common criminals, whom the Bourbon troops had set at liberty before their departure by throwing open the doors of the prisons, were infesting almost every township. The new police force, composed entirely of raw material, was as yet inefficient, while the force that had previously existed, being composed of non-Sicilians and obnoxious individuals, had of necessity been disbanded.

Nor were all of those who had enlisted in the militia amenable to discipline. After the battle of Milazzo some of them deserted from their regiments, carrying their guns with them, and took to wandering about the island. A circular was despatched to the governor of each province and to the seven commandants of the military stations ordering them to hunt out these deserters, arrest them, and try them by court-martial.

The energetic measures adopted by Crispi were, however, sufficient to cope with the situation. A public functionary had been murdered in the province of Messina, and the minister telegraphed as follows to all the authorities connected with the administration of the police department :—

Arrest the murderers of Carlo La Cava, and proceed against them. When murder is committed against a public functionary it becomes high treason as well. Appeal to the noble sentiments of the people, that this outrage against civilisation may be avenged, and the revolution remain unsullied in the eyes of the world.

At Montemaggiore deeds of blood and larceny had been perpetrated by a band of malefactors, and eleven persons had been killed. The detachment of mounted police sent thither made several arrests, whereupon the Council of War ordered six of the culprits, who had confessed, to be shot, and the sentence was executed without delay.

At Mazzara also two criminals, Giuseppe Aguglitta and Gaspare Ampolilla, who were guilty of three murders, an infanticide, and three acts of violence against women, were condemned and immediately shot.

Nor were deeds of blood the only crimes to be suppressed, for high-handed dealings of every description were prevailing on all sides.

‘Dear Crispi,’ Depretis wrote, ‘Princess Niscemi, née Lampedusa, has just been to inform me of an act of violence committed against her property, which must be immediately investigated and

punished. Her feudal estate called Raffo Russo in the Nino district, township of 'Torretta, has been invaded by about one hundred individuals, some of whom are armed and who belong to the communes of Sferracavallo and Tomaso Natale. They drove out the Princess's agent, divided the land amongst themselves, marking off the boundaries by means of lime and walls, and have settled down to cultivate. Send two large detachments at once. . . .'

But while Crispi 'bore the burden of power' his enemies did not lay down their arms. Petitions, manifestos, and demonstrations followed each other in rapid succession. One day the walls of the city were papered with many-coloured placards bearing the words: 'Long live United Italy, Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi!—Down with Crispi for ever!' (August 12); and on the following morning the Pro-Dictator received an address signed by eight hundred citizens, praising Crispi's patriotism and the services rendered by him, and condemning the 'outcry made by a handful of malicious persons who, feigning to be official exponents of the people's desires, have diligently woven a tissue of lies.'

The fire of discord was still being fed by La Farina through his friends Cordova and company.

Cordova had written to Turin that Crispi was 'most unpopular,' and that this reason alone had prevented his acceptance of Depretis' offer to enter the ministry. Cavour sent a letter in reply, which he authorised Cordova to show to Depretis, to whom he thus indirectly offered advice. He declared that it would be wiser not to bring up the question of Crispi's removal in order not to 'get into trouble with Garibaldi,' but that it would certainly be advisable to withdraw the portfolio of the interior from Crispi's possession, and thus 'deprive him of all real authority in the management of Sicilian affairs.'

This, however, it was impossible to do, for Crispi would never have accepted a subordinate position which Depretis had not the power to force upon him.

The only truly efficacious means would have been annexation,

for this would have deprived both Garibaldi and Crispi of all power, whereas other measures heretofore contemplated had been manifestly inadequate.

Towards the end of August Cavour, in compliance with a proposal of La Farina's, sent the Deputy, G. B. Bottero,¹ to Palermo. In a letter to a friend written on the twenty-sixth La Farina expressed his satisfaction at this step, and added that Bottero, who was a personal friend of Depretis',

is authorised to declare to the Dictator that it is the government's desire that the people be summoned to give their vote before September 15 ; that, if this is done, the Sicilian government may count upon the friendship of His Majesty's government, but that otherwise His Majesty's government will be forced to look upon the Sicilian government as its enemy.²

Depretis' conduct, placed as he was between his promise to Garibaldi and Cavour's imperative orders, was anything but straightforward. He manifested his intention of respecting the Dictator's wishes, while all the time he was secretly inciting the communes of the island to send in petitions for immediate annexation. The game was a foolish one ; for Crispi was on the watch, and the plot was easily discovered. Simultaneously, and from several different places, the Minister of the Interior received the original copies of those petitions which had been despatched to the heads of the municipal bodies direct from the cabinet of the Pro-Dictator, as was clearly apparent from the seal and the quality of the paper. The proof was irrefutable.

On the other hand, that good man Asproni, who had been in Palermo for a short time organising the infant schools, wrote to Crispi on August 29 :—

Depretis wishes to open a way to power for him-

¹ Bottero's official mission was to consign to the Sicilian government part of a sum of 500,000 lire which two Piedmontese bankers had advanced, and for which His Majesty's government had made itself responsible.

² *Epistolario*, La Farina, ii. 412.

self, in Turin. He has no liking for Cavour, but he will second him with this end in view. Cajoled by Cordova into the belief that he is winning Cavour's favour by listening to his advice and virtually surrendering his own will to him, he regards your achievements and your presence in the ministry with secret disapproval. I am convinced that should you fall beneath a load of universal hatred, and lose all prestige, he would rejoice. Already many of your enemies' agents are working diligently and unremittingly to spread the false notion that you alone are the cause of all the ills that afflict Sicily at the present moment. Thus set forth in its true light, his apparent benevolence becomes hypocrisy, which is doubly base when used against one who has conspired, suffered exile and imprisonment, and defied death a thousand times in the cause of liberty.

Crispi, who was quick to discover the true nature of Bottero's mission, was indignant at his scheming, and on August 30 appealed to Garibaldi himself:—

Sicily is in the hands of one of Cavour's substitutes. . . . Immediate annexation is already being openly discussed, and it is said that you not only desire it, but have ordered it yourself. Can this be possible? Let me know. Is it true that in a fortnight Sicily will be summoned to decide her fate, and this by your command? ¹

Depretis had written a pressing letter to Garibaldi begging for authorisation to summon the voters to the polls, and

¹ Letter from La Farina to P. Gramignani, September 3 (*Epistolario*, ii. 414): 'As to Sicily, the Pro-Dictator already promises the elections before the 15th of September.'

The same to P. Poggi, 5 September (*Epistolario*, ii. 415): 'I think this shameful comedy will soon be over . . . either annexation will be achieved or Crispi and Company will be flung out of the window.'

declaring that further delay would cause insurmountable difficulties both at home, where the people were clamouring to be relieved of provisional conditions, and in connection with the government at Turin. Piola, Minister of the Naval Department, had been commissioned to deliver this document and lend it his warmest support.¹

In a letter to La Farina written on September 7 Cordova expressed himself as follows, probably indulging in much exaggeration when alluding to his adversary:—

Things are getting hotter than ever here. On the evening of September 4, there was a violent scene in the Pro-Dictator's cabinet, when Crispi sought to attack me bodily, on account of a certain letter which speaks of secret circulars ordering the arrest of some of the annexationists. I have also mentioned this in a letter to the Count (Cavour). Yesterday we had Crispi's resignation, which was the outcome (according, at least, to Pisini's and Manzoni's accounts) of the Pro-Dictator's refusal: I.—to publish Garibaldi's letter against annexation, which Piola had brought; II.—to send Bottero and myself out of Sicily, with two hours' notice.

Yesterday there was a slight demonstration against

¹ Bertani in his diary, published by J. W. Mario (*Agostino Bertani e i suoi tempi*—Florence, Barbera, pages 456-457), wrote on this subject on September 4: "... Piola arrives. ... Has a heated conversation with Türr. Enters a room in a tavern. ... Garibaldi and Basso pass into another room. Cosenz arrives. I come in just as the General is dictating the following words to Basso: "Dear Depretis, let annexation take place as soon as you like." I gave a start of amazement and exclaimed: "General, you are abdicating!" He fixed that penetrating, questioning glance of his upon me. "Yes, General, you are hamstringing the revolution, and relinquishing all possibility of carrying out your programme. Sicily is your great source of strength, especially now, for you have not yet reached Naples." The argument waxed hot. ... I reminded him that ... so far Sicily alone had borne the cost of the war; that the banks of Messina were full of money and that Acerbi was near at hand, bringing in funds and provisions that had been contributed by Sicily. ... "You are right," the General said, and turning to Basso once more, he dictated as follows: "Dear Depretis, I think we will let Bonaparte wait a few days longer. Meanwhile get rid of half a dozen agitators." And here the incident ended."

Crispi, which broke up on the arrival of the news of his resignation. But before night he was back in office again, his resignation not having been accepted.*

Crispi had tendered his resignation with the firm intention of maintaining it, for the accusation he had hurled at Depretis, of having failed to fulfil the obligations assumed, made it imperative that he should resign.

Depretis first sought to retain Crispi, not knowing how to replace him in the ministry, and then directed his efforts towards delaying his departure for the camp, fearing the accusations he would be sure to lay before Garibaldi. The following notes, copied from the originals, serve to illustrate the Pro-Dictator's embarrassment.

2 September.—DEAR CRISPI,—Bottero is here. Will you see him for a few minutes? It would be a satisfaction to me.—Believe me, yours affectionately,
DEPRETIS.

5 September.—*To the Secretary of State.* DEAR SIR,—I beg you to honour me with your presence this evening at 9 o'clock, to confer concerning matters of state.

The Pro-Dictator,
DEPRETIS.

7 September.—DEAR CRISPI,—Your successor has not yet been appointed. I beg of you not to forsake me at this difficult moment. But if your resolve be indeed irrevocable, it is absolutely necessary that we should meet. I have many things to tell you, and all are of the greatest importance to the country.—Believe me your affectionate friend,
DEPRETIS.

8 September.—DEAR CRISPI,—Here is the great

news for you ! Garibaldi entered Naples yesterday at 12.30 P.M. Come and see me. DEPRETIS.

10 *September*.—DEAR CRISPI,—Keep quiet, for no steamer is leaving to-day. Come to see me to-night, I beg of you. Last night I waited for you in vain.—Yours, DEPRETIS.

The council at which Depretis proposed the proclamation of the franchise was held on the fifth. Crispi offered violent opposition to the motion, and voiced Garibaldi's wishes on the matter. Hereupon Depretis declared his intention of setting out for the camp, and appointed General Paternò, Minister of War, to represent him in his absence. Crispi opposed this also. The Pro-Dictator might not delegate to another that authority which had been already delegated to him, and had therefore no right to forsake his post. Depretis stood his ground, nevertheless, and ordered that the decree of delegation be prepared. Hereupon the council rose.

Early on the following morning Crispi personally tendered his resignation to Depretis, who refused to accept it. The Council of Ministers was convoked, and Crispi repeatedly summoned to attend, whereupon he sent in his resignation in writing, declaring that if he had not already left his office it was only because he was awaiting the arrival of his successor. Here are a few notes on the subject.

6 *September*.—*To the Pro-Dictator*. SIR,—After the explanations which I gave you at our last conference, allow me to repeat in writing, my request to be relieved of the Secretaryship of State and the Interior.—Believe me, etc. . . .

6 *September*.—*To the Pro-Dictator*. SIR,—I am still at my office awaiting the arrival of my successor.

7 *September*.—DEAR DEPRETIS,—I trust you have found a successor for me by this time. But at any

rate, no matter what measures you may have adopted, I warn you that I intend to start for the camp this very day. Under the present circumstances it is impossible for me to remain in Palermo. Please give orders that I am to be received on board the *Tükery* or any other steamer that is starting for Späri.

10 *September*.—DEAR DEPRETIS,—Is it true the steamer is starting to-day? If so I beg you to tell me so, and let me know at what time. Is it possible that I am doomed to remain in Sicily?

As was but natural, Crispi wrote to Garibaldi that same day to inform him of what had happened :—

For the last fortnight letters have been circulating all over Sicily, which are said to have been despatched from the Pro-Dictator's office, requesting the Municipal Bodies to assemble and vote an address asking for immediate annexation. Petitions are being circulated in Palermo for the same purpose, which impress the people the more because they are declared to express the desire of the Head of the State himself. The chief movers and their accomplices in this bogus demonstration are Cordova and his relations, and a certain Bottero, sent here expressly by Cavour. I hold documents that prove the truth of all these assertions, and I am ready to submit them to you at any time.

It is not true that the country really desires immediate annexation. The communal councils have either completely disregarded the pressure brought to bear by our enemies, or have voted in an entirely different direction. . . . I regret not to

have been able to join you, but Depretis forbade my going, fearing I should enlighten you on the true state of affairs. . . . From this distance I can only warn you not to believe the prophecies of imaginary danger in case you are really opposed to annexation. Sicily will obey your slightest sign. If Depretis, Cordova, Bottero and their helpers had not stirred up the country, no one in Sicily would have given a thought to immediate annexation. Drive out the agitators, issue a programme that shall clearly set forth your views, and the country will at once be quieted.

The bearers of this letter (Paolo Orlando and three others), all true patriots and devoted to the national cause, are going to you for the purpose of explaining the real state of affairs, and also to receive your orders.

P.S.—Depretis will probably go over and seek to persuade you to allow annexation to take place. He has given his word to Cavour to get this done. I have resigned.

In another letter, written the following day, Crispi insisted upon the necessity of Garibaldi's intervention in order to delay events, and added: 'Remember your reply to the Municipal Body of Palermo; let that be the basis of your programme.'

Between the eighteenth of August, the day Bixio landed at Melito, and the seventh of September, that is to say in twenty days, Garibaldi's volunteers made their way upwards as far as Naples, encountering but little opposition, and everywhere welcomed by the population as liberators.

Here are a few war bulletins that were despatched to the Sicilian government at this time.

Reggio, 21 *August*, 3 P.M.—To-day we have conquered once more. The enemy, part of whom

have fled while the rest are shut up in the fortress, have left us a good number of prisoners, arms and horses.

G. GARIBALDI.

23 *August*.—The two brigades, Melendez and Briganti, have surrendered unconditionally. We are in possession of their artillery, arms, ammunition and animals, and also of the Pizzo fort.

G. GARIBALDI.

Messina, 4 *September*.—On the day before yesterday General Garibaldi achieved further glorious success at Tiriolo near Sala, disarming 10,000 soldiers, and taking possession of twelve cannon and of a large quantity of requisites, as well as a number of horses and mules.

THE GOVERNOR.

Pialo, 6 *September*.—The Caldarella brigade, which withdrew from Cosenza after capitulation, has entered our service. The Dictator continues to press forward.

GENERAL SIRTORI.

Depretis was unwilling that Crispi should see Garibaldi and report what was going on at Palermo unless he himself could be present. Piola must certainly have informed him how suddenly the General had altered his opinion concerning annexation, and he therefore deemed himself justified in believing that he might be induced to change his decision a second time. Depretis and Crispi, therefore, set out by the same steamer, and joined Garibaldi at Naples. Both had an interview with him, and the General demanded time to decide. Meanwhile a deputation had arrived from Palermo, and after having listened to their petition the Dictator summoned Depretis, and acquainted him with the complaints they had laid before him. Depretis could not justify his attitude. He soon saw that he no longer enjoyed the confidence he could

not do without, and proceeded to tender his resignation, which was immediately accepted.¹

This took place on September 16. There was no longer any government in Sicily, and Garibaldi determined to set out for Palermo that very day.² He desired Crispi to accompany him, but Crispi sought to avoid doing so. The country knew of his disagreement with Depretis, and his return now, at the Dictator's side, and after his adversary had been forced to retire, would have been a triumph indeed. But he was satisfied with the knowledge that his conduct and his loyalty to the programme had been publicly recognised. He had no desire to be avenged, nor to resume the direction of Sicilian affairs, after the four months of torment through which he had passed. His one wish was to remain with Garibaldi. He was by his side at last, and he was determined not to leave him again.

But Garibaldi insisted, and Crispi finally feigned to yield, but at 8 P.M., the hour fixed for the departure of the *Elettrico*, he had not come aboard. When the steamer was well under way he telegraphed as follows to Signor Parisi, Director for the Interior:—

As soon as the General Dictator arrives give him the following despatch: 'To the Dictator.—I did not reach the steamer in time to accompany you to Palermo last night, as you had ordered me to do. If it is not too late, and my presence in Sicily is still necessary, let me know and I will come.'

CRISPI.

¹ Garibaldi's attitude of severity towards Depretis in his disagreement with Crispi acquires special significance if we consider that only a few days had elapsed since that famous proclamation to the people of Palermo (September 11) which began with the words: 'Whether I be far away or near at hand, I am with you, my brave people of Palermo, and I shall be with you as long as I draw breath,' and in which Garibaldi went on to speak of the Pro-Dictator in the following terms:—'. . . I was forced to leave you, in the interest of the great cause, but I left you my second self, Depretis!'

² 'Why was it that as long as the expedition lasted they never ceased to incite the Sicilians against me, using the annexation question as a pretext, and finally obliging me to leave the army near the Volturmo, on the eve of a battle, and return to the Island to appease the population?' (Garibaldi, letter to the *Movimento* of Genoa, August 24, 1869).

The country remained in a state of great agitation for some days after Depretis' departure from Palermo. The annexationists were living in hopes that the Pro-Dictator would return with the decree for assembling the electoral colleges. 'In a few hours now,' Cordova wrote to La Farina, 'Depretis will be back. On leaving he said to Casalis¹ that he would not return without the authorisation to convoke the electoral colleges at once, and proceed to annexation.' But meanwhile, in consequence of an order received from Naples, both Cordova and Bottero² were expelled from Sicily.

'At the very moment when Crispi and Depretis were leaving Palermo,' so Cordova himself wrote, 'the following despatch left Naples (11 September, 12 P.M.). "General Sirtori to the Pro-Dictator.—Send Cordova to Naples at once." This order was undoubtedly provoked by Crispi, to get me out of Sicily. Unless Depretis takes advantage of Garibaldi's altered policy (altered we suppose it to be, at least) and brings back a counter-order, or should he hesitate to provoke the General, I shall have to start for Naples before night! This greatly disturbs me, for I can be still more useful here in the times that are fast approaching.'*

Cordova sought to gain time, but on the fifteenth a 'thundering telegram' from Sirtori put an end to delay. He set out on the sixteenth, after having been warned that if he did

¹ This is Bartolomeo Casalis, who later rose to a position of eminence in the hierarchy of administration and was made a senator. At this time he was termed 'Cavour's fourth-rate agent,' and was expelled by Mordini.

² Bottero, who later on, as editor of that most influential journal the *Gazzetta del Popolo*, was one of the leading spirits of liberal Piedmont, became a fervent admirer of Crispi, and openly defended his policy, at a time when many so-called liberals were fighting him with dishonest weapons. In a letter of February 24, 1895, Bottero wrote to Crispi: 'Your name and your past stand for one long glorious policy, which cannot be cancelled, and which will ever remain the property of the nation. We will carry on the struggle with renewed faith; faith in you, who were and are a very pillar of Unity, and a statesman of the broadest views.'

not go of his own free will the *Carabinieri* would escort him aboard ship.

The excitement in Palermo is easily explained if we reflect that there were conflicting rumours of a Cordova-Bottero plot to proclaim the Duke of Genoa King of Sicily, and of a project, championed by Crispi, for binding Sicily to Naples. Then, on the sixteenth, a report spread rapidly that Garibaldi was ill, whereupon a manifesto was issued, signed by all the ministers, and declaring that: 'Up to the present moment, 3 P.M., no despatch from the Dictator to the government has been received from Naples. Therefore all reports now circulating among the public are herewith declared destitute of foundation.'

When Garibaldi reached Palermo the news of his coming had not yet become generally known, but the people assembled rapidly, and gave him an impressive welcome. On reaching the Royal Palace he found the great square crowded to overflowing, and his words of greeting and of thanks to 'the people of the barricades, that had cost him so much trouble and fatigue; the people to whom he was bound by common ties of danger and of glory,' were received with interminable applause.

The Dictator remained but a few hours in Palermo, just long enough to summon and dismiss the ministers and nominate a new Pro-Dictator. His choice fell upon Antonio Mordini. On starting for Naples he addressed the following proclamation:—

TO THE PEOPLE OF PALERMO

The people of Palermo—as they once faced bombardment undismayed — have recently faced those individuals who wished to corrupt and mislead them.

They have talked to you of annexation as if they were even more eager than I, for the regeneration of Italy.—But their true purpose was to serve base personal interests, and you replied as a people

should, who is conscious of its own dignity, and has faith in the sacred and inviolate programme proclaimed by me :

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL !

At Rome, O people of Palermo, we will proclaim the Kingdom of Italy, and there solemnly sanctify the great family gathering of all the free and of all who were slaves, and who are sons of the same soil.

Annexation was desired at Palermo that I might be prevented from crossing the Strait.

Annexation is desired at Naples that I may be prevented from crossing the Volturno.

But as long as there are chains to be rent asunder in Italy, I will keep on my way, or I will lay my bones by the roadside.

I leave you *Mordini* as Pro-Dictator, and he will prove himself worthy of you and of Italy.

I wish, furthermore, to thank you and the brave National Militia for the trust you have placed in me and in the redemption of our country.—Yours,

G. GARIBALDI.

PALERMO, 17 *September*, 1860.

Garibaldi was back in Naples on the eighteenth. On that same day Cordova wrote to La Farina assuring him that ‘nothing further is needed in order to break off all connection with the Crispi-Garibaldi past, save the reappearance of our military flag off the coast of Palermo, floating above a vessel that bears a battalion of *Bersaglieri*. Everything is prepared here.’

CHAPTER XVII

Garibaldi at Naples—His first acts—The Neapolitan fleet entrusted to Admiral Persano—A ministry of conservatives—Struggle between Cavourians and *Garibaldini*—Cavour hastens the occupation of Umbria and the Marches in order to bar Garibaldi's passage—A letter from Victor Emmanuel—Minister Scialoja wishes to bestow an allowance upon a Bourbon princess—Decrees of September 16 and 20—Crispi Minister of Sicilian and of Foreign Affairs—Letter from Mordini concerning his government—Bertani leaves Naples, and Crispi assumes the General Secretaryship of the Dictature—Crispi and the journal *Nazionale*—Agitation amongst annexationists encouraged by the conservative ministers—No longer possible to postpone annexation, as Piedmontese troops are advancing towards Naples—Was Garibaldi's plan to deliver Rome absurd?—Political atmosphere of Turin described by the Deputy Asproni—Mordini, fearing the landing of Piedmontese troops in Sicily, convokes the Sicilian Assembly.

AT Naples Garibaldi was not allowed to enjoy his triumph, for Cavour poisoned his happiness from the very beginning.¹

During this period the Count had a day-to-day policy, and on July 11, before the battle of Milazzo had taken place, he wrote to Admiral Persano:—

It is therefore desirable, on the one hand, that Garibaldi be prevented, *at all costs*, from crossing over to the Continent, and on the other hand, that an uprising in Naples be encouraged.

After Milazzo, realising that no one would be able to check Garibaldi's victorious advance, he hastened to write to

¹ 'And how about the machinations of Cavour's agents on Neapolitan territory to stir up a revolution against the Bourbon before our arrival, thus depriving us of all the merit, whereas the Sardinian government was all the while protesting its friendship for the unfortunate Francesco II.?' (Garibaldi, letter quoted above).

Admiral Persano in a letter designed for the Dictator's reading :—

After such a splendid victory I do not see how he can be prevented from crossing over to the Continent. . . . We must let Garibaldi have his way.

A second letter, which was confidential, contained the words :—

Do not facilitate Garibaldi's passage to the Continent, but rather seek to detain him as long as possible by indirect means.

Cavour left no stone unturned in his efforts to deprive Garibaldi of the glory of delivering Naples as well as Sicily. He despatched Persano, equipped with unlimited authority and much money, and surrounded him with Sardinian and Neapolitan agents; he even evolved a plan for making the Conte di Siracusa, Francesco the Second's uncle, regent, preferring his rule to Garibaldi's Dictatorship!

But all his efforts failed, and the uprising in Naples did not take place. The King and the court left Naples on September 6, not because they feared the band of official conspirators, but because Garibaldi was near at hand!

Unarmed, accompanied only by a few friends, and welcomed with extraordinary rejoicings by the Neapolitans, who were probably more amazed than conscious of the importance of the event, Garibaldi had assumed the Dictatorship, not for the 'Mazzinians,' but for Italy and for Victor Emmanuel, and his first edict read as follows :—

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Dictator herewith decrees :

That all gun-boats and the vessels composing the mercantile navy of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, all arsenals and naval appurtenances, are herewith incorporated with the fleet of the King of

Italy, Victor Emmanuel, which is under Admiral Persano's command.

NAPLES, 7 September, 1860.

Garibaldi showed weakness in the composition of his government, which was formed almost exclusively of members of the conservative party. Only Agostino Bertani, who was appointed Secretary-General of the Dictature, belonged to the Party of Action.

However, on September 16 Garibaldi issued the following decree :—

The Dictator, being forced by the necessities of war to absent himself from the administrative centres of Southern Italy, delegates two Pro-Dictators to represent him, one in Sicily, the other in the fifteen provinces of the Continent.

The Dictator reserves to himself the supreme direction of political and military matters, and the sanctioning of all acts of legislation.

The Dictator will therefore appoint the Ministers and other representatives in foreign countries, the Secretaries of State, the State Councillors, the Judge of the Apostolic Legation of Sicily, the Ministers of State, the Directors of Departments, the Governors, the Prefect of Police at Naples, the Questors of the police force in Sicily and all superior Officers and the Generals. The Secretary-General will always have his headquarters in the Dictator's immediate vicinity.

G. GARIBALDI.*

The Secretary-General,

A. BERTANI,

Colonel of the General-Staff.

At Naples the strife between the two factions waxed hotter than ever around the Dictator. The conservative Cavourians approved of what had already been achieved, that is to say,

the redemption of the two Sicilies, but they condemned the future programme that implied the continuation of the war until the whole of Italy should have been set free. And as this programme had been proclaimed and confirmed by Garibaldi, the action of the Neapolitan conservatives was really directed against him, through his faithful friends and companions in arms.

Had Garibaldi held steadily and firmly on his way and kept the power within the loyal circle of his own friends, Count Cavour might still have succeeded in preventing his advance on Rome, but he would not have been able to bring about annexation in the way in which it was ultimately effected.

There exist irrefutable proofs that the Piedmontese government had decided to prevent Garibaldi from attacking Rome, even, if necessary, *resorting to arms against him*; and it is furthermore certain that the occupation of Umbria and the Marches, ordered by Cavour, was a consequence of Garibaldi's programme. Cavour wrote as follows on September 11 :—

He (Garibaldi) never fails to display his antagonism to the French government; he talks of going to Rome, declares he does not fear the Emperor of the French, and is constantly committing other indiscretions of a like nature. This conduct of his has forced His Majesty's government to adopt energetic measures in the question of Umbria and the Marches, although it never forgets that daring must not exclude the greatest possible prudence.

On the seventeenth he again wrote :—

Once in Naples Garibaldi has flung aside his mask (?!) announcing by his address to the Palermians, his firm determination to go to Rome, and sending Trecchi to the King to demand that Farini and I be excluded from his council. The King replied calmly but firmly. . . . As a matter of fact we have not yet decided how to act should Gari-

baldi refuse to obey the orders the King has sent him by Count Vimercati. But I have an idea, and that is, to propose to the Council that Persano be sent to Palermo with the fleet and a regiment of soldiers, for the purpose of bringing about annexation, and I would also *establish an 'observation corps' under General Cialdini, along the Neapolitan frontier.* This corps should be composed, as far as possible, of veteran troops, or of such as are least susceptible to the influence of 'Garibaldism.'

Victor Emmanuel was no less determined than his government. On September 20 he wrote to General Fanti :—

I do not know what Garibaldi's conduct will be, but if he follows the line he has now adopted, and on which I am seeking to place a check, his conduct cannot be other than bad, and we shall be forced to assume a resolute attitude. He has written to me requesting me to dissolve my Cabinet, and declaring that he will proclaim me King of Italy from the Capitol, when he has hounded the French out of Rome. *I wish you to bear in mind, General, that Garibaldi is not to cross the frontier of the Kingdom of Naples. I gave my word to the Emperor that he should not.*

Garibaldi certainly did not deserve the harsh criticism contained in Cavour's letter of September 11 ; his own honest nature had prompted him to consign the Neapolitan fleet to Persano and to give government into the hands of the Cavourians. Crispi immediately perceived the error that had been committed, and at the very moment of the Dictator's arrival at Palermo on September 17 he despatched a telegraphic message to him, calling his attention to the fact that the Council of Ministers had not approved his decree concerning the Pro-Dictatorships, and exhorting him to surround

himself with 'our own people—to check the advances of those who have always been our enemies, or, at least, lukewarm in their friendship for us. Any other policy will surely lead us to ruin.'

On September 18 the Minister of Finance, Antonio Scialoja, prepared a decree by virtue of which Princess Maria Vittoria Luigia Filiberta, wife of the Conte di Siracusa, would receive a monthly allowance of 4000 ducats 'for the proper maintenance of her establishment.'

But Scialoja's solicitude on behalf of a Bourbon princess failed to meet with the approbation either of Crispi or Bertani, and the minister deemed it advisable to despatch his decree directly to the Dictator for signature, together with the following letter:—

To the General Dictator.

The proposed decree herein enclosed was discussed in Council and in the presence of the Pro-Dictator. After the confiscation of the property and of the appanages of the reigning house and the Bourbon princes, it was found that a princess of the house of Savoy, a cousin of Victor Emmanuel's, who has remained here, undaunted and fearless, has not sufficient means to maintain herself as befits her rank. That this manifestation of confidence in the dictatorial government on the part of a woman, may be met with becoming chivalry, it is proposed to make the princess a monthly allowance. I am convinced that you, General and Dictator, will grant your approval to the proposal of the Council, and place your signature beneath the decree herewith submitted to you.

You will easily comprehend why I am taking the liberty of sending it *directly to you*.

Believe me, with sincere admiration, etc.

But Garibaldi shared his friends' opinion that 4000 ducats

a month might be spent to better purpose, and declined to sign the decree.

By an edict dated September 20 Garibaldi, acting on Crispi's advice, strengthened the position of his own friends Cithout, however, dismissing the ministers already appointed. He nominated two Secretaries of State, one for Sicilian the other for Neapolitan affairs, who were to remain in his *entourage* and 'at his disposal'; he ordered that the General-Secretariate be endowed with the same prerogatives enjoyed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers under the former *régime*—that, according to the law enacted on September 16, all matters be examined by that one of the two secretaries in charge of the special province to which the matter referred; and the edict concluded with the provision that the Departments of War and of Foreign Affairs be placed under the Dictator's immediate control.

Thus the bulk of power was concentrated in the hands of Crispi, who, while retaining the Secretaryship of Sicilian Affairs, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by a decree dated September 22, and in those of Bertani, Secretary-General of the Dictature.

In the following letter Crispi explained this arrangement to the Pro-Dictator Mordini on September 27.

NAPLES, 27 Sept., 1860.

To the Pro-Dictator.

The Dictator has received your letters of the 22nd, and noted the several objections concerning the regulations that circumscribe the prerogatives of the Pro-Dictatorship. He has requested me to answer them, and I do so at once, as I am sure you are anxiously awaiting a reply.

By means of the laws enacted on September 16 and 20, the Dictator intends :

- I.—To place the Department of War under one head,
- II.—To prepare Naples and Sicily for ultimate union with the Kingdom of Italy, by means of a system of unified legislation,

III.—To create in foreign countries, and at those courts where representation is necessary, a sole organ for the transmission of his ideas.

He has therefore reserved to himself the right to sanction all laws, the Departments of War and of Foreign Affairs, which branches will be dealt with at the General Secretariate, by two Secretaries of State, at the disposal of the Dictator.

The Dictator is determined that, until such a time as Southern Italy shall have been incorporated with the Kingdom of Italy, Naples and Sicily shall have two free and independent governments. The ministers at Naples will possess no authority over Sicily, nor those of Sicily over Naples. They will govern as if the countries were two separate provinces, bound together only politically and by the common cause which unites us all.

As to the expenses of the war, the two governments will keep separate accounts, and the two provinces will contribute in proportion to the number of their inhabitants. Should one province be forced to spend more than the amount established, the other will make up the deficit. These regulations have been established in order that the Dictator's wish may be complied with, and an exact estimate made, at the close of the war, of how much the redemption of Southern Italy has cost, from the moment of the General's landing at Marsala until the taking of Gaeta.

The Dictator is doing his best to establish easier and more regular means of communication between Naples and Sicily. He will try to secure the services of other steamers besides those belonging to Florio.

Everything that can accrue to the welfare of

Sicily it rests with you to undertake, and you may rely implicitly upon the General's approbation.

F. CRISPI.

The Pro-Dictator Mordini had very wisely determined upon a line of conduct which, while firm, was nevertheless conciliatory.

‘At the moment of my nomination,’ he wrote on September 25, ‘I had little reason to hope that I should soon find myself surrounded by such peace and quiet. I sought to know the people, and to make myself known to them. The fact that I represented Garibaldi was my greatest recommendation. . . . The formation of the Ministry made an excellent impression.¹ The country saw that our views were not one-sided, and that while staunchly maintaining Garibaldi’s programme, we would not stoop to convert the government into a party. . . .’

It is true that two of Cavour’s principal agents, Cordova and Bottero, had been banished, and that Mordini now proceeded to rid himself of a third, who was still at Palermo.

‘Under existing circumstances,’ Mordini continued, ‘the arrival of Signor Casalis was fatal. Not that he is either influential or powerful, but his previous conduct. . . should have sufficed to make his coming here impossible. As soon as he arrived here he called upon all of Signor Cordova’s relations and friends, and before coming to see me. I was, however, aware of his movements. He lost no time in spreading the rumour that Depretis would soon arrive in the capacity of Royal Commissary, and be accompanied by 4000 Piedmontese. If, by convey-

¹ Nicola Fabrizi, Giorgio Tamaio, Paolo Orlando, Monsignore Ugduleña, and G. B. Fauchè were members of this cabinet, all men of well-known integrity.

ing the impression that my government is to last but a few days, they succeed in sapping my moral strength, I greatly fear the result, for my material strength is slight enough. The agitators, taking advantage of Casalis' presence, boast themselves authorised from "on high," and conspire more actively than ever. They are now trying to collect names for an address to the King, begging him to send troops to Sicily. . . . They are also seeking to persuade the Municipal Council to do the same. . . . After allowing Signor Casalis to have his own way for a time, that I might study his methods; I finally gave orders for his arrest. . . . The Sardinian Consul asked that the prisoner might remain at his residence, and to this I consented. But the Consul presently demanded that Casalis be removed from his house and conveyed aboard ship. . . . He is convinced that the agent's arrest was a precautionary measure, adopted to ensure his personal safety, which was threatened by the indignation now reigning among the people.'

On the following day (September 26) Mordini wrote to Crispi, who had offered him some suggestions in connection with the government:—

I have received your letter. I will act upon your advice. . . . The only thing that troubles me is the dread of one day seeing the Piedmontese fleet appear, with a couple of regiments of soldiers. I have no other fear than this, and the Dictator may rest easy as far as Sicily is concerned. . . . On the whole, the conditions are satisfactory, and nowhere even in continental Italy would you find a quieter city than Palermo.

Mordini's dread of violence on the part of the Sardinian

government was not unfounded. That Cavour had really contemplated a violent course, and at La Farina's suggestion, is apparent from his letter of September 17, given above. La Farina and Casalis had, moreover, succeeded in getting a deputation, led by Father Ottavio Lanza, and composed of Matteo Reali, Count Manzoni, Prince di Trabia, Prince di Belmonte, Prince Biscari, Baron Spedalieri and others, to go to Turin and beg the King to send troops and a Royal Commissary to Sicily. We know that the deputation was received by Cavour on October 13, and our knowledge is derived from a source above suspicion. La Farina himself wrote as follows to Pietro Gramignani on September 15:—

. . . Garibaldi will not hear of the elections. . . . We must therefore make all haste to create a provisional government (if we may count on the National Guard) or, *at least despatch a deputation of notabilities* to implore the King's protection. The King, in this case, would send a Commissary to Sicily with a body of troops sufficiently strong to ensure respect of his authority.*

Mordini, meanwhile, was embarrassed by the daily demands for men and arms that were coming to him from Naples.

The Minister himself sends me an order from the Dictator to despatch more troops, thus stripping Sicily, which needs them so much.

On September 30 Bertani left Naples, and Crispi undertook the duties of Secretary-General of the Dictature.

During his short term of office Bertani had been made the object of all manner of accusations. The Cavourians accused him of having perverted Garibaldi, and of having carried out his own wishes even when they clashed with the Dictator's. The *Nazionale*, a journal that had been started at Naples with capital provided by the Piedmontese government,¹ and of which Ruggero Bonghi was editor, attacked Bertani with especial

¹ See *Silvio Spaventa*, by Benedetto Croce, Naples; Morano, 1898, pages 292-294.

violence, hurling false and odious accusations against him, such as that of having ordered the governor of the province of Teramo to offer armed resistance to the entrance of the Royal Piedmontese troops into the Neapolitan States. One fact, however, is firmly established, that Garibaldi, who was always easily impressed, after receiving three letters full of complaints from the ministers Romano, Pianelli, Cosenz, Scialoja, D'Affitto, and Conforti, became distinctly cold in his bearing towards his Secretary-General, who failed to recover his favour. It also happened at this time that several decrees dealing with military matters which had been prepared by Bertani were not approved by the Dictator, who ordered them to be submitted to the Minister of War, Cosenz. It was probably Carlo Cattaneo who, having at last accepted his friends' invitation to come to Naples, where he was greatly esteemed, advised Bertani to start for Turin in time for the opening of Parliament on October 2. Bertani wrote to him as follows on October 6:—

You who were instrumental in bringing about my departure, should now seek to obtain a word from Garibaldi in my favour, for they are accusing me here of having deceived Garibaldi, and they say he has turned against me. To forsake me now would be an act of ingratitude.

After Bertani's departure Crispi found himself in a most difficult position. The agents of Cavour,¹ who had failed to rouse the people against Francesco II., were now labouring to incite them against the men by whom Garibaldi was surrounded, laying stress upon a Jesuitical distinction between himself and them. On every possible occasion his praises were sung, while his followers were spared no injurious accusations, beginning with that of having 'played false to Garibaldi's true intentions.' All this activity, that aimed at separating the Dictator from those who had shared with him the dangers of the expedition, and who were the true representatives of his political opinions, aroused his indignation at last, especially as he could

¹ Cavour had placed 1,000,000 lire at the service of his agents. See Persano, *Diary*, page 151.

not doubt that Crispi, who up to October 5 had worked to delay annexation, had, in so doing, simply laboured to maintain that programme with which the Thousand had set out from Quarto.

Cavour's press was now accusing Crispi of acts of despotism, and seeking to place him in an evil light. But Crispi was not the man to sit still under false accusations, and his answer came without delay.

To the Editor of the Nazionale.

In speaking of me in your issue of yesterday, you committed three grave errors.

I relinquished my office in Sicily of my own free will. By my resignation, and by repairing at once to head-quarters, I succeeded in preventing the immediate and unconditional annexation of my native Island to Piedmont. The General Dictator, who visited Palermo on the seventeenth of last month, had the opportunity of convincing himself that my presence was greatly desired in my own country. He moreover declared this in public on his return to Naples, in the presence of the former Pro-Dictator, Signor Depretis.

I never received any compensation for my services as Secretary of State. Up to the present, the many services I have rendered to my country have brought me no other recompense than imprisonment, exile and honest poverty. I believe none of your friends can say as much.

I never issued any orders that rigorous measures be adopted against those who signed petitions to the King. To the governor of Chieti, who had applied to the General Secretariate of the Dictature for orders on this point, I replied simply that *annexationist* petitions were not to be tolerated, this being the wish of the Dictator himself, and I imparted

the same general rule to the governors of the other provinces.

I beg you, Sir, kindly to insert this correction in the next issue of your journal. F. CRISPI.

The following telegrams reached the General-Secretariate on the first and second of October.

1 *October*, 10.54 P.M.—We have conquered all along the line. There is an isolated column of royal troops near Caserta. We hope to take them all prisoners.

2 *October*, 1.30 P.M.—The Bourbon troops repulsed from Caserta. The General Dictator, General Bixio and Brigadier Sacchi are cutting off their retreat.

2 *o'clock*, P.M.—The General Dictator still pursuing, and cutting the enemy to pieces above Caserta. The enemy, numbering 8000, still retreating in great disorder.

3 *o'clock*, P.M.—We have taken 2000 prisoners. They are starting for Naples. Order out the National Guard to meet them.

After this fresh and important victory Garibaldi, who had recently been depressed and uneasy, quickly regained his usual good spirits, and the task of accomplishing his mission must have appeared less arduous to him.

On the 2nd of October he received a telegram from Crispi :—

An address to His Majesty Victor Emmanuel is circulating here in Naples, demanding that he should come and restore peace and quiet to the Kingdom. People are being intimidated, and made to sign in the streets and *cafés*. What do you wish me to do ?

On the same day, at 7.35 P.M., the Dictator despatched the following order to Crispi from Caserta.

Come and see me to-morrow.

The result of this interview was the telegram from the Secretary-General to the governors of all the provinces ordering that annexationist petitions be forbidden.

But the Minister of the Interior, Conforti, was the Dictator's minister only up to a certain point, and that he opposed his orders is evident from the following note :—

*The Governor of Salerno
to the Secretary-General of the Dictature,
at Naples.*

I have this minute received the following telegram from the Minister of the Interior :—

You will be held responsible for all rigorous measures adopted against those persons who have signed or shall sign petitions to King Victor Emmanuel.

Our invincible Dictator issues his decrees in the name of Victor Emmanuel, and desires that Victor Emmanuel be King of Italy. It would therefore be strange indeed if such as see fit to petition him should be subjected to rigorous measures. The national vote must be free—that is what the Dictator desires.

It is of course understood that all addresses shall recognise the Dictatorship of this great man who has delivered Southern Italy, and to whom the country owes eternal gratitude.

Reply at once by telegraph.

NAPLES, 5 October, 1860.

You who are familiar with preceding events will need no explanation of the true meaning of this telegram. I must inform you, however, that no steps have been taken here against the authors of petitions. The minister would probably be gratified to see those brave patriots severely punished, who have opposed these addresses as illegal and pernicious,

and whose one thought is not of petitions, but of how best to procure arms for themselves and their friends, and of hastening to the spot where the salvation of our country is being consummated—the Headquarters of the Dictator.

I shall look for an answer.

Such conditions as these could not last. Either Garibaldi and Crispi must yield or rigorous measures must be adopted against a party that was deriving moral strength and material support from the government of Victor Emmanuel.

In reality the determination of the Piedmontese government to invade Umbria and the Marches with their own forces, and to send the King to Naples, had made it impossible for Garibaldi to persevere in carrying out his programme.

Had this unforeseen obstacle not existed the Neapolitan reactionaries might easily have been reduced to silence, and after the victory of October 1 Garibaldi's army, reorganised and increased in numbers by recruits not only from every corner of Italy but from foreign lands as well¹—for many were eager to hasten to Naples and enlist—might have overcome the Bourbons' last weak efforts at resistance, and reached Rome itself.

And would Napoleon III., in the face of a popular insurrection and of the firm determination of the Italian nation to achieve Union, have sent that same army to defend the Pope which, but one year before, had crossed the Alps to strike for Italy's independence?

Those who do not hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative have not reflected that Napoleon, before deciding upon a line of conduct so manifestly absurd, must have paused to consider the consequences of fresh intervention on his part in Italian affairs. That he was making a second and far more important expedition to Rome simply out of regard for the Holy See the world would refuse to believe, and would jump to the conclusion that after victory would come the demand

¹ On October 5 Garibaldi authorised a committee of the *Démocratie Française*, of which General L. Mieroslowski was a member, to organise a 'foreign legion,' which would come and fight for the complete redemption of the Italian nation.

for territorial compensation. Now England, after the annexation of Nice and Savoy, would not tolerate this! Napoleon's throne, moreover, did not stand so firm as to warrant disregard of the danger that the revolution, suppressed in Rome, might not find an echo in Paris.

Nor was it to be expected that Austria, after the defeat of the preceding year, and the internal complications, both economic and political, that had arisen from it, would risk further misfortune for love of the Temporal Power. But, even had Austria intervened, a defeat of her forces would have effected the results of the war of 1859, and the kingdom of Sardinia could not long have remained a simple spectator. With its army swelled to 300,000 by the contingents from Lombardy and Central Italy, Piedmont must have participated in that great and noble national struggle, which would have been worthy of our glorious traditions, and of which the Union of all Italian peoples would have been the inevitable result.

Be this as it may, we cannot wonder at the manifestation of faith and enthusiasm that was great in the beginning and mighty indeed after the consummation of events. We are not in a position to judge of what that ardent enthusiasm was capable that swayed the soul of a whole nation, with Garibaldi at its head. The great French revolution never paused in its course, but having driven the stranger from the territory of France, it pushed onwards to impose peace in the capitals of the invaders themselves.

The detachment under General Fanti had no great difficulty in carrying out the undertaking that had been desired and prepared by Mazzini and Bertani. Count Cavour arranged it with all possible sagacity, and as far as the Pope was concerned, took but little thought of international rights. With Napoleon, however, his conduct was such that the Emperor did not know whether to blame him or be grateful to him. But his first thought was to be revenged on Garibaldi. He had failed to detain him at Quarto, when he was of opinion that the fruit of Union was still unripe; he had been unable to limit Garibaldi's achievements to the taking of Sicily or to prevent the redemption of Naples. Now, however, he might reach Umbria and the Marches before him, and he was

determined not to forfeit this satisfaction. But the Bourbon dynasty would not have fallen had Garibaldi been checked at Messina, and had he not reconfirmed his programme on reaching Naples, Cavour could not have said what he did to Baron de Talleyrand, Napoleon's representative at Turin, on the eighth and eleventh of September :—

Le gouvernement Piémontais, ne pouvant arrêter la marche de Garibaldi ni à Naples ni dans les Romagnes, doit lui opposer une barrière près des Abruzzes.

Si nous ne sommes pas à la Cattolica avant Garibaldi, nous sommes perdus ; la révolution envahit l'Italie entière. Nous sommes forcés d'agir.

Cavour's intentions are clearly stated in his telegram of August 29, addressed to Costantino Nigra, the Piedmontese representative at Paris :—

Farini and Cialdini returned from Chambéry this morning. It is too late to prevent Garibaldi from reaching Naples and getting himself proclaimed Dictator there. We must not offer further opposition to him in this region, and I have therefore written to Persano to limit his operations to taking possession of the forts and securing the Neapolitan fleet, and to arrange with Garibaldi himself concerning all other matters. As we did not succeed in getting ahead of him at Naples, we must stop him somewhere else. This we will do in Umbria and the Marches. An insurrectional movement is about to break out there, and at its first manifestation, Cialdini will enter the Marches and Fanti invade Umbria, in the name of order and humanity. They will proceed to fling Lamoricière into the sea and occupy Ancona, declaring Rome inviolate. This plan has the Emperor's approval.*

As a matter of fact, there exist many documents to prove that the 'Emperor's approval' was a myth. In a note to his diplomatic agents dated October 18, '60, Thouvenel, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared this assertion to be a 'calumny,' and went on to relate that the Emperor had been informed by Minister Farini that the Piedmontese troops would enter Umbria and the Marches solely for the purpose of re-establishing order and of *combating the revolution on Neapolitan territory should this be necessary*, after which the Italian question would be immediately submitted to a congress. In the end the French representative at Turin was recalled by his government. From the very beginning Cavour foresaw the possibility of armed conflict with the *Garibaldini*,¹ and he expressed his consciousness of this possibility in a deplorable declaration that he was ready to 'resort even to civil war.' Later on, the knowledge that Napoleon could not offer armed resistance made him openly audacious.²

As descriptive of the political atmosphere of Turin at that time the following letter of October 4, from the Deputy Asproni to Crispi, is of interest.

I enclose three copies of the two laws Cavour has presented to the Chamber for discussion. Read them carefully. They contain a veritable challenge to Garibaldi and to the party that supports him, and an open provocation to civil war.³ Cavour and

¹ In a letter to Nigra (September 22) Cavour, who was indignant because Garibaldi had advised the King to get rid of him, declared that the Dictator had flung aside his monarchical mask (?), that order should be re-established at Naples and Palermo within a fortnight, even 'if we have to fling all the *Garibaldini* into the sea,' and that Cialdini's and Fanti's soldiers asked for nothing better than to rid the country of 'red shirts.'

² Thouvenel wrote to Gramont on September 23: 'His Majesty, however, is of opinion that a military expedition into Umbria and the Marches is impossible. The conditions that now prevail in Italy would necessitate an army in order to carry out our intentions. The Roman question would become entangled with all the others, and we should be exposed to all manner of complications.' And E. Ollivier added; 'This was the final decision. And what did it mean? That once more it was the Emperor alone who determined our policy.'*

³ This was the draft of a bill 'authorising government to accept and establish by Royal Decrees, the annexation to the State, of new Italian provinces.'

Farini are ready to shed blood. An overwhelming majority in the Chamber applauds insanely and slavishly, and is ready to grant even more than Cavour himself dares to demand. In the 7th Committee Room, La Farina drew a most horrible picture of the state of things in Sicily, declaring in violent language, that the Island was a prey to anarchy and in dire need of prompt, efficacious and stringent measures. Some one replied by pointing out his natural tendency to wild exaggeration, and his ill-controlled longing to be revenged for personal offences. But in spite of all our efforts he missed his appointment as Commissary by three votes only. Although certain of ultimate defeat the minority is making a brave stand, trusting that its attitude may at least serve as a lesson to future generations who, it is to be hoped, will be more honest, and less susceptible to the corrupting action of Jesuitism. . . . That ancient 'Jesuit of the Left,' the former Pro-Dictator Depretis,¹ has come over to our side, and is fighting the government and defending Garibaldi. Cast off by Cavour on account of his want of success, scourged by Bottero, who has not a good word for

¹ Eighteen years later.

It was during the month of February 1878. Pius ix. was dead, and the Conclave was to meet and appoint his successor. This was a great event, and was being looked forward to with interest not only in Italy, but in foreign lands as well; for it would be the first Conclave held in Italian Rome, and the ultra-clerical party hoped that this solemn occasion would enable them to prove that the Church was not free. But order was maintained in every particular, and the Conclave was able to fulfil its mission with perfect freedom. Crispi, as Minister of the Interior, received great praise for this. However, a disagreement arose at this time between Crispi and Depretis, who was then Prime Minister. Crispi knew his business, had taken every precaution, and made all necessary arrangements with the person in authority at the Vatican during the interregnum. Depretis took it upon himself to offer some advice which Crispi interpreted as a mark of distrust. The consequence was that on

him, he has come to the conclusion that he is better off in the party of opposition, which, although weak to-day, is sure of the future, and so he is all for the revolution. Never a word from him against you or your government.

There is but one voice here in Piedmont. All are for Cavour, body and soul, and all speak of Garibaldi with anger and contempt. The entire press is singing Cavour's praises. Even the *Diritto* veered round a short time since, and changed its tone. The secret motive for all this is neither love and esteem for Cavour nor hatred of Garibaldi—it is the fear of losing the Capital that is driving them all crazy. For the reasons I shall go on to explain, they now believe they have won. Public opinion is no less perverted in Liguria, Tuscany and Lombardy. In Genoa they tried to stir up a hostile demonstration against Bertani, who was accused of having advised Garibaldi in a spirit of hateful democracy. In Milan the walls of the houses are papered with manifestos displaying the words, *Down with the Mazzinians*, in huge letters. By 'Mazzinians' they mean all those who are in favour of Garibaldi, against whom the most odious insults were recently launched. Now, however, they have changed their tactics and are directing all their efforts towards separating his cause from that of his true friends, isolating him, stripping him of all political significance, annihilating

February 9 he wrote as follows to the Prime Minister, addressing him with the formal 'lei' (the third person) instead of the familiar 'thou':— 'I am well aware that I am not a minister after your own heart, and that sooner or later *we shall end as we did at Palermo in 1860.*' Depretis sought to justify his attitude in a letter beginning: 'You are both unjust and cruel' (using the familiar 'thou'), and ending with the words: 'Crispi, do not doubt your old friend. You are my only friend, and at my age I have no other ambition than to bring my political career to a worthy finish, and dwell in peace with you.'

him, in a word, in order to clear the field for the action of His Majesty's government against democracy.

A person who has seen the decree assures me that the King, acting on the advice of Cavour and Farini, has signed a document that makes Garibaldi an outlaw. This edict has simply been kept secret, and was not revoked even after the government had received the assurance that Garibaldi would *obey*, and was ready to surrender his command and withdraw to Caprera. Farini, who goes everywhere with the King, has the fatal document safe in his portfolio.

Emboldened by Garibaldi's weakness, Cavour and Farini are pushing matters with the utmost audacity.

As we have said before, the advance of the King of Sardinia's troops made perseverance in Garibaldi's undertaking impossible. The question of the annexation of the redeemed provinces, which there was no longer any reason for deferring, was settled by a resolution adopted by the Pro-Dictator of Sicily.

On October 5 Mordini despatched an official letter to the Secretary-General of the Dictature, in which he announced that 'the grave conditions of the present moment' had induced the Council of Ministers unanimously to adopt the resolution set forth in the following statement:—

After deliberating upon the conditions that have prevailed in this country since the beginning of the uninterrupted advance of arms on the Continent, and in consequence of repeated rumours of possible armed intervention in the Island, which would greatly strengthen one special party to the detriment of free manifestation of opinion on the part of the great majority of the people,

The Council is unanimous in declaring that, in accordance with the decree of June 30, 1860, the convocation of the electoral colleges is necessary, in order to place the country in a position that will ensure the free expression of her will. The Council requests that this statement be laid before the General Dictator, that he may impart further and definite instructions.

The decree submitted to the Dictator fixed the twenty-first of October for the convocation of the electoral colleges for the purpose of appointing deputies to the Sicilian Assembly.

On October 6 Mordini gave Crispi an official explanation of the motives that had prompted this resolution :—

On the fourth of this month you said, in a post-script to your letter of the second : ‘ They are trying to get the better of us in Turin.’ I was already well aware of this, and I was furthermore aware that they are preparing expeditions into Sicily and the landing of troops, for the purpose of driving out Garibaldi’s representatives. I determined to reply to these machinations by convoking the electoral colleges for October 21 in order that the deputies may be appointed. I found an open door in the decree of June 23, and I have simply taken one more perfectly lawful step towards arresting the tempest with which Cavourianism threatens us. The General will order the convocation of the Assembly whenever he judges best, and the Assembly will cast its vote when the General chooses. Should he wish to do so, he may summon the people to the polls once more to sanction the vote of the Assembly, thus gaining ample time for the accomplishment of his own political ends. Meanwhile, yesterday’s decree, which was entirely unlooked for

and which has been evolved out of the situation itself as by enchantment, has taken every one by surprise and effectually checked all plotting against the government, as the despatch of October 4 plainly shows.

I must have the assurance of the Dictator's unconditional approval as soon as possible.

That same day (October 6) Crispi telegraphed to Mordini after having conferred with the Dictator :—

The Dictator approves the decree for the nomination of deputies. Convoke the Assembly for any day that suits you best. As regards the meeting of the Assembly, the law enacted on September 16, 1860, will be revoked, and you will thus find yourself as free to act as you desire to be.

The next day Crispi submitted the following edict to Garibaldi for endorsement :—

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Dictator of Southern Italy.

The day is not far distant when the people of Southern Italy will be summoned to decide their own destiny, and it being necessary that the Pro-Dictators of Naples and Sicily be invested with the proper powers,

The Dictator, acting in accordance with the proposition of his Secretary of State,

Decrees as follows :—

ARTICLE I.—Those prerogatives which the Dictator had reserved to himself by virtue of the law enacted on September 16, 1860, are herewith restored to the Pro-Dictators of Naples and Sicily.

ARTICLE II.—All the Ministers and Secretaries of

State are charged with the execution of the present decree.

These arrangements made, steps had to be taken to prevent Cavour from carrying out his plan for sending troops to Sicily. This project was now being everywhere discussed, as the French press had announced that it might be expected to be put into immediate execution. Crispi wrote to all his friends in Turin assuring them that the news 'that a body of 4000 Piedmontese were to be sent to the Island before the people had had time to manifest their wishes concerning their own destiny had been received with indignation,' and that 'it was not improbable that a riot would take place on the arrival of the royal troops, which circumstance would greatly injure the cause of National Union.'

CHAPTER XVIII

Giorgio Pallavicino, sent to Turin by Garibaldi, returns converted by Cavour—Garibaldi hesitates to appoint him Pro-Dictator; Crispi persuades him to do so—Elections and Assembly—Crispi suggests formula for the plebiscit, which is accepted by Pallavicino—Decree of October 8—Disagreement concerning the Assembly—Crispi's account of it—Garibaldi approves the convocation of the Assembly as championed by Crispi—Decree of October 12—Resignations of Pallavicino and Cabinet—A change of scene—Garibaldi no longer resists—Crispi resigns as minister, but remains by Garibaldi's side—Crispi's last decree—He writes the letter by which Garibaldi resigns his Dictatorship to King Victor Emmanuel—Was Crispi one of the founders of United Italy?

HAVING signed the decree of September 16, Garibaldi before leaving Naples entrusted the Pro-Dictatorship of the Neapolitan provinces to Sirtori, as he had done for Sicily in July, before setting out for Milazzo. After September 11, however, he had determined to offer that position to Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio, a Lombard patrician, whose love of country had led him to long imprisonment, which he had borne with noble resignation, in the fortress of Spielberg.

Pallavicino had been summoned to Naples, and after conferring with the Dictator had at once set out again for Turin, for the purpose of ascertaining the King's intentions regarding the antagonism that prevailed between Garibaldi and Cavour, and of obtaining from Victor Emmanuel a word of consent to the advance on Rome. Up to the very last Garibaldi deceived himself concerning his personal influence with Victor Emmanuel, and even when the Piedmontese troops appeared on the frontier of Abruzzo he still entertained hopes that they might possibly co-operate in freeing Rome.

The *Opinione* and the *Gazzetta di Torino* announced on September 25 that Marchese Pallavicino was leaving that

night for Naples. 'General Garibaldi had entrusted him with a mission,' so the *Opinione* said, 'in regard to which it was easy to foresee that His Majesty's government could make no concessions.'

And indeed Pallavicino, who had found Cavour present at the audience granted him by the King, brought only bad news to Naples. Not only had Cavour not the slightest intention of retiring, but Garibaldi was enjoined to give up all thought of advance, and was peremptorily requested to order the immediate annexation of the former kingdom to Piedmont, and the expulsion from Naples of Mazzini, Crispi, Bertani, and Mordini.

The King's demands irritated Garibaldi to such an extent that at first he determined not to carry out his plan for appointing Pallavicino Pro-Dictator.

In his heart of hearts Pallavicino disapproved of Cavour's policy on account of the Napoleonic hegemony by which it was controlled. He could have wished to bring back the King's consent that the Roman question be solved while the spirit of revolution still burned bright throughout the country. But concerning annexation and the dangers of Mazzinianism, he was entirely of the opinion of King Victor Emmanuel's minister. This nobleman was a native of Northern Italy, and the letter from Giorgio Asproni, given in the preceding chapter, ably describes the sentiments then prevailing in those regions.

Pallavicino's wife Anna wrote as follows to Carlo Cattaneo on Friday, September 28, at half-past seven o'clock :—

MON CHER MONSIEUR,—Georges vient d'arriver, il désire vous voir avant d'aller à Caserta. Comptant sur votre extrême obligeance, je vous prie de passer à l'hôtel le plus tôt possible. Je vous serre la main affectueusement.

During this interview and those that followed Pallavicino was forced to declare himself convinced that at Turin they were exaggerating the dangers of the 'Mazzinianism' of Garibaldi's followers; and other opinions of his on the situation were probably modified as well, for in the end it was Crispi, one of those against whom on his arrival he had enter-

tained hostile sentiments, who, aided by Cattaneo, succeeded in persuading the Dictator to sign his appointment. It was at Caserta on October 3 that Garibaldi endorsed the decree in Crispi's handwriting, by virtue of which—

The Marchese Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio is appointed Pro-Dictator of Naples, in the place of Major-General Sirtori, who voluntarily resigns his office, that he may take part in the national struggle.

To Pallavicino the all-important question was that of annexation, and he believed that in its solution lay his whole duty. He brought it up immediately.

But was it to be the plebiscit alone or the Assembly as well?

Let us hear what Crispi had to say on this point.

On October 6 . . . a government Commissary arrived in Naples, who was the bearer of a decree ordering the convocation of the Sicilian Assembly. The idea of an assembly in the Island was unwelcome to Garibaldi, for the dangers attendant upon such an act had brought about the end of the Depretis pro-dictatorship twenty days before, and the General had repeatedly expressed his opinion that the elections should not take place until after the close of the war. On receipt of the news that the Piedmontese had occupied Umbria and the Marches he thus expressed himself in a proclamation to the volunteers: 'Our brothers are fighting the foreigner in the heart of Italy. Let us hasten to meet them in Rome and thence march together into the Venetian territory.' When asked to sanction Mordini's decree and then to pass a resolution to the same effect for Naples, he hesitated somewhat before deciding. After some minutes of reflection

he said, in the tone of one who is casting off a heavy burden : ‘ As it would be impossible to alter what has already been done at Palermo without upsetting the government a second time, give orders for the convocation of an assembly in Naples also.’

On October 7, the ministers met in council at the residence of Marchese Pallavicino, who had been appointed Pro-Dictator four days before. The subject of annexation had been several times discussed in the Cabinet, and with much heat indeed, on the first and second of the month, but to no purpose, as all were well acquainted with Garibaldi’s opinions on this point. On the seventh, encouraged by the example of the Pro-Dictator of Sicily and by the permission Garibaldi had granted, the *annexationists* felt more free to express their true feelings, and it was decided by three votes to two that the Assembly should be convoked.

I am unaware whether his own personal opinions made Pallavicino fear an assembly of Neapolitan deputies or whether his attitude was inspired by obligations assumed while in Turin, but at any rate, he opposed the idea of convoking the assembly with all the strength of his authority, and started at once for Caserta, whence he returned presently with an order from Garibaldi that in the continental provinces the will of the people should be expressed directly, and by the plebiscite alone.

My own opinion was . . . that the people should not confirm the national union, should not establish it, as it were, but simply declare themselves in favour of it ; later on the Assemblies, which must accept the vote of the people as their law, would establish the proper conditions of liberty and of power to ensure the execution of the people’s will.

. . . When Pallavicino announced to me that Garibaldi desired the plebiscite alone, I immediately perceived in that arrangement the remedy for the evil I had feared. I saw how his act could be reconciled with the Dictator's wish, without interfering with Mordini, and I at once determined to arrange matters so that we should have both the plebiscite and the assembly, and that the one should simply precede the other. . . .

On October 8, the ministers met in council in the office of the presidency.

I introduced the topic, referring to the obligations Garibaldi had assumed towards the country. I declared that the Southern provinces, owing to the special conditions under which their revolution had taken place and in consideration of the importance of their position as regards the rest of Italy, could not accept the formula that had been adopted when the people of Tuscany and the Emilia had cast their vote. Our country must not *give* herself to another, must not *annex* herself, which verb savours overmuch of servitude, but must rather express her desire that union be achieved. After Garibaldi's declaration that we must go to Rome and drive the foreigner beyond the Alps, a plebiscite under the conditions that prevailed in the Central provinces might now be regarded not as a simple halt by the way, but as a complete renunciation of our determination to redeem the entire peninsula. I told them that Italy had a powerful and insidious enemy in federation; that consequently, by means of our vote, we must give expression to an ideal not unlike that which the French Convention proclaimed and extolled, placing it over against the federal doctrine of the Girondists, and pointing out to the people

that Unity and Indivisibility of the French Republic were a vital necessity and their sacred right.

Pallavicino, who is susceptible to great and noble ideals, listened attentively, and finally burst out with: 'Very well then, we will vote for Italy, One and Indivisible, with Victor Emmanuel for her King. That is, moreover, in perfect harmony with the Marsala programme.'

Having settled upon the idea that must dominate at the plebiscite, several drafts of it were made out, the one composed by Conforti being accepted. The decree was signed by all the ministers¹ and then sent to press. Naples may well be proud, for on that day a great principle was laid down, and a solemn obligation assumed, to which we will ever remain faithful. . . .

The decree of October 8 laid the foundations for the new privileges of the Italian nation.

Received with enthusiasm in all the electoral colleges, it bestowed lawful consecration upon the revolution we were to carry by force of arms into those cities of the peninsula still occupied by the foreigner. For the first time three-eighths of the people composing a great nation established, in the interest of all, both of the free and of those still in bondage, the territorial sovereignty of their common country, and expressed the firm purpose of conquering that territory. Up to this time the provinces that had been delivered had voiced but one desire, that of being united to constitutional Piedmont.

¹ Crispi's signature was suppressed when the decree was published in the *Official Journal*. Crispi thus alluded to this act of spiteful meanness on the part of his adversaries in a letter of November 10, 1860, to the *Journal des Débats*: ' . . . j'ai signé, comme tous mes Collègues, le décret; et si mon nom n'a pas paru au bas de ce document, c'est par suite d'une manœuvre que je ne veux point qualifier ici.'

The South, however, would not follow this method, that too nearly resembled a *dedication*, but proclaimed its right, and re-evoked the supreme duty of the entire Latin race.

But this act once accomplished, we must not pause. The question of unity finally settled, we must prepare ourselves to achieve it. The decree concerning the plebiscite must be made to embrace Sicily also, and at the same time, having fixed the purpose of the Assembly that had been convoked in Palermo, we must convoke one in Naples as well. On that same evening (Oct. 8) I went to Caserta to acquaint Garibaldi with our opinions. He immediately grasped the advantages our plan offered, and sent to request Pallavicino to come to him on the following day at six P.M.

I do not know what passed between the General and his Pro-Dictator. . . . Garibaldi, however, assured me that the idea of an Assembly had been accepted. It is a fact that he lent his approval to the draft of the decree that was presented to him, and with his own hand wrote the following words beneath it, which were addressed to Pallavicino:—

This appears to me to represent precisely what we agreed upon together, and is perfectly satisfactory to me. If you consent to all this, send me a copy of the above decree, duly endorsed, and I will sign it also.

Pallavicino mistook our intentions. . . . On the evening of October 11, we all met Garibaldi at Caserta. The discussion was an animated one, and as it resulted in the triumph of my wishes, Pallavicino tendered his resignation. On the twelfth the entire Cabinet followed his example, and the day was noisy with popular demonstrations, in which

we were one and all cursed and applauded by turn. . . . On the 13th, a new council met, in which Pallavicino, all the ministers who had resigned, and several of Garibaldi's friends were invited to participate. When the discussion was at its hottest and before any one knew what the final decision would be, a petition from the National Guard of Naples and a letter from D'Ancona were brought in. At a sign from Garibaldi all were silent, and the Dictator, having read the documents, proceeded to announce his decision. The plebiscit for Naples, and the Assembly for Sicily.

On the evening of October 12, after the resignation of the Pro-Dictator and his Cabinet, Garibaldi had signed the decree which ordered an assembly composed of the people's delegates to meet in Naples on November 11. This edict declared that the purpose of the Assembly must be to *recognise the regularity of all the acts appertaining to the plebiscite, and to make all necessary arrangements for the subsequent incorporation of the Southern provinces of the peninsula, with Italy, One and Indivisible.*

Another decree issued the same day, while leaving the date fixed for the meeting of the Sicilian Assembly unchanged, pointed out the same purpose, and summoned the inhabitants of the Island to gather in their electoral colleges on October 28, and to deliver a plebiscite like that of Naples.

Such were the limits within which the two assemblies were to operate. But the pressure that was brought to bear in the struggle against the Neapolitan Assembly, Garibaldi himself could not withstand, and it was finally rejected. In Sicily, owing to alterations in Mordini's plans, it never met.

The plebiscite of the Southerners did not signify the *annexation* of the former kingdom of Sicily to the Sardinian provinces, and even where this was implied, it did not mean that annexation was to be *immediate*. The people simply declared their desire for national union with the dynasty of Victor Emmanuel. This conception contained the constitutional principle of the future government of our country, and the honest men of either party should have been satisfied, for all possibility either of federation or of a republic was thus excluded. Meanwhile, as the means by which union was to be achieved could not be established by direct suffrage, this must be done by the Assemblies. Those who were opposed to the Assemblies either did not understand the decree of October 8, or wilfully misinterpreted its meaning. Consequently the ministers at Turin were entrusted with a mission that should have been fulfilled by the local parliaments. . . .

There were two ways of composing the new Italian family, and these were respectively supported by the two schools which had predominated in the national movement. The party that acknowledged Cavour as its head, and that had made use both of the regular forces and of diplomatic intrigue, looked upon Piedmont as a banner beneath which the various states of the peninsula would cluster. Our party, whose leader was Garibaldi, and which had overthrown a most ancient dynasty by the strength of the people alone, looked upon Italy, One and Indivisible, as a state of new creation, in which all monarchies—the Sardinian with the rest—would be merged and disappear.

. . . There were neither first nor last in the peninsula. Since 1848 each one had been doing

his best to further the emancipation of the nation. . . .

At that time there was no model state in Italy whose laws might be adopted and its hegemony accepted. Piedmont herself, who had rescued the national banner when Italian liberty suffered shipwreck, had staggered on, down to the year 1860, beneath a load of codes that dated back to the days of despotism, and some of these, despite the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy, she has not even yet been able to cast off. On the other hand, the provinces of the South, although deficient in political stability, were, by a singular contradiction, and in spite of the tyranny that had long held all freedom of thought in check, further advanced both as regards civilisation and the perfection of their codes and administration. Thus, with some slight alterations attendant upon liberty, the legal *régime* of the Southern states might be regulated to form a basis for the organisation of the nation.

Ever since our arrival in Naples the Dictature had worked with this in view. The kingdom that had been formed in the North after the annexation of Tuscany and the Emilia was inferior in population to the countries over which Garibaldi held sway. The new laws that had been enacted towards the close of 1859 had failed to give good results in Piedmont, had caused irritation throughout Lombardy, and had been rejected at Florence. If the provinces of the South had reformed their administration and their laws in conformity with the new political institutions, and furthered the interests of the population by enacting wise economic laws, we might have achieved union and escaped those ills which the emissaries from Turin subsequently

brought upon us, and we should have led the rest of the nation on, to the enjoyment of the benefits of progress which still loom but dimly in the far distance.

But the Dictator was not permitted to work out these reforms. On one and the same day we had decreed the abolition of the lottery, the suppression of religious congregations and the confiscation of ecclesiastical property. The law concerning the religious congregations was suppressed even before its publication in the *Official Gazette*, and the other two were suspended. Garibaldi's beneficent intentions having been paralysed by the action of the evil genius who haunted his councils, it would have been right, and indeed an act of civil prudence, to entrust the popular assemblies with the mission of regeneration, which the Head of the State himself had justly aspired to accomplish.

The above account was contained in Crispi's famous letter to Mazzini of March 18, 1865. The particulars of the events alluded to were narrated by him in the two private letters to Bertani that follow.

NAPLES, 13 *October*, 1860.

MY DEAR BERTANI,— . . . The pro-dictature has fallen, and with it the Conforti cabinet. The honour of having brought this about is attributed to me, but I assure you it is undeserved. During the eight days of its existence the pro-dictature did everything in its power to irritate Garibaldi and to lead him to believe that it was being coerced by Cavour's faction. You are aware that one of the conditions for an agreement with the Sardinian government was my, your and Mazzini's expulsion from Naples. This condition Garibaldi refused, and was indignant at the

proposal. Consequently Pallavicino remained forgotten at the *Hôtel delle Crocelle*.

On the third of this month Cattaneo and I went to Caserta to persuade Garibaldi to define Pallavicino's position, which was becoming ever more vague. After much hesitation on his part, I finally succeeded in inducing him to appoint . . . prodictator. I myself drew up the decree. It was a mistake. No compromise is possible with our political enemies. Pallavicino's very first act was to despatch a letter to Mazzini advising him to leave¹; then came the suppression of the clubs, to be followed immediately by that of the Dictator's secretariate. As to myself, he was unable to discover any way of getting rid of me, and so showed his vexation by his violent and imperious bearing towards me during our discussions. He wished me to resign, and although he did not say so in so many words, his manner showed it plainly enough. But I remained at my post, and kept my temper.

Meanwhile the news arrived of the convocation of the Sicilian Assembly. Upon being requested to adopt the same measures in Naples, he refused. The matter was discussed in council, and the ministers were three against two for the Assembly. Hereupon Pallavicino betook himself to Garibaldi, coming back presently with the news that the General was for the plebiscite. (7 October.)

The next day the decree for the plebiscite was signed and published. Garibaldi was opposed to it.

¹ This letter was published. 'Even unintentionally,' it told Mazzini, 'you stand between us.' Mazzini replied by stating the reasons for his refusal to leave. When Garibaldi learned what Pallavicino had done he manifested his disapproval by inviting Mazzini to call upon him, on which occasion he allowed him to perceive how cordial were his feelings towards him,

He wanted for Naples what was being done in Sicily. Between the ninth and the eleventh there was a continuous coming and going between Naples and Caserta. Garibaldi, who was staunchly in favour of the Assembly, called a meeting of the council to be held in his presence. On the 11th, at 6 P.M., Cattaneo, Pallavicino, Parisi (Minister of the Interior for Sicily), Calvino and I conferred, under the presidency of Garibaldi.

While all this was going on there was no end of trouble at the Ministry of Finance, to meet the just demands of the intendancy of the army. There was also trouble about paying for the 40,000 rifles which Garibaldi of Marseilles had been commissioned to purchase; and five governors, all friends of Garibaldi's, were deposed.

On the evening of the eleventh we discussed the necessity of an assembly with the General. Pallavicino, who was against it, declared it would bring about civil war. These words did not suit the General, who retorted hotly that there could be no question of civil war where he was, that all this was simply a bogey, invented by his enemies, by those who seek to place difficulties in the way of his government, who refuse him funds and separate him from his friends. These expressions stung Pallavicino, who was already implicated, and he immediately concluded that the Dictator was thereby making a reference to himself. He declared he would resign, and springing to his feet with an exclamation that was entirely out of place, attacked me violently as the cause of all this discord, and swore that I alone was responsible for the evil it would bring upon Italy.

I answered quietly and without losing my temper,

and the General requested Pallavicino to resume his seat and try to control himself. The old man sat down, but demanded that I should leave Naples. He actually made my expulsion a condition of his remaining in office. 'He or I,' he cried sharply, almost violently. When I ventured to remind him that I had been the author of the decree that nominated him, he answered roughly, whereupon Garibaldi put an end to the matter with a few sensible words. 'Crispi,' said he, 'is one of my best friends. He is both disinterested and honest, and has always helped me better than any one else. He has shared great danger with me, and when in power has never taken advantage of his position. I will not give up my friends for the caprices of others. You, Marchese, must act as you may judge best for yourself.'

Pallavicino left the room grumbling, and took his departure. All his wrath was directed against me.¹

The General announced that he would come into Naples the next day and arrange matters.

A council in Naples on the 12th. The General

¹ Crispi was exasperated by Pallavicino's unjust attitude towards himself, hence the asperity with which he sometimes alluded to one who had made himself the mouthpiece of Cavour's bitterness. But he did not long harbour resentment against his adversary. In 1862 he defended Pallavicino, who was then prefect of Palermo, in Parliament, and Pallavicino wrote to him on July 16: 'I am most grateful to you for the words you spoke in the Chamber on my behalf. Our friend (Garibaldi) abstaining, as he has promised me to do, from further vituperation against a certain person . . . will content himself in the future with stirring up the country and demanding, in his most stentorian tones, that the Roman Question be dealt with. I believe that agitation of this sort is good, even necessary, and a wise government might make use of it against France. But our government is far from being a wise one. Turin still persists in governing Milan, Bologna, Florence, Naples and Palermo according to *Turinense ideas*. We shall soon see the consequences of this deplorable policy. You may be sure I shall not forsake my post, but I believe I shall be recalled'

reprimanded the Ministers for the acts I have alluded to above. They all resigned.¹

Up to the present we have no ministry, and the General is disinclined to form one.

But enough for to-day, for I have no more time. I will continue my account in my next. I embrace you heartily.

NAPLES, 18 October, 1860.

I take up my account where I broke it off in my letter of the 13th.

On the evening of the twelfth there were demonstrations for and against the Assembly, for and against the men who were said to be at the head of the two different systems of votation. During the demonstrations organised by our opponents, there were shouts of *Death to Mazzini and Crispi!* but those of *Down with Crispi!* were the most frequent of all. Since you left I have been the scape-goat!

The demonstrations continued even after Garibaldi's arrival from Caserta. The police force which, notwithstanding the abolition of the secret fund, had taken 14,000 ducats from the State Treasury, organised and fed these demonstrations

¹ Here is the letter containing the resignations of the ministers.

To the General Dictator.

The undersigned, having become aware that the policy followed by them has failed to meet with your approval, and this despite their efforts to deserve such approval, herewith present their resignations, which they beg you to accept. They will always remember you, General Dictator, with all the grateful veneration which a Hero who is also a Deliverer must inspire. 12 October 1860.

Raffaele Conforti—Pasquale Scura—Giacomo Coppola—A. Anguisola—Luigi Giura.

Pallavicino also forwarded his written resignation to the Dictator on the twelfth. Cattaneo having informed him on that day that Garibaldi was going into Naples, and exhorted him not to incite and lend his support to those who 'were ready even for civil war,' Pallavicino answered sharply: 'I have tendered my resignation and I shall not withdraw it. Either Mazzini and Crispi leave at once, or I myself take passage on the first steamer starting for Genoa.'

with its own men. Their purpose was to prove that our people are disliked, and that Conforti and Pallavicino alone enjoy true popularity. Conforti addressed his adherents, who very naturally demanded that he should remain in power. He said a thousand things in his own favour, and ended by declaring that he would not relinquish his post unless forced to do so. He had evidently forgotten that the day before he had 'voluntarily' tendered his resignation, declaring that he was no longer trusted. . . . Garibaldi delivered a short but earnest speech which I take from a local newspaper, and enclose for you.¹ He was warmly applauded, so warmly indeed that an hour later he expressed his satisfaction with his reception. But this was to be his last triumph, for, yielding to that evil genius that sways him in the name of 'Concord,' he requested Conforti and Pallavicino to confer with him once more at two P.M., at the D'Angri Palace.

¹ 'This capital is distracted by tumult and discord. Do you know to whom we owe these conditions? To those who prevented me from facing the Austrians with forty-thousand volunteers—to those who prevented me from coming to deliver you a year ago, with twenty-five-thousand volunteers—to those who sent La Farina to Palermo and clamoured for immediate annexation, that is to say, who wished to prevent Garibaldi from crossing the Strait and driving out Francesco II.

'There have been shouts of "death" to this one and to that—all friends of my own! Italians should cry "death" to the foreigner only, and let love and respect reign among themselves, for one and all are part of the Italian Union.

'When disagreement breaks out, come to me. Send me a deputation, not of noblemen and princes, but of simple men of the people, and I will banish your ill-humour and drive out the spirit of discord.

'Yesterday I told you that the King was coming, and to-day I have received letters from him. On the 10th a body of Piedmontese troops crossed the frontier of these provinces, and two days hence Victor Emmanuel will place himself at the head of his valiant army.

'In the course of a few days, therefore, we shall see our King. Let our bearing during this period of *transition* be calm, prudent and tolerant, that the Neapolitan people may appear the valiant people it really is.

'Let us create United Italy! And shame upon him who cries out against her!'

At two o'clock, therefore, Conforti and Pallavicino were ushered into the General's presence, and were soon followed by Cattaneo, Saliceti, Parisi (the Sicilian minister), Calvino, and a certain Signor De Luca, a Calabrian and a man of such excellent principles and admirable integrity that every good patriot must feel drawn to him. A few minutes later Türr arrived who, as military commandant of the city and province of Naples, had wished to take part in our political conference.

The question of assembly and plebiscite was discussed at length, and a means of combining the two was sought for in order to reconcile the methods of votation in Sicily and Naples. Garibaldi agreed entirely with Cattaneo and myself until suddenly, as if tired of all this disputing, he rose, declaring that he cared little for the differences in the way the two countries saw fit to proceed, and that he was willing the Pro-Dictators of Naples and Sicily should adopt the method that either deemed most expedient.

This, of course, put an end to the crisis. Pallavicino and Conforti resumed their offices and I, who alone had stood firm, but who could not possibly continue to hold my seat in the midst of that Cabinet, immediately tendered my resignation, which had been so ardently desired and as good as demanded, by that martyr from the Spielberg, who cherishes a sincere hatred of me, for what reason I know not.

In Sicily, where the news had spread that Garibaldi had ordered the plebiscite, the people were not pleased with the method of voting through an Assembly. They therefore also demanded a plebiscite, which will take place on Sunday. Here

the Cavourian press is as rabid and violent now as it was base in the days of our triumph, and there are articles against us in every paper issued. It is altogether the most disgusting *tolle* that ever was!

I am aware that there has been much peace-making in your part of the world, and that you yourself have carried the olive branch to Cavour. I heartily congratulate you!

I have read Ferrari's splendid speech. Give him my regards, and tell him I shall write to him soon.

We add the following documents in order to complete this account, which was evidently jotted down *currente calamo*.

The following was the first draft of the decree for the convocation of the Assembly. We transcribe it from the original. The lines addressed to Pallavicino are in Garibaldi's own hand.

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Dictator of Southern Italy.

In completion of the decree of the 8th of this present month convoking the people to vote by plebiscite, and for the purpose of recognising the regularity of all acts regarding that plebiscite, and of determining all matters concerning the future incorporation of Southern Italy,

It is herewith decreed:—

ARTICLE I.—That on November 1, an assembly of deputies for the Continental provinces of Southern Italy shall meet in the city of Naples:

ARTICLE II.—That the deputies to the Assembly shall be appointed by universal suffrage:

ARTICLE III.—That the Pro-Dictator of Naples

shall fix the number of the deputies, determine the electoral circumscription, and make all necessary arrangements for the meeting of the Assembly :

ARTICLE IV.—The Pro-Dictator and the Neapolitan Ministers are charged with the execution of the present law.

This appears to me to represent precisely what we agreed upon together, and is perfectly satisfactory to me. If you consent to all this, send me a copy of the above decree duly endorsed, and I will sign it also.

To the Marchese Pallavicino.

G. GARIBALDI.

The decree for the Assembly which Crispi presented to the Dictator for endorsement on the twelfth, and which Garibaldi signed, Pallavicino's contrary opinion notwithstanding, and which was finally made public, fixed October 11 for the convocation, but omitted all mention of the Pro-Dictator.

NAPLES, 12 October, 1860.

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Dictator of Southern Italy.

In completion of the decree of the 8th of this present month convoking the people to vote by plebiscite, and for the purpose of recognising the regularity of all acts regarding that plebiscite, and of determining all matters concerning the future incorporation of Southern Italy with Italy, *One and Indivisible*,

It is herewith decreed :—

ARTICLE I.—That on November 3, an Assembly of deputies for the Continental provinces of Southern Italy shall meet in the city of Naples :

ARTICLE II.—That the deputies of the Assembly shall be appointed by universal suffrage :

ARTICLE III.—That a Ministerial Decree shall fix the number of the deputies, determine the electoral circumscription, and make all necessary arrangements for the meeting of the Assembly :

ARTICLE IV.—The Cabinet at Naples is entrusted with the execution of the present law.

The Secretary of State,

F. CRISPI.

The Dictator,

G. GARIBALDI.

At the same time Crispi got Garibaldi to sign another decree establishing conformity between the elections in Naples and Sicily, where the Pro-Dictator Mordini had convoked the electoral colleges for the nomination of deputies only.

NAPLES, 12 October, 1860.

ITALY AND VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Dictator of Southern Italy.

In consideration of the decree of October 5, issued by the Pro-Dictator of Sicily for the convocation of an assembly in Palermo, and wishing to lend all possible solemnity to the vote which Sicily is now called upon to cast concerning her political conjunction with the other provinces of Italy,

It is herewith decreed :—

ARTICLE I.—That the people of Sicily be summoned to the polls on Sunday, October 28, for the purpose of answering the following question, by *yes* or *no* :

Do the people desire *that Italy be One and Indivisible, with Victor Emmanuel as her constitutional monarch, to be followed by his legitimate descendants ?*

ARTICLE II.—The mission of the Assembly that has been convoked in Palermo will be to recognise the

regularity of all acts appertaining to the plebiscite, and to determine all matters concerning the future incorporation of Sicily with *Italy, One and Indivisible*.

ARTICLE III.—The Pro-Dictator of Sicily will issue all decrees and the necessary regulations for the execution of this law.

It is furthermore ordered

That the present decree, bearing the national seal, shall be made public by the usual means, and all whom it may concern are enjoined to obey it and exact obedience to it from others also.

The Secretary of State,

F. CRISPI.

The Dictator,

G. GARIBALDI.

On the evening of the thirteenth Crispi tendered his resignation by means of the following letter to Pallavicino.

To the Pro-Dictator.

Events of recent occurrence with which you are well acquainted have rendered my further participation in a ministry of which you are the head, impossible, and I herewith tender my resignation as Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

He announced his resolution to Mordini at the same time, and forwarded him a copy of a decree which he had induced Garibaldi to sign that very day (thirteenth), and which ratified all acts, laws, and edicts issued by the Pro-Dictator of Sicily since September 16. 'Where so many changes are taking place,' he wrote, 'this ratification was necessary, and I deemed it my duty to procure it for you.'

Crispi continued to remain by Garibaldi's side, but without occupying any official position. By an edict dated October 19 the Pro-Dictator Mordini appointed him State Councillor. At the time, however, he neither accepted nor refused the office, but simply remained at Naples, using the title to

countersign certain other decrees which he was determined to present to Garibaldi.

These are dated October 29, are signed by Garibaldi and countersigned by Crispi as 'Councillor of State, Secretary to the Dictator,' and their purpose is (1) to assign to Sicilian political victims one-fourth of the revenue derived from the confiscation of the property of the Bourbons; (2) the abolition of penal action against those who were guilty of acts of violence against agents of past tyranny during the period of revolution.

Crispi proposed other decrees to the Dictator by virtue of which the State undertook to make adequate compensation for 'damage caused by the Bourbons' agents to persons or things'; for the creation of a military hospital at the royal villa of Quisisana, at Naples; for the granting of a life pension of forty ducats a month to the parents of Colonel Filippo Migliavacca, 'who fell at Milazzo, while fighting for the cause of liberty.' He also drew up a decree which Garibaldi proposed to Victor Emmanuel, establishing the recognition of all acts, laws, and edicts promulgated by the Dictator and the Pro-Dictators, and of those in favour of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of Garibaldi's army, of all officers and troopers from the Piedmontese army who had forsaken their flag to fight in Southern Italy, and of the functionaries of the dictatorial and pro-dictatorial governments. He furthermore persuaded the General to order that the archives of the Ministry of Sicilian Affairs should be transferred to Palermo.

Crispi, the only member of the Party of Action who was still with Garibaldi, was of the greatest service to him during the last days of his Dictatorship. The letter by means of which the people's hero surrendered the power over 10,000,000 Italians to King Victor Emmanuel was composed by Crispi. It is a well-known document, but our readers will doubtless be glad to find it here.

SIRE,—When I landed upon Sicilian soil and assumed the dictatorship, I did so for you and in your name, most noble Prince, in whom all the hopes of the nation are centred. I am now but fulfill-

ing a sacred vow, and maintaining a promise which I have frequently expressed in public acts and decrees, in surrendering to you that power which is yours by every right, now that the people have solemnly dedicated themselves to United Italy, to your rule and that of your legitimate descendants.

I surrender to you the power over ten million Italians, who, but a few months since, were the subjects of a despotism that was both stupid and cruel, and to whom compensation is now due. This compensation they will enjoy under you, whom the Almighty has chosen to restore the Italian nation, making her free and prosperous at home and powerful and respected abroad.

In this region you will find a people as docile as they are intelligent, as fond of order as desirous of liberty, and ever ready for any sacrifice when appealed to in the name of our country or of a national government. For six months I have held supreme sway here, and I have naught but praise for the docility and ready affection of this people, whom my companions and I now have the good fortune to be able to restore to Italy, from whom the tyrants of other days had separated them.

I will not dwell upon my own government. The Island of Sicily, despite the difficulties created by outsiders, possesses a civil and political organisation equal to that of the states of the North, and is now enjoying perfect peace. Here on the Continent, where the presence of the enemy is still an obstacle, the country is preparing herself, by her every act, for national union. And all this is due to the prompt intelligence of the two patriots to whom I entrusted the reins of public administration.

At this moment of surrendering the supreme

authority, allow me, Sire, to express one wish. I implore you to take under your powerful protection all those who have laboured with me in this great work of redemption in Southern Italy, and to receive my companions in arms into your own army, those companions to whom Your Majesty and our country are so deeply indebted.—I am, Sire, etc. . . .

Last of all, Crispi prepared the announcement of the Dictator's surrender of his authority to the King, and wrote the words of farewell which Garibaldi addressed to the volunteers who had made his expedition possible.

SOLDIER CITIZENS,—Now that the valiant army of Northern Italy has come to carry on the people's war, you who were summoned at a time when the strength of our arms was derived entirely from the sublime enthusiasm of volunteers, may return to your own fire-sides without a fear for the safety of our country.

Let these my last words of praise for the obedience and devotion you have displayed on the field of battle, go with you on your way. Your conduct has been an honour to the Italian name. You have given fresh proof that when Italy needs her sons, like the myrmidons of old, warriors spring up from her very soil.

Farewell, Soldier Citizens. I can never forget you, and I cherish the hope of meeting you again when the day shall dawn upon which we shall be called upon to redeem those of our provinces that still suffer foreign bondage.

Garibaldi left Naples for Caprera on November 9, after the King had refused his request that he might be appointed the

monarch's lieutenant in those provinces he had delivered. He set out, scorning any recompense however slight, magnificent in his modesty, sacrificing his own just resentment on the altar of his country, hoping to resume the campaign he was leaving unfinished in the coming spring.

All of Garibaldi's associates, save his soldiers, were neglected.

At the very moment when others who had never risked their lives even for a single day were reaping the fruit of his long martyrdom and of his determined endeavours, Crispi was being made the object of abuse in the letters of a certain senator, Audiffredi of Cuneo, to whom he despatched the following indignant reply :—

Not only are you the victim of an illusion, but you are a slanderer as well. . . . By the might of the people alone we have delivered ten million Italians from Bourbon tyranny. We have redoubled the strength of the nation; we have given that throne to the House of Savoy which Cavour never dreamed of creating, even with the powerful support of the foreigner. We, Sir, are the Unionists, we, the men whom you would set in the pillory under the imputation of republicanism. When the time to deliver Rome and Venice shall arrive, it will not be men of your stamp, but we ourselves, the veterans of Calatafimi, who will carry on to its consummation the work of redeeming this great Italy of ours.

Does Crispi's name deserve to be enrolled amongst those of the founders of Italian Union?

That is a question for the historian of our *Risorgimento* to answer.

It has now been shown how he laboured to rouse Sicily against Bourbon despotism, that is to say, how he prepared the way, that the Expedition of the Thousand might be crowned with success. It has been shown how he laboured to persuade Garibaldi to lend his sword and the mighty support of his

name, that was already glorious, to this war of redemption, upon which for eleven years his hopes had been fixed.

From the moment of landing at Marsala to the end of the Dictature he was always either a member of the government or at Garibaldi's side. The first to confer the title of 'King of Italy' upon Victor Emmanuel, in the decree from Salemi on May 14, to him we also owe the formula, 'the people wish Italy to be One and Indivisible,' which confirmed the solemn obligation to achieve union, and sanctioned, not the annexation of one province by another, but the creation of a new State.¹

As minister under the revolution he overthrew the Bourbon administration by means of his decrees, and, stripping it of that favour it still enjoyed among those whose interests were at stake, organised the new State. When Garibaldi entered Palermo it was Crispi who undertook to establish regular government, neglecting no particular; and his provisions inspired such confidence that the large amount of private capital deposited in the Bank of Sicily was not withdrawn, and in June the government bonds were still quoted at their usual price, a price superior to that of the Piedmontese bonds, while the taxes were being contributed regularly by the rate-payers. In spite of the enormous outlay for the provisions of war, which included the purchase of no less than twelve steamships, and the maintenance and equipment of 30,000 men, who were always well provided for, even after they had crossed over to the Continent, the treasury, in which the revolution had found but 134,000 ducats, contained 1,348,816 ducats when it was surrendered to His Majesty's government.

One of Crispi's greatest merits was that of having induced Garibaldi to take a firm stand against immediate annexation, both before the fate of Sicily was decided and when, after her emancipation, the time had come to free Naples from Bourbon domination. Had the demands of Cavour not encountered this firm resistance throughout the struggle that was so long and so exasperating, the year 1860 would not have witnessed the consummation of Union.

¹ He remained ever faithful to this principle. Being in office as minister at the time of Victor Emmanuel's death, he stood his ground against the traditionalists of the House of Savoy, and succeeded in inducing the second King of Italy to assume the title of Humbert the *First*.

Crispi did not reach Naples until Garibaldi's initial errors, due entirely to his loyal trust in others, had already become irreparable. Nevertheless, he always defended Garibaldi's programme when and where he could, avoided the parties of violence, and strained every nerve to bring the glorious Dictature to a worthy finish.

This man, who had suffered so much and laboured so hard, received no other reward than the approval of his own conscience. But the joy and pride of purpose achieved went with him to the end of his days.

APPENDIX

THE DIARY OF THE THOUSAND

PRELIMINARIES

GENOA, 7 *April*, 1860.—On receipt of news of the insurrection that had broken out at Palermo, Bixio and I went to Bertani to get him to write to Garibaldi and remind him of his promise to help Sicily.

We arranged everything without delay. At 5.55 P.M., Bixio and I started for Turin.

Bertani gave me the following letter of introduction to the General.

‘GENOA, 7 *April*, 1860.

‘DEAR GENERAL,—This is to present Signor Crispi, a Sicilian, a staunch patriot and one ready to take personal responsibility.

‘Sicily has made a move—our friend knew and spoke the truth. Now she must be helped, and Crispi will place himself at your disposal for all the final arrangements with Finzi for arms and money.

‘There is money to be had which we have the right to ask for. There are arms in Milan, and with your consent and help, they might be brought here immediately. Albinolo has five cases of arms in his keeping, which have been sent you from America.

Besides this you have some 60 kilograms of powder. A little money will procure a steamer.

‘Crispi will give you a copy of what he proposed to-day to Colltelletti,¹ for obtaining help in collecting names for the Nice affair, which we all have so much at heart.—Yours heartily, A. BERTANI.’

Have forwarded copies of the address² to Cremona, Como, Milan and London.

We reached Turin at 9.30, and went at once to where Garibaldi is staying in Via Santa Teresa.

The General was out. Came in towards 11 P.M. Was delighted with the news from Palermo, and promised to return to Genoa with us if the good news is confirmed by Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister³ to-morrow.

8 *April*.—We went to see Garibaldi again to-day, at noon.

The news of the insurrection in Palermo has been confirmed.

It has been decided that Bixio return to Genoa to make all necessary preparations for the expedition. I am to go to Milan for arms and money. Garibaldi is giving me a letter for Finzi, that reads as follows :—

‘TURIN, 8 *April*, 1860.

‘DEAR FINZI,—I have urgent need of you here, or at least of Guastalla or some other member of the board. Meanwhile prepare as many arms and as much ammunition and money for me as you can, and make no noise about it.

‘If you can arrange to pass part or all of these commodities on to Genoa, do so at once.

¹ A friend and confidant of Garibaldi’s.

² Concerning Nice.

³ Hudson.

‘The bearer is one of our most trusted friends.—
Yours, G. GARIBALDI.’

I started for Milan by the 5.30 P.M. train. At 10.16 I reached the Lombard capital and went to the Hotel d’Europe.

9 *April*.—Went to the office of the board of the Million Rifles Fund. I found Guastalla alone. Finzi and Besana both absent. Finzi has gone to a little town somewhere beyond Cremona.

Guastalla immediately telegraphed to him as follows:—

‘Your presence urgently needed in Milan.’

The whole of the 9th has been wasted. I have gone about the city visiting its objects of interest.

10 *April*.—As yet no answer to yesterday’s telegram has arrived, nor has Finzi returned to Milan. Another day wasted.

11 *April*.—Besana has returned and I have given him Garibaldi’s letter to Finzi. He promises to carry out the General’s wishes in everything save in the matter of arms, concerning which Finzi alone can give the necessary orders. Left for Turin again at 5 P.M., arriving at 9. Went to see Garibaldi at once and informed him of result of my mission.

12 *April*.—Have been to Palazzo Carignano to see Bertani who has already arrived in Turin. As there is a rumour afloat that Garibaldi is starting for Nice to stir up trouble for France, I have begged Bertani to detain him in Turin.

Bertani will do this, and says that henceforward we must think of Sicily only. Garibaldi has put his question in the Chamber, concerning the cession of Nice to France.

13 *April*.—Have returned to Genoa.

17 *April*.—La Farina has arrived in Genoa and taken up his quarters at the Pension Suisse. Nothing from Milan—neither money nor arms.

It has been decided that I must return to Milan.

Bertani has given me the following letter to Finzi:—

‘GENOA, 17 *April*, 1860.

‘DEAR FINZI,—Signor Crispi comes to you in the name of a friend of yours and of mine, to beg you to make haste in the matter with which that friend has entrusted you, and to arrange with you how best to execute his commission.

‘Any further advice from me would be superfluous.

‘Hearty greetings from yours affectionately,

‘A. BERTANI.

‘*P.S.*—Crispi may be useful in bringing what you have promised us, to Genoa.’

I left for Milan at 2 P.M., and arrived at 9. The office of the committee being closed at that hour, I must wait until to-morrow.

18 *April*.—Have seen Finzi. Besana left for Genoa yesterday. Finzi tells me that Massimo D’Azeglio, governor of Milan, has confiscated all the arms by order of Cavour. However, he promises to purchase more. Meanwhile we have decided to start for Turin to-morrow.

19 *April*.—Finzi and I left for Turin at 9.15 A.M., arriving at 1 P.M.

Cavour is absent. Has gone to accompany the King on a visit to the newly annexed provinces.

Finzi has been to see Farini. On his return he informed me that the Minister cannot take any important steps during the absence of the head of

the Cabinet. I myself then went to see Farini. I found him changed since the last time I saw him in Modena.

He declares that France is offering opposition to the annexation of the Emilia and Tuscany—that, as there is a prospect of a Congress, it would be unwise to arouse suspicion among the governments of Europe by a Sicilian expedition. He says we should wait for a more favourable opportunity, and content ourselves, for the present, with increasing the size of Victor Emmanuel's kingdom by the addition of new territory !

He furthermore declared that the revolution in Palermo has been suppressed, and that the few rebels in the country are already offering submission.

At 5 P.M. I started for Genoa once more, where Orsini,¹ La Farina and La Masa have been since the 18th.

20 *April*.—La Farina has been to Quarto and seen Garibaldi for the first time. They have made peace, and La Farina promises arms for the expedition.

23 *April*.—Preparations for the expedition have really begun. Fresh delay in the afternoon. We have read and discussed the *Gazzetta di Genova's* account of the defeat of the insurgents. There is talk of detachments of Bourbon troops having been sent to Bagheria, Ficcarazzi and Misilmeri.

A letter from Messina announces that the consuls residing in that city sent out a messenger for news. He went to within three miles of Palermo and

¹ Vincenzo Orsini, a Sicilian, was implicated in the conspiracy of 1847, took part in the revolution in Sicily in '48, went into exile, but returned to join the Thousand.

then came back declaring that the revolution had ceased.

Sirtori and Bertani have been out to Villa Spinola. Discussions concerning the equipment of the expedition. Sirtori, while promising to assist, has great doubts of its ultimate success. People in the confidence of the Turin Minister are constantly coming and going, and trying to persuade Garibaldi to give up the attempt.

24 *April*.—Colonel Frapolli has also been to see Garibaldi for the purpose of dissuading him. He prophesies that the General will share the fate of Murat, the Bandiera brothers and Pisacane. Garibaldi is undecided, and sometimes threatens to return to Caprera.¹

FROM QUARTO UNTIL THE END OF GARIBALDI'S DICTATORSHIP

5 *May*, 9.30 P.M.—Leave Genoa.

5 *May*, 10 P.M.—Reach Quarto.

5 *May*, 11 P.M.—Leave Quarto.²

6 *May*, 4 A.M.—Embarkation.

6 *May*, 8.30 A.M.—Anchor raised.

6 *May*, 9.30 A.M.—Stop at Bogliasco for provisions and equipments.

We stop again at Camogli at 11 A.M., to wait for the boats loaded with ammunition. We buy a cask of oil for the engines. No sign of the boats, and we continue on our way without the powder.

¹ Perhaps in a letter.

² At 11.30 P.M. fifty of our people took possession of the steamships *Piemonte* and *Lombardo*, in the Gulf of Genoa. It took three hours to get up steam on board the *Piemonte*. At 2.30 this vessel left the harbour of Genoa towing the *Lombardo*, whose furnaces were alight, but had not yet produced sufficient steam.

On the 6th, a fresh *scirocco* blows from the East until 8 P.M.

7 *May*.—Towards 10 A.M. we cast anchor off the coast of Talamone to take aboard provisions and organise the corps. From Talamone, Zambianchi starts into the Romagna with fifty men.

8 *May*.—Organisation.

Kindness of Lecco family. The head of this family is Signor Emilio, the Sanitary Official.

At 5 P.M. we get up steam. At 7.30 our departure is postponed.

9 *May*.—Start at 3.30 A.M. Reach San Stefano at 5. Leave San Stefano at 2.30 P.M. The 25th battalion of *bersaglieri* forming at Orbetello. Major Macedonio Pinelli in command. Taddei and De Amicis, officers in the Piedmontese army, have joined us as common soldiers.

The *columbrina* given us at Orbetello bears the inscription: *Opus Joannis Mariae Cenni florentini —1570—Ferd. II. Hetruriae V. Mag. Dux.*

10 *May*.—Steaming between Sardinia and Sicily. At 7.30 we were within 70 miles of Marittimo. We had lost sight of the *Lombardo* since 5 P.M., and therefore went in search of her. The *Lombardo* believed she was being chased by hostile vessel, and failed to recognise our many signals. We reached her at last, however.

11 *May*.—At 3.30 A.M. we thought we saw land, but it was a delusion. Just a bank of clouds so close down to the sea that it was easy to be deceived. As dawn broke, the clouds gradually vanished.

At 6.30 the outlines of the *Ægades* became visible. At 10.35 we spoke with an English sailing vessel. At 11.30 we met a fishing boat which we

are taking along with us. Her skipper is a certain Strazzari.

We reached Marsala at 1.15 P.M. Landing executed in perfect order and finished by 2.15. Men and ammunition all on shore.

The steamers we first stripped and wrecked, and then abandoned.

A sailing frigate, the *Partenope*, being towed by a steamer, the *Stromboli*, and a customs-boat have entered the harbour from the East. About 2 P.M. they were within a few yards of the shore. The steamers and the frigate opened fire upon our men who were marching along the mole.¹ Balls and grape-shot wasted. One dog killed. Not a single man of ours wounded. Public offices, post-offices, prisons and office of the Decurion.

12 May, 5.30 A.M.—The two steamers have withdrawn, one going towards the East the other in a westerly direction. We halted at the Nuccio farm at 10.30. Started forward again at 11 A.M. At 6 P.M. we reached small house on the estate known as Rampigallo, which is let to Signor Mistretta, but is the property of Baron Genna of Marsala. Baron Santanna has come up with his following from Paceco. Recruits from Mazzara and Alcamo.

13 May.—At 9.30 we received news that a battalion of royal troops is advancing towards Salemi, the very place we are making for.

Started forward at 11. The main body arrived towards 3 P.M.—the General-Staff at 7.

Enthusiastic reception at Salemi.

¹ Two hours before—the frigate and the steamers in the waters of Marsala. The frigate missed every shot—into the water or into the air every time. The steamer's firing was better.

At points where passage was difficult, the marines worked with much zeal and energy.

14 *May*.—Have visited the neighbouring hills with the General and Türr.

Messengers constantly coming in. Illumination of Salemi. One house with inscription: '*Viva United Italy! Long live Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy! Long live Garibaldi the Liberator!*'

15 *May*.—Started at 5.15. Reached Vita at 6.30. Enthusiasm of the population.

At 8 the General set out to reconnoitre the chain of hills on the right of Vita, and was able to observe the position of the royal troops at Calatafimi. At 9.30 news was brought us that the troops were leaving the town.

Calatafimi is perched on the western slope of Monte Tre Croci, and stretches from East to West. It is dominated on the left by Monte Inici. Monte d'Alcamo rises directly behind it, and in the distance the mountain range that runs towards Palermo is plainly visible. Below the Croci, and not far distant, are three green-clad hills. Behind the last of these, called Chiusi, is the fortress where the troops have been. Paganazzo, Costa di Sole and Pantano, on rising ground, form a group on the left of Croci, and there is a chain of hills that extends as far as Salemi. Sentinels have been posted on the hill-tops that tower above the road to Trapani, beyond Inici. The General is of opinion that the troops have definitely abandoned the town. Towards 11.30 a body of sharp-shooters march forward and come to a halt on a knoll at the foot of the hill. At 12 their positions are: three small detachments holding the valley that separates us: the fortress behind the third hill in the hands of the royalists.

12.15 P.M.—The main body of royal troops has taken up its position on third hill, detaching a few *éclaireurs* to the left.

1 P.M.—The royal troops have rallied on third hill, are drawn up in line of battle, and have sent out a detachment of sharp-shooters, which is spreading downwards on our left. Another detachment on our right.

The battle begins at 1 P.M. At four the victory is ours! We have dislodged the enemy from the Chiusi hill, a very strong position, taken two cannon and many prisoners. The enemy's losses supposed to be very heavy: 36 killed and more than 100 wounded.¹ Our losses heavy enough also. General Garibaldi is especially grieved because two of his officers have been wounded and the banner presented to him by the Italians of Buenos Ayres has been seized by the enemy. In the beginning Schiaffino bore the banner, but he fell beneath it, and it was then carried forward by the General's own son, who has been wounded in the hand. It took us from 6 in the evening until the next morning to collect the wounded. There were some Neapolitans among them.

At 8 P.M. General Landi started for Palermo with his contingent.

16 May.—At five in the morning we heard the joy bells ringing at Calatafimi.

At 7 A.M. our troops enter Calatafimi, after the arrival of several messengers from there, to see the General. Great enthusiasm. Illumination in the evening. Arrival of contingents from Castelvetro and Alcamo, with music playing. A friar is leading the recruits from Castelvetro.

¹ The troops carried off some dead and many wounded. A major, a captain and a lieutenant among the killed.

We found 44 wounded in Calatafimi, those whose wounds were but slight, and the more distinguished, having been removed.

An official communication from Commandant Landi, dated May 15, and addressed to the King's Lieutenant, demanded prompt reinforcements, without which he threatened to beat a retreat.

17 *May*.—We leave for Alcamo at 5 A.M. and arrive at 9. Reception wildly enthusiastic—music—deputations—carriages!

Signor Lamonica and the Santanna brothers have made a patriotic gift of 100 *onze* to the national cause. Illuminations and music.

18 *May*.—Leave Alcamo at 5 A.M. Reach Partinico at 9.45. Warm reception. Leave again at 3.45, and arrive at Borghetto at 4.30.

At 6 we bivouac on the plain of Renna, near the Montagna del Re and the Renna hill.

19 *May*.—Santomeli's arrest. Journey to Partinico.

20 *May*.—Still bivouacking at Renna. Start at 4.30.

Reach Pioppo at 6.

21 *May*.—At 7.15 A.M. the first attack is made, the troops being divided into several squadrons.

Death of Rosalino Pilo and of two others near the Castellaccio at Monreale.

At 7 P.M. we advance towards Parco by a cross-road.

22 *May*.—We reach Parco at 4 A.M. The population still asleep.

23 *May*.—Leave Parco at 4 A.M. At 4.45 we are at Poggio del Castro, where we pitch camp.

Slight skirmish in the open between Parco and Palermo. A more important one at the Grazia.

24 *May*.—Shots in the direction of Monreale at 3 A.M.

Towards 5 o'clock the royal troops come down from Monreale into the Parco valley and occupy positions among the Pozzillo hills. The General sends the Carabineers out to meet them, and despatches several bands of volunteers towards the heights of Mocarta.

We leave Poggio del Castro by the main road leading to Piana de' Greci.

The Carabineers fight with their usual ardour.

The squadrons, under Oddo, turn and run.—The Carabineers, thus abandoned, escape by a miracle, as the royal troops had already begun to surround them. For a moment we believed they were lost. They join the main body again by small detachments.

The regulars pretend to run along the crest of the hills and descend upon the main road to Piana. The General orders the 1st and 2nd battalions to climb to the top of Monte Campanaro. The artillery takes up a position whence it can command the road to Palermo. After about half-an-hour of firing the Neapolitans (6000 strong) sound the retreat. We fall back on Piana de' Greci.

At 6 P.M. we start for Marineo, and bivouac at Pianetto at 11.

25 *May*.—Orders to march at 4 A.M. We descend to Porto Vecchio, and taking the valley near mount *Pizzo di Parrino*, we reach Marineo towards 10 A.M.

We start for Misilmeri at 7 P.M., arriving at 8.30.

A deputation from the Palermo Committee arrives in Misilmeri. Earlier in the day a deputation from the Castrogiovanni committee had reached us.

26 *May*.—We set out for the camp at Gibilrossa at six in the morning.

Leave again at 5.30 P.M., after having visited the encampment of the volunteer bands.

27 *May*.—We are in the neighbourhood of Palermo by 3.30 A.M. A halt is called at the Scaffa mills, and we discover that the Neapolitan sharpshooters are posted at the Ponte dell' Ammiraglio, and in the gardens on the opposite side of the road. A regiment on the plain of Sant' Erasmo. Fighting begins. Infantry, cavalry, artillery.

We enter Palermo. Barricades.

Bombardment and barricades.

28 *May*.—General Lanza requests Rear-Admiral Mundy to act as mediator and obtain an armistice.

Mundy replies that he is not in communication with the city.

Lanza insists, and invokes the protection of the English flag for the Bourbon generals who will be obliged to cross the city to go on board the *Hannibal*.

The Rear-Admiral replies that he must consult Garibaldi.

Meanwhile he demands the suspension of hostilities.

29 *May*.—Fighting in the neighbourhood of the royal palace, at the Papireto and near the cathedral.

Once more Lanza begs the English rear-admiral to act as mediator. Sir Rodney Mundy consents and communicates his acceptance to Garibaldi. Garibaldi and two Neapolitan generals to meet on board the English vessel. A boat will be at their disposal at Porta Felice.

30 *May*.—Garibaldi receives a letter from Lanza and consents to the proposed conference.

At 2 P.M. Garibaldi goes aboard the *Hannibal* with two Bourbon generals. The commandants of French, Sardinian and American warships are present. An armistice to last 24 hours is concluded. Return of the royal flying-column from Corleone by Marineo to Palermo. Fight at Porta di Termini. Carini wounded.¹

31 *May*.—Embarkation of about 800 wounded and of a large number of non-combatants—women, children and invalids.

The *Mouette* leaves the harbour and another French frigate arrives from Naples.

An armistice to last three days, beginning to-day at noon.

Garibaldi announces this to Sicily and demands arms and men.

During the night two Bourbon generals start for Naples to obtain permission from the King to conclude a longer armistice with Garibaldi.

The *Ichnusa* arrives from Cagliari with de Saint-Bon in command. Baron Pisani and his son return by this ship.

Secret instructions from Cavour are despatched to the commandant of the *Governolo* (D'Aste) by the V. E. from Cagliari.

1 *June*.—Evacuation of out-posts.

2 *June*.—Formation of dictatorial cabinet, and nomination of ministers.

3 *June*.—Armistice indefinitely prolonged.²

4 *June*.—The V. E. returns to Cagliari with a letter from Garibaldi to Persano.

5 *June*.—Persano leaves Cagliari for Palermo.

¹ Counter-Admiral D'Aste, commanding the Sardinian vessel *Governolo*, anchored in the harbour, refused us powder when appealed to.

² That day Nicolo Fabrizi landed at Pozzallo (Siracusa) with five-and-twenty volunteers, and some arms.

6 *June*.—Arrives at Palermo on board the *Maria Adelaide*.

The royal troops capitulate, abandoning San Giacomo, the royal palace, the Santa Trinità quarter, all the out-posts and the Fieravecchia square. They concentrate between the Quattroventi and the Campo, at Monte Pellegrino.

13 *June*.—The *Governolo* leaves Palermo for Messina.

3 *July*.—Signora Alba.

7 *July*.—Griscelli and Trotti.

8 to 9 *August (Night)*.—Missori lands in Calabria.

12 *August*.—Sirtori in supreme command of Sicily.

14 *August*.—Garibaldi is at Golfo degli Aranci.

16 *August*.—Returns to Palermo in the night.

17 *August*.—Is between Taormina and Giardini.

18 *August*.—Bixio lands at Celito.

19 *August*.—Garibaldi embarks for Calabria.

20 *August*.—His arrival there.

31 *August*.—Arrival of Bottero.

1 *Sept*.—Minister Piola goes to the camp.

4 *Sept*.—Trouble with Cordova.

5 *Sept*.—Piola arrives in Palermo. Council in the evening. Depretis' proposals. Garibaldi's letter.

6 *Sept*.—My resignation.

7 *Sept*.—Garibaldi enters Naples.

8 *Sept*.—In the evening the patrols tear down certain placards that bear an inscription to the effect that the elections shall take place whenever Garibaldi wishes for them.

11 *Sept*.—Depretis and I start for Naples at 11.30 A.M.

12 *Sept*.—Reach Naples at 5.30 A.M. We go to see Garibaldi at 8.30. He arrives at 9.

13 *Sept*.—Visit to the cemetery.

14 *Sept.*—Visit to Castel Sant' Elmo. The cannon of 1755 with the motto: *Servatur imperium.*

Depretis' resignation. Garibaldi decides to start for Palermo.

16 *Sept.*—The General leaves for Palermo on board the *Elettrico* at 8 P.M.

17 *Sept.*—Reaches Palermo at 3 P.M., and is received with enthusiasm. He dissolves the Cabinet, appoints Mordini Pro-Dictator, and surrounds him with new Ministers. Addresses the people and leaves Palermo again at 8 P.M.

Giuseppe Ferrari arrives in Naples.

18 *Sept.*—The General reaches Naples at 2 P.M., and gives his account of Sicilian conditions and of public opinion there, with evident satisfaction.

19 *Sept.*—Fighting round Capua. The royalists repulsed. The General signs the decree concerning the Ministry of Sicilian Affairs. Arrival of Vimercati, officer of ordnance to Victor Emmanuel, with a letter from the King to Garibaldi. The monarch congratulates him on his victories; believes the time is now come to attend to unification of the country's affairs; inquires what forces Garibaldi is prepared to contribute towards the national struggle.

24 *Sept.*—Bertani, Ferrari, Cattaneo, Costantini and I go to Maddaloni. A conference with the General. Sineo represents the extreme right. The Ministry recomposed. Garibaldi's accusations against Cosenz. Conforti opposed to the Committee for Public Safety, defends the old Cabinet, demands that Cosenz be retained. This is granted. Discourse to the General on Sicilian affairs. The speedy arrival there of a Royal Commissary with 4000 Piedmontese is announced to Garibaldi. No provisions made.

Arrival of Saffi. Reactionary despatches. A fire at Messina. About this time Minister Scialoja sends to Garibaldi to induce him to sign a decree dated Sept. 18, granting a monthly allowance of 4000 ducats to the wife of the Conte di Siracusa.

An address to the King is being circulated for signature among the people. It demands annexation. Pisanelli, Scialoja and Spaventa its chief promoters. The General orders arrest of all three.

25 *Sept.*—Saffi and Nicotera with the General. His declaration in favour of the party. Promises of administrative organisation. Decree in favour of the mother and sisters of Agesilao Milano, and of Pisacane's daughter.

Arrest of Spaventa, Pisanelli and Scialoja.

29 *Sept.*—Departure of deputies to Turin Parliament.

3 *Oct.*—Discussions in Council concerning the petitions. Necessity for a firm policy. Annexation or no annexation; if we are to have it, let us make concessions and put an end to the matter; if we are not to have it, let us forbid petitions of every description. We go out to the camp with Cattaneo. Pallavicino appointed Pro-Dictator at my suggestion.

4 *Oct.*—Further arguments in Council. Saliceti. Conforti. No fixed principles in politics. The art lies in knowing how to go as far as possible.

5 *Oct.*—Publication of Mordini decree.

6 *Oct.*—Arrival of Calvino from Palermo. Has gone to see the General.

7 *Oct.*—Council of Ministers at Pallavicino's residence. Plebiscite or assembly. Three for assembly against two for plebiscite.

Pallavicino goes to Garibaldi, who consents to the plebiscite. He also consents to the assembly for Sicily.

Arrival of Parisi.

8 Oct.—Signing of plebiscite. Parisi and I go to Garibaldi. What is the true meaning of this plebiscite? Neither annexation to Piedmont, nor recognition of the capital, nor unification of the codes—but the proclamation of a principle.

Garibaldi determines to telegraph to Pallavicino to come to him to-morrow at 6 P.M.

9 Oct.—Mistake in the hour. We do not arrive until after Pallavicino has left. Garibaldi declares he has arranged with Pallavicino for an assembly. We submit the draft to him which Cattaneo has prepared, and he endorses it.

10 Oct.—Need of assemblies in both countries. Their purpose purely legislative and to prepare the South for annexation to the other provinces governed by Victor Emmanuel. Pallavicino denies having discussed the question of assemblies with the General. Parisi, who is present, repeats what Garibaldi has said to us. In the evening we go to see the General again, but find him already asleep. We spend the night at Caserta.

11 Oct.—At 6 A.M. we are talking with the General. Pallavicino is telegraphed to, to come out to Caserta at 6 P.M.

At 7 P.M. Cattaneo, Parisi, Calvino, Pallavicino and I are with the General. Discussion of question of assembly or plebiscite. Pallavicino opposed to assembly, and declares it would occasion civil war. Garibaldi irritated by this remark. Declares there can never be civil war where he is; that those who wish to be rid of him, who refuse him money to carry on the war, who place difficulties in the way

of his government by stirring up discord, are the ones who will be responsible for civil war, and who sow the seeds of it. Pallavicino, who takes this speech as implying distrust of himself, tenders his resignation. Hurls an angry epithet at Crispi, accusing him of being the author of all this discord. Declares that Italy will never be made by means of such innovations as these, and that Crispi alone is responsible for all the evil that will result from them.

Garibaldi exhorts him to control himself. Pallavicino sits down shouting: 'He or I! One of us must withdraw!' When it is pointed out to him that he owes his appointment to Crispi, he returns a coarse answer. Garibaldi loses his patience, and speaks flatteringly of Crispi. Pallavicino withdraws, grumbling and cursing Crispi. Garibaldi decides to go to Naples on the following day at noon.

Requests that the Council of Ministers be convoked for that hour.

12 Oct.—The Ministers and Garibaldi. Accusations and defence. The Ministers resign, giving as a motive that Garibaldi has ceased to trust them.

Garibaldi requests me to bring him the decree concerning the assembly for endorsement, and entrusts the government to the directors and myself until the assembly be convoked. The decree is signed. My position. Persano and Villamarina. Popular demonstration for and against: *a morte!* and *evviva!*

13 Oct.—The General returns to Naples. Irritated by the demonstrations, he blames the police in violent language. Orders arrest of De Simone. His speech to the people, after Conforti's address.

The Council: Pallavicino, Conforti, Deluca, Saliceti, Parisi, Calvino, Cattaneo. For and against the assembly. Garibaldi inclined to favour it. Pallavicino demands official acceptance of his resignation. Garibaldi, who is tired of it all, decides that the two governments of Naples and Sicily shall act as they please. The Ministers and Pallavicino resume their portfolios. No further question of assembly.

Request for an assembly in Sicily in June, and in Naples in September. I oppose this. I tender my resignation.

Cattaneo and Pallavicino.

Letter from the King in Ancona, to Garibaldi, instructing him to make all necessary preparations.

21 Oct.—Voting at Naples. Blows and wounded in the Calvario quarter. The same in the Chiaja quarter. The General comes into town in a rage about a letter he has received. He goes to visit the wounded.

22 Oct.—The General goes to Pompeii. Banquet at Naples in the evening.

23 Oct.—The General comes into Naples to visit the wounded. Ill humour still continues. I see him at Hôtel d'Angleterre. I refuse the vice-presidency of the railway company.

I see him again at Caserta at 7 P.M. Fresh irritation caused by a telegraphic message. He must rise at two on the following morning and prepare to march.

27 Oct.—Garibaldi and the King meet between Marzaniello and Vairano. They march together for six miles.

28 Oct.—The King instructs Garibaldi to combine with General Della Rocca for the siege of Capua. Garibaldi resigns his command to Sirtori, instructing

him to place himself at General Della Rocca's disposal. General Della Rocca sends messengers to Capua, but the commandant of the forces there refuses to parley with them. We meet in the evening at Caserta. A Frenchman, sent by Mieroslowski and Etienne Arago, asks that a foreign legion may be formed, its soldiers to be led by officers of their respective nations. The General would like to consent to this, and decides to propose it to the King.

The General requests me to come to him on the following morning.

29 Oct.—Surrender of authority. Decrees presented to the King for signature. Letter to representatives abroad. Letter to the Pro-Dictators. Deputation from Palermo with a sword of honour.

30 Oct.—General remains in his own apartments, busily writing. General Della Rocca comes to confer with him towards noon. In the forenoon the General sends the King a letter by which he surrenders his authority. Nullo despatched with the letter. Finzi comes out to Caserta.

31 Oct.—Benediction of Hungarian flag. Türr invites Garibaldi and several Sicilians to a lunch-party at his lodgings. Trecchi goes to see the King. Nullo returns with a letter from the King, who answers the General's cordial letter with equal cordiality. He states that, the plebiscite once published, he will assume the authority, and provide for Garibaldi's companions. This he cannot do at present as he is still unable to assume the supreme authority. He will not forget the General and those who shared his labours in the work of redeeming the South of Italy. The King wrote from Sessa.

1 *Nov.*—Trecchi goes to see the King once more. His Majesty has signed the decree of pardon for the military. He has appointed a commission, composed of Medici, Cosenz and Cialdini, to examine the non-commissioned officers of the army of the South.

Conforti comes to Caserta. Before he enters, a deputation to whom the General is granting an audience, accuses this most worthy Minister of unpopularity and of a thousand other defects, including that of favouritism. Conforti comes in while the deputation is still abusing him.

2 *Nov.*—Garibaldi comes to Naples to visit the wounded in hospital. Joins the funeral procession of the day-labourer Gambadella, who had been most treacherously murdered the day before.

3 *Nov.*—Another visit to the hospital. Makes arrangements for a vessel to be placed at his disposal. Commandant Cacace and Counter-Admiral Anguissola. The first apologises for having spoken ill of him, etc. . . .

4 *Nov.*—Distribution of medals to those who landed at Marsala. Ladies and cavaliers. Lunch-party. Signing of decree for compensation to political victims. Pallavicino takes his oath.

6 *Nov.*—The King appoints Garibaldi General in the regular army. Conference at Santa Maria with Cialdini. Military review at Caserta. Mordini arrives.

7 *Nov.*—We go out as far as Capua to meet the King. His Majesty arrives by carriage at 7.30 A.M. Ladies of the city, dressed in white, offer flowers. Mordini and Conforti present results of plebiscite. King proceeds on his way and we return by water. We stop at Santa Maria and wait for the King. Great crowds and many presentations. We get into

carriages. We are in the third carriage with the court servants. We arrive. Find ourselves stationed beneath a pavilion. Municipal Body and notabilities. Heavy shower. San Gennaro. Presentations at court, in the Throne Room. Garibaldi remains in the background with his hat on. A court functionary wonders at this. Breda tells him 'the grandees of Spain had the right to stand before their king with head covered, and that Garibaldi is a grandee of Italy, and perhaps something more.' Mordini at court.

8 Nov.—Official presentation of plebiscite. Order of the *Annunziata*. Scene between Garibaldi and Pallavicino, who does not appear at the ceremony. Garibaldi confers with the King. Negotiations broken off. Demonstrations, music and farewells.

9 Nov.—The *Washington* in harbour at 6 A.M. At 7 she puts out to sea. Garibaldi has started for Caprera.

11 Nov.—Conference with Farini.

16 Nov.—My departure from Naples, and departure also of Verdura, Torremuzza and others.

29 Nov.—Demonstration against Mordini.

1 Dec.—The King reaches Palermo.

2 Dec.—Plebiscite. Lieutenancy. My conversation with the King.

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